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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The term socialism is used comprehensively in this paper. It 
includes communists, left wing socialists, centrist socialists, and 
Social Democrats. The attitudes of these various groups and parties 
towards each other during the Weimar Republic determined their attitude 
towards National Socialism. Together, they represented a majority 
movement but because of their division, they failed to pass the supreme 
political test of the 1920's by not preventing the rise of National 
Socialism. The communists thought that they could let the National 
Socialists do the job of disposing of the Social Democrats before 
taking over from an otherwise epheme.ral fascist movement. The Social 
Democrats were blind to the National Socialist danger. Their official 
chief publicist,for example, Friedrich Stampfer, believed in November 
1932 that the National Socialist movement had run its course and would 
fade away before long to leave the Social Democrats in their tradition-
al position as the strongest party of the Weimar democratic system. 
Only the socialist splinter parties assessed the political situation 
realistically. 
The shock of the National Socialist assumption of power had 
presumably awakened the Social Democrats and the communists to reality. 
In their emigration, they professed to be antifascists first and fore-
1 
2 
most. In order to be effective in that role, they had to stop doing 
abroad what had led to their failure at home. A disunited, self-
disruptive emigration could not win the credibility it needed to be 
taken seriously in its various host countries. A reconciliation 
between communists and Social Democrats in a United Front would have 
been the most radical reversal of their previous rivalry. The concept 
of the Popular Front was based on an additional reconciliation between 
the socialist and the bourgeois groups. A more simple and practical 
change would have been an end to intra-socialist recriminations and 
an exclusive concentration on antifascism without any formal political 
group association. There was also the possibility of a so-called 
socialist concentration without communists. In these respects, this 
paper studies the attitudes and the activities of the German socialist 
emigration in the United States. 
The political environment in this country added another dimen-
sion to the work of the socialist emigrants. American socialism had 
begun to decline in the 1920's before reaching significant proportions. 
After 1933, it fell into dissolution as the result of a belated polar-
ization into right wing and left wing groups which, in Europe, had 
ta~en place earlier. In addition, these groups were mainly ethnic so 
that there were small German American conservative, centrist,and left 
wing socialist organizations with which the emigrants had to deal. 
The divisiveness of the German American groups could compound that of 
the emigrant groups. On the other hand, the former could furnish the 
latter with established organizations and publications. 
p 
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The emigrant groups also needed contacts with the American 
union federations, with at least one of the two major political parties 
and with the government. The establishment of the latter was subject 
to political requirements which the emigrants could fulfill or fail to 
meet with the respective consequences for their political prospects. 
But they could adjust to American politics in more than one way. For 
the right wing socialists,for example, the choice depended on whether 
they would'give precedence to antifascism or anti-communism. An asso-
ciation with the American Federation of Labor would strengthen their 
anti-communist bent which would, however, embarrass the government in 
its wartime alliance with Russia. In this sense, the American political 
situation offered the German socialist emigrants alternatives which 
they could perceive in terms of their political preferences. 
p 
CHAPTER II 
THE STATE OF THE GERMAN AND OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 
IN THE TWENTIES AND THIRTIES 
The state of the German and of the American labor movement in 
the twenties and thirties conditioned the history of the German social-
ist emigration in the United States. The German labor movement of the 
Weimar Republic was divided. These divisions and their underlying 
ideologies carried over into the emigration. The major groups of the 
American labor movement were non-socialist. The small socialist move-
ment of the United States declined in the 1920's in innumerable splits. 
By the time of the German socialist emigration, it had nearly disinte-. 
grated except for the Communist Party and certain unions. 
The German Socialist Party never had a homogeneous ideology. 
During the First World War, it split over the issues of international 
solidarity and nationalist support of the German war effort into the 
two parties of the reduced Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Inde-
pendent Socialist Party (USPD). From then on, the SPD became very 
defensive and distrusted all parties to its left. 1 The rise of commu-
nism and the German defeat in 1918 further complicated the crisis of 
the German labor movement. The German Communist Party (KPD) grew out 
of the leftist components of the USPD. The weakened Independent 
1Richard N. Hunt, German Social Democracy, 1918 - 1933 (Yale 
University Press, 1964), p. 254. 
4 
, 
Socialist Party could not survive long in the center between the KPD 
and the SPD. By 1922, its majority rejoined the SPD but never felt 
comfortable there throughout the Weimar Republic. 2 The personal and 
5 
ideological distance between the traditional and the reintegrated Social 
Democrats remained,and became unduly significant in the emigration. 
The issues which had led to the foundation of the USPD were not resolved 
with its disappearance. The right wing of the SPD imposed its policy 
of coalitions with non-socialist parties, the so-called policy of the 
Grosse Koalition (great coalition). In the process, it also assumed a 
3 
compromising position towards German rearmament. The left wing of the 
SPD amounted to nearly half the party at times but it was less confi-
dent and not proportionately represented in the national party execu-
. 4 tl.ve. 
In this situation, the party would have benefitted from a sense 
of fairness and toleration. But the natural intolerance of the wartime 
SPD was intensified by the challenge of the KPD. The traditional SPD 
became absorbed by its anti-communism and, in this context, treated the 
d . t. . f th t . h . . 5 l.Ssen 1.ng w1.ng o e par y Wl.t suspl.Cl.on. This behavioral pattern 
reappeared in the emigration and especially in the American emigration. 
2 . 
Ibid., pp. 193-210. 
3Hanno Drechsler, Die Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutsch-
lands (Marburg, 1965), pp. 32-50. 
4 Hun~, German Social Democracy, ~P· 210-229, 255. 
5Hans J. L. Adolph, Otto Wels und die Politik der Deutschen 
Sozialdemokratie, 1894- 1939 (Berlin, 1971), pp. 118-145. 
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The KPD was equally uncompromising towards its dissenting factions and 
in its opposition to the SPD. Each of the two parties believed that 
6 
it could make its progress only over the dead body of the other. Thus, 
both parties failed to perceive the challenge of National Socialism. 
The dissenters in both parties often realized that only social-
ist solidarity could stop National Socialism. But the SPD and the KPD 
dismissed these warnings from within their own ranks and pushed the 
dissenting factions out of the two major parties. As a result, there 
appeared in the late twenties and early thirties a number of splinter 
groups such as the Kommunistische Partei Opposition (KPO, Communist 
Party Opposition), the Sozialistische Arbeiter Partei (SAP, Socialist 
Workers' Party), the Internationale Sozialistische Kampfbund (ISK, 
International League·for the Socialist Struggle, and the Gruppe·Neu-
beginnen (NB, Group New Beginning). These small parties were symbols 
of the blindness of the two major parties towards National Socialism. 
During the last years of the Weimar Republic, they issued numerous calls 
for a United Front against Hitler which were ignored. 
In the emigration, they became relatively important. This 
circumstance only helped to continue their difficulties with the two 
major parties and especially with the SPD on the antecedents of the 
Weimar Republic. In fact, these antagonisms determined largely the 
history of the German socialist emigration, especially in the United 
States. They became the priorities of the German socialist emigration 
and created an emigrant atmosphere in which antifascism often receded 
into the background. The KPO, SAP, and ISK did not have organized groups 
in the United States but NB rivaled the Social Democratic group in sig-
p 
nificance and served as rallying point for individual emigrants of the 
other splinter parties. The leaders of the latter often had curious 
careers in that they successively participated in several splinter 
groups. Even within the same group, they often belonged to different 
factions. Many of these leaders ended up in the American emigration 
where their party historical antecedents determined their mutual rela-
tionships in a mostly negative way. They usually chose to remain 
isolated. At best, they had loose relations with NB. 
The KPO which was founded in early 1929 grew out of a rightist 
faction of the KPD. 6 This faction was predominant in the KPD in the 
early twenties and advocated a policy of German communist independence 
and of communist cooperation with other labor groups. It wanted to 
7 
establish a United Front from above with the leadership of other social-
ist groups rather than a United Front from below that would only involve 
their membership. In accordance with the factional alignment in the 
Russian Communist Party, this was considered rightist. With the rise 
of Stalin, a leftist policy of opposition to all non-communist parties 
came into vogue. Its purpose was to displace the pre-Stalin leadership 
in the European communist parties. The rightists survived as a faction 
in the KPD. In 1928, they even challenged its leadership. But Stalin 
viewed this conflict in the light of his campaign against Trotskist 
remnants in the various communist parties. The rightists were expelled 
in January and February 1929. 
6K. H. Tjaden, Struktur and Funktion der KPD-Opposition 
(Marburg, 1964). 
The KPO was very active but had little success. In 1932, it 
split over the issue of a proper attitude towards the SAP. A minority 
advocated an association with all of the SAP on equal terms. It was 
expelled in January 1932 and joined the SAP where it played a contro-
versial role. 7 The majority unsuccessfully pursued its re-admission 
to the KPD. Immediately after January 1933, it organized underground 
groups and established an Auslandskomitee (exile party executive com-
mittee) in France. In the Internationale Vereinigung der Kommunisti-
schen Opposition (IVKO, International Association of the Communistic 
Opposition), the German emigrant group and the American KPO under Jay 
Lovestone played major roles. The IVKO fell apart in 1939 because of 
the revisionism of Lovestone who renamed his group the Independent 
Labor League of America. 8 As a result, the German emigrant group also 
split into a- pro- and an anti-Lovestone faction. The former was 
evacuated to the United States. 9 The two main leaders of the latter 
did not get beyond Cuba. The International Relief Association (IRA) 
took care of the evacuation of KPO and other leftist emigrants to the 
United States or to other American countries. 
Of the former KPO leaders in the United States, Erich Hausen 
and Hans Tittel belonged to the pro•Lovestone faction. Albert 
Schreiner had left the KPO orbit. Jakob Walcher, Paul Frolich, Rose 
7Ibid., pp. 288~291; Drechsler, Die SAP, pp. 148-153. 
8Tjaden, KPO, pp. 330, 331. 
9Ibid., pp. 339, 340. 
8 
9 
Frblich-Wolfstein, Erna Halbe, Josef Lang and Karl Frank were the former 
leaders of the minority that joined the SAP. 10 Of these, Frank had an 
even more colorful career. He became the main leader of the NB emigra-
tion and played a major role in the American emigration. He was also 
instrumental in evacuating his former fellow minority leaders to the 
United States. 
The SAP was founded by the purist faction of the SPD left wing 
in the fall of 1931. 11 This demonstrated the lack of cohesion of the 
left wing whose conciliatory faction remained in the SPD. In the con-
frontation over the Bruning government, the left wing was divided in 
its response to the right wing policy of toleration. 12 At the national 
congress of 1931, the party expelled the left wing leaders Kurt Rosen-
feld and Max Seydewitz for refusing to tolerate any further government 
13 by emergency decrees. During the more than two years before the 
National Socialist assumption of power, the SAP tried desperately but 
unsuccessfully to establish some kind of United Front against Hitler. 
The chief promoter of these antifascist attempts was Rosenfeld. He 
carried on this work in the American emigration where he was a promi-
nent representative of the German American Popular Front. 
10Ibid., Biographischer Anhang: p. 5: Karl Frank, Paul Frolich; 
p. 7: Erich Hausen; p. 8: Joseph Lang, "Leo"; p. 10: Albert Schreiner; 
p. 11: Hans Tittel; p. 12: Jakob Walcher; p. 13: Rose Wolfstein; also 
footnote 15 of chapter I,l: pp. 80, 81: Walcher; footnote 16 of 
chapter I, 1: pp. 81,82: Fr~lich. 
SAP. 
11 Hunt, German Social Democracy, pp. 230-240; Drechsler, Die 
12Ibid., pp. 56-63; Hunt, German Social Democracy, p. 231. 
13Ibid., p. 233; Drechsler, Die SAP, pp. 87-99. 
But in America, Rosenfeld could not cooperate with the SAP 
leaders who came to New York in 1940 and 1941. These were the former 
KPO minority leaders who later formed the aggressive left wing of the 
SAP. 14 Before they could seize control of the party Rosenfeld and 
Seydewitz dissolved the SAP in March 1933. But they proceeded with 
15 the convocation of a party congress. There, they organized a SAP 
underground structure with a domestic executive committee in Germany 
and an exile executive committee in Prague and then in Paris. Before 
the beginning of the war, the SAP emigration in Paris disintegrated 
completely. One of its factions objected to close cooperation with 
communist emigrants because of the Stalinist purges in the Trotskist 
party of Spain during the Civil War. It was eventually expelled and 
formed the group Neuer Weg (New Orientati9n). The remaining SAP emi-
grants still disagreed over the degree of cooperation with the commu-
10 
nists. They would have split also if it had not been for the outbreak 
16 
of the war and the resulting refugee crisis in France. 
A good number of the German socialists involved in the events 
surrounding the SAP emigrated to the United States. Because of their 
past differences, they failed to cooperate there. Of the former mem-
bers of the conciliatory left wing of the SPD, there were Siegfried 
Aufhauser, the president of the Allgemeiner Freier Angestellten Bund 
(AFA, General Independent White Collar Workers' Federation), the SPD 
14 b'd I L ., pp. 295-310. 
15Ibid., pp. 326-329. 
16Ibid., pp. 347-349. 
11 
executive member Georg Dietrich, Ernst Frankel, E. J. Gumbel, the anti-
militarist theorist Arkadij Gurland, Siegfried Mark, Gerhard Seger, the 
former general secretary of the Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft (German 
Society for International Peace) and member of the Reichstag, the 
Reichstag member Toni Sender, Hans Siemsen and Walther Victor. 17 Most 
of them had access neither to the established Social Democratic emigra-
tion in New York nor to the emigrants of the splinter groups with whom 
they used to sympathize. Other SAP leaders in America were the economic 
theorist Fritz Sternberg, Will Schaber, the later editor of the German 
Jewish immigrant weekly Aufbau, Ludwig Hacke, the former chairman of the 
SAP district of Southwestern Saxony. Of the socialists who had parti-
cipated in SAP related United Front activities, there was the pacifist 
and economist Alf~ns Goldschmidt who later played a role in the German 
American Popular Front. There was also Helmut Wagner, a Saxon Social 
Democrat who was expelled from the SPD for organizing left wing opposi-
tion groups. 18 Most prominently of the group New Orientation, there was 
Erwin Bauer, a personal friend of Trotsky. The left wing SAP leaders 
who came to America have already been mentioned as former KPO right 
wingers. Before their evacuation to the United States, they crystallized 
into the two factions around Walcher and Frolich. Thus, all these SAP 
leaders contributed to the atomization of the German socialist emigra-
tion in the United States. 
None of them played a role in the American emigration except 
17 Ibid., pp. 21, 22. 
18
olaf Ihlau, Die Roten Kampfer (Marburg, 1969), pp. 57, 58, 61, 
and 183. 
12 
Frank. He was expelled from the SAP for his tendency to join the SPD 
with a small group of SAP members. He had also impatiently tried to 
associate the miniscule SAP party militia, the Sozialistische Schutz-
~ (Socialist Defense League) of which he was the leader, with the 
Eiserne Front (~ron Front) militia of the SPD and its Weimar coalition 
partners. After this expulsion, he became an SPD member in 1932.
19 
But he was unhappy there with the indolence of the SPD towards National 
Socialism and its unpreparedness for underground work. 
The smallest of the four splinter groups discussed here was the 
International League for the Socialist Struggle (ISK). 20 It was a 
group of ethical socialists that was expelled from the SPD in 1926. 
This was again a symptom of the SPD mentality which could not tolerate 
the innocuous ISK idea of transforming society through moral leadership 
rather than by revolution. The League was a strong advocate of a 
United Front against fascism. For lack of a common working class can-
didate in the presidential elections of 1925, it recommended a vote for 
h . d 'd E Th''l h 1 · 1 21 t e commun~st can ~ ate, rnst a mann, as t e esser ev~ . It 
realized that the agrarian and the lower middle class were especially 
liable to join the National Socialist movement and agreed with the 
other splinter groups that National Socialism once in power would be 
there to stay for a long while. After January 1933, the ISK transformed 
itself into an underground organization with an exile executive commit-
19T· d KP 207 Ja en, __Q,, p. . 
20
werner Link, Die Geschichte des Internationalen Jugenbundes 
und des Internationalen Sozialistischen Kampfbundes (Marburg, 1964). 
21 Ibid., pp. 154, 155. 
13 
tee. It cooperated among others with the International Transport 
workers' Federation (ITF) in Amsterdam and with the Einheitsverband 
der Eisenbahner Deutschlands (Federation of the German National Rail-
22 
road Workers). But the arrests of 1937 and 1938 practically liqui-
dated the ISK underground groups in Germany. 
A number of ISK emigrants escaped to America. Anna Stein, a 
leading ISK educator; Klara Deppe, the former secretary of the Hamburg 
ISK district; and Hans Kakies arrived before the war. After the French 
defeat, about fifteen ISK functionaries escaped to the United States. 23 
They received funds for their evacuation from one of their comrades in 
Switzerland. Among them were Erna Blencke, the former leader of a 
Hannover based underground group, and Eva and Erich Lewinski who co-
operated with the Social Democratic refugee committee in Marseille and 
with the NB-related rescue committee in the United States. The ISK 
emigrants in America worked individually with American or German emi-
grant groups. 
The most unusual of the socialist dissident organizations was 
24 the New Beginning Group. It was founded in 1931 by Walter LOwenheim 
and was also called the Miles Group according to the pseudonym of its 
founder. It functioned within the SPD from which it recruited most of 
22Ib. d ~ . ' pp . 216' 217 • 
23Ibid., pp. 271, 272, 273. 
24Kurt Kliem, Der Sozialistische Widerstand gegen das Dritte 
Reich dargestellt an der Gruppe Neu-Beginnen (Marburg, 1957), and 
Edinger, Lewis J., German Exile Politics. The Social Democratic Execu-
tive Committee in the Nazi Era (University of California Press, 1956). 
pp. 83-90, 96-98. 
14 
its members and from which it was never officially expelled. According 
to Lowenheim, only a new departure in theory and organization could de-
feat National Socialism. In the face of fascism, a socialist revolu-
tion was only potential. It required the patient and expert work of an 
elitist organization whose underground cadres laid the foundation of a 
counterrevolution. Thus, NB was the underground organization par excel-
lence. But by 1935, Lowenheim conceded the failure of his theory and 
wanted to dissolve the NB Group. In this situation, the NB Auslands-
leitung took over the organization. Its leader was Frank who had 
joined NB after 1933. 
He reshaped the ideology of NB under the auspices of the 
Revolutionary Socialists of Austria. As a former Austrian socialist 
who had left for Germany at the age of twenty-five, he was acquainted 
with all Austrian socialist leaders and shared their activist approach 
to antifascism. This activism was based on a scientific realism that 
relied on a study of the socio-economic conditions rather than on 
revolutionary optimism. Even under favorable conditions, socialist 
progress could only come through activist leadership. This dynamic 
approach appealed to many European socialists who disliked the policy 
of appeasement of the English and the French governments. They saw in 
it a third alternative to communism and Social Democracy. 
The NB Group had the best organized underground organization 
in Germany and a well connected executive committee abroad. The latter 
benefitted from the reputation of the Austrian emigrants who had made 
a courageous stand against the Dollfuss regime in 1934. It was favored 
by a number of European labor parties and American labor groups as well 
, 
as by the Second Socialist International in Brussels, whose executive 
secretary was the Austrian Friedrich Adler, and by some International 
Union Trade Secretariates in Amsterdam. 
During the first and second emigration in Czechoslovakia and 
France, the issue of antifascism could unite the German socialists as 
little as during the Weimar Republic. Rather than solving the old 
problems of the relationships between the various parties, the defeat 
of the German labor movement created new ones. The proportion of 
strength between the two main parties and the splinter groups changed 
after January 1933. What the former lost the latter gained, so that 
especially the SPD lost its confidence about its position within the 
German labor movement in emigration and the splinter groups acquired 
15 
a new sense of significance. They still shared a common antifascist 
ideology. Their reputation improved because their predictions about 
National Socialism had come true. Also, they were well prepared for 
underground and emigrant work. Numerically, they were at less of a 
disadvantage at home and abroad than before. The two main labor parties 
and the unions had lost their former mass membership while the splinter 
groups had always been top heavy with well qualified leaders. In the 
underground and abroad, the splinter groups could then compete with the 
former giants of the Weimar Republic. They differed, however, in their 
front ideologies. The SAP was the leader of the United Front advocates 
but the NB Group preferred a concentration of all non-communist labor 
groups. The former approach was more attuned to the communist, the 
latter to the Social Democratic emigration. Yet, neither of the two_ 
major parties made good use of its opportunity so that after the second 
, 
16 
emigration, the German socialists were as divided as they had been at 
the beginning of the first. 
The Social Democrats felt insecure under the changed circum-
stances of the emigration. The more militant European antifascists of 
the exile countries blamed them for their poor performance against 
. 1 s . 1" 25 Nat~ona oc~a ~sm. This lack of sympathy isolated the Social Demo-
crats and made them more defensive. Also, defeat engendered internal 
quarrels. A number of SPD executives went abroad, first to the Saarland 
and then to Czechoslovakia. There, they experienced an abrupt change of 
heart and called for a militant antifascism. This annoyed the remaining 
executives in Berlin who had not yet given up all hope for legal party 
work. As a result, each of the rump executive bodies claimed the final 
party authority. The SPD leaders in Prague constituted themselves as . 
26 the exile executive of the SPD, the so-called Sopade. In the result-
ing confusion, impatient second level SPD leaders in Germany organized 
underground groups on their own initiative without recognizing the 
jurisdiction of the Sopade. They also cooperated with other socialist 
underground groups. The Sopade was an exile head without much of a base 
. 27 
at home. Also, Social Democratic emigrants in the Saarland, France 
and elsewhere organized their own Landesgruppen in the absence of any 
25 Adolph, Otto Wels, pp. 291-305; and Edinger, German Exile 
Politics, pp. 99, 100: Edinger quotes Norman Thomas about the Sopade: 
"Exiles from their home country, •.. men who made no more successful 
resistance to fascism when they were at home", could not lead the fight 
against Hitler; "it is to the younger generation in Germany that we 
must look." 
26
rbid., pp. 25-33, and Adolph, Otto Wels, pp. 273-276 and 
pp. 277-285. 
27 Edinger, German Exile Politics, pp. 75-78. 
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central planning. They claimed autonomy from the Sopade. Together 
with other socialist emigrants, they established the first border 
stations for communication with adjacent underground groups in Germany. 
The Sopade tried only later to integrat_e this system of border stations. 
With the victory of National Socialism, the leftist policy of 
German communism was outdated. But a rightist policy came into its own 
only after the VII. Congress of the Communist International in August 
1935. The communist German emigrants had rejected previous feelers of 
the German splinter groups for an emigrant United Front. When the call 
from Moscow came they aimed at a comprehensive Popular Front rather 
than a socialist United Front. This strategy was geared to the defense 
of the Soviet Union and did little to promote unity among the German 
socialist emigration. It outflanked the splinter group emigrants on 
the right. Thus, the most consistent advocates of a front against 
Hitler were· left behind. The response of the Social Democratic emigra-
tion was divided. The Sopade in Prague agreed to talks with German 
communist emigrants about practical matters but refused to issue a com-
mon manifesto. It maintained this attitude towards the Popular Front 
. . . P . d h W E . . 28 negot1at1ons 1n ar1s an ot er est uropean c1t1es. In the context 
of the French Popular Front, the SPD Landesgruppe Frankreich (the 
autonomous SPD emigrant group in France) and individual Social Democrats 
participated in the experiment which Heinrich Mann sponsored in February 
1936. Albert Grzesinsky and Siegfried Aufnauser, two later members of 
the Social Democratic group in New York, signed the manifesto of the 
meeting at the Hotel Lutetia. A group of SAP emigrants like Rosenfeld, 
28 Adolph, Otto Wels, pp. 324-329. 
Walcher, Frolich and Willi Brandt also signed the manifesto which was 
not followed up by other activities. 29 Later, the established Social 
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Democrats in New York were equally indecisive in their attitude towards 
the first German American Popular Front. For several years, they did 
not know where their interests lay. After the conclusion of the Hitler 
Stalin Pact, they felt that anti-communism would give them the best 
identity available. The NB Group consistently abstained from United 
and Popular Front discussions during the first two emigrations. It was 
mainly interested in a socialist concentration. 
The Sopade was equally inconsistent in its response towards 
cartel plans of the splinter groups. In its hour of need, it tried to 
regain its leadership with the revolutionary manifesto of January 28, 
1934. This document conceded that "the old apparatus no longer exists" 
and pled for "new organizational forms". The Sopade offered to serve 
this revolutionary reorganization and promised to support "every group 
whose revolutionary spirit guarantees that its activity contributes to 
the downfall of the National Socialist dictatorship". 30 The Sopade 
relied on the illegal network of NB and other groups and granted them 
subsidies for their underground work. By 1935, this honeymoon was over. 
The Sopade felt betrayed by NB which had tried and failed to win an 
independent seat in the Socialist International to be deducted from the 
number of Sopade seats. A further altercation occurred with the care-
29 Drechsler, SAP, pp. 343-346. 
30Erich Matthias, ed. Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland. Eine 
Dokumentation uber die sozialdemokratische Emigration (DUsseldorf, 1968), 
pp. 215, 216, 217; Adolph, Otto Wels, pp. 306-308; Edinger, German 
Exile Politicsi pp. 110-119. 
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less handling by the Sopade of its documents about illegal contacts of 
NB in Germany. When a concerned Sopade secretary leaked the documents 
to Frank,who showed it to Adler of the Socialist International, the 
Sopade charged the NB leader with bribery and conspiracy and cut off 
b 'd' 31 all su s1. 1.es. This response of the exile executive was also condi-
tiqned by conspiratorial opposition within the Sopade which had little 
to do with NB. 
After this change of attitude towards NB and other socialist 
groups, the Sopade relied more on its Mandatstheorie (the theory of its 
mandate) for its emigrant legitimation. It believed that it carried on 
the mandate and the authority of the Weimar SPD because all Sopade 
executives were elected or reelected at the emergency Reichskonferenz 
(national conference of party leaders) of April 26, 1933. 32 This 
gathering was a substitute for an ordinary national party convention 
which was no longer feasible. But the SPD leaders at this conference 
did not intend to convey an unlimited mandate for the twelve years of 
armed peace and international war of the Hitler era. They still anti-
cipated a legal if reduced party activity and opposed the idea of 
emigration. The theory of the Sopade also disregarded the fact that a 
party mandate was at best issued to the full reelected SPD executive. 
But its Berlin section refused to recognize the authority of the emi-
grant section in Prague. Nevertheless, the Sopade based its rejection 
31 Adolph, Otto Wels, pp. 314-323~ "Neu-Beginnen und die Aus-
einandersetzung mit Paul Hertz". 
32Matthias, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, p. 72; also 
Adolph, Otto Wels, pp. 269-272 and Edinger, German Exile Politics, 
pp. 123-124. 
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of a socialist concentration during the thirties largely on its mandate 
theory. 
The occasion for such a concentration arose in 1938 after the 
Austrian Anschluss and the German occupation of parts of Czechoslovakia. 
This caused the second emigration which concentrated most emigrant 
groups in France. In June, 1938, the leader of the Austrian socialist 
emigrants,Joseph Buttinger, addressed a call for the formation of a 
socialist cartel to the Sopade, the autonomous SPD emigrant group in 
France, to NB and eventually to the SAP. The Sopade participated in a 
debate on this issue in order to buy time and settle down in Paris. 
Eventually, it rejected the idea of socialist emigrant unity. It did 
not want to lose its supposedly unique position and was afraid of 
drowning in such a cartel arrangement. In a symbolic act of question-
able legitimacy, it excluded Paul Hertz from the Sopade. 33 The 
emergency national conference had chosen him as one of three executives 
from the opposition to the former Weimar party executive. Throughout 
the first emigration, he promoted within the Sopade the idea of a 
socialist concentration. He also served as treasurer of NB and was on 
close terms with the NB emigrant leaders and with NB and other under-
ground groups in Germany. The Social Democrats in New Yor~ followed 
the precedent of opposition to NB even though they could claim little 
of the controversial statutory authority of the Sopade. They did this 
at a time when the Sopade toned down its own resentment of NB and other 
splinter groups. Their main fear was that of being outdone by the NB 
organization in the United States. Thus, the stage was set for a 
33Ibid., p. 41. 
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fruitless antagonism that bedeviled the history of the German socialist 
emigration in the United States. 
The state of the American labor movement was not favorable for 
the German socialist emigration,either. The latter needed the sponsor-
ship of American labor groups. But the demise of American socialism 
coincided with the German socialist emigration. This socialism had had 
a modest start at the end of the nineteenth century which culminated in 
the formation of the Socialist Labor Party (SLP). This still radical 
party had to give way to the reformist Socialist Party of America (SPA) 
in 1901. 34 The SPA reached its peak before the First World War with 
one-hundred-twenty-thousand members, and then suffered from its unpatri-
otic stand against American involvement in the war. After the Russian 
Revolution, the rise of.communism engulfed American socialism in a 
debilitating series of party splits. 35 It decimated the SPA which 
unsuccessfully tried to recover in its third party politics of the 
twenties. But the dreams of a new progressive Labor Party did not 
materialize. The Christian Socialist revival of the SPA under Norman 
Thomas at the end of the twenties was also shortlived. 36 It actually 
contributed to the breakup of the SPA by introducing a new element into 
a troubled party with no digestive capacity. The major split of the 
SPA occurred in 1936. It produced a number of successor parties which 
34 Melech Epstein, Jewish Labor in the United States (Trade 
Union Sponsoring Committee, New York, 1950), vol. I: 1882-1914, 
pp • 2 3 9-25 2. 
35 James Weinstein, The Decline of Socialism in America, 1912 -
1925 (New York, 1967), pp. 177-233. 
36Bernard K. Johnpoll, Pacifist's Progress. Norman Thomas and 
the Decline of American Socialism (Chicago, 1970). 
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did better than their mother party. By 1942, the SPA was left with a 
membership of below one thousand. American communism started out with 
three parties. By Russian fiat, they were reduced to one by 1921. By 
that time, the Communist Party had lost most of the members whom it 
had taken over from the- SPA. Then it fumbled through the twenties with 
changing directives from the Comintern. At the end of the twenties, it 
divested itself of its rightist opposition under Jay Lovestone and of 
its Trotskist faction. Then it enjoyed some prosperity during the 
Popular Front period which coincided with the New Deal. 
American socialism was largely an ethnic movement. This cir-
cumstance had advantages and disadvantages for the German socialist 
emigration. The American Socialist and Communist parties consisted 
partly of semi-autonomous language federations made up of local branches. 
At the time of the SLP, the German element was the strongest. But it 
declined with lessening immigration from Germany. By the end of the 
thirties, the German percentage in the SPA and its successor parties 
was negligible SQ that the socialist emigrants could not rely on much 
ethnic party support. The main German American legacy was the Neue 
Volkszeitung which became the symbol of establishment for the Social 
Democratic emigrants. The Communist German language federation was 
also small. It bequeathed mainly its journalistic facilities to the 
German splinter party emigration during the German American Popular 
Front period. German American unions played a minor role in the left 
wing antifascist phenomenon of the latter. The secondary German Ameri-
can labor organizations were also of debatable benefit to the socialist. 
emigration. For the sake of fraternal and cultural benefits, they 
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overcame disruptive ideological tendencies by accommodating communist, 
left wing and right wing socialist factions within each organization. 
For this reason, they were ideal Popular Front organizations. But 
they did not lend themselves to partisan support of competing emigrant 
factions. The Social Democratic emigrant group failed in its efforts 
of monopolizing their support. It tried hard to do so because these 
secondary labor organizations represented the only, if limited, mass 
basis for the organizational efforts of the emigrants. These organi-
zations also contained the readership for the emigrant edited news-
papers which always had German American predecessors. The partisan 
emigrant approach was out of tune with the practice of the secondary 
labor organizations. 
The Jewish labor groups turned out to be the most important for 
the German socialist emigrants. They eclipsed the German element after 
the mass emigration from the ghettos of Eastern Europe before and after 
1900. 37 Most of these immigrants found employment with the Jewish 
garment manufacturers of New York and, to a lesser extent, in other 
East Coast cities and in Chicago. 38 The second wave of immigration 
was especially strong and provided the mass membership of the Jewish 
garment unions, of the Jewish language federation and of the Jewish 
37on Jewish labor in the United States, see: Elias Tcherikower, 
The Early Jewish Labor Movement in the United States (New York, 1961); 
Melech Epstein, Jewish Labor in the United States, Vol. I: 1882-1914 
(New York, 1950) and Vol. II: 1914-1952 (New York, 1953); The Jew and 
Communism: The Story of Early Communist Victories and Ultimate Defeats 
in the Jewish Community of the United States, 1919-1941 (Trade Union 
Sponsoring Committee, New York, 1942). 
38Tcherikower, The Early Jewish Labor Movement, pp. 162-178. 
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fraternal organizations. With it came Jewish socialists of the General 
Jewish Workers' Union who constituted a second generation of Jewish 
American leaders. 39 Because of these origins, Jewish socialist organi-
zations were mainly regionalized in New York. In the communist exodus, 
many members of the Jewish language federation left the Socialist 
Party. In the rump SPA, the Jewish socialists were divided among the 
Old Guard and the Centrist factions. The Jewish partisans of the Old 
Guard played an important role in the breakup of the SPA and in the 
formation of its successor parties. The American Labor Party (ALP) 
and the Liberal Party in New York were Jewish parties that eventually 
completely replaced the Socialist Party of that state. The garment 
unions provided a synthesizing element in the Jewish labor movement. 
Despite their socialist background, they affiliated with the American 
Federation of Labor where they played an important role, especially 
during the New Deal. They were also the main advocates of industrial 
unionism and became instrumental in the formation of the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations in 1936. 
The Jewish socialists provided a link between American and 
European labor that was vital for the German socialist emigrants. 
They had an ideological and cultural affinity with European socialism 
because of their recent East European origins and their continuing ties 
with Jewish labor there. In the refugee crisis of 1940, they organized 
the evacuation of their European comrades. But they went beyond a 
39Bernard K. Johnpoll, The Politics of Futility. The General 
Jewish Workers' Bund of Poland, 1917-1943 (Cornell University, 1967), 
pp. 259-269. 
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limited ethnic purpose. They formed the Jewish Labor Committee (JLC) 
to combat antisemitism at home and abroad. In this comprehensive 
purpose, they included German socialist emigrants in their rescue 
operation and became the main sponsors of these emigrants in this 
country. They also mediated between the emigrants and the AFL execu-
tive under William Green. 
In general, the historical differences between the German and 
the American labor movement complicated the association between emi-
grant and American groups. Many American socialists disliked the 
German Social Democrats for their nationalist support of the war effort 
from 1914 to 1918 which split ~he German party. They sympathized with 
the USPD which later caused jealousies in the emigration. The Social-
ist Party of America had been exemplary in its nearly unanimous opposi-
tion to American military involvement. 40 It suffered for this stand 
materially but it emerged ideologically intact from the war years. 
What broke the spirit of the SPA was its inability to deal with the 
issue of communism after the Bolshevist Revolution. 41 At first, very 
few American socialists were unhappy about the establishment of the 
S . u . 42 o~et m.on. Even a right wing socialist like Abraham Cahan found 
occasional praise for the proletarian government in Russia. 
Differences arose only over the applicability of Russian 
methods to the United States. The East European language federations, 
40
weinstein, The Decline of Socialism, pp. 178, 179. 
41 Ibid., pp. 221, 222; and Theodore Draper, The Roots of .~eri­
can Communism (New York, 1957, second printing 1966), pp.l64-175. 
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and especially the Russian federation, had swelled by recent immigra-
tion from Imperial Russia. After 1917, they got carried away by their 
pride in the Bolshevist Revolution. A majority of them believed that 
their extremism could succeed if they dared to apply the surgical knife 
to the body of the SPA and cut it down to the essential minority. A 
minority hoped to win over the whole Socialist Party to the new cause 
but was repudiated. After the initial splits, the fading SPA still 
opted for the class struggle and against compromising political coali-
tions of the Weimar type. In 1920, it was forced by a party referendum 
to apply for affiliation with the Communist International but could not 
comply with the conditions imposed by the latter. The German Social 
Democrats could not understand this lack of political discrimination 
in the Socialist Party of America. Only the successor parties of the 
SPA were sufficiently rightist for the taste of the German Social 
Democrats who by then had become emigrants. 
The Christian Socialist revival under Norman Thomas only made 
the SPA more foreign to German socialists and led to a destructive 
polarization within the party. The Socialist Party could stand the 
increase in membership from below eight thousand to nearly twenty 
thousand that accompanied the new leadership of Thomas. But it could 
not survive the overdose of an infusion of new elements. These new 
members were young and middle class. They were mostly progressive in-
tellectuals or Christian Socialists with a college background and a 
radical apprenticeship in the Intercollegiate Socialist Society. 43 
43 Johnpoll, Norman Thomas, p. 59. 
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They did not fit easily into a labor party even though the ideological 
difference between progressivism, Christian Socialism and democratic 
socialism is marginal. Instead of narrowing this gulf, Thomas symbol-
ized it with his animosity towards Morris Hillquit. He personally led 
the campaign for the ouster of the veteran national chairman from a 
1 h . . 44 mere y onorary pos~t~on. He further strained the factional relations 
with his progressive political ventures such as his municipal efforts 
in New York which contributed to the demise of the Democratic Tammany 
Hall establishment in 1933.45 Under these circumstances, the party 
failed to benefit from the propitious times of the depression. The 
defection of many socialists to the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt 
was less a cause than a symptom.of socialist disunity. 
Thomas might have saved the unity of the SPA if he had done the 
necessary mediation. Instead, he let his antipathy towards the Old 
Guard get the better of him and supported the progressive intellectuals 
even when he disagreed with their position. 46 He needed them in his 
party and was afraid of losing them if they became isolated. They were 
called the Militants, more because of their evangelical social zeal 
than for the radical vocabulary which served them as rhetoric in the 
contest for control of the party. To the German Social Democratic 
emigrants, the Militants were as repulsive as to the Old Guard of the 
SPA, especially after a Militant led delegation to the conference of 
44Ibid., pp. 83, 91, 92. 
45Ibid., PP· 63, 64, 70, 74. 
46 b"d I ~ . ' pp. 80, 120-125. 
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the Socialist International of August 1933 in Paris humbled the guest 
delegation of the German unionist and Social Democratic emigrants for 
their recent indolence towards National Socialism and their inevitable 
defeat. Out of resent~ent for the Militants, the Old Guard defended 
the German Social Democratic record of antifascism. 
The early socialist emigrants in the United States witnessed 
the further disruption of the SPA. Both the Old Guard and the Militants 
47 
were determined to win control of the party or break it up. The 
emigrants became inevitably involved in these factional struggles which 
influenced their history in the United States. They criticized, 
especially, the isolationist Declaration of Principles which the Mili-
tant minority submitted to the National convention of 1934 in Detroit. 
This Declaration proposed mass resistance and a general strike against 
American participation in a potential war. The new party constitution 
passed when Thomas threw in his lot and the votes of his delegate block 
. h h M'l' . . 48 w~t t e ~ ~tant mLnorLty. As a result, the Old Guard lost control 
of the national-executive committee. 49 
It fought back vigorously and not always legitimately. First, 
it conducted an expensive campaign before the party referendum and 
lost. The new Declaration was narrowly accepted with a voter partici-
pation of only 50%. 50 At that point, control of the vital New York 
47E . psteLn, 
48 Johnpoll, 
Jewish Labor, Vol. II, pp. 240-251. 
Norman Thomas, p. 123. 
49Ibid., pp. 125, 126. 
50Ibid., pp. 127-130. 
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City and State organizations of the SPA was at stake. After the Old 
Guard dissolved some city branches and replaced them with paper 
branches,the Militants and Centrists set up a rival state organization 
. d b h . 1 . 51 that was recogn~ze y t e nat~ona execut~ve. The denouement of the 
crisis came with the primary elections of the spring of 1936 which also 
decided about the number of delegates that each faction could send to 
the national convention in Cleveland. The pro-Thomas group won with 
52 56% of the vote and thirty delegates to the Old Guard's twelve. The 
latter could only fade out or bolt the party. Its delegation was not 
seated at the national convention when some of its leaders refused to 
rise for the singing of the International. They had already drawn up 
plans for a new party which they called the Social Democratic Federa-
tion (SDF). 
The SDF was a small party which did not live up to the expecta-
tions of its founders. 53 The Socialist Party of Wisconsin joined the 
Farmer Labor Progressive Federation which was a member of the Progres-
sive Party of Wisconsin. For this reason, the Social Democratic 
emigrant group could take no foothold in Milwaukee. It did take over 
the small German language branch of the SDF which it invited all Social 
Democratic emigrants to join. The moderate socialists of the garment 
unions did not fit into the SDF. They founded the American Labor Party 
(ALP) so that they could deliver their entire vote to Roosevelt and 
become independent New Deal partners. The ALP started out as a New 
51
rbid., pp. 162-167. 
52Ibid., p. 170. 
53Epstein, Jewish Labor, Vol. II, p. 246. 
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York organization. But its name was designed for national expansion 
which made, however, little progress. Nevertheless, the party played 
an important national role. The SDF was closely associated with the 
ALP, almost in the form of a member organization. It left most of the 
candidacies for city, state and Congressional offices ·to the ALP and 
supported all ALP candidates. By 1938, the American Labor Party re-
placed the Socialist Party in New York. The latter advised its members 
54 to join the new party. During the war years, the ALP fell victim to 
a contest between its communist and progressive factions. In 1944, the 
progressive minority left the ALP and founded the Liberal Party which 
also played an important electoral role. The SDF remained an insigni-
ficant group. 
After 1936, the SPA dwindled into non-existence. 55 Its isola-
tionism drove out the internationalist faction in 1940 and 1941. 56 The 
latter constituted that portion of the SPA which sponsored the NB emi-
gration in the United States. A group of internationalists, led by 
Reinhold Niebuhr, founded the Union for Democratic Action which sup-
ported the interventionist foreign policy of 57 Roosevelt. Later, 
another group dropped out which was centered around the United Auto 
Workers and included Leonard Woodcock and Paul Porter of Kenosha, Wis-
consin, the site of the American Motors Company. Both of them had been 
54 Johnpoll, Norman Thomas, p. 195. 
55 Ibid., p. 191. 
56 Ibid.,. PP • 220-226. 
57 Ibid.,_ pp. 216, 246, 247. 
31 
members of the national executive committee of the SPA. Walter Reuther 
had left the SPA in 1938 already because of an electoral quarrel with 
the Trotskist faction in the Socialist Party. 58 One of the last inter-
nationalists to leave was the conciliatory Alfred Baker Lewis, the 
leader of the Massachusetts party. The SPA affiliate League for Indus-
trial Democracy also dissociated itself from Thomas and forced him to 
resign from its board. Two of its important officials were Mary Fox 
and Anna Caples, the latter of whom married the NB leader, Frank. All 
of the above leaders supported or joined the NB sponsor organization, 
the American Friends of German Freedom. Thus, the SPA had nearly dis-
appeared by the end of the thirties. But its successor organizations 
sponsored either the Neubeginnen or the Social Democratic emigrant 
group in the United States. 
The communist party adjusted somewhat to American conditions 
between 1918 and 1921, not without help from the Comintern. The 
revolutionary American purists were told by Lenin that left wing com-
munism is "an infantile disorder". The two existing communist parties 
had to unite. Their members had to join the other American labor 
organizations in what was called a United Front from bel6w. The united 
communist party was still something of an underground organization. By 
December 1921, it shed this vestige of revolutionary conspiracy with 
the formation of the open and legal Workers' Party which lasted until 
1928. By that year, it had expelled its unruly factions and took on 
the name of Communist Party of America (CPA). A former left wing group 
58 Ibid., p. 191. 
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of the SPA was largely responsible for the change to the Workers' Party. 
This so-called Workers' Council had remained in the Socialist Party 
and agitated for the association of the latter with the Third or Com-
munist International in order to salvage the whole SPA for the pro-
letarian cause. After the failure of this strategy, the Workers' 
Council campaigned for an open communist party and won the approval of 
the Comintern. 59 
While the socialist movement was breaking up in the 1930's, 
the communist party was on an upswing, especially after 1935 when the 
Comintern issued the policy of the United and Popular Front from above. 
The CPA made a good public relations effort in these years and had a 
certain organizational momentum. It could rely on the pro-Sovietism 
and antifascism of many American intellectuals. The New Deal condoned 
the Popular Front which involved labor organizations like the CIO and 
even some unions of the AFL. Their support was valuable for Roosevelt.· 
But the impressiveness of the Popular Front was more on the level of 
propaganda. Its actual strength is difficult to determine. It put the 
American socialists and ex-socialists on the defensive. They could not 
trust a party that had wrecked the American socialist movement. On the 
other hand, they did not know what to make of the official acquiescence 
in the Popular Front which made them feel uncertain in their anti-
communism. 
The German and Jewish sectors of the American labor movement 
formed the ethnic context of the German socialist emigration in the 
59
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United States. The German language federation of the SPA began declin-
ing before the First World War. After the war, part of it left for the 
communist party. A percentage of the remaining component found itself 
in the Social Democratic Federation after the party split of 1936. 
The German Social Democratic emigrants had an easy time of dominating 
this small German language branch. The communist party had a German 
Bureau which coordinated and subordinated the various German party 
60 locals. Until 1925, its secretary had been Ludwig Lore. He had 
played an important role in the socialist movement before and after 
the First World War. In the SPA, he becam~ the editor of the New York 
Volkszeitung. It was established as the German American daily by the 
Socialist Labor Party and switched to the SPA with the German American 
socialists who were instrumental in founding that party. During the 
American years of Trotsky, Lore became a friend of the Russian revolu-
tionary. In the confusion caused by the rise of communism, he played 
a waiting game as one of the main leaders of the Workers' Council. 
This also suited his position as editor of the Volkszeitung,which had 
a mixed readership after 1918. After the Workers' Council merged with 
the Workers' Party, the Volkszeitung was at the disposal of the German 
Bureau and became the official German American communist daily. When 
Stalin came to power, Lore had to pay for his Trotskism and for his 
earlier aloofness from the communist party. He was expelled in 1925 
and carried on the Volkszeitung until 1931 as a paper in between the 
60
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communist and Socialist Parties in accordance with its centrist reader-
ship of the secondary German labor organizations. Without Lore, the 
volkszeitung lasted until October 1932. It was discontinued because 
of factional difficulties,but reappeared two months later as the Neue 
Volkszeitung (NVZ) with mainly conservative sponsorship. In the thir-
ties, Lore was only a marginal socialist figure. One of his associates 
in the Workers' Council and later in the CPA, the German American 
William F. Kruse, reappeared in 1942 in Chicago as the head of a German 
61 American Volksfront group. As a right wing socialist paper, the Neue 
Volkszeitung became involved in the factional struggles that preceded 
the party split of May 1936. With that mission accomplished, the 
editorship of the NVZ was given to the Social Democratic emigrant, 
Gerhard Seger, the same month. The NVZ became the weekly of the German 
branch of the Social Democratic Federation, whose strong Jewish branch 
sponsored the conservative German emigrants. Both the SDF and the NVZ 
became rallying points for the official Social Democratic emigrant group. 
Simultaneously with the NVZ in December 1932, appeared the 
Kampfsignal as the periodical of the left wing, non-communist social-
ists. It hoped to become a major voice of a German American United 
Front. But it could only maintain itself for a few years against the 
competition of the communist and Social Democratic press. Its pub-
lishers included many former supporters and colleagues of Lore. It was 
also supported by some left wing branches of the secondary German 
6 ~einstein, The Decline of Socialism, pp. 171, 247; and Draper, 
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American labor organizations such as the Arbeiter-Kranken-und Sterbe-
Kasse (AKStK,Workmenrs Benefit Fund), which will be discussed later. 
An important figure in the latter organization was Otto Sattler, one 
of the main centrist promoters of the German American United and Popu-
lar Front. The Kampfsignal bore the same name as the paper of the 
German SAP. Its supporters were in contact with the leaders of the 
German splinter party. The German SAP founder, Rosenfeld, emigrated to 
the United States where he cooperated closely with Sattler. 62 
After the expulsion of Lore, the German Bureau of the CPA had 
to publish a new paper. Der Arbeiter appeared from 1927 to 1937. It 
outlasted the period of communist leftism by two years. They were 
necessary in order to adjust to the new policy of the United and Popular 
Front. The result was the Deutsches Volksecho which was edited by 
German leftist emigrants. 63 Some of them were probably associated with 
the German Bureau. But this connection would,in any case, have been 
disguised during the Popular Front period. 
An important affiliate of the German Bureau of the CPA was the 
federation of the Deutsche Arbeiterklubs of North America. They were 
United Front organizations but their formation predated the official 
policy switch of the Comintern. They tried to give organizational 
expression to the antifascism of the German American workers. In this 
function, they were at first officially independent of the German Bureau. 
62 Robert E. Cazden, The Free German and Free Austrian Press and 
Booktrade in the United States, 1933-1950 (condensed published version 
of dissertation, Chicago, 1965), pp. 29, 30. 
63 Cazden, The Free German Press, pp. 38, 39, 42, 43. 
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The DAK Yorkville in New York City was organized in December 1932. 
Others followed in 1933 and 1934, including the DAK Milwaukee. They 
were federated in March 1934. The two main organizers of the DAK's 
were E. W. Mareg and Richard BekGran. The latter had come to the United 
states after the First World War. He joined the Communist Party in 
1930 and became a functionary of its German Bureau. In 1935, the latter 
made an end to the precarious independence of the DAK's by requesting 
that their news bulletin become a supplement to Der Arbeiter, thus de-
priving it of its non-partisan character. Mareg and BekGran were 
disappointed about this change and left the CPA with a faction of the 
DAK's. They formed the Klub deutscher Antifaschisten (Club of German 
Antifascists) in New York, and supported the journal Gegen den Strom 
which BekGran published in imitation of the official paper of the 
German communist party opposition. Later, Gegen den Strom joined the 
Social Democratic emigrants in denouncing the NB leader Frank as a 
64 
communist agent. 
The German American socialists also had a f~w parapolitical 
.organizations such as the German American Forum and the German American 
Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold (National Flag Black-Red-Geld, the militia 
for the defense of the Weimar Republic). The Forum was the successor of 
the Wendekreis (Tropic). It was a socialist educational and propaganda 
organization. In the thirties, its president was Frank Bohn, who later 
headed the Social Democratic rescue effort in Southern France. It 
participated in the German American Popular Front for a short time with 
64
rb;d., 30 40 41 ~ pp. ' ' • 
the Social Democratic emigrant Seger as its delegate. The American 
branch of the Reichsbanner had been organized in the late twenties by 
German Social Democratic immigrants from the Weimar Republic. Its 
Chicago City branch participated longer in the Popular Front than the 
New York branch. 
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There were also a number of German American unions of the AFL 
and CIO. They were either socialist, Social Democratic, pro-communist, 
independent laborite, conservative,or mixed. Regarding their partici-
pation in the Popular Front, it is not always clear whether an entire 
local or only a faction of it was a member. In Chicago, there remained 
few pro-Popular Front union locals after the movement for independent 
labor politics in the twenties and thirties. New York was better off 
with locals of the International Association of Machinists, of the 
Electrical Workers, Brewery Workers, and others. 
More important and less politically oriented were the fraternal 
and cultural German American labor organizations. The largest of them 
was the Workmen's Benefit Fund (AKStK). It was founded during the time 
of Socialist Labor Party predominance in the 1880's and numbered one 
thousand members at its first convention in 1892. By 1901, its member-
ship rose to thirty thousand and by 1931, to fifty-eight thousand. 
After some decline and recovery in the 1930's, it stabilized around 
fifty thousand by 1939. During the First World War, the AI<St:.K naturally 
adhered to the antiwar resolution of the SPA. The editor of its monthly 
journal Solidaritat or Solidarity was relieved of his post for his pro-
German and pro-war attitude. He was replaced by Otto Sattler who held 
this position until after the Second World War. As a centrist socialist, 
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he cooperated closely with Rosenfeld and other leftist emigrants in the 
German American United and Popular Fronts. Kruse was also an official 
of the AKStK and used this position for his Popular Front activity. 
The communist equivalent of the AKStK was the Arbeiter-Kranken-
und Sterbe-Versicherung (Workmens' Benefit Insurance) in which Ludwig 
Lore was instrumental. It was the German American Branch of the Inter-
national Workers' Order. Other communist organizations included several 
German American branches of the International Labor Defense like the 
Klara Zetkin branch of Yorkville, a German neighborhood on the East 
Side of Manhattan. 
The main cultural organizations were the Naturfreunde (Nature 
Friends) and the Arbeitersangerbund (ASB, Federation of Workmen's 
Choirs). The latter was a federation of va~ious individual groups that 
originated part~y before 1900. Such local groups as the Ferdinand 
LaSalle Women's Choir and the DeLeon Men's Choir in Chicago were probab-
ly members of the ASB. The Nature Friends organization was started by 
German and Austrian immigrants around 1910. By 1939, there were twenty 
local branches in the United States with eighteen nature camps through-
out the country. Camp Midvale in New Jersey became the scene of many 
Popular Front activities during the thirties. The movement originated 
around 1890 in Vienna,and spread rapidly throughout Europe with a mem-
bership in the hundred thousands. It made the contact of city workers 
with nature financially possible. The athletic clubs of the workers 
were mostly organized on a local level such as the Soziale Turnverein 
(the Social Turners) in Chicago. The Soziale Turnhalle (Social Turners' 
Hall)on Belmont and Lincoln Avenues served all German American labor 
l 
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organizations, including the Popular Front, for major events. 
The Jewish socialist organizations had imitated,at first~the 
structure of the German establishment. After some experimentation, the 
early Jewish socialist groups were consolidated as an autonomous branch 
of the Socialist Labor Party. Jewish socialists of the SLP then organ-
ized the union federation of the Vereinigte Yiddishe Gewerkschaften or 
United Hebrew Trades (UHT) which paralleled the Vereinigte Deutsche 
Gewerkschaften (United German Trades). Then, they founded individual 
unions as members of the UHT. These affiliated with the AFL in accord-
ance with German American reformism which abhorred dual unionism. 65 
Also, in 1892,the fraternal organization of the Arbeiterring or Work-
men's Circle (WC) was founded in New York. It became a national organ-
ization in 1910. 66 . 
One problem of early Jewish socialism was the alienation between 
socialist leaders and Yiddish working people from Eastern Europe. The 
first generation of these leaders was more Russian arid intellectual 
than ethnic and political. They spoke Russian even in private and were 
part of the socialist component of the Russian Enlightenment that fol-
lowed the Crimean War. These international socialists were more inter-
ested in ideological debate than in labor organization. One of these 
debating societies was the Russian Labor Lyceum in New York. Under the 
influence of German American socialists, they turned toward the Yiddish 
65Tcherikower, The Early Jewish Labor Movement, pp. 316, 317, 
319, 322, 327; and Epstein, Jewish Labor, Vol. I: pp. 168-191. 
66 Ibid., pp. 298-317. 
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speaking working class and started seriously to organize American Jewish 
67 labor. Two important leaders of the first generation were Morris 
Hillquit and Abraham Cahan. The former immigrated to the United States 
in 1888 and eventually became the chairman of the Socialist Party. The 
latter came in 1882 and became the foremost Jewish socialist journalist. 
The main work of Cahan was the Jewish Daily Forward. In 1897, 
he was instrumental in planning and establishing this Jewish socialist 
daily which was named after the Vorwarts of the much admired German 
Social Democratic Party. 68 This development paralleled the breakup of 
the SLP which had controlled all socialist papers. Cahan planned an 
independent popular daily with the motto of "for the party but not by, 
or of, the party". Under his editorship, the Forward reached a circu-
lation of seventy-two thousand in 1907, and of over two hundred thousand 
in its second decade. On this basis, Cahan had a strong influence on 
the development of the Jewish labor movement. The Forward nearly mon-
opolized Jewish socialist propaganda and played a strong role in Jewish 
labor disputes. It often also controlled the strike funds. Thus, 
Cahan came to occupy a unique position in the Jewish and American labor 
movement. He developed the habit of acting independently and uncom-
promisingly,and resented the ascendancy of the second generation of 
Jewish socialist leaders. He displayed his stubbornness especially 
during the factional fights within the SPA in the 1930's. His partisan-
67Ibid., pp. 138-144. 
68Ibid., pp. 273, 275, 318-334. 
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ship for the German Social Democrats was equally onesided and disrup-
tive. 
The decisive impulse to the American Jewish labor movement came 
from the mass immigration of the post-1905 pogroms and its second gen-
eration Jewish socialist leaders. The Jewish garment unions grew 
rapidly and became cohesive organizations with a determined membership 
and a common ideology. The roots of these qualities were in the East 
European labor movement whose General Jewish Workers' Union or Bund had 
made considerable progress around 1900. The main American Jewish 
unions were the garment unions of the International Ladies' Garment 
Workers (ILGWU), the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA), 
and the United Hat and Cap Makers and Millinery Workers (UHCMWU). There 
were also Jewish unions of the furriers, painters and co~struction 
workers. The Workmen's Circle also prospered on the new immigration 
and rose to a membership of fifty thousand by 1915 and to over one hun-
dred thousand in later years. The ILGWU was founded in 1901 as the 
successor of previous UHT unions. After years of expansion, it declined 
during the fac~ional struggles of the twenties and the misery of the 
Depression. But during the New Deal it rose to a membership of over 
two hundred and fifty thousand and became the third largest union of 
the AFL. 69 Its president, David Dubinsky, became a vice president of 
. 
the AFL. He cooperated loyally with Roosevelt and was instrumental in 
founding the American Labor Party and the Liberal Party for this purpose. 
69 Ibid., pp. 362-386; Vol. II, pp. 192, 383-385. 
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b . k . 1 d . 1 d 70 Du ~ns y was a typ~ca secon generat~on ea er. He was born 
in Brest Litovsk in 1892. At the age of fifteen, he became the secre-
tary of a Bund union local. After repeated arrests, he was condemned 
to exile in Siberia but escaped on the march there and came to New York 
in 1911. He worked in the SPA but concentrated on his career in the 
garment unions. As the leader of the strongest garment union, he also 
had an influence on the German socialist emigration in the United States. 
The ACWA was founded in 1914 as a rival union of the United 
Garment Workers, an affiliate of the UHT and the AFL. 71 In the strike 
of 1910 against the Jewish garment manufacturers in Chicago, the United 
Garment Workers insensitively betrayed the tailors of Chicago who re-
volted afterwards against their national union and founded their own 
union of men's clothing workers four years later. ~he ACWA soon out-
distanced its rival and reached a membership of one hundred twenty 
thousand. After a compromise with the United Garment Workers, it was 
reconciled with the AFL for the two years from 1934 to 1936. Before 
and after this short AFL membership, it was an independent union and 
was always more radical than the ILGWU. It spearheaded the drive for 
industrial unionism which ended with the formation of the CIO. It re-
mained in the American Labor Party after the ILGWU had left the ALP for 
the Liberal Party. Sidney Hillman was the president of the ACWA for 
72 
over thirty years. He had been one of the main leaders of the revolt 
70Ibid., pp. 395~401. 
71Ibid., pp. 40-55: "Born out of rebellion". 
72 Ibid., pp. 392-395; and Madison, Charles A. Eminent American 
Jews, 1776 to the Present (New York, 1970), pp. 313-337. 
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against the United Garment Workers. He was born in Lithuania in 1887 
and joined the Bund at the age of sixteen. After six months in jail, 
he left Russia during the post-1905 reaction and arrived in the United 
States in 1907. As a union leader of national stature, he held such 
posts as· associate director of the War Production Board. For the 
German Social Democratic emigrants, he was too far to the left. 
The most important Jewish leader for the German socialist emi-
73 grants was Charney B. Vladek. He was born in Minsk in 1886. At a 
young age, he became a professional organizer for the Bund. "Vladek" 
was his underground name which he later assumed permanently. His repu-
tation as an orator won him the name of "the second Lasalle". At the 
exile convention of the Russian socialists in London in 1907, Lenin 
tried to win the votes of the Bund delegates by individually inviting 
them to lunch. To his later regret, Vladek voted for the group of 
Lenin which broke away from the group of Plekhanov. In 1908, Vladek 
emigrated to the United States. He joined the SPA and had a significant 
political career. He was the main conciliator in the SPA and despaired 
over its breakup in 1936,which probably contributed to his early death 
in 1938. During the thirties, he promoted underground work in Poland 
and encouraged the German socialist emigrants on his visits to Europe. 
He had an evenhanded approach to .the latter and invited representatives 
of the German garment unions, the Social Democratic and the NB emigra-
tion to the United States. Had he lived longer, he would have estab-
lished some unity in the German socialist emigration in the United 
73 Johnpoll, Norman Thomas, pp. 128, 129, 166, 171; and Epstein, 
Jewish Labor, Vol. II, pp. 244, 246, 384-388. 
r 
44 
States. The uneasy relationship between Vladek and Cahan had its after-
effects on the German socialist emigrants in America. It symbolized the 
antagonism between the first and second generation of Jewish socialist 
leaders which was largely resolved by the thirties except for the Jewish 
Daily Forward. Cahan held on to the control of his creation and of the 
Forward Publishing Association which was a stronghold of the Jewish 
Old Guard. As one of the main promoters of the Yiddish language and 
literature and as a writer and poet of considerable talents, Vladek 
became general manager of the Forward in 1916 but could not dislodge 
Cahan. The latter survived him by many years and played partisan poli-
tics with the German socialist emigrants. 
After 1933, Vladek and Dubinsky were the two Jewish leaders 
most instrumental in organizing American union aid for European under-
ground work. At first, they were concerned with the fate of the Bund 
in Poland under the rightist government of Pilsudski.. But they were 
also interested in assisting illegal groups in Germany and German 
socialist emigrant groups. For these purposes, they initiated the 
Anti-Hitler Labor League. The 1934 national convention of the AFL in 
San Francisco discussed and accepted their proposal. They had also in-
vited Walter Citrine, the president of the International Federation of 
Trade Unions, to speak on behalf of the European underground and emi-
grant labor movement. William Green, the president of the AFL, served 
as chairman of the Labor League which established a Labor Chest for the 
collection of funds. Dubinsky raised $64,000 the same year from the 
ILGWU. 
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During the conflicts over the CIO, the Labor League fell into 
abeyance and was eventually replaced by the Jewish Labor Committee 
(JLC). 74 The AFL gave an ultimatum to the garment unions as the organ-
izers of the Committee on Industtial Organization. The latter then 
left the AFL and became the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The 
ACWA participated in the CIO. The ILGWU saved face by becoming inde-
pendent for two years before rejoining the AFL in 1937. 75 For these 
reasons, the Jewish labor organizations had to rely on themselves in 
their fight against antisemitism at home and ·abroad. The Jewish Labor 
Committee comprised mainly the garment unions, the Workmen's Circle and 
the American branch of the Bund. Until 1941, it contributed $224,000 
to the European underground labor movement. In the refugee crisis of 
the first war years, it organized the evacuation of several hundred 
Bundists and European socialists to America. 
But the American labor movement could not provide adequate 
sponsorship for the German socialist emigrants. The remnant groups of 
American socialism involved these emigrants in their own complexities 
which reinforced an already well established German factionalism. 
Because of this preoccupation with organizational politics, the anti-
fascist work of the socialist emigrants took second place. They ac-
complished very little in the decade from 1935 to 1945. The period of 
the German American Popular Front exemplifies the limits of interaction 
between emigrant and American groups in an ethnic socialist context. 
74Ibid., pp. 258, 259, 402-409. 
75
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CHAPTER III 
THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE GERMAN AMERICAN 
POPULAR FRONT 1934 - 1939 
The German American component of the Popular Front movement is 
difficult to define. It was a native movement in which a few social-
ist emigrants served as leaders. The ascendancy of the emigrants was 
a gradual process that took place at the pace and rate of their arrival 
from Europe. An analysis of the German American Popular Front is, 
therefore, a study in the complexity of political association and in-
teraction. The divisions of American and German socialism were con-
fusing already when considered separately. Their combination in Popular 
Front organizations of unclear initiatives and relations produced pat-
terns even more difficult to disentangle. In the associations between 
ideologically equivalent native and emigrant factions some native or-
ganizations, and nearly all native newspapers ended up under emigrant 
control. The resulting ethnic mergers constituted the building blocks 
of a Popular Front in which the respective ideologies and goals could 
coexist only precariously in various phases of a double ascendancy. 
Native control gave way to emigrant control. Within this development, 
centrist prominence was followed by a short period of limited factional 
balance which then succumbed to leftist leadership. These oscillations 
followed the chronology of the United and Popular Fronts. The United 
Front was a centrist invention for dealing with fascism. The commu-
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nists accepted it officially only in 1935 and then only as a prerequi-
site of their Popular Front. The native and emigrant Social Democrats 
went along temporarily only because of their involvement in the second-
ary and United Front-like German American labor organizations whose 
participation in the Popular Front they could not prevent. When the 
Social Democrats formed their own political groups after the breakup of 
the Socialist Party, they left the centrists at the mercy of the left-
ists. With the decline of the SPA, the centrists no longer had a party 
political home and became stuck in the Popular Front. The latter 
brought some centrist and leftist socialist emigrants together. But it 
also reinforced the Social Democratic phobia of intersocialist coopera-
tion. 
The first native Popular Front of centrist initiative was the 
Antifaschistische Aktion (Antifascist Action Committee). It folded 
when the still unreformed communists tried to take it over. The cen-
trists then attempted a non-partisan Popular Front in the Deutsch-
Amerikanische Kultur Verband (DAKV, German American League for Culture) 
that consisted of the secondary labor organizations and of some educa-
tional party affiliates. It went through all the phases mentioned 
above. Rosenfeld reinforced the native centrists. The Social Democrat-
ic emigrant, Seger, became its president until May 1936, the month the 
Social Democratic Federation was formed, and Seger became the editor of 
the Neue Volkszeitung. After that, some Social Democratic labor groups 
still belonged to the DAKV and the moderate German American, Frank Bohn, 
became its president until 1938. But for the year after the exit of 
Seger, the initiative in the DAKV went to the Popular Front group of 
Chicago. 
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The latter consisted of the editors of the monthly Volksfront 
and of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft fortschrittlicher deutsch-amerikanischer 
Vereine (Action Committee of the Progressive German American Societies). 
The Action Committee was founded in the spring of 1935, that is, before 
the DAKV. It included also some emigrants but the.ir proportion cannot 
be sufficiently established. Its organizer, Erich von Schrotter, a 
recent immigrant from Austria, was also the chief editor of the Volks-
front. This Chicago group became the DAKV Chicago. For a while, it 
disposed of the only newspaper in the DAKV. Its ideology was an Austrian 
type antifascist activism whose antiwar stand paralleled Midwestern 
isolationism. The DAKV Chicago soon launched a campaign for expansion 
in the Midwest and the Far West in the hope of winning a proportional 
share of national executive authority at the first national convention 
of the DAKV. 
But the leftist emigrants in New York upstaged the Chicagoans 
and took them under their protection. They had arrived in this country 
in 1937 and 1938 and edited the Deutsches Volksecho (DVE), the communist 
Popular Front successor of the Arbeiter. They first established their 
ascendancy in the DAKV New York before synchronizing their preparations 
for the national convention with the DAKV Chicago. For more time, the 
convention was postponed until 1938. In the meantime, the rep~esentative 
of the DAKV New York made himself comfortable in the DAKV Chicago. He 
rivaled the organizational work of Schrotter and became co-editor of the 
Volksfront. The latter then fell in line with the emigrant policy of 
all out support for President Roosevelt. Part of the leftist prepara-
tion for the national convention was the campaign for an Einheitszeitung. 
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The latter would have combined the two New York papers of the Volksecho 
and the Volkszeitung and left the Volksfront intact. It conveniently 
provided a positive appeal to the secondary labor organizations to the 
detriment of the Social Democrats. 
At the national convention, the emigrant-immigrant coalition 
-
converted its Popular Front ascendancy into executive control of the 
DAKV. It shifted the executive seat to Chicago, out of reach of inter-
ference by non-leftist groups in New York. The leftists strengthened 
their position further with continued expansion. The Chicago DAKV 
attempted inter-ethnic antifascism in Chicago and in Hollywood. The 
New York DAKV was strengthened by two new member organizations, the 
Volksfrontgruppe deutscher Emigranten (Popular Front Group of German 
Emigrants) under Rosenfeld and the German American Writers' Association. 
The latter included emigrant and native writers of socialist and liberal 
persuasion but its leftist emigrants were predominant. 
The political and diplomatic developments in Europe were un-
favorable to the P9pular Front movement. The latter lost its momentum 
with the defeat of the front governments in France and Spain. It 
failed because of the appeasement policy of France and England and the 
resulting diplomatic deal between Stalin and Hitler. In the period of 
DAKV decline, the Neue Volkszeitung tried unsuccessfully to wean the 
secondary labor orbanizations away from the DAKV. After the Hitler-
Stalin Pact, it openly denounced the DAKV and tried to organize its 
own ethnic labor front. The DAKV could not adjust to the new situation 
at its second national convention in September 1939 in Cleveland. It 
reverted to a cultural and domestic emphasis in its ideology which 
l 
l 
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concentrated on social and educational legislation. But its main 
attempt of changing its image failed. German American conservative 
cultural organizations wanted to deal even less with the DAKV in 1939 
than before. Under these circumstances, the Volksecho and the Volks-
front stopped publication. The first phase of the German American 
Volksfront was over. The DAKV survived with the low profile of a pas-
sive federation of some locals of the secondary labor organizations. 
The political climate of the years from 1939 to 1941 favored the activ-
ities of the Social Democratic emigrants. 
The development of the Antifascist Action Committee exemplifies 
the fate of centrist initiative in socialist front politics. The sue-
cess of the latter hinged on the attitude of the left and right wing 
factions. The centrists could only count on the interest of their 
United Front partners in the secondary labor organizations. Sattler 
and his followers in the Workmen's Benefit Fund initiated the Antifas-
cist Action Committee. For its foundation, eighty representatives of 
German American labor organizations met at the New York Labor Temple in 
1 February 1933. As a political thinker and motivator and as the editor 
of the Solidarity, Sattler had a certain moral influence but the extent 
of his statutory leadership in the Benefit Fund is unclear. In the 
Action Committee the centrist factions of his and other secondary labor 
organizations had to deal with communist groups like the German branch 
1 Volksfront, (monthly, from November 1935 to March 1938; weekly, 
from April 1938 to September 1939; published by the Action Committee of 
Progressive German Societies in Chicago from November 1935 to February 
1936; by the German American League for Culture in Chicago from March 
1936 to September 1939), 3 June 1938; see also Die Einheitsfront (news-
paper published in one issue by the Anti-fascist Action Committee, New 
York), August 1934. 
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of the Communist Party, the publishers of the Arbeiter, the Federation 
of the Deutsch Amerikanische Arbeiterklubs (German American Workers' 
Clubs), and the Rote Hilfe (Red Aid). For political balance, the 
German language group of the Socialist Party and the publishers of the 
Neue Volkszeitung represented the Socialist side. 2 This fragile coali-
tion was able to publish its Einheitsfront only in the single issue of 
August 1934. When the communists succeeded in making support of their 
Arbeiter a condition for further membership in the Action Committee, 
the German language group of the SPA, the representatives of the NVZ 
d f h lf h f .. 3 an o ot er groups, e t t e ront organ1zat1on. 
As a result of the experience with the Action Committee, the 
German American League for Culture was organized on a different basis 
as its name implied. It excluded political parties and consisted only 
of the secondary labor organizations. Its main initiators were, again, 
Sattler and the Benefit Fund, "the heart of the DAKV". Planning started 
in the early summer of 1935, before the critical Comintern Congress in 
4 Brussels, and ended with the formation of the League on September 23. 
The ideology of the early DAKV was ethnically and domestically 
oriented. According to Sattler, the secondary labor organizations were 
afraid of-National Socialist infiltration and of anti-German reaction 
in this country. The Benefit Fund amended its constitution by restrict-
2Ibid. 
3 Robert E. Cazden, The Free German and -Free Austrian Press and 
Booktrade in the United States, 1933 to 1950 (Dissertation, Chicago, 
1965; condensed published version), pp. 41, 42. 
4 Volksfront, February 1936 and 3 June 1958. 
, 
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ing membership to antifascist German Americans. The coalition of the 
DAKV could perform even better the public relations task of identifying 
its members with antifascism. To the general German American constitu-
ency, Sattler presented antifascism in the form of an ethnic patriotism 
which synthesized the German and the American heritage by way of the 
German American contribution to the civilization of this country. This 
patriotism was simultaneously pro-German and pro-American and was sup-
posed to counter the National Socialist appeal to the German Americans. 
Some of the ideas of Sattler were somewhat farfetched. He con-
ceded that the German American socialists had neglected the'Reimatgefunl" 
(nostalgia for the province of birth) which results from the ties to the 
home province rather than to the whole country of origin, as the scene 
of childhood memories and the residence of relatives. He complemented 
these local values with the proposal of cultivating "a conscious and 
deliberate link with Germany as a nation and with the German cultural 
heritage". 5 For this purpose, Sattler proposed a German cultural pro-
gram designed to preserve the use of the German language in the United 
States. He deplored the failure of the early German American schools 
founded by German American progressives. As a substitute, he proposed 
that German American students enroll in the German classes of public 
schools and colleges. The DAKV also planned to establish German li-
braries and eventually an academy of German culture. Sattler did his 
own research in German American history and contributed numerous arti-
cles to the Volksecho and the Volksfront. With the help of this transi-
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tional link, the German heritage could also motivate a good immigrant 
to defend American liberties. The drawback of this approach was that 
the conservative German Americans refused to follow a socialist lead 
in the cultural sphere. 
Sattler claimed later that his formula made the League for 
Culture a lasting front organization. This was true insofar as it 
limited membership to the secondary labor organizations. But these 
integrated fraternal and cultural organizations were already based on 
the principle of a United Front to which the DAKV added nothing new. 
In turn, they w~re exposed to new stress by their membership in the 
federation. Their own factional struggles intensified when their pro-
and anti-DAKV segments contested the elections for their national 
executives. The· reason for the relative longevity of the DAKV was that 
the secondary labor organizations were solid enough to withstand these 
disruptions. Some of the secondary labor organizations of the League, 
like the Workers' Clubs, were party affiliates and represented party 
interests. They just happened to coincide with the purposes of the 
DAKV when the Comintern proclaimed the Popular Front and the Socialists 
could not leave a federation of the crucial secondary organizations to 
the sole care of the communists. 
The Socialists were quite prominent in the early DAKV. One of 
their main delegates was the Social Democratic emigrant, Seger. He 
represented the German American Forum of which Frank Bohn was the 
president. 6 Seger was already a member of the constituting committee 
6
rbid., November 1935. 
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and then became the first president of the DAKV. In this function, he 
was an active organizer and was interested in the merger of the Chicago 
Popular Front group with the Kulturverband. During a promotional visit 
to Chicago, he shared the speaker's forum and the main addresses with 
Schrotter in a mass meeting of the Chicago group. According to the 
.... 7 
Volksfront, Seger "spoke with his usual objectivity and fairness'.'. He 
was interested in the Chicago Popular Front for the same reason that 
he joined the DAKV. Both organizations consisted mainly of the frater-
nal and cultural labor organizations which constituted the main reader-
ship of the Neue Volkszeitung. 
Two months later, the Chicago Popular Front was in, and Seger 
was out of the DAKV. As the new editor of the NVZ, he could no longer 
remain president of the cultural federation. Also, after the breakup 
of the SPA and the formation of the Social Democratic Federation, the 
conservative socialists had their own political home and intended to 
play more of a right wing role. The NVZ fell in line with this policy 
and became critical of the DAKV. The implacable anti-communist Cahan 
of the Jewish Daily Forward had a hand in these developments. Offi-
cially, Seger resigned from the DAKV because of an alleged communist 
conspiracy to seize the main executive positions in the federation. 8 
In vacating its presidency, Seger actually helped the leftists to take 
over. 
7Ibid., February 1936 and March 1936. 
8 Cazden, The Free German and Free Austrian Press, p. 44. See 
also Radkau, Die deutsche Emigration in den USA, p. 172. 
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The admission of the Ch{cago group was expected to consolidate 
the DAKV rather than to shift its center to Chicago. As the Eastern 
DAKV, the Chicago group consisted mainly of the secondary labor organi-
zations. It claimed the adherence of thirty-five groups which included 
the Workers' Benefit Fund, the Nature Friends, the labor choirs, th~ 
athletic clubs, several unions, and the Reichsbanner (a German American 
branch of the militia for the defense of the Weimar Republic). 9 But 
there were more recent immigrants and emigrants in the Chicago Popular 
Front. According to Maria Schrotter, the emigrants numbered several 
hundred but there i~ no other evidence to confirm this claim. As a 
result of its peculiar composition, the Chicago group was more ambitious 
and energetic than the Eastern DAKV. In its ideology, it paid attention 
to both America and Europe. 
Schrotter was a typical exponent of this attitude. He was a 
recent immigrant from Graz, Austria. Before the First World War, he 
had taught German literature at the University of Chicago for several 
years. In 1925, he returned to the same position. Then, he switched 
to Northwestern University, which dismissed him in 1928 in a purge of 
leftist professors. According to his wife, he had not been politically 
active in Austria. But he called himself once "an old revolutionary!'. 
He was an activist antifascist of the Austrian type and conducted the 
Chicago Popular Front accordingly. His activism and his ideology 
reinforced each other. 
9 Volksfront, November 1935 and July 1936. 
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Schrotter expressed his views often in the Volksfront which he 
edited since November 1935. Fascism was the crisis stage of capitalism 
and was on the rise in all industrialized countries. This was good 
Marxism. In the view of Schrotter, there was a fascist threat to 
Austria and America from within and without. The Chicago Popular Front 
could fight fascism on the spot rather than wait for developments in 
Germany and Italy. Also, all industrialized nations were imperialistic 
and contributed in some way to the international tensions that could 
set off another war. In the crisis of 1935, England, France and Italy 
would have liked to divide up the "Ethiopean roast" but they nearly 
fell out with each other in the process. The imperialist interests of 
h U . d S f d E A . d . d · "1 · k lO t e n~te tates ocuse on ast s~a an conta~ne s~m~ ar r~s s. 
To the Volksfront, the intentions of President Roosevelt in 1936 were 
suspect. He was "wavering, ••. he is unreliable .••• Should [Senator] 
Borah win the succession we could be certain that a pacifist is in com-
mand and that America will not participate in a war." For the Popular 
Front, "the best thing for 1936 would be: no new world conflagration".11 
The remedy against fascism was the traditional socialist paci-
fism, the solidarity of the workers of the world against war which had 
failed twenty years ago. But Schrotter thought that the workers had 
learned the lesson of the First World War: "This is not 1914. We have 
learned something. The United Front must be achieved in the whole 
world. Only a strong United Front will be capable of preventing a war 
10Ibid., November 1935. 
11
rbid., January 1936 and September 1936. 
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12 that is already approaching from the East and the West." The result 
would be "the victory march of the liberation of all peoples" from 
fascism and imperialism. For the United States also, "the Popular 
Front idea is probably the only salvation". Schrotter warned that 
"Roosevelt and his entourage are not unconditionally on the side of 
freedom" for the colonies. Therefore, the Popular Front "must counter 
13 the threat that comes from Landon, Coughlin, Lemke and, or Roosevelt". 
This approach was also the solution for Germany. It was only "a matter 
of time and of the United Front before the local disturbances would 
merge into a powerful mass movement against Hitler". The Chicago paper 
appealed to the Sopade in Prague to assist such a German front. 14 The 
role of the Soviet Union was secondary in this front theory. The pro-
Sovietism of Schrotter paralleled that of many American liberals and 
. 11 1 . h h' . 15 ~nte ectua s ~n t e t ~rt~es. 
This positive ideology was geared for political action. The 
Chicago group was aggressive and activist. It fought the local German 
12Ibid., December 1935. 
13Ibid., September 1936. Charles E. Coughlin, the "radio priese' 
was a violent opponent of the Second New Deal. He felt that the infla-
tionary currency policies of the latter did not go far enough. In 1934 
he founded, therefore, the National Union for Social Justice which be-
came the Union Party of the presidential elections of 1936. As a com-
promise candidate, he chose Congressman William Lemke who did not really 
fit into this third party movement and was not a talented campaigner. 
As a result, the cause of "Liberty Bell Bill" suffered some cracks in 
the elections. 
14
rbid., December 1935. 
15
rbid., January 1937. 
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American National Socialists not only in its newspaper but also in the 
16 
streets. It organized demonstrations against their meetings which 
were often protected by the police. Its members went inside the meet-
ing places and participated in the discussions. In a meeting of March 
1938, Schrotter resisted some local stormtroopers who wanted to eject 
h~. 17 He was arrested by the police and had to appear in court. Such 
incidents made good headlines in the Volksfront and even in. the Chicago 
papers. This side effect was not unintentional. 
With this mentalit~ it is not surprising that the Chicago group 
advocated a political front rather than the non-partisan cultural con-
cept of the DAKV. Its inability to find political partners by early 
1936 facilitated its merger with the DAKV. But as the DAKV Chicago, it 
did not forsake a political orientation. An explanation in the Volks-
16The German American National Socialists were organized in the 
German American Bund. It succeeded in 1935 the Friends of the New 
Germany which in turn was an outgrowth of the pre-1933 Teutonia Club. 
The Bund was a very small organization. By 1939, it had fifty five 
locals of which seventeen were in New York. According to Fortune Maga-
zine, its membership amounted to no more than two thousand five hundred 
while the statistics of the Justice Department counted forty-five locals 
with six thousand six hundred seventeen members. The Weckruf, the pub- . 
lication of the Bund, had one thousand one hundred sixty subscribers in 
Chicago and only two hundred in New York. The Volksfront remarked some-
what apologetically that the main fascist danger lay in the number of 
fellow travelers. Even the German government became disenchanted with 
the awkward activities of the Bund. Its president Fritz Kuhn was physi-
cally prevented by the German ambassador Diekhof from rising for a 
speech at the German Day rally of 1937 in New York. The German govern-
ment had decided that it was not interested in the fomentation of anti-
German feelings in the United States. For references about the Bund 
and Kuhn, see Sander A. Diamond, The Nazi movement in the United States, 
1924-1941 (Cornell University Press, 1974); Radkau, Die deutsche Emi-
gration in den USA, pp. 66 to 69; also Volksfront, 15 December 1937; 
22 July 1938; 8 April 1939. 
17Chicago Daily News, 3 March 1938. 
convergence of spontaneous popular groups is completed. - Let us pro-
ceed with 'the organization of the antifascist front of attack.'" 20 
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It alleged that the idea for the conference had originated with several 
progressive organizations of Wisconsin. The purpose of the conference 
was to promote the political Popular Front. A delegate from Chicago 
criticized the DAKV for being "still on the defensive and even too weak 
for a successful defense" against National Socialist advances in the 
German American societies. A delegate from Detroit was displeased with 
"the purely negative attitude of most organized antifascists". He ad-
vised "a new orientation" through "self-criticism, a practical presen-
tation of ideas, tactical versatility and speedy action". He stated 
flatly that "neutrality is no longer possible today" and that "not even 
the League for Culture could completely isolate itself from political 
questions". In fact, "the political parties had an important function 
in the Kulturkampf (the fight for cultural values)". Campaigning for a 
farmer-labor·party would 11not conflict with the principles of the League 
for Culture." The conference decided to appeal to the national DAKV for 
h d . . f 1. . 1 . 21 t e a m1ss1on o po 1t~ca part1es. 
In the Chicago paper, this antifascist conference was described 
as a genuine Popular Front movement. It consisted of thirty delegates 
from four states. They reached "full unanimity" in their discussions. 
It was "amazing that people from four different American states who had 
not previously talked or corresponded with each other wanted in princi-
20Ibid., July 1936 and September 1936. 
21Ibid. 
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ple all the same thing". Schrotter encouraged them by pointing to the 
progress of the Popular Front in France and Spain. He emphasized the 
need for the kind of "central combination in the local sphere" which 
the Midwestern Popular Front was. He hoped that the conference would 
become "the first step for the unification of all German speaking 
circles of America". A permanent committee of six representatives was 
formed. The Volksfront became the official organ of the Midwestern 
Popular Front to which it devoted a special section of every issue. A 
delegate of the DAKV New York was invited to witness these proceedings. 
He understood that the DAKV Chicago was not willing to wait for the 
. 1 AKV . h h . . f 1· · 1 f 22 nat~ona D w~t t e organ~zat~on o a po ~t~ca ront. 
The Chicago group still had to reap the full benefits of its 
local expansion. For this purpose, it adopted a new constitution for 
the Midwest, together with the DAKV Detroit, and asked the national 
executive to accept its statutes as a constitutional proposal to a 
prospective national convention. According to the new arrangement, the 
latter would take place annually and elect each time a new executive. 
The national convention would proportionately represent the local DAKV 
organizations. For each thousand of its membership pool, a local DAKV 
23 
was entitled to one delegate. In this way, the Chicago group could 
make its weight felt in the national executive. The main problem was 
the numerical definition of the local membership. It is difficult to 
determine how a Benefit Fund local, for example, became part of the 
DAKV. But all its members were counted on the inflated DAKV list. 
22Ibid. 
23Ibid., November 1936. 
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In the fall of 1936, the Chicago group had already an organiza-
tional headstart for the convention which was to take place in New York 
in March 1937. It pressed its advantage with a further expansion in 
California in the winter of 1937. In January of that year, it sent 
24 Erich Rix on a lecture tour of the Far West. He was a former official 
of the Transport Workers' Union of Northern Germany and editor of a 
union paper there. He had been arrested in February 1933 and sent to 
a concentration camp. After his release, friends helped him to come 
h . 25 to C 1.cago. In April 1937, he finally founded a DAKV local in San 
Francisco. It had a membership pool of only three thousand which was 
a sign of a modest labor base of secondary organizations such as the 
Benefit Fund. 26 It came still in time for the national convention. 
After the appearance of the Volksecho in New York, the latter was post-
poned by a full year to June 1938 in Chicago. 
The editors of the Volksecho first established themselves on 
the Popular Front scene in New York. They did so by acquiring an auton-
omous front position and winning a corresponding influence in the DAKV. 
The Volksecho became the organ of the DAKV in New York in the absence 
24Ibid., January 1937 •. 
25 Interview with Mrs. Marie Schrotter, 10 December 1973; 
Questionaire, Erich Krewet, pseudonym Erich Rix, filled out on 25 Octo-
ber 1969,Dokumentation zur Emigration, Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, 
Munich, Federal Republic of Germany: Krewet was born in 1900 in Wuppertal, 
Barmen. In 1935, after his imprisonment, he fled to Antwerp in Belgium 
to join the German group of the International Transport Workers' Federa-
tion. He came to the United States in 1936 and stayed here until 1957. 
After the war, he unsuccessfully appealed his exclusion by the National 
Socialist government from employment as a sailor. 
26 Volksfront, 15 April 1937 and 15 June 1937. 
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of any other front newspaper. It appeared first in February 1937. 27 
Its editor was Stefan Heym who had arrived in the United States shortly 
before. During the Weimar Republic, his poems had appeared in social-
28 ist and liberal papers. Today, his literacy reputation is interna-
tional. During the war, he received several medals in the American 
army. But in 1953, he sent them back to President Eisenhower and left 
the United States for East Germany because of the McCarthy hearings. 
Another Volksecho writer was the leftist emigrant, Martin Hall. He was 
an irrepressible organizer and covered the whole country in his Popular 
Front career from the East to the Midwest and the Far West. After the 
war, he became prominent in the propaganda division of the East German 
government. Other Volksecho writers were the emigrants Rosenfeld, 
29 . .. Goldschmidt, Karl Obermann and Walter Schonstedt. 
The ideology of the Volksecho was the Popular Front concept of 
the Comintern. It centered around the defense of the Soviet Union by 
27 Deutsches Volksecho, (New York weekly, published from February 
1937 to September 1939), 20 February 1937. 
28Radkau, Die deutsche Emigration, p. 170. 
29Alfons Goldschmidt was very interested in the international 
Popular Front. His advocacy of a Latin American Popular Front was due 
to his past economic research. In 1929, he had founded the Wirtschafts-
institut Latein Amerika (Economic Institute for Latin America) . He was 
also treasurer of the Deutsch-Amerikanisches Hilfskomitee zur Unter-
stutzung des spanischen Freiheitskampfes (German American Committee for 
Aid to the Spanish Fight for Freedom). In February 1938, he reported 
the collection of $3,410.21. Albert Einstein warmly supported the com-
mittee. The Volksecho cosponsored the American good will tour of 
Ludwig Renn who was a general in the International Brigade in the Span-
ish Civil War. Renn was a German aristocrat, officer, and writer with 
the original name of Vieth von Golzenau. 
collective security. A sanitary cordon of Popular Front governments 
was to keep National Socialist Germany in check. The Volksecho liked 
the interventionist tendencies of President Roosevelt. It supported 
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him fully and asked him in a letter of April 1938 to join the interna-
tional Popular Front. 30 It discarded the socialist theory of fascism 
in all industrialized countries. National Socialism became an isolated 
evil in a worldwide contest with democracy. The alternatives of "his-
torical significance" were regression or progress, barbarism or civili-
zation, slavery or freedom. The Volksecho asked all German Americans 
to "confess unqualified loyalty to the democratic principles of the 
United States". 31 
The Volksecho was in a good position to gain influence in the 
German American Popular Front. The latter was more the affair of 
ideologically committed individuals than of spontaneous masses. It 
depended on pointed propaganda. With the control over information, 
the Volksecho and the Volksfront could shape Popular Front opinion. 
The former called this its service to the popular movement. Critics 
of the front media would have had to rely on them for voicing their 
reservations. The two newspapers were as important as the delegate 
system for maintaining communication between the member organizations 
of the DAKV. In every issue, they published the weekly Vereinskalender 
30
volksfront, 9 April 1938. 
31Ibid., 29 April 1938 and 16 September 1938. 
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(organizations' schedules) and discussed the activities of the member 
organizations. They could exert pressure on these groups by criticizing 
or praising them. They could also dress up their reports on the groups 
by suppressing negative developments and emphasizing positive ones. 
Besides their publicistic advantage, the publishing associations of 
the two front papers acted as front centers of their own. These con-
sisted of delegates from the constituting groups of the DAKV and held 
monthly conferences. They organized picnics, summer festivals, dis-
cussion forums, protest meetings and demonstrations either alone, with 
some of the DAKV member organizations or with friendly outside organiza-
tions. 
During 1937 and early 1938, the Volksecho insistently wooed the 
secondary labor organizations especially in preparation for the national 
convention of the DAKV. It patronized the meetings and conventions. 
It admonished the German American Workers' Clubs to "fulfill their 
mission as one of the main elements of the German American antifascist 
32 
movement". They were told to "get on their way to the masses 11 and to 
"bring together all progressive elements even beyond the confines of 
33 
·the workers". The Volksecho approved the change of name to German 
American Clubs for this purpose. The national convention of the latter 
in April 1938 gave unconditional support to the Volksecho. It decided 
further to develop the United and Popular Fronts and to extend its work 
to the South and West. It resolved to appeal to Roosevelt for his 
32 Volksecho, 27 March 1937. 
33Ibid., 3 April 1937. 
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support of collective security and to campaign for the repeal of the 
34 Neutrality laws. The Volksecho also promoted the Federation of Work-
mens' Choirs and the Nature Friends. In its view, the latter had be-
come "points of concentration for the antifascist German population". 35 
They were expected to grow into "a powerful organization" and were 
36 
recormnended for their integration into "the new unionist front". 
Both groups repeatedly paid tribute to the Volksecho. 
The only competition of the Volksecho for the influence over 
the secondary labor organizations came from the Neue Volkszeitung. 
Before the national convention of the DAKV, the Volksecho took special 
care in neutralizing the Social Democratic appeal by starting a cam-
paign for an Einheitszeitung (Consolidated Newspaper). The latter 
·would have absorbed the two New York papers, depriving the Social Demo-
crats of their mouthpiece while leaving the Chicago Volksfront intact. 
The NVZ had to reject this scheme. It was thus put on the defensive 
and was stigmatized as uncooperative which served the propaganda pur-
poses of the Volksecho. In May 1937, Hall had still professed his in-
terest in coexistence with the Volkszeitung. There was, in his opinion 
ample space for several newspapers in a field of a few million German 
A . k 37 merLcan wor ers. A week later, he asked already for cooperation 
38 between the two papers. During the surmner, the Volksecho prepared 
34Ibid., 9 April 1938. 
35Ibid., 22 May 1937. 
36Ibid., 29 May 1937. 
37
tbid.' 1 May 1937. 
38Ibid., 8 May 1937. 
l 
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its call for the Einheitszeitung. It built up publicity for the nation-
al convention of the Federation of Workmen's Choirs which took place in 
September, in Cleveland. There, the Brooklyn branch of the Federation 
introduced a motion for an Einheitszeitung which was unanimously adopted, 
that is, by twenty-two positive votes and forty-six abstentions. Hall 
covered the convention extensively and reported in a headline that "the 
Federation of the Workmen's Choirs decides the unification of the anti-
fascist press". He elaborated that "the actual duplicating and, unfor-
tunately, often opposing work" of the two papers was self-defeating. 
Only a unified front press could conduct the counterattack against the 
Nazi agitation in the United States. 39 
The Volksecho then wrote to all secondary labor organizations 
for support of the Cleveland resolution. In every issue of both front 
papers, another local of another labor organization reiterated the call 
for an Einheitszeitung. Goldschmidt denied that Seger had made a new 
paper out of the old NVZ and scored "his lack of evident journalistic 
experience". He thought that Seger "writes badly and his information 
d k .11 . ff. . " 40 an S L are LnSU LCLent • 
The NVZ reacted very awkwardly. In his address at the choirs' 
convention, Seger admitted that he was "unfortunately not in the popu-
lar situation of the Volksecho representative". In its protest letter 
39Ibid., 11 September 1937; Neue Volkszeitung, (New York weekly, 
published by the Progressive Publishing Association fro~ 1933 to 1949), 
9 October 1937; Radkau, Die deutsche Emigration, p. 171. 
40 Volksecho, 25 December 1937. 
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to the secondary labor organizations, the NVZ argued that it was the 
older paper. The Volksecho and the Volksfront were "Gegengri.indungen" 
(counter-foundations). They could discontinue publication if a single 
antifascist paper was essential. Somewhat facetiously, the NVZ also 
mentioned its obligation to honor its advertisement contracts. 41 During 
his visits to most of the secondary labor organizations, Seger claimed 
that the NVZ was committed to "the scientific socialism of Marx and 
Engels". The special temporary task of antifascism could not absorb 
this general tradition. The NVZ devoted only a third of its space to 
the antifascist cause while reserving another third for the social and 
political problems of Europe and the remaining third for the develop-
ments in the United States. The NVZ was more than an antifascist news-
paper of emigrants like the Volksecho. It was not only against some~ 
thing but also for something, namely socialism. It could not assume a 
liberal mask like the Volksecho. It could not give up its opposition 
to capitalism for temporary tactical reasons. Seger added,somewhat 
contemptously that the l±beral conversion that was implied in the Popu-
lar Front ideology made the existence of communist parties superfluous. 
For conducting a liberal Popular Front policy, the League for Human 
Rights would suffice. Seger made the rhetorical offer that there would 
have been no insuperable objections to a request by the DAKV for the 
use of one page of the NVZ as a special Popular Front section. He sus-
pected that the Volksecho ~anted to benefit from the superior resources 
42 
of the NVZ. All these rationalizations could not prevent the success 
41Ibid., 18 September 1937. 
42
volkszeitung, 6 November 1937. 
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states whereto he returned in 1936. 44 His novel "Das Lob des Lebens" 
was serialized in the Volksecho. 
For a complete preparation for the national convention, the 
leftist emigrants in New York had to synchronize their Popular Front 
work with the DAKV Chicago. They brought the Volksfront in editorial 
line with the Volksecho. This task fell to Hall, who came to Chicago 
at the end of 1937. The Chicagoans could only emphasize their past 
merits. In expectation of Hall, the Volksfront invited its readers to 
"imagine what the antifascist movement in America would be like today 
without the work of the progressive Germans of Chicago ••• and their 
45 
newspaper". Shortly after the arrival of Hall, Schrotter reflected 
b h . ld 1 . 46 . f d . 11 a out 1s past as an o revo ut1onary. His w1 e resente espec1a y 
the arrogance of Hal~. 47 Under these circumstances, the compliance of 
Schrotter is surprising. Perhaps his hands were tied by the communist 
members of the Chicago group like the emigrant Arthur Necker. Perhaps 
he realized that only the cooperation between the New York leftists and 
the Chicago activists could outmaneuver the German American and emigrant 
centrists of New York. The Volksecho praised him as "an old and well 
known co-fighter of our cause". 48 , Hall soon rivaled the organizational 
activity of Schrotter. He spoke with Schrotter or without him at the 
44 Volksfront, March 1937. 
45
rbid., 15 June 1937. 
46
rbid., 15 January 1938. 
47 r · · h M . S h .. 10 D b 1973 nterv1ew w1t ar1a c rotter, ecem er . 
48 Volksecho, 30 April 1938. 
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meetings of the DAKV and of its member organizations. At one of them, 
he confidently "predicted which forces in Germany will finally stop 
49 Hitler1'. He became co-editor of the Volksfront in January 1938 and 
editor of an equal status on 22 April 1938. On that date, the Volks-
front finally appeared as a weekly, just a little over a month before 
-----
the national convention. In a front page article, Hall daimed that 
with this weekly appearance "the Midwest and the Far West of the United 
States received an independent, progressive German language newspaper 
that did not exist before11 • 50 He reserved the front page to himself 
for such occasions as the Munich Pact, a keynote address for the new 
year, the German occupation of Czechoslovakia or the military and party 
purges of 1938 in the Soviet Union. 
The Volksfront soon voiced the policy 9f the Comintern. Presi-
dent Roosevelt finally became its hero, too. It defended his domestic 
and foreign policy, "the perfection of inner democracy" and the defense 
of international democracy. It rejected the third party attempts of 
Governor LaFollette of Wisconsin which it had previously favored. 
LaFollette was inclined to limit assistance to unemployed workers in 
favor of suffering farmers. Only a third party promoted by the AFL and 
the CIO would have met with its approva1. 51 When Cong~ess threatened 
to cut $150 million from the Work Projects Administration emergency 
budget in February 1939, the Volksfront called this a concentrated 
49 Volksfront, March_ 1938. 
SOibid., 2 April 1938. 
51Ibid., 7 January 1939 and 11 February 1939. 
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The meeting of the DAKV New York also discussed the Chicago proposal 
for a new constitution of which the Volksfront plan was only one arti-
cle. According to the NVZ, the delegates received no advance copies of 
the constitution. The proposal was read to them only at the meeting so 
·that they had little time for deliberation. Also, the national executive 
in New York failed to make an alternative proposal. It was even suspect-
ed by the NVZ of conspiring to liquidate itself in favor of a new execu-
tive in Chicago. The Volkszeitung finally charged the communist groups 
of the DAKV with claiming double and paper representations for the 
. 1 . 55 nat~ona convent~on. This outside criticism by someone who could 
have done better from within was not very effective with the secondary 
labor organizations. 
The leftist activist coalition reached its main objectives at 
the national convention: the adoption of its constitution, the election 
of its candidates to the national executive and the selection of Chicago 
as the new executive seat. As the result of nearly two years of prepar-
ation, it controlled a majority of delegates. Most of the representa-
tive speakers of the nine DAKV city locals favored the coalition. Eric 
Sanger, the leader of the German American Club Astoria, and Karl Meyer, 
the president of the Arbeitersgnger, spoke for New York; Arthur Necker, 
the new president of the DAKV Chicago, for that local; Anton Jacobs, a 
writer of the Volksfront, for the Detroit local, and Sch~nstedt for the 
locals of Philadelphia and Baltimore. Arthur Hesse, the business mana-
ger of the Volksfront, represented San Francisco by pr~xy. This conven-
55
volkszeitung, 21 May 1938. 
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tion elected an almost all Chicago national executive. Hall became 
vice president after his co-nominees Schrotter and Necker declined in 
his favor. Schrotter was unanimously elected national secretary with 
Necker as his deputy. The positions of treasurer, protocal secretary 
and legal consultant were also occupied by Chicagoans. This was almost 
necessary because of the controversial shift of the executive to 
Chicago. The liberal Dr. Rudolf Brandl, a former editor of the Frank-
furter Zeitung and director of the Ullstein Publishing House archives 
in Berlin, lost his prominence in the DAKV. He was offered the low 
position of secondary protocal secretary under the condition that he 
move to Chicago. But his main job was in New York as editor of the 
. 56 German Jewish immigrant paper Aufbau. Sattler was unanimously elec-
ted president of the DAKV. But this was not the strongest executive 
position. Also, he lived in New York which further impaired his execu-
tive effectiveness. Thomas Mann had sent a letter of commendation to 
the national convention and then accepted a DAKV vice presidency for a 
while. 
There was a certain amount of opposition at the convention 
which the leftist activist coalition had to conciliate in order to pre-
serve a minimal harmony. The reports of the two front papers emphasized 
the unity and unanimity of the proceedings of the convention. 57 But in 
its final report, the Volksfront was nevertheless satisfied that the 
56 Volksfront, 15 January 1938. 
57
rbid., 17 June 1938. 
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conference could be held "despite all difficulties". 58 The coalition 
leaders had to be very diplomatic in handling the delicate problem of 
the role of Sattler and the Benefit Fund. They allowed for a certain 
measure of ideological diversity and passed by the opportunity of 
giving policy speeches of their own. They also refrained from pushing 
controversial issues too far. They had to outmaneuver Sattler and the 
Benefit Fund without over-alienating them. The latter were indispen-
sable as "the heart of the DAKV". Hall took it upon himself to nominate 
Sattler for the presidency and to deliver the official laudation: "None 
of us has acquired more merits for the progressive development in the 
German American field or has contributed more to the general development 
of the DAKV and none of us commands such great personal and moral auth-
ority as our friend Sattler."59 Nobody at the convention criticized the 
latter for reaffirming the non-partisan character of the DAKV. He held 
to the centrist illusion that it did not matter "whether someone is a 
socialist, a communist or a democrat The main thing is that he 
. . . f N . 1 s . 1 . II 60 ~s a s~ncere enemy o at~ona oc~a ~sm. But he conceded "the 
relatively weak influence of the League of Culture in the German Ameri-
can field" and o·ffered the remedy of a greater 'emphasis on the German 
background and on German and German American cultural values. 61 This 
was not enough for the activists of Chicago. In an impli~it criticism 
58
rbid., 3 June 1938. 
59
rbid., 17 June 1938. 
60
rbid., 3 June 1938. 
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rbid. 
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of the centrist DAKV, the Volksfront pointed out that the new constitu-
tion "liberated the DAKV from the narrowness of a small circle that was 
1 . d h . 1 b . . " 62 more or ess restr~cte to t e progress~ve a or organ~zat~ons • It 
justified the transfer of the executive to Chicago with "the great pas-
sibilities for the development of the progressive German population in 
the Midwest" and with the argument that the whole country could be 
better propagandized from that central point. The DAKV Chicago was 
free to follow a more dynamic Popular Front policy. For the New York 
leftists, any further comment was redundant after their success at the 
convention. 
Schrotter himself still clung to some remnants of his indepen-
dent Popular Front theory. He still considered National Socialism as 
part of a larger problem and believed tha-t "if we do not have any 
higher general goals and concentrate exclusively on the Nazis in Germany 
we cannot escape the reproach of anti-Germanism. We oppose the Nazis 
only within the context of the general fight against fascism and for 
democracy." He felt that the Popular Front had to deal with the rise 
of American fascist organizations beyond the small German American Bund. 
He was not as tolerant of the American political and economic system as 
the leftist advocates of the Comintern policy. For him, there were two 
overlapping fronts: "A freedom loving America is the last safe bulwark 
against world fascism alone, Soviet Russia against world fascism and 
. 1" 1163 cap~ta ~sm. 
62Ibid. 
The Popular Front took only a temporary precedence over 
63
rbid., 17 June 1938. 
the ultimate goals of socialism. 
The purpose of harmony was also served "by wisely giving up 
resolutions of secondary importance". On the recommendations of 
Sattler and Schonstedt, the committee on resolutions withdrew two mo-
77 
tions which "might not find unanimous acceptance". The first contained 
an honorable citation of the Chicago group for the weekly publication 
of the Volksfront. The second resolution reminded the delegates of the 
campaign for the Einheitszeitung by asking that all mutual recrimina-
tions between the two front papers and the NVZ be dropped. Thus, the 
coalition did a complete job at the national convention. 64 
After the convention, the DAKV made creditable efforts in 
further Popular Front organization with limited success. The DAKV 
Chicago pursued an inter-ethnic Popular Front in the Midwest and on 
the West Coast. For Schrotter this was a natural course. Chicago 
had sizable minorities of all the former ethnic components of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire which were then all threatened by Germany. 
The DAKV Chicago participated in a mass meeting to commemorate Hitler's 
assumption of power with such groups as the Czechoslovak National Alli-
ance of America,. the Hungarian Democratic Federation, the Lithuanian 
Progressive Organizations, and the Jewish People's Committee. 65 This 
meeting resulted in the formation of a Joint Council of National Groups 
of which the DAKV Chicago became a member. 66 Thus, the latter gained 
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some liberal recognition by way of inter-ethnic associations. 
The further expansion on the West Coas~which had hardly any 
secondary labor organizations, was carried out by Hall in 1938 and 1939. 
He was mainly interested in Los Angeles and Hollywood which had become 
a center of German Jewish immigration and of American Jewish migration 
after 1933. It was a promising field for Popular Front antifascism. 
Various antifascist organizations existed already which the DAKV could 
potentially join. There were also many German exile writers, drama-
tists, actors and other artists in the area. Among the writers were 
Thomas Mann, Heinrich Mann, Bertold Brecht, Lion Feuchtwanger, Bruno 
Frank and Carl Zuckmayer. Their reputations went beyond ethnic and 
labor limits,and their very professions symbolized the antifascist 
principle of free artistic expression for which they had been persecu-
ted. Their literary contributions to the front press and the front 
press reports about their activities had an unlimited propagandistic 
value. But Hall's exploits were rather modest. In September 1938, he 
founded a DAKV local in Los Angeles that consisted of sixty members 
from three organizations like the German American war veterans of Cali-
fornia. Bruno Frank, who was known for his protests against the atro-
cities of the First World War, promised his cooperation. This embryonic 
DAKV participated in the activities of the Council of Nations which 
consisted of antifascist groups with Central European origins. A mass 
meeting was planned for October with an All Nations' Show directed by 
h h b k h d f bl . 1. 67 Max Rein ardt, t e est nown t eater irector o Repu ~can Ber ~n. 
67 Ibid., 24 September 1938; also Volksecho, 1 October 1938. 
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In 1939, Hall went back to the West Coast. The Volksfront serialized 
his travel diary which he sent from Portland, Oregon. 
The Eastern DAKV founded new locals in Rochester, New York and 
d . 1 . 68 Rea ~ng, Pennsy van~a. The DAKV New York, which was then headed by 
Sange~ of the communist German American Club, tried desperately to make 
69 
some Popular Front connections with non-labor groups. The Volksecho 
campaigned continuously for this forward move. From dubious evidence, 
it detected a change of mood in the non-labor organizations. In 
October 1938, it derived hope. from the fa-ct that only a bare third of 
the ten thousand German Americans who gathered for the Deutsche Tag 
(German Day) meeting in New York "raised their hands for the Hitler 
salute". There was "only one solitary and badly visible swastika" on 
display. The Volksecho discovered a "process of reorientation among 
German Americans" which was supposedly based on a popular "rank and 
file movement" within their organizations. 70 This warranted optimism 
for a comprehensive Popular Front. The German Day was organized by the 
Vereinigte Deutsche Gesellschaften (Confederated German Societies) to 
which belonged also the Steuben and the Karl Schurz societies. 71 The 
Volksecho defined this federation as a center block with which the left 
block of the DAKV was to effect a Popular Front as a matter of "histori-
cal mission". This front would oppose the fascist block of the National 
68 Volksfront, May 1939. 
69 Volksecho, 28 May 1938. 
70
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their efforts mainly on the Benefit Fund as the largest organization. 
Seger defended the past Social Democratic approach of reserve and pro-
crastination by conceding that "an organization like the Workmen's 
Benefit Fund must, of course, not be jeopardized or even destroyed by 
1 . . 1 d' . 1175 po ~t~ca ~scuss~on .. But political discussion was exactly what he 
had in mind under the new circumstances. For the quadrannual conven-
tion of the Fund in New Yor~, he admonished the delegates "that the 
political activation of the masses of the AKStK should be a special 
goal for the next four years". He advised the leaders of the organi-
zation to reform their "bad conscience toward revolutionary socialism". 
He saw the AKStK as the nucleus of a new labor party and recommended 
"political pioneer work for the formation of an independent labor move-
ment in the United States". Within such a movement, there was no room 
76 for a Popular Front. 
But Seger commented only indirectly on the DAKV. In his speech 
to the AKStK delegates, he explained why the NVZ did not believe in 
"cooperation with the adherents of the Soviet dictatorship". In an 
ensuing article, he expressed satisfaction with the eighth resolution 
of the convention which objected to "any kind of dictatorship". He 
interpreted it as a refusal of "fighting the fascist dictatorships to-
gether with the advocates of a differently colored dictatorship11 • Then, 
he exhorted the Benefit Fund that "the unity of the movement, the 
uniformity of the fight, the strength of the organization and the purity 
75
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76Ibid., 1 July 1939. 
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of the political ideas require the rejection of the wrong allies". 77 
Despite the decline of the Popular Front, the Social Democrats 
did not make many inroads on the AKStK. It is difficult to assess the 
factional balance within the Benefit Fund, but it did not seem to have 
shifted radically in 1939. The previous year, the Group for the Repre-
sentation of the Proletarian Interests had asked the Progressive Group 
in the AKStK to discuss a coalition of the two factions. The Progres-
sive Group claimed that it had already absorbed all factions and that 
the former consisted exclusively of communists. It insisted that there 
existed already "a unity of action in the fight against war and 
fascism". These Progressives were probably centrist rather than con-
78 
·servative members of the Krankenkasse. At the convention, Sattler 
proclaimed that "we remain the arch enemies of Nazism and fp.scism and ·r 
remain so as editor of the journal [Solidarity]. In this respect, there 
"11 b . 1179 WL e no compromLse. The resolutions of the convention demanded 
the continued unity of the socialist workers and asked for financial 
and political contributions to the work of the DAKV. Another appeal 
asked all branches of the Benefit Fund to join the DAKV. Heym reported 
in the Volksecho that "a reactionary mood" at the convention was over-
come and that the organization remained fortunately "on the side of 
the fighting proletariate". The "reactionaries" had criticized fi-
nancial and moral aid to the Spanish Popular Front. Except for the 
77 Ibid. 
78 Volksecho, 19 March 1938 and 16 April 1938. 
79Ib"d 
L •' 24 June 1939 and 1 July 1939. 
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communists, the AKStK remained united on the issue of a potential war. 
It demanded a referendum about American participation unless the United 
States would be attacked directly. 80 
After the conclusion of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the NVZ finally 
asked the secondary labor organizations directly to repudiate the DAKV. 
Seger publicized the refusal of the Volksecho and of the Volksfront to 
condemn the pact and invited "the AKStK, the Federation of Workril.en's 
Choirs, the labor athletic unions, in short, all German labor organiza-
tions of America [to] make a decision". He considered anybody hopeless 
"who has still not understood that you can't sit down at the same table 
with communists". There were "now only adherents of democracy and 
adherents of dictatorship". Seger asked those who agreed with the NVZ 
to decline any further cooperation with the DAKV. He admitted that 
"the NVZ had shown extraordinary restraint towards the DAKV during the 
past two years [and] had generally avoided to publicly confront organi-
zations who cooperated with communists". I~ had done so, according to 
Seger, not because it considered cooperation with communists possible 
but "for the sake of the fight against National Socialism". He stated 
categorically that "there is now an end to.this". 81 In December of 1939, 
the NVZ ·called for a boycott of the German Day rally of the DAKV and, 
for the first time, refused to report about this meeting of "a branch 
of Stalinists".82 It defined itself as "the only German language news-
80
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paper in the United States that, in accordance with its socialist prin-
ciples has continuously,fought against dictatorships of all shades."83 
The German American Popular Front nearly disappeared in the fall of 
1939. But the Social Democratic emigrants could claim no credit for 
this fact. They even failed to reap the benefits from it which they 
had expected. 
The German American Popular Front tried to adjust to the new 
situation of the non-aggression treaty and the resulting war with little 
success. It did so at the second national convention in Cleveland 
which had been postponed from June to early September for obscure rea-
sons. The best defense for the DAKV was another attempt at reaching 
safe, middle class waters. The Popular Front was supposed to save the 
United Front. According to Hall, "the needs of the day and the maturity 
of the evolution make it necessary and possible to expand the KV beyond 
h . 1 f h 1 1 . 1 b . . " 84 t e c~rc e o t e pure y c ass-consc~ous a or organ~zat~ons • 
Sattler agreed that it was most important "to make a consistent effort 
f • • b • • • II 85 o w~nn~ng over ourgeo~s organ~zat~ons • In the new situation, this 
strategy required ideological changes. In the resulting controversy 
over the proper adjustments, the leftists imposed their unworkable ap-
preach on the centrists. At the convention, Sattler introduced a motion 
to condemn the Hitler-Stalin Pact. But the leftists could not disown 
the latter. The Volksecho blamed it on the isolation of the Soviet 
83Ibid., 9 September 1939. 
84 Volksecho, 10 September 1939. 
85
volkszeitung, 9 September 1939. 
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Union which needed more time to prepare for the onslaught of the German 
armies. 86 The leftists referred the motion of Sattler to the committee 
on resolutions. There, they theorized that "the foreign policy of 
Russia did not concern the work of the League directly". The committee 
submitted a counter-resolution against condemnation "because of the 
unpredictable consequences and because the situation could change 
rapidly". The thirty-five delegates from a dozen cities accepted the 
second resolution "by all against four votes". The Volksecho reported 
this development only some ten days after the convention, in its last 
issue. 87 As a result of this stand, the German American Popular Front 
lost one of its main purposes, the defense of the Soviet Union by col-
lective security. But it could not benefit from this diplomatic change 
which was, propagandistically, much worse than the concept of collective 
security. 
In this dilemma, the leftists resorted to substitute ways of 
improving the image of the DAKV. The delegation from Philadelphia felt 
that the DAKV was "not only an anti-Nazi organization, but an auxiliary 
organization for all German Americans". Hall belatedly proposed to em-
phasize the transformation of the DAKV "from a purely negative anti-
Nazi organization to a positive German American cultural organization". 
He deplored the fact that the cultural work of the League was "still 
its greatest weakness". It was "sporadic and never systematic". It 
required "a serious, systematic educational program that familiarizes 
86 Volksecho, 26 August 1939. 
87 Ibid., 16 September 1939. 
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German Americans and Americans with German language, literature and 
music". It should extend to "the field of civilization", that is, it 
should "pursue German American interests in the public school system, 
h II 88 the public ousing system, etc •. Thus, the DAKV switched its empha-
sis from foreign to domestic policy. It stood "for a progressive 
internal policy" with a "minimum program of democracy for all German 
Americans 11 • 89 That meant "no lowering of salaries, no elimination of 
the WPA11 • 90 
The leftists also paid attention to the nationality issue and 
to ethnic protection. The Volksecho deplored that many German Americans 
denied their German origins. This contributed to the misconception that 
"Germandom and National Socialism are identical~'. 91 Hall also suggested 
that a strong DAKV could raise its voice after the war "when a new 
Versailles must be prevented to ensure the renaissance of a free demo-
cratic Germany". The convention should lay the foundation for this 
assistance. As a comprehensive purpose of a better Popular Front, the 
leftists offered "the protection of the loyal German Americans in the 
face of the war situation and of the danger of a rising anti-German 
hatred in the United States". 92 
With these ideological concessions, the DAKV hoped to qualify 
88Ibid. 
89Ibid., 2 September 1939. 
90Ibid. 
91Ibid., 19 August 1939. 
92Ibid., 16 September 1939. 
87 
for cooperation with the conservative German American societies. 93 
The president of the Wisconsin Zentralverband deutschstammiger Vereine 
(Confederation of German Societies) accepted an invitation to the con-
ference. With him, the German American Turners, a non-labor organiza-
tion, and the Steuben Society were envisioned as members of a National 
Cartel Organization of German Amer~cans. This middle class strategy 
could not work for a DAKV that identified with the Hitler-Stalin Pact. 
The Neue Volkszeitung correctly diagnosed it as a sign of decline. 
Hall covered this bleak outlook up with a show of confidence. Ignoring 
the latest international developments, he called the period from mid-
1938 to the fall of 1939 "a year of progress". In his speech to the 
convention, he described the development of the DAKV "from a loose 
federation of individual city locals .•• to a relatively solid national 
. . . h . 1 . 11 94 organLzatLon wLt a natLona executLve . He added that the latter 
was of one mind and had never had any serious differences of opinion. 
But with "the reorganization of the national executive" and other 
measures, the Popular Front assumed a lower profile which was not con-
ducive to a publicity oriented movement. Sattler was unanimously re-
elected president. Schrotter remained national secretary but Hall and 
Necker did not retain their vice presidential posts. Hall became na-
tional organizer instead. In a time of reduced activity, this was more 
a recognition of past services. A national secretariate of five members 
would reside in Chicago while the full executive of fifteen members 
would meet every six months in a central location., The national con-
93Ibid. 
94Ibid. 
88 
vention would be held only bi-annually unless half of the DAKV locals 
demanded an earlier date. The Volksecho and the Volksfront discon-
tinued publication shortly after the convention. The latter planned 
to issue a monthly DAKV bulletin for 1¢ apiece. 95 The first phase of 
the German American Popular Front was over. The DAKV survived only 
in obscurity. The next two years of the German socialist emigration 
belonged to the Social Democratic and the New Beginning groups. 
95
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC GERMAN EMIGRATION BEFORE 
THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORTS OF THE 
SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, THE UNIONISTS AND THE NEW BEGINNING GROUP 
These three Social Democratic groups were not equally compe-
tent in their organizational efforts in this country. The Sopade and 
the emigrants of the Allgemeine Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (ADGB, 
General German Trade Union Federation) had the best opportunities for 
establishing branches in the United States and for consistently culti-
vating good relations with American labor groups. But they were pre-
occupied with European events and did not make any long term plans. 
They represented the Weimar labor establishment and did not" feel the 
need for winning the recognition of an American labor movement whose 
socialist sector was alien to them, disorganized and small. The AFL 
was powerful but anti-socialist. At times of financial distress, the 
unionist and SPD emigrants made' ill-conceived attempts at raising 
instant American funds. 
The unionist emigrants made Martin Plettl the American repre-
sentative of their belated Gewerkschaftliche Auslandsvertretung Deutsch-
lands (Geade, Exile Committee of the German Trade Unions). But Plettl 
lacked the proper attitude to the plans of his American sponsors and 
remained too isolated. The Sopade was equally shortsighted. After 
89 
90 
failing to establish an early representation on the basis of already 
existing contacts, it sent a number of individual volunteer fund-
raisers to the United States at haphazard intervals: Seger in 1934 
and 1935, Sollmann in 1937, and Stampfer in 1939 and 1940. At the 
occasion of Stampfer's first trip to America, the Sopade finally es-
tablished an American branch, the German Labor Delegation (GLD). By 
then, the latter had already been preceded by the Gruppe Neu Beginnen. 
Unlike the other two groups, NB had no American contacts in 
1933. But its emigrant leader Frank seized the opportunity of Vladek's 
visit to Europe in 1935. Eager for a status which the Sopade tried to 
deny the NB Group, Frank realized that political work in the United 
States was important for a long term emigration. Before the end of 
his first visit to America in 1935, the NB Group had the nucleus of an 
American sponsor organization in the American Friends of German Free-
dom (AFGF). But the number of American sponsors was mainly limited to 
the Jewish labor leaders and the progressive minority in the Socialist 
Party. Even as a latecomer, the German Labor Delegation was not will-
ing to share the vital support of the Jewish labor organizations with 
NB. It resented the American success of Frank and tried to dislodge 
the New Beginning Group from its favorable position. In this process, 
antifascist unity was again sacrificed to emigrant rivalry. This be-
havior of the German socialist emigration limited the extent of its 
political work in the United States. It disillusioned the American 
sponsors and turned their antagonisms to the disadvantage of the 
German socialist emigration. In the Jewish Labor Committee, the pro-
NB and pro-GLD factions neutralized each other's initiatives for the 
91 
respective German emigrant groups. 
Long range Social Democratic planning would have required the 
establishment of an official branch of the Sopade in the United States 
in 1933 or 1934, before the split of the SPA in 1936. The Sopade was 
then financially independent and could have been an equal partner of 
American socialists. In this way, the SPD executive and the later 
Social Democratic emigrants in New York could have won the willing 
cooperation of the unionist emigration instead of arrogating unionist 
functions under the pressure of later circumstances. Neither could 
they have been challenged by New Beginning which was, instead, allowed 
a headstart. They would also have had to be more tolerant of dissent-
ing groups. Vladek would have insisted on moderation. But the Sopade 
lacked the necessary vision. It was only in~erested in Europe and ex-
pected an early end to National Socialism. By the time of its bank-
ruptcy, the Sopade was considered doomed so·that American socialists 
and unionists were reluctant to waste money on it. The opposing 
socialist emigrant groups were only good for partisan American pur-
poses. 
Immediately after the National Socialist assumption of power, 
Siegfried Lipschitz encouraged American socialists and unionists to 
cooperate with the· Sopade. He had run the Social Democratic press 
service in New York since 1929. 1 Especially American Jewish socialists 
1Federal Republic of Germany, Political Archives of the Aus-
wartiges Amt, Bonn, Ausburgerungen, 23. Liste, L-Z. Dr. Siegfried 
Lipschitz: Preussische Gestapo to Reichsministerium des Innern, 15 
November 1934. This document further elaborates that Lipschitz became 
a journalist after serving in the German army and studying law and 
economics in Berlin and Vienna. He represented various liberal German 
92 
and unionists were interested in contacts with the Sopade and in ex-
tension of its work to the United States. But Lipschitz found the task 
of mediation frustrating. Part of his problems with the Sopade were 
his own ideas about antifascist work in the United States. The execu-
tives disliked his patronizing criticism and activism and his insis-
tence on socialist renewal and cooperation. For a while, he had been 
editor-in-chief of the old New York Volkszeitung which suggests that 
he was too radical for the Sopade. Lipschitz deplored that the Weimar 
SPD had not responded to his exhortations of thoroughly informing 
American public opinion about the dangers of a National Socialist 
victory. In 1933, he was convinced that antifascist publicity in 
America by the SPD was more important than ever, and more important 
than in Europe because of "the support which we may receive from all 
sides of American public opinion for our fight against the Hitler 
regime". He. described how many "government agencies, organizations, 
newspapers, etc." had asked him "to be kept up to date about the de-
velopments within the German socialist and labor movement and to be 
informed regularly about all declarations, decisions, etc. of our move-
ment". Reciprocally, he hoped to contribute to the Neue Vorwarts and 
2 to all other publications of the Sopade. Beyond that, Lipschitz pro-
posed the formation of an official branch of the party in this country 
newspapers in the Far East. Then,he spent four years in Mexico as the 
head of the Social Democratic press service in that country before being 
promoted to the same task in the United States. 
2Archiv der sozialen Demodratie, Bonn, Emi rations-Kores ondenz 
(later referred to as EK), Lipschitz to Werte Genossen (Sopade , 21 June 
1933, Mappe 72. 
! 
r 
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on the ground that a mere press service would not suffice for the 
necessary work in the United States. He considered his loyalty un-
questionable and made himself available to the emigrant executives 
"at any time and in any way necessary in this fight against the reign-
ing German tyranny". 3 He informed them that he planned to attend the 
conference of the Socialist International in Paris in August 1933, 
where he expected to discuss these American matters with them person-
ally. Stampfer represented the Sopade in Paris and seemed very inter-
ested in the proposals of Lipschitz. He promised to report them to 
4 the full executive in Prague. 
But the Sopade was not interested. It was disappointed by 
the criticism of the SPA delegation to the Paris conference. Soon 
after his return from Europe, Lipschitz questioned Stampfer about the 
progress in the matter of an American Sopade branch and insisted again 
on the necessity for an immediate decision. He explained again that 
his plans were not only supported by the SPA but also by the American 
unions and by the leadership of the AFL. He offered to be an honorary 
Sopade representative and expected compensation only for the cost of 
running an office. The latter could in his opinion maintain close 
contacts with the government agencies in Washington and extend its 
work from a central point to the Latin American countries which were 
5 especially vulnerable to National Socialist propaganda. It can be 
3Ibid. 
4L· h' S d 7 1 1933 EK ~psc ~tz to opa e, Ju y , Mappe 72. 
5Lipschitz to Friedrich Stampfer, 27 September 1933, EK 
Mappe 72. 
r 
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assumed that an SPD branch of long standing would not have been ig-
nored by the American government. 
Without the establishment of a Sopade branch, Lipschitz con-
tinued his work within the antifascist activities of the American 
socialists. He wrote the pamphlet "Swastika over Germany" which was 
printed by the Rand School, th~ propaganda stronghold of the Old Guard 
in the SPA. 6 Shortly after his return from Europe in the fall of 1933, 
"the Socialist Party and the antifascist unions" organized the Labor 
Conference to Combat Hitlerism, a forerunner of the Labor League. 
According to Lipschitz, the ACWA and the ILGWU belonged to the Confer-
ence together with other Jewish labor organizations like the Workmen's 
Circle and "German party and labor groups". 7 The Labor Conference de-
cided to.:form locals throughout the United States and established an 
office for publicity, the Transatlantic Information Service (TIS). It 
was run by Lipschitz who then had an American substitute for the de-
funct Social Democratic press service. He expected the Sopade to 
cooperate closely with the Labor Conference and with the TIS. He 
solicited a regular correspondence which was to include telegrams on 
special occasions. He emphasized that "these international contacts 
are all the more necessary as we might at some unforeseen moment be 
terribly dependent on them". 
6Political Archives AA, Bonn, Ausburgerungen, 23. Liste, L-Z, 
Dr. Siegfried Lipschitz: Bericht der Deutschen Botschaft in Washing-
ton, 10 June 1933. 
7Transatlantic Information Service, New York, Lipschitz to 
Parteivorstand, Prag, 31 January 1934, EK Mappe 138. 
95 
This was a reference to a potential revolutionary change in 
Germany about which Lipschitz shared the general illusions. In March 
1934, he doubted whether the Sopade was prepared for such an eventu-
ality and was afraid "that the approaching hour of destiny will find 
us inhibited by unresolved questions". 8 He praised the Revolutionary 
Manifesto of the Sopade as a necessary beginning but urged more revolu-
tionary seriousness. He believed that "the time has come to officially 
shed the garb of the old Social Democracy and to unite under a new 
banner, in name also". In so doing, the Sopade could overcome the 
general criticism of the Social Democratic performance before and 
after January 1933. Lipschitz urged this change out of loyalty to the 
SPD which ought to defend itself against the charges from within and 
without its ranks that its Revolutionary Manifesto was only "new wine 
in old containers". He expected the Sopade to assume the revolutionary 
leadership against National Socialism and reintegrate the dissident 
. 9 
socialist groups into a common effort. He also advocated more far-
reaching plans which would have "an electrifying appeal to youth and 
to the world". He considered it necessary to unite "the defeated 
German and Austrian forces into a 'Grossdeutsche' socialist party" 
which would pursue "the goal of a united socialist 'Grossdeutschland' 
imbued with true Social Democratic spirit". 10 Such ideas could not go 
8Lipschitz to Stampfer, 2 March 1934, EK Mappe 138. 
9Ibid. 
10Ibid. 
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over too well with the Sopade which viewed the internationally favored 
and more radical Austrians with distrust. 
The Sopade nearly ignored the Labor Conference and left Lip-
schitz to his own devices. He had to remind the executives that 
Vladek, the general manager of the Jewish Daily Forward, had asked 
them for delivery of all Sopade publications including the issues of 
the year old Neue VorWarts. He told them without making much of an 
impression that "comrade Vladek is easily the most active American 
. 11 
personality in the fight against the Nazis, here and over there". 
In the absence of good overseas relations, Lipschitz vigorously pursued 
the American goals of the TIS with the assistance of the Jewish Daily 
Forward. He conducted "a systematic press and radio campaign" against 
the Third Reich, the Nazi propaganda in the United States, and against 
American antisemitism. His infor~tion went to more than five hundred 
d . . . d . d. . d 1 12 newspapers an magaz~nes, to numerous organLzatLons an ~n ~v~ ua s. 
The German government was concerned about the activities of 
Lipschitz because of its fear of anti-German feelings in the United 
States. The German embassy in Washington was upset about the circular 
letters of the TIS to the American press and about the wide influence 
13 
of the Information Service which reached Chicago, St. Louis and Omaha. 
The Prussian Gestapo complained that American public opinion was easily 
impressed and that Lipschitz "inflicted substantial damage on National 
Socialistic Germany and its economic relations with America", especially 
11Lipschitz to Stampfer, 30 April 1934, EK Mappe 138. 
12L· h' S d 31 J 1934 EK Ma 138 Lpsc ~tz to opa e, anuary , ppe • 
13Political Archives AA, Bonn, Ausburgerungen, 23. Liste, 
Bericht der Deutschen Botschaft in Washington, 26 January 1934. 
14 
through the proclamation of a boycott against German goods. To for-
ward its information to German newspapers was considered as "the 
15 
ultimate impudence" of the TIS. By March 1935, the German consulate 
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general in New York was satisfied to report that "the anti-German acti-
vities of Lipschitz have apparently subsided". According to a special 
agent, the TIS existed no longer and Lipschitz had accepted a position 
with the AFL. 16 Despite "his limited circumstances", the German 
embassy considered it advisable to postpone depriving Lipschitz of 
his German citizenship which-would only bring him undeserved publicity! 7 
The Gestapo waited until August 1937 before resubmitting a proposal for 
the Ausburgerung (deprivation of citizenship) of Lipschitz to the Min-
istry of the Interior which had then no more objections. 18 
. The disappearance of the TIS was due to an expansion of the 
Labor Conference. The latter was concerned that a strictly Jewish 
fight against fascism would stimulate rather than contain antisemitism. 
The Labor Conference was only precariously inter-ethnic with the mem-
14Ibid., ~reussische Gestapo to Reichsministerium des .Innern, 
. 15 November 1934. 
15Ibid., Bericht der Deutschen Botschaft in Washington, 26 
January 1934. 
16Ibid., Bericht des Deutschen Generalkonsulats in New York, 
6 March 1935. 
17 Ibid., Bericht der Deutschen Botschaft in Washington, 18 
January 1936. 
18Ibid., Preussische Gestapo to Reichministerium des Innern, 
20 August 1937; also Reichsministerium des Innern - Preussische 
Gestapo, 3 September 1937. 
\ 
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bership of such elements as "the German party and labor groups". 
According to Lipschitz, these "German organizations of a socialist hue 
have been active despite their weakness and have organized numerous 
meetings". But the Neue Volkszeitung did in his opinion "not fully 
1 • [ J • 11 19 ~ve up to our expectat~ons • Nevertheless, the Labor Conference 
refused to associate with communist groups. According to Lipschitz, 
the German communist emigrant Willi MUnzenberg, a Popular Front theo-
rizer and organizer in Paris, "thoroughly failed" in his purpose of 
winning American Jewish union funds during his visit to the United 
States in the summer of 1934. 20 Lipschitz also refused to mediate in 
August 1934 between the American Committee against Fascist Oppression 
in Germany and his "friends in the Socialist Party". He did not recom-
mend the communist proposals for a United Front around "the solidarity 
21 
campaign for the political prisoners in Germany", which were for-
warded to him by the American Munzenberg associate, Louis Gibarti. 
Under these circumstances, the American Jewish labor groups wanted "to 
conduct the fight on a strictly unionist basis" and tried to involve 
the AFL. They persuaded William Green to make boycott declarations 
19Lipschitz to Sopade, 31 January 1934, EK - Mappe 138. 
20Lipschitz to Stampfer, 21 August 1934, EK - Mappe 138. Mlln-
zenberg had his own convictions about the Popular Front which was 
officially proclaimed by the Comintern a year later, in August 1935. 
He was expelled from the KPD in 1939 for his independence of mind and 
action and shortly thereafter died mysteriously· in a forest near 
Grenoble, France. 
21Archiv des Bundesvorstandes des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes 
(DGB), DUsseldorf, Emigrationsnachlass Martin Plettl: Louis Gibarti to 
Lipschitz, 2 August 1934. 
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against German goods and issue antifascist appeals. In February 1934, 
Green and other AFL leaders presided over a "Hands across the Seas 
Dinner" which the Labor Conference organized in New York "as a symbol 
of solidarity with the German labor movement". Finally, the national 
convention of the AFL in San Francisco, in the late summer of 1934, de-
voted a full day "to the discussion of fascist problems". 22 Then, it 
established the Anti-Hitler Labor League and instituted a Labor Chest 
for the Relief and Liberation of Workers in Europe. Lipschitz kept 
his public relations job in the League so that the general consulate in 
New York had been correct in reporting his employment by the AFL. In 
October 1934, the Sopade finally responded to the entreaties of Lip-
schitz by sending Segar on a trip to the United States. It will be 
discussed after the following report on the relations between German 
and American unionists. 
The problems of Plettl in the American emigration were related 
to the lost reputation of the ADGB leaders after their misguided attempt 
at appeasing the Hitler government. The union emigrants faced an un-
friendly European union movement which tried to take the organization 
of underground work in Germany into its own hands. This was all the 
easier since the German union leaders were not prepared for such work 
and took more than two years to establish an emigrant representation. 
What hurt them most was this loss of international status in addition 
to their defeat at home. They were used to being the principals of the 
European union movement. They intended to rehabilitate themselves and 
22Lipschitz to Stampfer, 21 August 1934, Mappe 138 EK. 
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regain some of their former stature by assuming a belated control of 
all underground work in Germany. No German union was to deal directly 
with the union internationals. Thus continued an unhealthy antagonism. 
The relationship between Plettl and the American Jewish union leaders 
duplicated the European situation. Plettl could help to raise funds 
which were handed over to the union internationals. He suffered from 
this disregard which intensified his traumatic European experience. 
He became obsessed with regaining European respectability for the 
German union emigration but that development took too long. It was 
retarded in the view of Plettl by a conspiracy between New Beginning 
and the union internationals against the ADGB emigration. When Vladek 
became also enamoured with NB the task of Plettl seemed hopeless. 
With his union background, his visit to the United States had 
not required much negotiation. He had been president of the Deutsche 
Bekleidungsarbeiter Verband (DBV), Union of the German Clothing Workers) 
from 1920 to 1933, and also president of the Internationale Bekleidungs-
arbeiter Faderation (IBF, International Clothing Workers' Federation) 
from 1924 to 1935. In 1933,he was imprisoned for a while in Berlin and 
fled to the IBF in Amsterdam after his release in May. It was natural 
for the American garment unions to sponsor Plettl for a six-month tour 
of the Eastern and Midwestern United States in the fall of 1933 on be-
23 half of the Labor Conference. He took it safe and stayed in America, 
where he died in 1958. His emigrant activity was limited to the three 
years from 1933 to 1936. It ended with the decline of the Labor League. 
23Lipschitz to Sopade, 31 January 1934, Mappe 138 EK. 
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Plettl was absorbed by the developments of the German union 
emigration in Europe. In 1933, at the congress of the International 
Federation of Trade Unions, the latter played only "the shameful role 
of tolerated spectators", a discrimination that Plettl felt still 
"burning on (his] forehead" three years later. He felt like "a fugitive 
from a defeated army" and was depressed over "the scorn for the German 
24 loser". In the two years before the organization of a German emigrant 
representation, the IFTU and the IBS, the labor internationals, tried 
to coordinate the unionist underground work in Germany. They formed 
the Coordination Committee for Illegal Activities among whose members 
were Edo Fimmen of the International Transportworkers' Federation (ITF) 
and T. von der Heeg, the secretary of Plettl's IBF. They advocated 
dynamic underground work comparabl~ to the program of the New Beginning 
Group with whom they had various connections inside and_ outside of 
Germany. The German unionist emigrants were afraid of an NB conspiracy 
in the international organizations: "Miles - SI (Friedrich Adler), 
Miles - IFTU (Walter Schevenels), Miles - ITF (Edo Fimmen)". 25 Plettl 
and his fellow ADGB emigrants maintained the same liberal attitude as 
the Sopade and called the Coordination Committee the "Soviet of Amster-
dam"26 which allegedly rejected "out of hand ·an those whose names are 
connected with the old German trade union movement; since [their] 
'political' program is identical with political revolutionary romanti-
24Plettl to Schliestedt, 11 May 1936, Nachlass Plettl. 
25
schliestedt to F(ritz] Kummer, quoted in F[ritz Kummer] to 
Marten Hendrick (Plettl), 17 May 1935, Nachlass Plettl. 
26
schliestedt to Plettl, 5 February 1936, Nachlass Plettl. 
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cism, it entails a priori the exclusion of the old trade unionists who 
cannot go along with this line under any circumstances". 27 Plettl 
failed to get a response from the secretary of his own IBF despite re-
peated requests for information. Simultaneously, his presidency of the 
IBF ended in 1935. 
In his search for rehabilitation, Plettl was one of the most 
emphatic organizers of an ADGB representation abroad. He discussed his 
plans by correspondence with his unionist colleagues in Czechoslovakia, 
28 France, Holland and Denmark. They called a conference of emigrant 
leaders and representatives of German underground groups to Reichen-
berg, Czechoslovakia, in the summer of 1935. It decided to~form an 
exile committee (Geade) and a Reichsleitung (national underground com-
mittee) in Germany. Both were to guarantee the organizational indepen-
29 dence of the German trade union groups. in Germany and abroad. Indi-
vidual union groups were no longer to deal directly with Amsterdam or 
Brussels but with the national committee. The Geade would mediate 
between the latter and the labor internationals. In September 1935, 
the Geade was recognized by the IFTU in time for the AFL convention in 
October. 
Plettl pursued his European interests in 1936. He made "far-
27F[ritz Kummer] to Marten Hendrick (Plettl), 17 May 1935, 
Nachlass Plettl. 
28
schliestedt to Plettl, 17 May 1935, Nachlass Plettl. 
29Kreyssig, im Namen des Internationalen Gewerkschaftsbundes to 
Internationale Berufssekretariate, 9 August 1935, Nachlass Plettl. 
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reaching plans" for the Geade and proposed "to centralize and to win a 
preponderant influence" in the IFTu. 30 He intended to travel to London 
for the IFTU congress of 1936 and proposed a prior meeting of Geade 
representatives in order to discuss the offensive strategy for the 
congress •. He objected especially to the comprehensive representation 
of the German speaking countries by an Austrian unionist, and insisted 
on a direct representation of the Geade in the IFTU. He also promoted 
the idea of "an inevitable war" in order to persuade the IFTU into 
considering the opposition against Hitler rather than against Franco 
as the main issue of its future policy within which the Geade would 
. 1 . 31 acqu~re a centra ~mportance. His European strategy was that of 
"a concentric approach". He impressed on the other Geade representa-
tives the need for "hannnering" from all points of the German emigration 
sphere at the reluctant union internationals for recognition. Plett! 
could not, however, take his trip to London for lack of money and for 
fear of being refused reentry into the United States on his temporary 
visitor's visa. The Geade did not become what Plett! wanted it to be. 
It could not catch up with the developments in the United States. 
While waiting, Plett! had to defer to the reality of the Ameri-
can situation. He necessarily agreed to' "the concentration of contri-
butions in the IFTU" and in the IBS. 32 The two internationals received 
30Plettl to Kreyssig, 16 May 1936, Nachlass Plett!. 
31Plettl to Schliestedt, 11 May 1936; also Schliestedt to 
Plett!, 13 October 1936, Nachlass Plett!. 
32Plettl to Fritz Heinrich, 22 September 1937, Nachlass Plett!. 
104 
33 
"several thousand dollars" in early 1934. But the German unionists 
continually complained to Plettl that Italian, Polish and Spanish con-
cerns received preference. He considered it, however, pointless to 
34 pass on their direct financial requests to the Labor Chest. Instead, 
he told his fellow emigrants to refrain from overcriticizing the IFTU 
when they would meet Vladek on his trip to Europe in the summer of 
1935. He advised them to tolerate the fixed idea of dealing exclusive-
ly with the internationals since "we will achieve our goals best by 
letting [the American unionists] persist in their initiative and their 
good faith in its fairness". 35 But Vladek ignored the German unionists 
whom Plettl had recommended to him. Besides some Sopade leaders, he 
met some IBS secretaries, the secretary of the Socialist International 
and Frank, who was favored by the Austrian Adler and thus benefitted 
from the reputation of the Austrian socialists after their courageous 
but unsuccessful stand against the Dollfuss government. Vladek invited 
Frank to visit the United States in the fall of 1935. 
At that time, Plettl hoped to win a few points in prestige as 
the American Geade representative in Atlantic City where the AFL con-
vention took place. He had not gone to the important convention in 
San Francisco in 1934 where his new employer, the Labor League, was 
formed. Apparently, he did not want to ask the ILGWU for the train-
33 Plettl to Friedrich Adler, 15 March 1934; also Max Braun to 
Plettl, 24 February 1935, Nachlass Plettl. 
34
schliestedt to Plettl, 13 October 1936, Nachlass Plettl. 
35Plettl to Schliestedt, Hartig, Reissner, Kummer, 7 August 
1935, Nachlass Plettl. 
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fare to the West Coast. For the convention in Atlantic City, he was 
resolved to shed his modesty and to speak in the name of the German 
union emigration. It gave him a feeling of continuity since he had 
been a member of the German study commission which had attended the 
AFL convention of 1925 in the same city in order to sound out the pos-
sibility of an AFL membership ~n the IFTU. 
But by 1936, Plettl neared the end of his emigrant activity. 
The American labor movement was disrupted by the split of the Socialist 
Party and by the challenge of the CIO. Since the main unions of the 
Labor League spearheaded the movement for industrial organization, the 
Labor League and the Labor Chest lost their organizational basis. 
Plettl hoped that "the rift will not be permanent" so that "in the 
interests of the European tasks, this welt-functioning institution [of 
the Labor Chest] will be maintained and will not be reduced to our 
original organizations", the Jewish unions. That was exactly what hap-
pened. The Labor League fell into abeyance. Plettl retired to Florida 
where he lived for the next twenty years. 
A long term approach would have been better for the union emi-
gration. As Geade representative in New York, Plettl could have 
continued working with the Jewish Labor Committee and with Lipschitz 
with whom he had corresponded and met frequently. He was also the 
president of the Deutsche Freiheitsbund (League for German Freedom), 
"a politically neutral organization opposed to the Friends of the New 
36 Germany". In New York, he would have entered into contact with the 
36Gerhard Seger to Parteivorstand, 10 November 1934, EK Mappe 
119. 
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later arriving Social Democratic emigrants. In 1940 and 1941 he could 
have persuaded the Jewish Labor Committee to rescue some of the union-
ist refugees from Southern France whom the German Labor Delegation 
neglected. Such reinforcements would have obviated the later conflict 
between the GLD and a second union representation. 
The fate of Plettl showed that the Labor League was more inter-
ested in politicians than in unionists. The request of Lipschitz for 
"a prominent party speaker" led finally to the first visit of Seger 
from October 1934 to June 1935. 37 Lipschitz promised that he would do 
every~hing in his power to make the tour successful and hoped that 
Seger would "not be too late" for an enthusiastic American reception. 
He conceded that "public interest was momentarily concentrated on the 
Austrians" in this year of their courageous resistance. But he was 
dissatisfied with the performance of the socialist mayor of Vienna 
whose tour he had arranged. The latter was already sixty-five years 
old and "avoided any discussion of political and power questions" 
which Lipschitz considered important "in the interests of the future 
and of the necessary appeal to youth". He confessed to Stampfer that 
"the time has come when we have to brutally assume the initiative and 
cannot afford the luxury of looking back to the past with nostalgia". 
For these reasons, the choice of Seger seemed "fortunate" to him. 38 
Seger had an ideal antifascist record for a speaking and fund-
raising tour. He had spent most of 1933 in the concentration camp of 
37L· h. p . d 31 1934 ~psc ~tz to arte~vorstan , Prag, January EK Mappe 
138. 
38Lipschitz to Stampfer, 2 March 1934, EK Mappe 138. 
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oranienburg from where he escaped in December 1933. In retaliation, 
his wife and two year old child were arrested and then released under 
1 . h 1 . t. 1 1" d d. 1 · 39 H Eng ~s ecc es~as ~ca , par ~amentary an ~p omat~c pressure. e 
described his ordeal in the report "Oranienburg" which sold eighty 
thousand copies in Sweden alone within half a year. But significantly, 
he could not find a publisher in England or the United States. 40 His 
recent loss of citizenship in the company of two German princes made 
also promotive news. 
Yet, the tour of Seger was not successful. He had not been 
part of the rightwing establishment of the SPD. His good publicity 
enabled him to pay his own way and gave him the opportunity to pursue 
an independent emigrant career. His recommendation by the Sopade re-
fleeted this ambiguity •. · It read that "comrade Seger supports the 
political work of the party during his trip to the United States in 
. ,.41 the name of the SPD execut~ve • More crucially, Seger took sides with 
the Old Guard in the factional disputes within the SPA. The Militant 
majority charged that the Old Guard exploited his tour for propaganda 
benefits in the party struggle. The factional problems began with his 
reception in New York. He arrived together with the Austrian Julius 
Deutsch who had led the socialist defense against the Heimwehr militia 
(national guard) and who later became a general of the International 
39
seger to Parteivorstand, 18 May 1934, EK Mappe 119; also 
Radkau, Die deutsche Emigration in den USA, p. 146. 
40 Seger to Paul Hertz, 19 August 1934, EK Mappe 119. 
41 Sopade recommendation for Seger, 16 October 1934, EK Mappe 
119. 
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Brigades in the Spanish Civil War. The two socialists were welcomed 
at the pier by a large delegation from the Jewish unions, the Socialist 
Party, the League for German Freedom, and other German American organi-
zations together with "thousands of young socialists" with red flags. 
They carried the Austrian German pair on their shoulders to the waiting 
cars that brought them to the Socialist Party headquarters in a pro-
cession of music bands and thousands of marchers with hundreds of 
hb 1 . . h 42 tore earers ~n~ng t e streets. According to Lipschitz, this wel-
come and its publicity in the American press caused "a disruption of 
the Nazi propaganda in this country that could not be overestimated". 43 
Yet, Seger- was not pleased. He felt upstaged by the Militant 
majority of the Socialist Party. He believed that the latter misused 
the reception and the tour of Deutsch for publicity purposes in the 
contest over control of the New York party organizations. 44 He sided 
with the minority. In his view, only "the New York [City] and a few 
other organizations correspond to the German party", that is the SPD. 
He sarcastically compared the twenty-two thousand SPA members to the 
one hundred twenty million people of the United States. The Socialist 
Party was only "a miniscule sect" which in turn consisted of "more 
factions than members". He declared the national executive in Chicago 
"controlled by half-communists" and explained to the Sopade that "it is 
better and more useful for the financial purposes if I do not appear 
42Lipschitz to Stampfer, 2 November 1934, EK Mappe 138. 
43Ibid. 
44 Seger to Crummenerl, 18 November 1934, EK Mappe 119. 
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too often as a speaker of this party because of the relationship be-
tween the American unions and this insane sect". According to Seger, 
the SPA even mismanaged the tour of Deutsch because their "wild revolu-
tionary determination ••. was inversely proportional to [their] ability 
of organizing a simple speaking tour". Seger complained that certain 
comrades were 11not very friendly" towards him. According to hearsay, 
the national secretary was "not interested in arranging the American 
travels of German traitors". Seger claimed however that the latter 
and many others changed their views after listening to his presentation 
of the Social Democratic case in the Weimar Republic. Deutsch also 
conciliated by asking Seger to continue his program because he was re-
quired to leave the United States prematurely. 45 Under these political 
circumstances, Seger relied "on organizations quite different from the 
Socialist Party". 46 
Yet, his attitude towards the Socialist Party probably hurt 
his work with the Labor League. Vladek, who tried desperately to save 
the SPA, was also the treasurer of the Labor League. He continued his 
practice of dealing financially only with the labor internationals 
which had a joint European Committee for distributing American funds. 
Seger received a set fee of $25 for every meeting of his speaking tour 
for the Labor Chest47 which lasted for two months beginning in January 
45 Seger to Sopade, 10 November 1934, EK Mappe 119. 
46
seger to Toni Sender, 29 November 1934, EK Mappe 119. 
47 Seger to Vladek, 18 November 1934, EK Mappe 119. 
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48 1935 and extended from New York to Los Angeles. Vladek delivered 
this money, some $1,056, personally to the Sopade during his trip to 
49 Europe shortly after Seger's departure. For other Labor Chest funds, 
the Sopade depended on the European Committee. Inevitably, controversy 
arose over how much the Committee received and what was the proper 
Sopade share. At the farewell dinner for Seger, Vladek reportedly 
mentioned that the Labor Chest had raised $28,000 for Europe up to 
June 1935. The European Committee received $5,000 from Vladek in No-
vember 1934. In the spring of 1935, the president of the IFTU told the 
Sopade that the Labor Chest had sent $15,000 up to then. Later, he 
claimed that the Seger tour had netted $2,500 of that sum, a figure 
which made no sense to Seger. The latter kept urging the Sopade to 
request its due share. Vladek had already told him in November 1934, 
at the start of the tour, that the Sopade should "insist on a really 
substantial portion that corresponds to the importance of Germany, of 
our work and of my cooperation". In this sense, Seger argued that 
"nobody has worked as hard for the enlightenment about fascism in the 
United States as I". Then, he negotiated "long and repeatedly" with 
Vladek. But the latter referred him back to the European Committee 
which alone decided about the deservingness of underground groups. 
The IFTU had given most of the American funds to illegal groups in 
Germany of whom Seger professed to have heard for the first time. He 
48 Seger to Sopade, 10 November 1934; also Seger to Crummenerl, 
18 November 1934, EK Mappe 119. 
49 Seger to Crummenerl, 18 July 1935, EK Mappe 119. 
told the Sopade in disgust that he did not want to "further concern 
himself with the issue especially since my experiences in the United 
50 States were not very pleasant". He also complained that "the part 
111 
of his speaking tour which was organized by the American Federation of 
Labor was not very successful". He considered the latter "unprepared 
for the organization of a campaign of political meetings" since it had 
"no cadres of functionaries or at least of employees who have organi-
zational experience" 51 
The other engagements of Seger were not very successful either. 
They included "a mass meeting" of the League for German Freedom and a 
meeting of the German branch of the New York Socialist Party. Both of 
them were relatively well attended with audiences of seven to nine 
hundred people. But Seger commented that "a German speaker is natur-
ally disappointed". 52 His Chicago appearances included speeches at the 
Universities of Northwestern and Chicago and "two dinners with the 
richest men in town", one of them at the house of the lawyer Levinson 
who had drafted the Kellogg Pact. From these wealthy Jewish business-
men, the Sopade received "a first installment" of $500. 53 The press 
reaction to his Chicago appearances was insignificant. According to 
Seger, only opponents of President Roosevelt could get good publicity 
50 Seger to Crummenerl, 18 November 1934, 19 June 1935; 18 July 
1935, EK Mappe 119. 
51 Seger to Crummenerl, 18 July 1935; also Seger to Sopade, 
19 June 1935, EK Mappe 119. 
5 ~ipschitz to Stampfer, 2 November 1934, EK Mappe 138; also 
Seger to Sopade, 10 November 1934, EK Mappe 119. 
53 Seger to Crummenerl, 18 July 1935, EK Mappe 119. 
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there. His total record consisted of one hundred fifty-three speeches 
and ninety-four interviews in fifty-five cities and twenty-one states 
during an itinerary of over thirty thousand miles. 54 In the final 
analysis, Seger considered his tour "politically successful, ••• much 
less successful in the collection of funds for our illegal activities'.~ 5 
The Sopade was still used to spending large sums. 
For his second time in the United States, Seger had a different 
concept. He thought he had enough experience and connections for es-
tablishing himself in the United States independently of the Labor 
League. But he wanted to involve the Sopade more in his plans. At the 
end of his first trip, he wrote the exile executives that "our anti-
fascist propaganda is lacking a centralized systematic direction. If 
we would create one we could accomplish something". He would be well 
equipped to be the agent of such a Sopade effort in the United States, 
especially with his prospect of joining the staff of the Neue Volks-
zeitung in August 1935. Seger did not have the time to go to Prague. 
The Sopade executive, Siegfried Crummenerl, met with him in St. Gallen, 
Switzerland, in order to discuss the next American trip. 56 Seger told 
the Sopade that he had already "so many speaking engagements for the 
coming season" that he had decided to settle in America with his family. 
He hoped to collect $8,000 to $10,000. He emphasized, however, the 
need "for a planned action covering all the states ••• instead of my 
54 Seger to Sopade, 19 June 1935, EK Mappe 119. 
55 Seger to Crummenerl, 18 July 1935, EK Mappe 119. 
56 Seger to Sopade, 19 June 1935; also Seger to Crummenerl, 
19 June 1935, EK Mappe 119. 
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more or less sporadic appearance". He advocated a "real 1 drive 1 in the 
American style". This required the establishment of a party represen-
tation. Seger intimated that his permanent position with the NVZ could 
give "the political work in the United States the necessary stability 
so that a solid center for our party work could be established". He 
volunteered for·such a project unless the Sopade had "other personnel 
intentions". In this context, he asked: "By the way, your permanent 
representative here, is that Dr. Lipschitz?"57 His ignorance of the 
status of Lipschitz was indicative of the Sopade attitude towards him. 
If the latter had planned to establish a party branch it would have sent 
somebody else. 
For his fundraising efforts, Seger wanted to address the liberal 
middle class besides the labor groups. He was aware of the difficulties 
of such an undertaking. According to him, collection for charity was 
more popular than for political causes. Especially Jewish groups pre-
£erred to contribute to emigrant aid societies rather than to socialist 
and antifascist groups. They were afraid of generating more antisemi-
tism by interfering in internal German affairs. Criticism of the Social 
Democratic role in the fall of the Weimar Republic was another obstacle 
to fundraising. This criticism was especially prevalent in liberal 
middle class circles. They had "a devastating conception of the 'fail-
ure' of German Social Democracy so that the communists and the enormous-
ly popular Miles Group [NB] have an easier access to funds even from 
rightist groups". Seger attributed the anti-Social Democratic attitude 
57 Seger to Crummenerl, 6 November 1935, EK Mappe 119. 
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of many intellectuals and liberals to the influence of the Nation and 
the New Republic. It meant that "this mood is based on a complete ig-
norance of the subject and can be overcome immediately by an authorita-
tive presentation of the real state of affairs". Despite his confidence, 
Seger did not raise much money for the Sopade. He did renounce his 
speaker's fee in its favor since he had a permanent job with the NVz.58 
But there was practically no correspondence between him and Prague after 
1935. He pursued his emigrant career independently of the Sopade as 
editor of the NVZ, short time president of the DAKV and principal mem-
ber of the Social Democratic Federation. After the outbreak of the 
Second World War, he had even more ambitious plans which will be dis-
cussed in the context of the German Labor Delegation. He hoped for a 
political career in the United States and did not return to Germany 
after the war. 
When a concerted Social Democratic effort was not forthcoming 
Vladek looked for more contacts with the German exile and underground 
movement. During his trip to Europe in the summer of 1935, he also 
explored the situation of the latter. The general secretaries of the 
Socialist International and of the International Federation of Trade 
·unions recommended the NB Group and its exile leader, Frank, to him. 
Such European socialists as Leon Blum, the organizer of the French 
Popular Front, and Sir Stafford Cripps of the English Socialist League 
also favored the NB Group. Vladek was impressed with the exile and 
underground work of the latter which in the beginning acted as a con-
58 Ibid. 
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sultant to the .Sopade in this field. 59 NB provided many of the under-
ground reports for the Deutschlandberichte of the Sopade. It coopera-
ted with Social Democratic underground groups like the Zehn Punkte 
60 Gruppe (Ten Points Group) which repudiated the Sopade and with the 
remnants of the Sozialistische Arbeiter Jugend (Socialist Workers 1 
Youth Organization) in Berlin. Vladek knew that the leaders of the 
latter had been expelled from the SPD in early 1933 for preparing an 
underground cadre system when the party still believed in a legal exist-
ence. Also, the salaries of NB leaders were considerably lower than 
those of the Sopade executives and NB devoted a larger proportion of 
its income to illegal work. The latter resembled the activities of the 
Bund in Czarist Russia which had shaped the political attitudes of 
Vladek. After the Sopade executives, the American Bundist also wanted 
to meet Frank. But he missed the NB leader in Prague who then followed 
him to Brussels, his last European stop. There, he invited Frank to 
visit the United States and advised him to adopt the covername of Paul 
H f h . A . t• •t• 61 agen or ~s mer~can ac ~v~ ~es. That remained the emigrant name 
of Frank in the United States. As a well known mediator in the SPA, 
Vladek was interested in a united German effort against National Social-
ism. His interest in NB continued his previous solicitude for the 
Sopade and the German unionists. He also favored the NB policy of a 
59Hoover Institute for War, Peace and Revolution, Stanford, Cal-
ifornia, Karl Frank Papers, Box 5, folder Neubeginnen, Inquiry by the 
Office of Strategic Services, 15 May 1942. 
60 Paul Hertz, Erklarung zum Falle Paul Hagen, Karl Frank Papers. 
61Autobiographical data about Karl Frank; also Answer to an in-
quiry by the OSS, box 5, folder Neubeginnen, Frank Papers. 
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socialist concentration. Contrary to the assumptions of the Sopade, 
it was not the identification of NB as a Social Democratic group which 
endeared it to Vladek but the NB ideology and practice. Neither was it 
the end of Sopade subsidies which caused NB to look for American funds. 
The financial success of NB in the United States only duplicated its 
European fund raising efforts. It had received 5,000 sfrs from the 
Swiss Socialist Party and from the Swiss unions, 90,000 ffrs from the 
French Section of the Socialist International under L~on Blum, 500 
pounds from the Socialist League of Sir Stafford Cripps and 50,000 
crowns from the Czech Social Democratic Party. 62 The Sopade could have 
been as successful as NB in the United States if it had cooperated bet-
ter with Vladek and adopted a more positive attitude towards other 
socialist groups. 
The first fund raising campaign of Frank lasted from the fall 
of 1935 to early 1936 and nearly coincided with the second campaign of 
Seger. In 1935 already, Frank organized an NB center in the United 
States, the American Friends of German Freedom (AFGF). The latter 
skillfully avoided a reference to socialism in favor of an appeal to 
freedom. It was more an American sponsor group than an overseas branch 
of a German political group. It was "a small, rather private organiza-
tion"63 until early 1939 when it expanded its activities and became !'a 
more public organization". According to Frank, its first supporters 
were Jewish labor leaders which included besides Vladek, Julius 
62Inquiry by the OSS, 15 May 1942, box 5, folder Neubeginnen, 
Frank Papers. 
63 Mary Fox to Paul Hagen, 18 November 1939, box 8, folder F, 
Frank Papers. 
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Hochman and Max Zaritsky. There were also Socialists like Reinhold 
Niebuhr and Norman Thomas and the League for Industrial Democracy of 
which Thomas was chairman, Niebuh~ vice president, Mary Fox executive 
secretary and Vladek a member of the board of directors. During his 
first American visit, Frank lived at the house of Thomas so that he 
could not have gone far beyond the circles of the Labor League and of 
the Socialist Party in New York. 64 With the help of Vladek and the 
American Friends of German Freedom, Frank raised about $7,000 or 
$8,000. This amount represented about one third of the total NB budget 
of that year. It was much more than Seger had been able to collect. 
As could be expected, the Sopade became concerned about these 
65 developments. It had just terminated its subsidies to NB and hoped 
to see that group decline. Thus, the successful work of NB in the 
United States rekindled Sopade antagonism and gave more urgency to fur-
ther Sopade efforts in the United States. In the latter, the SPD execu-
tive was encouraged by Cahan who hated Thomas and opposed the attempts 
of Vladek to save the SPA. In this process, the Sopade sat on the 
wrong chair of American sponsorship. Even though Cahan himself reported 
to Wels that Frank collected only "a few thousand dollars with the help 
of Vladek" during his first visit, the Social Democratic emigrants cir-
culated rumours of much higher sums, usually $10,000. According to 
some statements, he raised $100,000 during his first tour. Others 
66 
claimed that he received $10,000 from Chicago sources alone. These 
64Ibid. 
65 Sopade to Seger, 18 September 1936, EK Mappe 119. 
66 
Abraham Cahan to Otto Wels, 21 May 1936, EK Mappe 58. 
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exaggerated figures implied criticism of Frank's fund raising methods. 
Cahan displayed more openly his political motivation. After 
the first visit of Frank, he changed his attitude towards the NB leader 
whom he had first met in 1934 at the convention of the British Trade 
Union Congress. Adler had introduced his friend to the patriarch 
socialist from America. Admittedly, the conversation with Frank was 
"clearheaded and realistic" and "he made a good impression on me". But 
in 1936, Cahan wanted to hear from his friend Wels "without delay, 
67 
what you think of Willi Muller [European covername of Frank]?" He 
told Wels that "as you know, we completely support the policy of the 
PV (Parteivorstand (party executive)] and I want to prevent anything 
that might further the interests of the NB Group in any way". He re-
sented that Frank had stayed at the house of Thomas and met "mainly 
with the leftist Socialists who cause us so much trouble and do so 
h d • h h • • • h h • II 68 muc amage wLt t eLr cooperatLon WLt t e communLsts . Actually, 
the pacifist Thomas group was the first from which the AFGF disengaged 
after the outbreak of the war. Cahan's antagonism towards NB was kept 
in check until 1938, that is "as long as Vladek was alive" who "pro-
tected our interests". 
The long response from Prague opened a campaign for the char-
acter assassination of Frank in the United States. The account of Wels 
about the past of Frank opened with the two points that were most in-
criminating in the United States: the NB leader was a former communist 
67
cahan to Sollmann, 16 August 1936, EK Mappe 122. 
68
cahan toWels, 21 May 1936, EK Mappe 58. 
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and a kidnaper. The account omitted the political context of the latter 
charge. Together with a fellow communist in Berlin, Frank had forcibly 
prevented a representative of the Social Democratic Vorwarts who later 
became a National Socialist from making a radio address in favor of 
naval rearmament. Instead of the Vorwarts speaker, a communist sp9ke 
against it. The SPD had just come out of the elections of 1928 as the 
strongest party after an appeal for more food to the needy rather than 
for new cruisers for the navy. In the process of forming a coalition 
government, the Social Democrats reversed themselves. In his letter, 
Wels continued the conspiracy theme by recalling that he had rejected 
a 1932 offer by Frank of bringing a faction of the SAP back into the 
SPD as the attempt of "a communist emissary" to infiltrate the party. 
In order to excuse the later Sopade dealings with the NB Group in the 
emigration, Wels made the Austrian socialists Adler and Bauer respon-
sible for the survival of NB. The 40,000 Mark of subsidies for the 
latter came out of a total budget of more than three million Mark and 
were expended "in order to synthesize what forces were still left in 
Germany" after 1933. This generosity was allegedly repaid with in-
gratitude when Frank "soon led all oppositional intriguing against 
II 69 
us • 
The rupture with NB came according to Wels when Frank bribed 
Otto Schonfeld, the secretary of Wels, into surrendering secret Sopade 
documents. Actually, Schonfeld turned them over voluntarily. They 
69 Sopade to Cahan, 12 June 1936, EK Mappe 58. 
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consisted of a report about NB at the time of its cooperation with the 
Sopade and contained the names and addresses of friends of Frank and 
Schonfeld in Germany. It was accessible to everybody in the SPD office. 
One of its secretaries was later discovered to be a Gestapo agent on 
whose intelligence many illegal socialists went to concentration camps, 
•• 70 .• including Schonfeld's father. After this incident, Schonfeld con-
tinued as Sopade secretary and held other positions of trust. The most 
arrogant conspiratorial act was according to Wels the attempt by Frank 
at winn,ing NB representation in the Socialist International. In his 
summary, the Sopade chairman characterized Frank as "a professional 
conspirator" who was by 1936 only "a maverick with a few friends". 
Only "his American visit has set him afloat again". Wels explained 
that the Sopade had "absolutely no relations with him". 71 Cahan re-
newed his continental friendships with a visit to Europe in 1936 despite 
his seventy-seven years. Then, he vigorously sponsored the plan of a 
fund raising campaign of the Sopade member Wilhelm Sollmann. 
The visit of Sollmann was another instance of how the Sopade 
bungled its American relations. Instead of working out a permanent 
arrangement with its man on base, it added another failure to that of 
Seger. The main problem was that the Sopade was only interested in 
raising funds instead of establishing a political base in the United 
States. The latter was a difficult goal to pursue as long as the exile 
executive tried to circumvent the American labor movement instead of 
70Erklarung von Otto Schonfeld, 6 November 1943, box 7, 
folder 4, Frank Papers. 
71Ibid. 
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coming to grips with it. The Sopade choice for a second envoy was no 
better than the first. Sollmann was not representative of the Sopade. 
Even though the latter had subsidized his newspaper Die Deutsche Frei-
~ in Saarbrucken and then in Luxemburg with initially 10,000 ffrs a 
month and had paid a salary of 1,200 ffrs a month to him and his asso-
ciate,Sollmann maintained an ideological independence with his Volks-
sozialismus (Ethnic socialism). His loyalty was more a matter of 
personal relations with his equals and old friends, Wels and Crummenerl. 
He did not recognize the Sopade as the official voice of the SPD and 
reserved the right of speaking for himself. Later, he resented Sopade 
propaganda that identified too closely with the Allied war effort. He 
was also more interested in establishing himself personally in America. 
With the help of his English Quaker friends, he eventually became a 
lec~urer at Swarthmore College near Philadelphia. In the United States, 
he soon detached himself from the Social Democratic executive and emi-
gration. In a probable reversal of his motives, he explained that he 
wanted to be an American. 
This reasoning did not apply to his conservative political 
relations with the former German chancellor BrUning and with the left-
ist National Socialist Otto Strasser. He was excited when Gottfried 
Treviranus informed him that "Bruning has repeatedly asked about me 
(sollmann]". He expected that Bruning "will certainly find an oppor-
tunity for a discussion with me" in the United States. There, he 
visited the former chancellor several times and corresponded with him 
throughout the war years. He also used the influence of Bruning for 
trying to get an American visa for Strasser. He had met with the 
122 
latter occasionally and corresponded with him until_l942. He assured 
Wels in 1936 that he was only interested in "objective discussions" and 
did not think of publicly cooperating with Strasser. But he was unable 
to "predict which alliances the future will force on us". 72 Sollmann 
considered the antisemitism of Strasser as mild. It would grant citi-
zenship to those Jews who could meet certain qualifications. Not 
accidentally, he was occasionally the recipient of antisemitic party 
correspondence which complained about the prominence of Jewish Social 
Democrats and their responsibility for the plight of the party. The 
ethnic socialist Sollmann deplore~ himself, the persistence of the 
Marxist ideology in the SPD and explained to Wels that "my national 
affiliation with Germany emanates from my peasant blood". 73 This choice 
of a representative exemplifies the ineptitude of the Sopade which hoped 
to raise large funds from Jewish organizations in America. It also 
meant that the Sopade did not yet grasp the importance of the American 
Jewish labor movement. As a first generation teader, Cahan was out-
dated. His maverick position depended on his old control of the Jewish 
Daily Forward. 
Seger did not grasp the situation either. He prepared the visit 
of Sollmann in the same way that he had organized his own speaking tours 
as those of an emigrant doing individual business with his own selection 
of disparate American organizations. There was at first also a personal 
problem. The Sopade treasurer Crummenerl, who was a,personal friend of 
72
so11mann to Wels, 31 D mb 1935 EK M ece er , appe 122. 
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r-~ 123 
t 
Sollmann' d.;d not l.;ke h.;,.,. 74 B t S 11 h d ·1· · L L ~  u o mann a a cone~ ~atory conversa-
tion with Seger during the latter's interim return to Europe in the 
summer of 1935. 75 In July and September 1936, the Sopade asked Seger 
76 directly to support the plans of Sollmann who eventually reported 
. 77 
that Seger "seems to promote me now vigorously". The two of them 
agreed that an American agent should plan the tour for a commission of 
25a/ Af f• • 78 S t "11 f 1 h t S 11m ~. ter ~ve negat~ve answers, eger s ~ e t t a o ann 
should not even bother with "the political labor movement in America" 
which included Vladek. He argued that it was "very weak" and had also 
suffered a split recently. A close identification with it would jeop-
ardize arrangements with other American organizations. Wels agreed 
with Seger. Despite the setbacks with an individual arrangement, he 
was still determined "to do everything possible in order to bring off 
h Am . . . " 79 t e er~can m~ss~on • He still thought that one of the possible 
things was to ignore Vladek who had made strenuous efforts for NB. 
Sollmann was pulling opposite strings. When Vladek was again 
in Europe in the summer of 1936 at the same time as Cahan and planned 
to visit Prague, Sollmann tentatively approached his dissenting Sopade 
colleague and NB supporter, Hertz, with the request: "Why don't you 
119. 
74 Sopade to Seger, 9 July 1936; 18 September 1936, EK Mappe 119. 
75 Sollmann to Crummenerl, 3 September 1935, EK Mappe 122. 
76 Sopade to Seger, 9 July 1936 and 18 September 1936, EK Mappe 
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sollmann to Crummenerl, 18 September 1936, EKMappe 122. 
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mobilize your connections for my American trip with which I am somewhat 
80 in love?" But he also tried to exploit the connection with Cahan 
while simultaneously excluding Cahan from a full preparation of his 
trip. He asked the Old Guard socialist to reconfirm the approval of 
his .American plans. The latter promised to "do everything in my power 
to make the trip possible". But he asked for a delay until the contra-
versies in the Socialist Party were resolved. He conceded that "our 
comrades in America - I mean the loyal Social Democrats - are somewhat 
confused about the background of the socialist work in Germany". But 
he confirmed that "we remain loyal to the old executive and its com-
rades. We are not interested in NB and all the other left wings" 81 
He reiterated his resentment of Frank's residence in the house of 
Thomas "who tried to oust Morris Hillquit and who collaborated with the 
American Trotzkists and other 'unofficial communists'". Thomas was 
"a muddle-headed demagogue of the cheapest type but we, the 'Old Guard', 
that is the loyal old Social Democracy, separated irrevocable from these 
people and founded the Social Democratic Federation11 • 82 He explained 
that the SDF retained the Jewish Daily Forward and the majority of the 
party members including the Jewish and the German speaking branches and 
"all loyal socialists of the American movement". He remarked on the 
Vladek group that "only a handful of our people are still trying to sit 
80 h. d . 1 k . hl 1 Arc ~v er soz~a en Demo rat~c, Bonn, Nac ass Pau Hertz, 
microfilm of the Paul Hertz Papers at the Institute for Social History 
in Amsterdam, Netherlands, Sollmann to Hertz, 9 July 1936, film reel 14. 
81 Cahan to Sollmann, 18 August 1936, EK Mappe 122. 
82Ibid. 
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on two chairs. One of them introduced W. ~uller [Frank] to the Jewish 
labor organizations •.. so that he received about $10,000. Later, they 
told me that, in their opinion, all this was done with my knowledge and 
approval."83 Cahan was determined to foil the plans that Vladek had 
with NB. He did not need the further prodding which Sollmann suggested 
to Wels. 84 
As Cahan used Sollmann, so the latter used the former. A friend 
of Cahan who was a correspondent for the New York Times wrote a lauda-
tory article about Sollmann just before the arrival of the Sopade 
representative in January 1937. It called him "the greatest political 
figure losing his citizenship at this time, .•• one of the outstanding 
leaders of German Democracy, ••• an authorized representative of the 
. 85 
underground movement in Germany". After this, Cahan's name was 
omitted from the letterhead of the invitations which the Sollmann 
Reception Committee sent out. As its secretary, Seger in·cluded the 
names of such dissenting emigrants as Sender and Rosenfeld. He con-
sidered it especially important to use the names of protestants like 
Niebuhr, Tillich and the executive secretary of the Christian Committee 
86 for the Aid of German Refugess. Because of this plan of approaching 
American protestant organizations, Seger advised that Sollmann should 
"not be branded right away as a party politician". This would close 
83Ibid. 
84 Sollmann to Wels, 18 August 1936, EK Mappe 122. 
85 New York Times, 4 December 1936, article on Sollmann. 
86 Sollmann to Wels, 31 December 1936, EK Mappe 122. 
many doors for him since "even well educated Americans unhesitatingly 
interchange socialists, communists and anarchists which is all red to 
h " 87 tern. Actually, the non-socialist protestants were not all that 
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antifascist, certainly not pro-socialist and sometimes suspect of anti-
semitism. Seger wanted to avoid the impression that the Sopade repre-
sentative was "engaged only by Jews". This raises the suspicion that 
Sollmann with his conservative and reactionary connections was delib-
erately chosen to appeal to American protestant and other organizations 
and that the detachment from the American Jewish labor groups was cal-
culated or, as it turned out, miscalculated. Sollmann hoped that Cahan 
would understand these tactics. 88 Later, he was incensed that the 
American Jewish Congress refused to engage him. The speaking tour of 
Sollmann was as uncoorainated as it could possibly have been. 
The Social Democratic expectations that had engendered the 
quasi-businesslike concept of the Sollmann mission were completely out 
of place. Wels admitted that "after five years of Hitler dictatorship, 
our accounts are substantially lower ••. and the time will come when 
they-will be empty". He projected that a monthly contribution of 
$4,000 from the United States would allow the Sopade to carry on as 
before. He regarded American Jewish institutions as inexhaustible 
suppliers of funds and could not believe that they would contribute to 
h . b . f . 89 Jewis em~grants ut not to ant~ asc~st groups. Sollmann set the 
87 Seger to Sollmann, 19 December 1936, EK ~ppe 122. 
88 Sollmann to Hertz, 6 March 1937, film reel 14, Nachlass Hertz. 
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sopade straight about his fund raising potential. He considered him-
self "lucky if I could raise $4,000 only once". He thought that he was 
doing a good job politically but conceded that the collection of funds 
was more difficult than he had imagined. 90 By the end of 1937, he had 
sent little money to Prague. 
Sollmann had various explanations for this failure. He claimed 
that his fund raising was "only so difficult because the Sopade is 
thoroughly despised except by a few people" like Cahan. 91 He was out-
raged by the favorable comments of Stampfer in the Neuer Vorwarts about 
the Popular Front discussions of Breitscheid and other Social Democrats 
in Paris. He was desolate about the way in which "the heritage of the 
greatest political movement the world had ever known [the SPD] was 
squandered by little souls". He then explicitly denied the Sopade "the 
future right to issue authoritative political judgements". With simi-. 
lar escapades, they were jeopardizing his future cooperation. This was 
ungrateful since he was the only productive executive in 1937 "in con-
92 trast to all of you". Sollmann also believed that in their effort 
"to starve out [the Sopade] financially", the NB Group had denounced 
him as antisemitic with American Jewish organizations. An article 
about his ethnic socialism by an.NB member had appeared in the Sozial-
istische Aktion which Hertz edited for the Sopade. 93 It was apparent-
Hertz. 
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sollmann to Crummenerl, 3 December 1937, EK Mappe 122. 
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ly translated into English and distributed to American Jewish organiza-
tions. But, according to Hertz, the Neue Volkszeitung itself had pub-
Jished an interview with Sollmann in which the latter frankly discussed 
his relations with Strasser. Hertz admitted that he had sent "some of 
my American friends" copies of his correspondence with Sollmann from 
the years 1935 and 1936 about the notions of this ethnic socialist on 
nationalism and the ~ewish question. He wanted to "avoid the impres-
sion that the underground movement endorsed these ideas". 94 This was 
probably the source of the charge that Frank had sent letters to Thomas 
95 
and to the president of the American Jewish Congress. Sollmann 
later admitted that he had no direct proof for this. He talked to 
Thomas and the AJC president but could not overcome the shame of having 
to defend himself publicly against a charge of antisemitism. Neither 
could he regain "full trust in any of the 'comrades' who believed such 
96 
unfounded rumours". It helped him to find his way out of the socia~-
ist emigration. His attitude towards the Jews was peculiar. He prob-
ably took some of the prejudices against them for facts which did not, 
however, justify any unequal treatment. In his own mind, therefore, he 
was not antisemitic. 
Despite the above explanations, Sollmann found out the cause of 
94 Sollmann to Hertz, February 1937; also So1lmann to Sopade, 
February 1937; also Hertz to Sollmann, 24 April 1937, film reel 14, 
Nachlass Hertz. 
95 Sol1mann to Sopade, 12 April 1937, EK Mappe 122. 
96Archiv der sozialen Demokratic, Bonn, Nachlass Friedrich 
Stampfer, Sol1mann to Stampfer, 21 February 1939, group I, section 13, 
Nr. 640. 
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his failure. He realized that without contributions from the Jewish 
unions he could not get very far. He told the Sopade about Vladek that 
"I do not believe that anything can be accomplished without him". 97 
Cahan was "the only loyal American friend ••• we have here". But the 
latter was limited. If he were "ten or twenty years younger everything 
would be much easier but the younger Vladek has overtaken him long 
98 
ago". Instead of blaming himself and the Sopade for the bad relations 
with the Jewish labor leaders, Sollmann scored the thirst for "radical-
ism" and "the complete lack of political instincts" of the NB contri-
butors. The concession he suggested was only palliative. He asked the 
Sopade to "please, think about whether you can not come up with some-
thing like a Social Democratic United Front". He had the Rote Stoss-
trupp. (Red Avant-Garde) in mind "or whatever the little group is called 
that rejoined you recently". 99 The Sopade and Sollmann had not yet 
overcome their sense of superiority over the American and American Jew-
ish labor movement which derived from their prominence before the defeat 
by National Socialism. 
The results of the following visits of Frank contrasted even 
more with the Social Democratic failure than the first one. His second 
visit lasted from April to June 1937 and netted $12,000. During this 
stay, he married .Anna Caples and became an American citizen. His third 
visit lasted from December 1938 to the spring of 1939. At that time, 
97 Sollmann to Crummenerl, 3 December 1937, EK Mappe 122. 
98 Ibid. 
99Ibid. 
130 
the AFGF was expanded and started publishing its Inside Germany Reports. 
With the ~inence of war, Frank decided to stay in the United States. 
He returned once more to Europe in June 1939 in order to transfer the 
NB exile committee from Paris to London in anticipation of a French 
defeat. In a response to an inquiry by the Office of Strategic Ser-
vices, he estimated the total sum of American contributions to NB 
between 1935 and 1942 at $90,000 to $100,000. Until 1935, the Sopade 
treasurer Crummenerl overlooked the NB funds. In 1936, Hertz became 
the trustee of NB finances at the suggestions of the SI secretary, 
Adler, the NB exile committee and several underground organizers. 
Hertz handled the NB funds through a committee of three that included 
himself and Frank. The American funds passed through a committee in 
New York. It transferred them to Sir Stafford Cripps in England who 
h d d h h H . 100 an e t em over to t e ertz commLttee. 
Despite these arrangements, Frank had to face all kinds of 
Social Democratic accusations. His visits became occasions for an es-
calation of Social Democratic recriminations. In this process, the 
relations between the two groups deteriorated beyond the mediation 
attempts by some Jewish labor leaders. The tables turned for the two 
groups when Vladek died at the early age of fifty-two in October 
1938. 101 The death of this influential NB sponsor gave free reins to 
100Paul Hertz, Erklarung im Falle Paul Hagen; also Autobio-
graphical data and OSS Inquiry, 15 May 1942, box 5, folder Neubeginnen; 
also Paul Hertz to Dear Comrade, 19 June 1940, box 7, folder 4, Frank 
Papers. 
101Frank, Autobiographical data, p. 9, document received from 
Mrs. Frank. 
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the antagonism of Cahan. By this accident, the Social Democrats re-
covered some of the ground they had lost through their lack of imagina-
tive planning. But they abused it to the detriment of the whole German 
socialist emigration in the United States. After 1938, it was difficult 
to stem the tide of Social Democratic recriminations. On hearsay infor-
mation, Seger charged among other things, that Frank had embezzled NB 
102 funds. He promised to retract these accusations publicly but failed 
to do so after the death of Vladek. It turned out that Frank had not 
led a luxurious life in an Austrian spa but merely spent some days with 
\ 
his daughter of his previous marriage before returning to the United 
States for good. 
In the fall of 1937, the general secretary of the Workmen's 
Circle, Jos~ph Baskin, who was also a member of the JLC, tried unsuc-
cessfully to bring about a friendly agreement between the Sopade and 
NB. During his tour of Poland, he made a detour to Prague and offered 
his "mediation in case of serious intentions for an understanding". He 
had an interview with Stampfer in order to sound out the attitude of 
the Sopade. Stampfer reacted positively as always but he discussed 
the interview only with Wels, Vogel and Crummenerl rather than with 
the full Sopade so that Hertz was excluded. As the outcome of this 
meeting, Stampfer informed Baskin that the Sopade was not interested 
in discussions with other groups. Under these circumstances, Baskin 
did not return to Prague. He regretted that the Sopade people were 
102 Paul Levy to Hertz, 7 February 1938; 14 February 1938; 5 
September 1938; 18 September 1938; also Hertz to Levy; 2 September 
1938; also Hertz to Hagen, 16 July 1940, film reel 14, Nachlass Hertz. 
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"blind, stubborn and live in the past". The Sopade and the Social 
Democrats in New York did not want to co-exist with NB. They hoped to 
supplant the latter in the favors of the Jewish Labor Committee. 
They made their first serious organizational effort in the 
spring of 1939, not because they were concerned with the political 
situation in case of war but because they were bankrupt. The Sopade 
~ad to discontinue two of its three publications, the Zeitschrift fur 
... 
Sozialismus in 1936 and the Sozialistische Aktion in 1938 after the 
expulsion of Hertz. It could not publish the Neuer Vorwarts much 
longer without American help. If it stopped publishing the Vorwarts 
prematurely it could expect no assistance at all. In this emergency, 
the Sopade decided to approach the Jewish Labor Committee and the AFL 
and to establish a permanent representation in the United States for 
104 these purposes. The latter was logically called German Labor Dele-
gation. The Sop.ade finally discarded the salesman's concept of soli-
citing donations for antifascist speeches in favor of negotiating with 
fellow labor groups. In order to initiate these plans, it sent the 
Jewish executive Stampfer to the United States. He was the one Sopade 
member best known and regarded by the American Jewish labor leaders. 
He was also the best public relations man of the exile executive. He 
was a party professional who had edited the national party daily 
Vorwarts since 1916. As an ethical rather than a Marxist socialist, 
he represented well the right wing Sopade. 
103 Hertz to Baskin, 9 September 1937, film reel 14, Nachlass 
Hertz. 
104Matthias and Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Ein-
leitung, p. 35. 
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By the time of Stampfer's first visit in January and February 
1939, the friends of Cahan had a majority in the JLC. The latter 
promised large sums on the scale of the contributions to NB. But their 
passage through the Committee took beyond the time of Stampfer's visit. 
The latter also met with the president of the AFL. With his right wing 
Social Democratic ideology, he thought that the Sopade had to choose 
the democratic AFL over the pro-communist CIO. He expected much from 
this national union federation without realizing that it was worlds 
apart from the socialist unions of the Weimar Republic. Stampfer told 
Green that the Sopade funds for the fight against Hitler were nearly 
exhausted and that the executive needed $50,000 annually for continuing 
its work. 105 For the current year, $25,000 would be enough. According 
to plan, Stampfer and the Social Democratic emigrants in New York 
formed the German Labor Delegation which was to pursue the relations 
with the JLC and the AFL. The rather obscure Rudolf Katz became the 
secretary of the GLD. He had come directly to the United States in 
the mid-thirties and had not been in contact with the SPD executives 
either during the Weimar Republic or during the emigration. In New 
York, he became a member of the editorial staff of the Neue Volks-
zeitung and the secretary of the German language branch of the Social 
Democratic Federation. He was ready to do the political work of the 
GLD for which he had few competitors among a Social Democratic emi-
grant group that had grown larger during the late thirties. It includ-
ed Aufhause~ Max Brauer, the former mayor of Altona, Grzesinsky and 
105
stampfer to William Green, 23 February 1939, Matthias and 
Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 49, p. 381. 
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Hans Staudinger, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce in the Prussian 
government and later professor at the New School for Social Research in 
New York. 
After the departure of Stampfer, the GLD could not lead the 
negotiations which he had opened to a very good conclusion. The JLC 
promised ~irst $15,000 and then $10,000 f~r 1939. 106 Katz and Stau-
dinger pleaded continually for an early partial payment and were 
finally granted $4,000 in May 1939 and a smaller sum later. The rest 
. 107 
of the $10,000 remained outstanding. In order to further its re-
lations with the JLC, the GLD invited Dubinsky, Zaritsky and Baskin to 
join its American sponsor committee. Seger addressed the AFL conven-
tion in Cincinnati in October 1939 but no contributions were forth-
coming from the giant union federation. In the field of the non-labor 
Jewish organizations, the GLD made no progress either. It contacted 
the two main conservative organizations, the American Jewish Committee 
and the order of Bne Brith which spent large sums on the fight against 
antisemitism. The AJC represented the Jewish business community which 
had Central European ethnic origins. It was reluctant to support revol-
utionary activities in Germany and was afraid of an antisemitic reaction 
in the isolationist United States. The Order of Bne Brith shared these 
reservations. Besides antisemitism, it combated communism and did not 
take the German Social Democrats for what they said they were. A 
106 Katz to Stampfer, 11 March 1939, Matthias and Link, Mit dem 
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 51, pp. 383-387. 
107Katz to Stampfer, 22 May 1939, Matthias and Link, Nr. 62, 
pp. 400, 401; also Stampfer to Sopade, 7 February 1940, Matthias and 
Link, Nr. 86, pp. 440, 441. 
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delegation under Katz met with the director of the American Jewish 
Committee and told him that the Sopade needed about $75,000 for 1939. 
The latter offered only to convene an informal meeting with a few in-
dividual AJC members to whom the GLD would have to report again. 108 
The wealthy labor lawyer, George Backer, who had recently bought the 
New York Post represented some potential AJC contributors and also made 
some offers of his own. He held out the prospect of $25,000 which 
would become speedily available in case of major developments like a 
war. But he procrastinated interminably so that Katz and Staudinger 
him after innumerable calls. 109 gave up on 
In the meantime, the GLD tried to bolster its labor image. It 
asked the labor international and the president of the exile committee 
of the German labor unions for endorsements. 110 The latter reacted 
with a letter to Green which stressed the independence of the unionist 
resistance and emigration. He agreed with the Sopade on the communist 
question and on the repudiation of the splinter groups, that is mainly 
NB. But he asked Green directly for support "for our inner-German 
union activit~s". 111 The GLD'could also intercede with the AFL for 
108Ak ' ''b . d . ld d tennot~z u er e~ne Unterre ung m~t Wa mann, signe Katz, 
24 March 1939, Matthias and Link, Nr. 55, p. 390. 
109Ak · "b . U d S d. d . tennot~z u er e~ne nterre ung von tau ~nger un Katz ~t 
Backer, 22 March 1939, Matthias and Link, Nr. 53, pp. 388, 389. 
11
°Katz to Stampfer, 11 March 1939, Matthias and Link, Nr. 51, 
p. 385. 
111Fritz Tarnow to William Green, 8 May 1939, Matthias and 
Link, Nr. 60, pp. 395-398. 
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contributions to the unionist emigration. The labor internationals did 
not endorse the GLD as a union representation. 
The main cause for the problems of the GLD was the antagonism 
towards NB which was supposed to alleviate them. The GLD was indignant 
about the official formation of the American Friends or German Freedom 
in May 1939 and about the sponsorship of the AFGF by some Jewish labor 
leaders. Adolph Held, the chairman of the JLC and the president of the 
Amalgamated Bank of the Jewish unions, accepted the job of overseeing 
the AFGF finances. Since the Social Democrats had not yet publicized 
their own cormnittee they felt upstaged by the "Konkurrenzfirma" [rival 
company]. They decided to publish their material immediately so that 
"we will still make it an hour ahead of them" .ll2 In the fall of 1939, 
the GLD became upset again over "the problem New Beginning and the ac~ 
tivity of Dr. Hertz". The AFGF celebrated the arrival of the latter in 
New York with a well organizedcfund raising dinner. Its financial re-
sults were so good that Hertz felt they could not be equalled by any 
other organization. Simultaneously, the AFGF published Nr. 48 of the 
Sozialdemokratische Informationsbriefe of the NB exile cormnittee, in 
New York. The GLD was incensed about this usurption of its identity 
and about "Dr. Hertz running to our American comrades [of the JLC] and 
presenting himself as a Social Democratic leader, an underground worker 
and a future Social Democratic restorer". 113 It decided on a 
112
staudinger to Stampfer, 23 May 1939, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 63, pp. 401, 402. 
113Katz to Stampfer, 14 November 1939, Matthias and Lin, Nr. 79, 
pp. 427, 428. 
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general campaign of enlightenment which was directed at "all American 
organizations and unions", especially at the JLC. Katz realized that 
the GLD could 11on the other hand not become vicious in public because 
the Americans must not be bothered with internal differences".ll4 Yet, 
one of the GLD counter-measures was an article in the NVZ which claimed 
that "every dollar contributed to this purpose [NB] will be a dollar 
thrown out the window". 115 Cahan followed with an even more vitupera-
tive article in the JDF. It accused the NB organization of both 
viciously attacking the Social Democrats "as a type of counter-revolu-
tionary reactionaries" and illegitimately appropriating the Social 
Democratic name for its own purposes. The latter offense was according 
to the JDF editor in step "with old communist tradition" while the 
former could only be committed by a "Connnu-Nazist agent or a totally 
blind fanatic 11 • With little consideration for reality, Cahan claimed 
that "all German Social Democrats .•. support the exiled party execu-
tive" and that the NB Group had "never held any practical influence in 
Germany". Any contributions to this group were wasted and only the 
116 GLD deserved American support. Katz suggested that the Sopade ex-
press special thanks to Cahan, "the great old man", for this article. 
With these methods, Katz expected a GLD victory in the fight 
for the favors of the JLC. The publicity against the Hertz dinner 
114Ibid. 
115Neue Volkszeitung, 18 November 1939. 
116 Artikel von Cahan, "Eine Warnung an alle Freunde der .• Deutsch-
en Freiheitsbewegung", Jewish Daily Forward, 19 November 1939, Uber-
setzung als Anlage zu Matthias and Link, Nr. 80, pp. 428-431. 
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caused "a small internal storm" or, in hi.l) phrase of two weeks later, 
"a great storm inside the JLC". The article by Cahan was "an energetic 
attempt at keeping three people away from NB", 117 Baskin, Zatitsky 
and Held. Katz was confident that "the overwhelming majority [of the 
JLC] under the leadership of Cahan is on our side". 118 But Cahan could 
not dominate the JLC. Each of its members relied on his individual 
authority as the leader of a labor organization which made voluntary 
contributions to the JLC. In response to the Cahan article, the minor-
ity prevailed on the JLC to request information about Hertz and NB from 
the general secretary of the~ocialist International. As anticipated, 
the grade from Adler for NB was "A-plus". He described the Croup as a 
movement for the restoration of German socialism. Stampfer considered 
this response as an interference by the SI secretary who was "preparing 
119 
a new split for the sake of his private enjoyment". The JLC minor-
ity could block appropriations to the GLD so that neither of the two 
German emigrant groups received anything. Held told Staudinger that 
his position as treasurer of the AFGF had "no special significance" 
and that he supported "all movements which seem capable of fighting the 
N . " 120 az~s • Then, he reproached Katz and Stampfer for leaving him ig-
117Katz to Stampfer, 3 December 1939, Matthias and Link, Nr. 81, 
pp. 431-433; also Sitzung der German Labor Delegation, 13 December 1939, 
Matthias and Link, Nr. 82, pp. 433, 434; also Nachlass Stampfer, group 
I, section 9, Nr. 429. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Stampfer to Sopade, 24 February 1940, EK Mappe 132. 
12
°Katz, Notiz; 22 May 1939, group I, section 9, Nr. 399, 
Nachlass Stampfer. 
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norant of the deep dissensions between Hertz and the Sopade and for not 
sparing him the "bitter fights with his friends". Katz thought that 
w~th this statement, Held only wanted to cover his tactical retreat. 
Actually, Held told Katz that "personally, he stood behind us, not 
behind NB 11 • He claimed to have directed the rejection of an appropria-
tion to NB because "he opposed divisiveness and considered the PV as 
the competent institution". But Held continually postponed a decision 
about a GLD appropriation for 1940. All the Social Democrats received 
was the rest of the appropriation of 1939. 
The latter development took place during the second visit of 
Stampfer from January to May 1940 which was supposed to overcome the 
stagnation in the GLD negotiations, and was inspired by the successful 
AFGF dinner for Hertz. The GLD wanted to similarly celebrate Stampfer 
., 
with a dinner with AFL executives or a meeting that featured Bruning, 
Thomas Mann and Hermann Rauschning, the former mayor of Danzig who had 
repudiated the National Socialists in his emigration with his best-
selling ~'Revolution of Nihilism". These plans annoyed Stampfer. He 
did not consider his presence in America indispensable. He suspected 
that the GLD had not followed up his initiatives of 1939 vigorously 
enough. After. his arrival in New York, he sought the solution therefore 
in a reorganization of the GLD. 121 In his opinion, Katz was not a good 
organizer; he was only "a good assistant, no more". He also was too 
busy making a living and could not efficiently conduct the affairs of 
the GLD on a part time basis for $30 a month. Stampfer thought that 
121 Stampfer to Sopade, 15 February 1940, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 88, p. 444. 
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the Sopade could rid itself of financial worries "if we had the courage 
122 
of instituting a full-fledged bureau here". The executive Rinner 
replied from Paris that he had been the first one to make this proposal 
while others hesitated to affront Katz. But by 1940, the Sopade was 
d • II • • b •1 • • f h • k • dlf 123 too est~tute to assume cont~nuous respons~ ~ ~t~es o t ~s ~n • 
There was also no suitable substitute for Katz. After this Sopade 
reaction, Stampfer temporized on the issue. By the time of his final 
return to the United States in the fall of 1940, it was too late to 
dislodge Katz. 
Stampfer soon conceded that he had held illusions about the 
potential results of his first visit, both regarding the JLC and the 
AFL. In 1940, he became even more pessimistic than the GLD members, 
and told the Sopade at o·ne time that he was "loaded with skepticism up 
124 to my neck". At the end of January he addressed the meeting of the 
Executive Committee of the AFL in Miami. The latter promised to sup-
port the GLD and the Sopade in all. respects possible. But Dubinsky, 
one of the AFL vice presidents, warned Stampfer that the support of 
the AFL Executive Committee was of purely political significance. 
Stampfer repeated to the Sopade that he considered the decision of 
Miami "as a gesture of sympathy without practical consequences". This 
was in his opinion still "a moral success ••• [that] improved our 
122 Stampfer to Sopade, 29 March 1940, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 94, p. 454; also Rinner to Stampfer, 8 March 1940, Matthias and 
Link, Nr. 91, p. 449. 
123Rinner to Stampfer, 8 March 1940, Matthias and Link, Nr. 91, 
p. 449. 
124 Stampfer to Sopade, 7 February 1940, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 86, p. 441. 
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prestige substantially". The Sopade and the GLD were recognized "as 
an important political factor" by an AFL that played an important role 
in American politics and whose president was a personal friend of 
Roosevelt. 125 
The warning of Dubinsky came true. The AFL depended on the 
union locals for financial contributions. Green encouraged all nation-
al and international unions, state federations and central unions of 
the AFL to give financial assistance to the GLD who represented "the 
old German Labor Movement ••• whose free, democratic, independent 
unions ••• were similar to our own American Federation of Labor 
unions 11 • 126 Stampfer visited ma~y national union offices in Washington 
as well as the New York Federation of Labor. He realized that the 
task of contacting local unions was unlimited since there were about 
forty thousand of them. He tried to organize a special committee of 
AFL unionists under the direction of Matthew Woll to keep up the AFL 
fund raising campaign after his departure. But Woll was not to be 
pressed into the service of a socialist emigrant. He promised to raise 
money for the GLD and the Sopade within his AFL Labor League for Human 
Rights which predictably came to nothing. Green made a_personal con-
tribution of $250 which some Jewish labor leaders considered prejudi-
cial. It prevented the New York union of musicians from contributing 
$1,000 since they did not want to go beyond matching Green's sum. The 
125 Stampfer to Sopade, 25 January 1940, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 85, p. 439; also Stampfer to Sopade, 9 February 1940, Matthias and 
Link, Nr. 87, p. 442. 
126G d. . .. d k h f d 8 reen an ~e Funt~onare er Gewer sc a ten er AFL, 2 Feb-
ruary 1940, Matthias and Link, Nr. 88, p. 445. 
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union of the hat and capmakers of Zaritsky donated $500. It was symp-
tomatic of the fund raising difficulties of Stampfer that he pursued 
the hopeless task of eliciting aid from Backer. The latter rejected 
the idea of a $15,000 loan against the credit of the future German 
labor movement. 
The negotiations with the JLC netted $3,000, that is the rest 
of the appropriation of 1939. It saved the Neue Vorwarts for a few 
more months until the German invasion of France. The JLC deferred 
interminably a decision over an appropriation of $10,000 for 1940. It 
\ 
was held up by a pending appropriation of $2,000 to Hertz. The 
millionaire socialist Alfred Baker Lewis from Boston, who was also one 
of the GLD sponsors, tried to mediate between the two German emigrant 
groups. After corresponding with Seger, Hertz, Frank, and others, he 
suggested that "the· connnunist issue be dead" in reference to NB. The 
latter had refused any involvement in the Popular Front negotiations 
in Paris in which several Social Democratic emigrants had participated, 
including the later GLD chairmen Aufhauser and Grzesinsky. Nor did 
the Boston socialist consider the GLD qualified to criticize the under-
ground record of NB. He told Seger that it would in his opinion be 
"relatively easy to get together with them [NB] if an effort were made 
to do so". In reference to the cooperation in the German socialist 
underground, he thought "it would be reasonable and statesmanlike to 
try to do the same thing among the emigres Germa~s. It would be help-
127 ful and not harmful as far as I can see." But the GLD was bent on 
127Alfred Baker Lewis to Seger, 16 March 1940; also Fred San-
derson to Lewis, 31 March 1940, film reel 14, Nachlass Hertz. 
disposing of the NB Group. When the JLC asked Stampfer for advice, 
the Sopade executive answered that the Labor Committee should know 
itself what to do with its money; that the $2,000 would, however, be 
used "to fight us". 128 Held kept reassuring Stampfer about another 
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$10,000 for the Sopade saying that it was only a matter of a few days 
before they would be approved. Actually, he postponed a final decision 
because he feared "a blow-up over the questionable $2,000" for NB. By 
the time of Stampfer's departure in May 1940, the JLC had not yet 
reached a decision. Stampfer considered this 11 a truly grotesque 
situation ••• [in which]NB is obstructive against us and a divisive 
' 
agent in the JLC". 129 The events in France relieved the JLC of making 
a decision. After the Fall of France, all JLC contributions were 
reserved for the rescue of the refugees. 
Thus, the Sopade became serious about its American relations 
at an inopportune time and in the wrong way. It was bankrupt finan-
cially and politically. With the outbreak of the Second World War, 
the hope for an inner-German solution to National Socialism faded away. 
A military confrontation intensified Western nationalism which did not 
help the Sopade and the GLD either. The former sank to the role of an 
undesirable applicant for asylum. With its intolerance, the latter 
destroyed the rest of its credibility after the loss of its political 
128
stampfer to Sopade, 9 March 1940, Matthias:and Link, Nr. 92, 
pp. 451, 452. 
129 Stampfer to Sopade, 15 March 1940, EK Mappe 132; also 
Stampfer to Sopade, 10 April 1940, Matthias and Link, Nr. 100, 
pp. 464, 465. 
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usefulness. With their own background, most of the Jewish labor 
leaders found a plurality of German socialist emigrant groups natural. 
But they could not abide the degree of antagonism between the latter, 
especially not during the refugee crisis of 1940 and 1941. 
I 
CHAPTER V 
THE POLITICS OF RESCUE 
The outbreak of the Second World War confronted the German 
socialist emigrant groups in the United States with the practical task 
of rescuing their comrades from Southern France. This required cooper-
ation and offered the chance of disregarding ideological differences in 
a common endeavor. But more consistently with their past antagonisms, 
the political aspirations of these groups interfered with the humani-
tarian task of rescue. This resulted in a limited performance in the 
service of their comrades. In the pursuit of its political ambitions, 
the German Labor Delegation obstructed not only some of the efforts of 
its New Beginning competitors, it also neglected its own Social Demo-
cratic and unionist refugees in Southern France. It made sure that the 
Sopade executives did not come to New York where they would have 
eclipsed the GLD. Eventually, it ignored the limited number of Social 
Democratic refugees whom it had helped to escape to America. 
In their rescue work, the socialist groups had to labor against 
the negative refugee policies of the French and the American govern-
/ 
ments. With its anti-semitic and anti-socialist attitude, the French 
government of Petain and Laval made life for the German and European 
refugees difficult and prohibited their escape. In the United States, 
the Roosevelt administration was sympathetic towards Jewish and anti-
145 
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fascist refugees. But it could not do much for them because of the anti-
alien mood of the country during and after the Depression. The policies 
of the French and the American governments explain sufficiently why a 
large number of socialist and other refugees were left stranded in 
Vichy France. In this context, it is difficult to judge the rescue 
work of the German socialist emigrant groups for their comrades in 
Southern France. Some of the emigrant groups in New York did their 
best for the refugees with limited success. But regardless of the gen-
eral circumstances, the German Labor Delegation often neglected its 
duties towards its fellow Social Democrats and unionists. 
After the outbreak of the Second World War, the refugees were 
no longer safe in France. The French government treated them as enemy 
aliens. It· subjected all male Germans between the ages of seventeen 
and sixty-five to internment in sixty so-called centres de rassemble-
ments (gathering centers). Simultaneously, they were liable to military 
service or to work in labor battalions or formations de prestataires. 
The last of the internees were released by mid-January 1940. Nine 
thousand of them joined the regiments de marche, the foreign volunteer 
units of the French army, and five thousand the prestataires forma-
tions. After the attack on France in May 1940, the French government 
ordered a second internment of all German men and women. With the 
approach of the German armies, their situation became precarious. They 
were moved from camp to camp or released, according to the individual 
judgement of the camp commanders. They mingled with the stream of the 
l 
1 French refugees trying to escape to Southwestern France. 
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The new French government in Vichy was much harder on the refu-
gees than its predecessor. Its own inclinations were in tune with 
German demands. It was obliged by article 19 of the armistice to 
2 
"surrender upon demand all Germans named by the German government". 
Delegations of the German and Italian armistice commissions were sta-
tioned in the major cities of the free zone. A new policy of intern-
ment established concentration camps and labor camps for the refugees. 
The conditions and the treatment in these camps were often appalling. 
Epidemics were rampant. The suicide and death rates were high. In the 
camp of Gurs, one thousand and fifty-five out of thirteen thousand five 
hundred refugees died. In mid-November 1940, the concentration camps 
were transformed into regular camps under civil authority. The poor 
and the specially suspect refugees were retained; those with indepen-
dent means were released and assigned to forced residency mostly in 
provincial small towns and villages where they could not initiate their 
1Kurt R. Grossmann, Emigration: Die Geschichte der Hitler-
Fluchtlinge, 1933-1945 (Frankfurt: 1969), pp. 12, 58, 59. See also 
Arthur Kastler, The scum of the earth (London~ 1949), p. 186, and 
Lucien Steinberg, "The scum of the earth, ein Beitrag zur Situation 
der deutschsprachigen Emigration in Frankreich zu Beginn des Zweiten 
Weltkt±eges", Widerstand, Verfolgung und Emigration, Studien und 
Berichte aus dem Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
c·n.d. ), pp. 104-117. 
2
varian Fry, Surrender on Demand, the dramatic story of the 
underground organization set up by Americans in France to rescue anti-
Nazis from the Gestapo (New York: Random House, Inc., 1945), Foreword 
p. X. 
emigration. The conditions in the transformed camps did not improve 
. .f. tl 3 s~gn~ ~can y. 
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During this emergency, the refugees received aid from twenty-
six mostly American relief organizations. Many of these also gave 
assistance in emigration even during the months when emigration was 
illegal. They became very important in the evacuation of the socialist 
refugees. Among them were the American Friends Service Committee of 
the Quakers, the Unitarian Service Committee, the Jewish Comite 
d'Assistance aux Refugies with thirteen subcommittees in the unoccupied 
zone, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, the Emigration 
Association of the Hebrew Immigration and Aid Society, the Emergency 
Rescue Committee and the International Relief Association. The French 
headquarters of these organizations were mostly in Marseille. 4 
The grace period for evacuation was circumstantial. Nobody 
could predict its duration. Its end was expected for as early as the 
spring of 1941. In early 1942, Laval promised the German government 
the extradition of ten thousand German refugees in order to stave off 
occupation. He ordered the provincial prefects to supply the lists and 
the refugees. In November 1942, the German armies finally occupied the 
rest of France. From the Vichy camps, the German government deported 
3Friedrich Heine to German Labor Delegation, 25 December 1940, 
EK Mappe 51. See also: Heine to Nielsson Thorsten, 30 M~y 1941, EK 
Mappe 51, and Grossmann, Emigration, pp. 205, 208. 
4G . . rossmann, Em~grat~on, 
twenty-six relief committees in 
Mappe 51; and Korrespondenz Max 
relief agencies, AsD. 
p. 206. See also: Heine, list of 
unoccupied France, 1 March 1941, EK 
Diamant, Teil 3, list of American 
almost two hundred thousand refugees to its extermination camps in 
Central Europe. Among the deportees were a number of socialist 
5 
refugees. 
Despite these dangers to the refugees, the Vichy government 
made escape from France almost impossible. It was illegal to leave 
without an exit visa. Until July 1940, the Bureau de Circulation 
Militaire and the provincial prefectures had the authority to issue 
exit visas. But then, the Ministry of the Interior monopolized this 
authority and refused to issue exit visas to German refugees for the 
rest of 1940. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sold them unofficially 
to rich refugees for 25,000 ffrs or about $625 apiece. 6 In January 
1941, the Ministry of the Interior unexpectedly reversed itself. The 
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refugees could then embark on French ships in Marseille for Martinique 
from where they could continue their voyage. Foreign lines could not 
operate in Marseille because of the war. 
The French visa policy complicated the task of evacuation. 
During the time of illegal exit, the rescue committees had to cover up 
their major activity with social work for the refugees. They were sub-
jected to periodical police raids and were pressured to close down 
their offices. It was very difficult for them to negotiate the release 
from camp of refugees for whom they had acquired an American visa. 
Sometimes, they bribed the guards or the camp commander. Sometimes, the 
5 Grossmann, Emigration, pp. 209, 210. 
6
vladimer Vochoc, Memorandum of the Emergency Bureau for the 
Rescue of German Anti-Nazi Refugees in London to the French Ministry 
of the Interior, May 1945, pp. 1-6, AsD. 
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refugees managed to escape by themselves. Marseille was the only place 
where the refugees could acquire the necessary emigration papers from 
the foreign consulates. But for traveling there, they needed a permit 
for safe conduct which had usually a time limit that was too short for 
the bureaucratic delays at the consulates. Also, a refugee in Marseille 
was automatically _suspected of pursuing illegal exit. There were fre-
quent police raids in the hotels and in the streets. With or without 
proper papers, a refugee could be arrested, sent back to forced 
residence or to a camp in the provinces. For a short while in the 
summer of 1940, the American consulate general in Marseille did not 
hand over an American visa without presentation of an exit visa,which 
was unobtainable. When a representative of the Emergency Rescue Com-
mittee complained to Eleanor Roosevelt the State Department changed 
that practice. 
During the time of illegal exit, Lisbon was the only continen-
tal port where the refugees could embark for overseas. The French 
police and the Italian armistice authorities easily controlled the 
harbor of Marseille. The only way to Lisbon was the landroute to the 
Pyrenees and through Spain and Portugal. This required Spanish and 
Portuguese transit visas which were not always easy to get. Traveling 
to, and crossing, the French Spanish border was illegal. Sympathetic 
French border officials at Cerbere often let the refugees pass on tpe 
train to Spain. Others arrested them and returned them to the camps 
or to forced residency. Suicide was not an unusual solution to these 
problems. A number of refugees left on carefully reconnoitered foot-
paths over the hills that circumvented the border guards. The Spanish 
l 
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border officials usually accepted them and put an entrada stamp on 
their transit visas. Refugees without entrada stamps were later ar-
rested and sent back to the border for a proper repetition of entry. 
The acquisition of Spanish and Portuguese transit visas was 
subject to varying conditions. Until October 1940, the Portuguese con-
sulates issued a transit visa for 200 ffrs or about $5.00 to any holder 
of an acceptable passport and of a visa of final destination. The 
possession of a Portuguese transit visa qualified for a Spanish transit 
visa. But the large stream of refugees made the Portuguese government 
uneasy. Between 1940 and 1942, forty thousand refugees passed through 
Lisbon. 7 Most of them waited there for weeks and months for a place on 
a ship or even for an overseas visa. They became often welfare cases 
that were tended precariously by American relief organizations like 
the Unitarian Service Committee. Eventually, the Portuguese authorities 
limited the transit stay in Lisbon to a number of weeks and arrested 
those refugees that could not comply. Also, the Portuguese consulates 
were instructed to issue a transit visa only on presentation of a paid 
ship ticket. The Spanish government also caused problems. On 25 Sep-
tember 1940, it instructed the Spanish consulates to submit all visa 
requests to Madrid where they could be better screened. After a visit 
in Madrid by Heinrich Rimmler, the chief of the Gestapo, the Spanish 
border opened and closed intermittently for arbitrary periods of time. 
Later, Spanish transit visas became contingent on French exit visas. 
With the spring of 1941, the Spanish government refused transit visas 
7
oscar Handlin, A Continuing Task. The American Jewish Joint 
Distribution Committee, 1914-1964 (1964), p. 87. 
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to male refugees of military age. This necessitated illegal entry into 
Spain and the use of counterfeit visas and entrade stamps. Few refugees 
succeeded in crossing Spain under these conditions. 
The dispensation of transoceanic tickets in Lisbon was organ-
ized by the HICEM, the Emigr~tion Association of the Hebrew Sheltering 
and Immigration Aid Society (HIAS) and of the older Jewish Colonization 
Agency (ICA) that dated back to 1881. According to an agreement with 
the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee which conducted rescue 
operations in Germany and German occupied countries, the HICEM covered 
Vichy France and related evacuation countries, including Portugal. It 
usually bought bulk space from various ocean passenger lines. For the 
places that remained after the accommodation of its own clients, it 
accepted the applications of other rescue committees such as the Emer-
gency Rescue Committee, the German Labor Delegation and the Internation-
al Relief Association. It waited for the cables of these committees 
from New York confirming payment or guarantee of payment for the pass-
ages. Sometimes, the HICEM granted subsidies to individual clients of 
the socialist rescue committees. 
The shipowners usually exploited individual refugees. Under 
the conditions of war, only a few Greek, Portuguese and American pass-
enger lines could operate out of Lisbon. Shipspace was limited so that 
there were always many more refugees than the lines could accommodate. 
This made evacuation a lucrative business. Individual tickets sold on 
the black market at inflated prices. A $185 ticket cost an additional 
$100 to $150. Better tickets were traded for $200 to $1,000 more than 
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h . b . 8 t e~r ase pr~ces. The ships were often in deplorable condition. 
Sanitary facilities were insufficient for an overcrowd of exhausted or 
ill refugees. Many died during an interminable voyage of weeks and 
sometimes months. A ship might dock at one or more Caribbean or Mexi-
can ports before sailing on to New York. The HICEM and the Portuguese 
government sometimes succeeded in imposing improvements of the ships on 
the reluctant shipowners. 
The evacuation of refugees from Vichy France was difficult but 
not impossible. The rescue organizations had to coordinate their oper-
ations in France, Spain, Portugal and America under constantly changing 
conditions in each country. They could only evacuate a minority of 
their clients. The American visa policy made their task more difficult 
and contributed to the partial failure of the work of .rescue. 
The Roosevelt administration left the quota immigration system 
untouched because the president could not do without the support of a 
group of anti-alien Democratic Congressmen from the South. The State 
Department was in tune with the latter. Its visa administration had 
the result that the German quota was not even fully used during the 
refugee crisis. From July 1940 to June 1941, during the main rescue 
year, the German quota use was only 47.7%. By the summer of 1941, new 
legislation practically stopped further immigration with its relative 
and LPC clauses. Refugees with relatives left in Germany were consi-
dered vulnerable to extortion of intelligence services and refugees who 
8 Curt Geyer to Ollenhauer, Vogel, 13 March 1941, EK Mappe 44. 
9 
were likely to become public charges were also unwelcome. 
Unlike immigrant visas, visitor visas were open to executive 
regulation. In their administration, the government had some leeway 
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which it used to pacify such political supporters as the Jewish labor 
unions. It created the emergency visa which suspended the six months 
tUne limit of the visitor visa but obligated its holder to leave the 
United States as soon as possible and start preparing for departure im-
mediately after arrival. The processing of special visa applications 
fell to the President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees (PAC). 
But the American consuls in Europe soon complained about this curtail-
ment of their visa authority. The State Department made good use of 
their complaints in persuading the president in mid-September 1940 to 
sanction severe restrictions of the emergency visa program. 
Thus, the benefits of this program for the German socialist 
refugees were modest. The Jewish Labor Committee had compiled a list 
of European labor leaders and intellectuals which a delegation under 
AFL president William Green handed over to the State Department on 
2 July 1940. About four hundred of the refugees on the JLC or AFL list 
or, as it was occasionally called, the Dubinsky lis~ received emergency 
visas. A number of clients of the Emergency Rescue Committee also ob-
tained such visas during the operative phase of the-program in the 
9
on the immigration policy of the Roosevelt administration, see 
Henry L. Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, the Roosevelt Administration 
and the Holocaust, 1938-1945 (New Brunswick, New Jersey; Rutgers Uni-
versity Press, 1970); SaulS. Friedman, No Haven for the Opp~essed, 
United States Policy toward Jewish Refugees, 1938-1945 (Wayne State 
University Press: 1973); and DavidS. Wyman, Paper Walls, America and 
the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941 (Amherst University Press: 1968). 
summer of 1940. 10 Later, special visas were very difficult to get. 
The testimony of the refugee committees confirmed these prob-
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lems. A representative of the Emergency Rescue Committee told Eleanor 
Roosevelt in November 1940 that since mid-September no new emergency 
visas had been granted to political refugees. On October 17, Frank 
wrote to Ruth Fischer in Lisbon about how "the consular service ••• 
paralyzed the original good will of part of the administration and re-
duced the results which seemed at first possible. The people in the 
administration ••• have more and more slowed down; even the active rest 
is split". He el.aborated that "for the last four or five weeks, perma-
nent committees have been meeting weekly. Each time, they say the issue 
has been salvaged once more but each time the counter current turned 
out to be stronger." Frank was also pessimistic about further sponsor-
ship.f<;>t; tJ:le rescue committees. He felt that "organizable good will ••• 
'has dropped to zero". This applied also to the unions who "after push-
ing through their first list of about three hundred refugees which con-
tained at least one third Mensheviks and Bundists .•• have neither the 
10Besides the discussions by Feingold, Friedmann and Wyman on 
the emergency visa program, see also: Dokumentation zur Emigration, 
Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, Munich, Bericht von Hilde Walters: She 
mentions a summary affidavit by William Green for about two hundred 
refugees on the JLC-AFL list. See also: William Green to Stampfer, 
27 August 1940, Matthias and Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, 
Nr. 103, p. 467; Jewish Labor Committee, Memorandum to the British Labor 
Party and to the Trade Union Congress, July 1941, EK Mappe 196; Hagen to 
Elfriede Eisler (Ruth Rischer), 17 October 1940, Frank Papers, box 8, 
folder E: Frank estimated that the first JLC-AFL list contained the 
names of about three hundred refugees in Southern France. See also: 
Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, I, EK Mappe 51; Katz to Stampfer, 
21 September 1940, Stampfer Nachlass, section I, group 9, Nr. 431; 
Ibid., Nr. 444; Rudolf Katz, Die exilierte deutsche demokratische Linke 
in USA, 1955, p. 9; Hagen to Hertz, 12 July 1940, Nachlass Hertz, 
reel 15. 
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chance nor the desire to force through a second listrr. The difficul-
ties for gaining approval of the first AFL list had been rrgigantic". 11 
Frank was exaggerating to a refugee whom he did not favor. But his 
assessment of the problems with the special visa program was correct. 
The French and the American visa policy limited the work of 
the German socialist rescue committees. The bureaucratic visa pro-
cedures required the unceasing efforts of these committees without al-
lowing them to accomplish much. Raising the necessary funds was also 
a frustrating job. But as former refugees, the German socialist emi-
grants in the United States could be expected to do their best against 
any odds. 
Unfortunately, they did not always live up to the demands of 
the refugee crisis. Not even for this humanitarian task could they 
muster the necessary antifascist solidarity. They continued fighting 
each other rather than their common enemy. Their antifascist perform-
ance fel·l short of their antifascist claim. Sometimes they were ab-
sorbed in political rather than humanitarian ambitions. The former 
interfered with the latter especially in the neglect of undesirable 
refugees. Their lack of foresight was already an indication of this 
attitude. They organized rescue committees only in the extremity of 
the French defeat. A more timely and systematic job would have achieved 
better results. 
It is not surprising that after the war some former emigrants 
covered up the partial failure of their rescue work. They did this in 
11 Hagen to Elfriede Eisler, 17 October 1940, Frank Papers, 
box 8, folder E. 
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the context of the domestic and international situation of postwar 
Germany. A record of good work in America and of successful relations 
with Americans could help their political image in the era of the Cold 
war when their conservative opponents tried to brand them as communists. 
In his postwar memoir, Stampfer claims: "The fact is that most of the· 
emigrants succeeded with the help of the United States to leave France 
12 before the extradition began." In his short memoir of 1955, Katz 
reflects on his achievements as one of the main rescue organizers by 
13 
using the phrase of "the miracle of the rescue". The introduction 
to the documentation from the Stampfer Papers repeats this uncritical 
view when it gives the grade of "highest merits" to the German Labor 
Delegation for its organization of the rescue effort in 1940 and 1941. 
The selection of documents does not substantiate "this great achieve-
14 
ment". These postwar reports also covered up the politics that in-
fluenced the rescue work of the emigrants. 
Against these later claims, it is important to establish the 
record of the emigrant rescue work. The second part of this chapter 
will therefore deal with the two main socialist rescue efforts, those 
of the American Friends of German Freedom and their Emergency Rescue 
Conunittee (ERC) and of the German Labor Delegation. It will discuss 
how much money these groups raised for their rescue work and how many 
1~atthias and Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, p. 118. 
13Rudolf Katz, Die exilierte deutsche demokratische Linke in 
USA, p. 30, Nachlass Stampfer, section I, group 9, Nr. 444. 
14Matthias and Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, p. 35. 
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refugees they were able to evacuate. The description of these tasks 
will exemplify the political conditions of the rescue work. The rela-
tionship between the two socialist committees will further elucidate 
their politics of rescue. 
The American Friends of German Freedom had a hard time getting 
their rescue work under way. Their first two attempts failed because 
of political obstacles. As a third attempt, they founded the Emergency 
Rescue Committee. The first rescue committee started in the spring of 
1940 before the French defeat. It had an initial fund of $3,000. 
Hertz was to come from Los Angeles to New York to support the committee 
with his independent status as an elected member of the Sopade. A 
friend in Washington probed the possibility of emergency visas. 15 But 
the committee failed because Frank as its main organizer became the 
victim of the character assassination of the German Labor Delegation. 
In the spring of 1940, he asked for an investigation of the charges 
against him. A socialist arbitration committee chaired by an American 
convened shortly before the German invasion of France. But the GLD 
representatives protracted the sessions into the spring of 1941 and 
intrigued against Frank as a politician under investigation. 
In order to neutralize this handicap, the AFGF tried to or-
ganize an international committee which included Austrian and Russian 
emigrants. They invited Thomas Mann to represent its German section. 16 
15 Hagen to Hertz, 17 June 1940, Nachlass Hertz, reel 15. 
16 Hagen to Hertz, 2 July 1940, Nachlass Hertz, reel 15. 
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They also hoped for the membership of the GLD which co~ld then no 
longer sabotage their efforts. The GLD tended to cooperate for poten-
tial benefits. But it continued its policy of monopolizing the support 
of the Jewish Labor Committee, especially in the matter of the emer-
gency visas. It opposed any share of the international committee in 
the several hundred blanco visas of the first list which the JLC and 
h AFL h d . d . h ff. d . b AFL . d G 17 t e a acqu~re w~t a summary a ~ av~t y pres~ ent reen. 
It persuaded the JLC chairman, Minkof, to drop the NB-clients from the 
"Dubinsky list" with the argument that their names had been submitted 
by a politically unreliable person. Hertz thought that "it was unbe-
lievably mean of the Sopade people (the GLD] to secure the elimination 
of our people from the list, no matter what explanation they might 
18 
offer". Frank worked strenuously for their reinstatement, with partial 
success. Buttinger, who had made large contributions that had also 
benefitted the GLD, backed him. Together, they appealed to Julius 
Hochman, who was one of the JLC members friendly towards the AFGF. The 
latter called a partial JLC meeting in which he objected to the methods 
of Minkof,and secured the reinstatement of six NB clients. 19 Frank 
mentioned, however, specifically more than six from the two groups of 
NB applicants, of which the second group contained "our own most en-
dangered people", while the first group included refugees like Konrad 
17Ibid., Hagen to Hertz, 12 July 1940. 
18 Ibid., Hertz to Hagen, 16 July 1940. 
19
rbid., Hagen to Hertz, 17 July 1940. 
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'd 20 He~ en. All other eighteen NB applicants were rejected. After this 
squabble over blanco visas, the AFGF initiated the Emergency Rescue 
Committee. 
For several reasons, the ERG was a committee that was able to 
go about its business. Mainly, the issue over the easy blanco visas 
was settled. The GLD was satisfied that the AFGF had to acquire any 
further visas on its own. Also, the structure of the ERC covered up 
its main connection with the AFGF. This was especially important for 
the isolated refugee work that the ERG had to do. The American sponsor 
organization of NB appeared as only one of several members in this 
third committee. But the representatives of the other member groups 
were mostly former friends of Frank like Buttinger of the Austrian 
socialist emigrants, Walcher and Frolich of the SAP, members of the 
Gruppe Neuer Weg, a former SAP faction, and members of the ISK. The 
dynamic force behind the ERG was the AFGF and Frank. Kingdon of the 
AFGF national committee was chairman of the ERC;1 Anna Frank-Caples 
its second secretary. With some modification, the ERG was a continua-
tion of the abovementioned international committee. Even the GLD was 
still represented by Katz who liked to treat the Emergency Rescue Com-
mittee as a non-political, philanthropic group of bourgeois benefactors. 
The ERG succeeded in portraying a non-political image by its 
work for the refugee journalists, writers and artists. This could pass 
20 Vogel to Emergency Rescue Committee, 26 April 1941, EK Mappe 
139. 
21 Katz to Stampfer, 21 September 1940; Matthias and Link, Mit 
dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 105, p. 472. 
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as a culturally antifascist endeavor in terms of freedom of opinion 
and expression. Many of the writers and journalists were, however, 
leftists to the point that they considered the Social Democrats as 
conservative. It was natural for the AFGF to practice socialist soli-
clarity towards these refugees. But the ERC was not selective in its 
aid. It helped all antifascist literary refugees. Temporarily, a 
group of non-socialist writers became even preponderant in the ERC. 
Frank claimed that in mid-August 1940, the conunittee had "completely 
fallen under the influence of German bourgeois writers who had very 
different ideas from ours on the merits of particular refugee cases". 
In this situation, the AFGF beat a tactical retreat that demonstrated 
its importance. According to Frank, "we pulled back and limited our-
selves more or less to our own closest party members. Things have 
22 improved though, lately." 
The AFGF also mobilized most of the financial sources of the 
ERC. Buttinger was able to be one of the individual contributors be-
cause of his American marriage. Ingrid Warburg,of the Warburg banking 
family, took a friendly interest in the AFGF and in the ERC. According 
to Varian M. Fry, who directed the ERC operations in Marseille, she 
"made [the rescue work] possible". The firm of Harold Oram in New York 
conducted publicity and fund raising campaigns for the AFGF that also 
benefitted the ERC. It generally served liberal groups. Anna Frank-
Caples worked there since 1939 or before. According to Hertz, one 
fund raising dinner in particular could not be equalled in financial 
.22 
Hagen to Elfriede Eisler, 17 October 1940, Frank Papers, 
box 8, folder E. 
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success by other political groups. Nevertheless, the ERC had early 
financial problems. They were exemplified by the hope that Hertz, in 
23 faraway Los Angeles, could raise "a large sum". 
The ERC was energetic in its quest for refugee visas. Frank 
and Buttinger had reasonable hopes for the independent acquisition of 
blanco visas after a conversation with Eleanor Roosevelt. But she 
could apparently not persuade the president into taking this kind of 
risk a few months before the elections. Katz noted with satisfaction 
that the ERC lacked the important protection of the AFL and was also 
suspected by Washington of pro-communism. He insisted that the ERC 
sponsored communists and fellow travelers whom the Smith Act excluded 
from the United States. 24 Actually, the ERC was reluctant to jeopardize 
its precarious reputation but refused to abandon its ex-communist refu-
gee clients. After this failure, the ERC had to submit visa applica-
tions to the PAC for the full bureaucratic process. 
It succeeded in acquiring a good number of regular emergency 
visas. The statistics of the AFGF give an indication of the work of 
the ERC. By August 1940, the NB sponsor organization had provided one 
hundred twenty affidavits which Frank considered "a Herculean achieve-
25 
ment". Among others, these affidavits were for two or three friends 
23 Hertz to Hagen, 23 August 1940, Nachlass Hertz, reel 15. 
24Katz to Stampfer, 21 September 1940, Matthias and Link Mit 
dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 105, p. 472. The Smith Act of,l940, 
catered largely to the fifth columnist hysteria. It required all aliens 
over the age of fourteen to register and to be fingerprinted. It also 
expanded grounds for deportation by adding membership or former member-
ship in a subversive organization such as .a communist party. 
25 
Hagen to Hertz, 23 August 1940,Nachlass Hertz, reel 15. 
163 
of Gurland, a former leftist Social Democrat who was then working in 
the ERC, for "the major members of the SAP", for some members of the 
Gruppe Neuer Weg, for some Brandlerites and for about twelve additional 
members "of our own group". These affidavits had by August resulted in 
visas for only forty refugees with prospects for twenty more visas. 
26 Six of the visas were for SAP refugees and one for an ISK refugee. 
By October 9, the AFGF was engaged in the collection of affidavits for 
"about forty or fifty organization members left for our considera-
t , 11 27 ~on . 
Not all of these cases were brought to a good conclusion. By 
October 1940, the AFGF had succeeded in evacuating only "about twenty 
28 
of our people". By that time, the emergency visa program was in 
trouble. But the financial situation of the AFGF seemed also hopeless. 
It had only $25 left after the expenditure of "horrendous sums". Frank 
explained that the refugees in Southern France and in Lisbon were mis-
informed in assuming that the AFGF had any special influence in visa 
cases. Its initial success was due to the fact that it had been the 
first organization "to realize the danger of the situation". Frank 
added that 've mobilized all our connections in this country and man-
aged to just get by with our funds". But the support of the rescue 
26 Hagen to Hertz, 26 August 1940, Nachlass Hertz, reel 15. The 
Brandlerites were the followers of the co-founder of the German Commun-
ist Party Opposition. 
27Hagen to Elfriede Eisler, 17 October 1940, Frank Papers, box 
8, folder E; Hagen to Hertz, 17 July 1940, Nachlass Hertz, reel 15; 
and Ibid., Hagen to Hertz, 25 July 1940. 
28Heine to Ernst Hirschberg, 29 August 1942, EK Mappe 51. 
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" . ~· of the AFGF had "meanwhile been reduced to zero". 29 
Fry conducted the rescue work for the ERC in Marseille. For 
this purpose, he established the Centre Americain de Secours (CAS) 
which was sponsored by Andre Gide and Henri Matisse, among other cele-
brities. Two of Fry's assistants were Social Democratic refugees. The 
CAS and Fry employed all imaginable tricks in their rescue work. ~Vhen 
necessary, they gave their clients Panamanian, Brasilian, Chinese, 
Siamese or Belgian Congo visas for a pretended destination, and 
30 Czechoslovakian, Polish, or counterfeit Danish and Dutch passports. 
They also provided special problem clients with French demobilization 
orders for Algeria and Morocco which they bought from a French officer 
at $5 apiece. For a better prospect of success, they sent their Lisbon 
bound clients to the Pyre~ees in small convoys accompanied by an Ameri-
can staff member or an experienced refugee. Fry, himself, and his 
assistant convoyed Franz'Werfel and his wife, Heinrich Mann and his 
wife, and Golo Mann, the son of Thomas Mann, into Spai?· Fry was 
forced to leave France in October 1941. But the CAS continued to oper-
ate until 1942. It was suspended on 2 June 1942 and closed down on 
31 15 September of the same year. 
29 Hagen to Elfried~ Eisler, 17 October 1940, Frank Papers, box 
8, folder E. 
30 Fry, Surrender on demand, pp. 44, 82, 219. One of the main 
purveyors of passports was the Czechoslovak consul Vladimir Vochoc. He 
was engaged in evacuating the "Czechoslovak freedom fighters" who had 
fought on the French side. He was in contact with the Unitarian Service 
Committee through Donald Lowrie, who was also a representative of the 
YMCA and of the American Friends of Czechoslovakia. He put Fry into 
contact with Vochoc. 
31Hirschberg to Heine, 6 September 1942, EK Mappe 51. 
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Under the impression of his initial success before September 
1940, Fry lost sight of th~ possibilities of further rescue, in the 
opinion of Frank. The NB leader thought that Fry should "know better 
from the absence of an echo to his persistent calls for help. He is 
sincere and active ••• but he fails to understand that aid cannot be 
given in proportion to need, but only in proportion to the support we 
are able to muster". 32 Nevertheless, the statistics which Fry offers 
in his report are impressive if somewhat generous and imprecise. 33 Out 
of fifteen thousand applicants, the CAS decided to consider one thou-
sand eight hundred cases which involved four thousand refugees as 
"genuine cases of intellectual or political refugees with a good chance 
of emigrating soon". It payed weekly allowances to five hundred sixty 
34 
refugees and refugee families in order to keep them out of ~amp. The 
Fry committee guided more than a hundred people into Spain on the clan-
destine "F-route" over the Mediterranean foothills of the Pyrenees. 
During 1940, it sent "nearly three hundred fifty human beings" out, of 
France, mostly without exit visas. During the period of legal exit in 
1941, "we ••• sent people out of France legally in wholesale lots and 
illegally in retail". By May 1941, the number of CAS evacuees had risen 
to more than one thousand. Nearly three hundred more people were res-~ 
32 Hagen to E. Eisler, 17 October 1940, Frank Papers, box 8, 
folder E. 
33 The records of the Emergency Rescue Committee in the Deutsche 
Bibliothek in Frankfurt, West Germany, were pillaged of most important 
documents as souvenirs of Thomas Mann, Lion Feuchtwanger and others. 
34Fry, Surrender on demand, pp. 189, 236. 
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cued between the departure of Fry in October 1941 and June 1942. 35 
The CAS gave special consideration to "the friends of Paul 
Hagen [Frank]". Fry wrote in his report that, "fortunately for me, the 
first of the refugees to come to [the CAS] in response to my summons 
were Paul Hagen's German socialist friends and some of the younger Aus-
trian socialists". 36 He also offered more than the usual assistance to 
"four friends of Paul Hagen's in the camp at Vernet [whom] he had asked 
me particularly to help, and I didn't want to go until I had gotten 
37 them out of France". This emphasized again the significance of the 
AFGF in the ERC. In general, the rescue effort of the AFGF was well 
coordinated. It had better organizers on both sides of the Atlantic 
than the Social Democrats. The communication between them was very 
good. 
The Social Democratic effort was hampered in all three rescue 
periods by serious financial, organizational and personal problems. In 
the first period, which lasted until the fall of 1940, the Social 
Democratic committee in Marseille exhausted its own funds and did not 
get much help from Frank Bohn, the representative of the GLD, the Jew-
ish Labor Committee and, indirectly, of the AFL. In the second period 
of the rest of 1940 and in the third period of the winter and spring of 
1941, the GLD failed to raise any funds beyond the limited contributions 
35 Ibid., pp. 124, 170, 188, 206, 236. 
36Ib "d ~ ., p. 14. 
37 Ibid., pp. 86, 87-92. 
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from the Jewish Labor Committee and to communicate properly with the 
Social Democratic refugees in Lisbon and with the Social Democratic 
committee in Marseille. The Social Democratic rescue effort failed 
except for the limited number of refugees whose evacuation was paid by 
the Jewish Labor Committee. 
The Social Democratic committee was organized by the Sopade. 
The SPD executives came to Marseille in the summer of 1940, mostly from 
the camp of Castres. They stayed long enough to organize their own 
evacuation to Lisbon with the $10,000 they had left after the seizure 
f h . b k h c 'd. c . 1 . p . 38 o t e~r an account at t e re ~t ommerc~a e ~n ar~s. Vogel and 
Ollenhauer left with their families at the end of August. They eventu-
ally went to England. Stampfer and Rinner left with their families in 
early September and went on immediately to New York. This geographical 
split 9f the Sopade will be discussed later. The Sopade left Friedrich 
Heine behind in charge of the Social Democratic committee. 39 Here-
mained until early 1941 when the chances for further evacuation became 
negligible. He had been coopted as a member of the Sopade in the early 
emigration and had the confidence of both the executives and the other 
refugees. To whatever the Social Democratic rescue effort amounted, be-
sides the contribution from the Jewish Labor Committee, was,mainly his 
work. 
38K D. . 1 . d h d k . h L . k . SA 9 atz, ~e ex~ ~erte eutsc e emo rat~sc e ~n e·~n U , p. , 
Nachlass Stampfer, section I, group 9, Nr. 444. 
39
vogel to William Gillies, 8 March 1941, EK Mappe 139. From 
1930-1933, Heine had run the SPD propaganda center in Berlin. He had 
been with the Sopade since 1933, throughout the Prague and Paris exiles, 
and was coopted into the executive. In Prague and Paris, he was man-
aging editor of the Neuer Vorwarts, the successor of the Weimar Vorwarts. 
i68 
He had to cope mainly with lack of funds and visas. Of the 
initial $10,000, 11 significant sums" went for "travel expenses beginning 
with [the Sopade executives] to the last friends 11 • The Sopade leaders 
left him "theoretically ••• 60 Mille", that is 60,000 ffrs or about 
$1,500, but "practically only about 45" Mille or $1,125. Of these, the 
Sopade leaders agreed with Heine before their departure to spend $625 
on the remaining Sopade associates in the camp of Castres, among them 
·curt Geyer and Gustav Ferl. The remaining $475, Heine spent on assist-
ance to Social Democratic refugees in Marseille and the Southern 
provinces. 40 By September, the Sopade funds were gone. In the absence 
of any other financial assistance, Heine persuaded Toni Wels, the widow 
of the former chairman of the Sopade, to give him a-loan of 77,000 ffrs. 
or about $1,925.· It enabled him to evacuate ten more refugees, in-
eluding the coopted Sopade member, Curt Geyer, Herbert Weichmann and 
Ernst Hamburger with their families. Eight of these refugees went to 
the United States. The Sopade leaders reprimanded Heine for using the 
money of Toni Wels. She never got it back and later lived a precarious 
life in New York until her death in March 1942. Heine was distressed 
to hear that his promises to Mrs. Wels were worthless. But he insisted 
that he had acted in the higher interests of the~lives of ten refu-
41 gees. 
From then on, Heine depended on the GLD and on Bohn. Since 
both of these received their money from the Jewish Labor Committee, it 
40Heine to Sopade, Lisbon, 15 October 1940, EK Mappe 51. 
41Ibid. See also: Heine to Ollenhauer, 27 September 1940, EK 
Mappe 51. 
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is not clear to which funds the GLD referred in its explanations to 
Heine. In September 1940, Katz complained that "our financial situa-
tion is deplorable considering the great task of the rescue". The GLD 
had paid the ten transatlantic tickets for the Sopade executives and 
their families. Five of these tickets it. held only in reserve as a 
safety for the Vogels and Ollenhauers in case they sho~ld not get 
English visas. When the GLD nearly had to make good on this polite 
offer it let the two executives know that they were not welcome in New 
York. This political incident will be further discussed later. After 
these expenditures, the GLD had only $2,000 left, earmarked for the 
1 . . k 42 next transat ant~c t~c ets. It refused to use part of this money 
for subsistence payments to the Sopade leaders in Lisbon. 
With Bohn, Heine argued about visas and subsidies. Bohn c~me 
to Marseille in July 1940 With the AFL list of emergency visa clients 
and the insufficient amount of $10,000. 43 He was responsible for 
several national refugee groups: the Polish Bundists and Russian emi-
grants who had not taken the Siberian route to Japan and California, 
the Italian socialists, a group of German literary refugees and the 
Austrian socialists and German Social Democrats. About one-third of 
the four hundred thirteen emergency visas under the AFL list was 
naturally reserved for the direct clients of the Jewish Labor Committee 
42 Katz to Stampfer, 21 September 1940, Matthias and Link, Mit 
dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 105, p. 473. 
43 Frank Bohn was the brother of William Bohn, a socialist edi-
tor and writer. 
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and the Polish Jewish Bund in New York. 44 Heine complained that rrthe 
Russians [received] the lion's share of the visas". He claimed that. 
"this jeopardized the whole [German] operation and had the effect that 
our really endangered friends fall under the table11 • Bohn was of the 
same opinion but he followed his instructions. 45 
Heine was also dissatisfied with the way Bohn spent and handled 
his limited funds. The latter had received "2-1/2 Mille [or $1,000] 
for each of the participating groups for initial activitiesn. The 
Germans and the Austrians were in the same group. 46 But this money and 
the rest of the $10,000 was mostly tied up in difficult exchange ar-
rangements and in a ludicrous rescue scheme. Heine could only get 
reimbursed by Bohn for some of his expenses. This was the best he 
could do after "the unproportionate expenditures in the first four 
weeks of [Bohn's] inexperience". Even for this, he had to make "extra-
47 
ordinary efforts11 • According to the Bohn accounts, Heine received a 
direct contribution of $1,000. 48 This amount is the only subsidy from 
49 Bohn that figures in the dollar accounts of Heine of early 1941. The 
Sopade also received a reimbursement of $1,000 from Bohn and kept it. 
44Hagen to E. Eisler, 17 October 1940, Frank Papers, box 8, 
folder E; and Heine to Ollenhauer, 27 September 1940, EK Mappe 51. 
45 Ibid. 
46Heine to liebe Freunde (Sopade, Lisbon), 16 September 1940, 
EK Mappe 51. 
47Heine to Ollenhauer, 27 October 1940, EK Mappe 51. 
48Heine to Erich Rinner, 29 October 1940, EK Mappe 51. 
49Heine, Abrechnung, Dollarkonto, spring 1941, EK Mappe 51. 
Actually, these $2,000 were about the legitimate German share of the 
$10,000 Bohn fund. 
In addition, Heine managed to recover na small amountrr of the 
squandered boat mone~ which he shared with the Italian socialists. 5° 
Bohn disliked the land evacuation route over the Pyrenees which trav-
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ersed three co~ntries. He thought that his clients were either too old 
for this ordeal or too endangered in fascist Spain. He invested $4,412, 
or nearly half of his fund, in renting and provisioning a seaworthy 
fishing boat for direct evacuation from the harbor of Marseille. 51 
Among its prospective passengers were a number of prestigious German 
writers and Social Democrats like Franz Werfel, Franz Mehring, Lion 
Feuchtwanger, Rudolf Breitscheid and Rudolf Hilferding. Heine objected 
to this scheme. It was an open secret for the Fr~ch police. The boat 
was seized by officials of the Italian armistice commission the day be-
·. 
fore it was due to sail. Heine referred to it later as the Flying 
Dutchman, the legendary ghostship of the Atlantic Ocean. 
The boat money also revealed the incorrect accounting of Katz 
for the Bohn fund. His compilation dates from June 1941 when the res-
cue operation was over. According to his defensive explanation, $8,700 
of the Bohn fund were spent by June 1941. Of these, the boat money ab-
sorbed 306,000 ffrs, or about $7,650. An additional 50,000 ffrs, or 
about $1,250 went for contributions to Stampfer, Breitscheid, Hilferding 
and Erika Biermann, a Sopade secretary. Even with the incorrect figure 
50Heine to liebe Freunde (GLD), 25 December 1940, EK Mappe 51. 
51Heine to liebe Freunde (Sopade, Lisbon), 16 September 1940, 
EK Mappe 51. 
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of the boat money, Katz did not account for about $1,300 of the Bohn 
fund. He also claimed that 105,000 ffrs, or about $2,625, of the boat 
money were recovered, a surprisingly large amount even it it was shared 
with some Italian socialists. The incorrectness in the Katz account 
was a coverup which shows that something was wrong with the rescue 
work of the GLD. 52 
Another example was the way the GLD dealt with the German liter-
ary refugees. A certain number of them was on the AFL list so that 
Bohn was responsible for them. He made subsistence payments to some of 
them including Leopold Schwarzschild, the former editor of the Welt-
b·~hne. 11More than once", the CAS wanted to take over a client from 
h h f 11 d h hi . . 53 Bo n w o o owe , owever, s ~nstruct~ons. Katz disliked this use 
of the Bohn fund, but it took him until September before he cabled to 
54 Heine: "positively no payment to others but strictly labor peoplen. 
Heine defended himself later against the criticism by Katz by arguing 
that even this late telegram was "not clear enough to give us firm 
guidelinesn. 55 Most of the writers were leftist and therefore poten-
tially labor people. Katz tried to regulate the payment of transatlan-
tic tickets more explicitly_. He demanded that "for the members of the 
literary, journalistic and artistic group who are not members of the 
52Ibid., and Heine to Erich Rinner, 29 October 1940, EK Mappe 
51; Katz, account-of the funds of Frank Bohn, 29 June 1941, EK Mappe 61. 
53Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, I, EK Mappe 51. 
54 Telegram from Katz, 27 August 1940, quoted in Heine to Sopade, 
16 .September 1940, EK Mappe 51. 
55Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, I, 'EK Mappe 51. 
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party we pay under no circumstances, even though they were on our 
56 list". Eventually, the Jewish Labor Committee paid the transatlantic 
fare for nineteen German and Austrian writers, including Hermann Bud-
zislawski, Alfred rbblin, Georg Bernhard, Konrad Heiden, Leopold 
Schwarzxchild. Of these, Heiden and Bernhard were reinstated on the 
AFL list after the protest by Frank. Katz explained the evacuation of 
the non-Social Democratic writers with the excuse that 11unfortunately, 
the (ERC] was founded four weeks after the start of our own rescue 
operation. Had ... we anticipated this we would possibly have limited 
57 
our visa list .•. to exponents of the labor movement". 
Despite his attitude towards the literary refugees, Katz objec-
ted to the publicity of the ERC which used the names of "two dozen 
writers •.. whom we [the GLD] rescued with our list and not they"-. But 
in his negotiations, Jne offered to let the ERC organizers have "this 
credit and its financial exploitation" if they agreed to his idea of 
11 ticket sharing". It stipulated that the ERC pay 50% of the transat-
lantic fare for "our party members", the Social Democratic refugees. 
Katz conceded to Heine that this method might seem "quite American but 
it is practical politics". This attitude was typical of Katz. 58 
This dependence of Katz on the Emergency Rescue Committee,with 
which he was on bad terms, ~hawed the precariousness of the Social 
Democratic rescue effort. Its first period ended with the exhaustion 
56 Katz to Stampfer, 21 September 1940, Matthias and Link, Mit 
dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 105, p. 471. 
57 Ibid., p. 472. 
58 Ibid., p. 471 
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of the Sopade funds, the departure of the unfortunate Bohn from France, 
and the curtailment of the emergency visa program. As a result of 
these negative developments, all of the regular German Social Democratic 
and unionist refugees were still in Southern France. According to 
Heine, there were "about two hundred forty party and union members in 
the unoccupied zone of France with whom we had contact; with their fam-
ilies, they numbered about six hundred". 59 The GLD, the JLC and Heine 
initiated the evacuation of a number of refugees. But they had to wait 
until 1941 before they could leave France. By the fall of 1940, the 
Sopade executives were out of France with the exception of Heine. Of 
these, only Stampfer and Rinner went to New York. With their families, 
they numbered five refugees. The JLC had paid for their tickets. 
Heine and the Sopade had each receiv-ed $1,000 from the Bohn fund. This 
was the amount of the American contribution. It is not even clear 
whether the first $1,000 were separate from the German share of the 
boat money. Heine claimed that "I would not have had a penny from you 
[the GLD] if it had not been for the small amountrr of the recovered 
money. 60 Ten more Social Democratic refugees had left Vichy France, 
eight of them for New York, with the help of the loan from Toni Wels. 
In the second period, no German Social Democratic refugee made 
it to the United States with the help of the GLD. The Sopade leaders 
waited in vain for some money from New York that would at least keep 
the refugees alive while they were waiting for evacuation. Ollenhauer 
59Heine to Thorsten Nielsson, 30 May 1941; and Heine to London, 
30 May 1941, EK Mappe 51. 
60Heine to German Labor Delegation, 25 December 1940, EK Mappe 
51. 
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and Vogel could not go on to England before December 1940. The corre-
spondence between the GLD and the Sopade executives in Marseille and 
Lisbon was one-sided and unpleasant. The contradictory statements of 
Katz about how much money they had already received from New York and 
how little was available in the last months of 1940, insulted them. 
Katz was the only Social Democrat whom they addressed with the formal 
"Sie". He was alien to them since he was unknown in the Weimar Repub-
lie and had not shared the first and second emigration in Prague and 
Marseille with them. The "Ems Dispatch" of December of 1940 symptomized 
this relationship. It told Vogel and Ollenhauer that they were unwel-
come in New York. 
The eff~rts of Heine, Vogel, and Ollenhauer during the second 
period were completely wasted. In October 1940, Heine had already com-
plained that "I really don't know how things are supposed to go on if 
everybody is going to keep sitting on my tail11 • He did not know, 
either, how to come up "with something like 70,000 ffrs [$1, 750 J for 
61 the transportation of twenty people". He remained helpless. In one 
of his rare letters, Katz answered in December 1940 that he could pro-
vide 11new visas, if at all, only very slowly and with great difficulty. 
money we can't send him (Heine] at all. we want you to realize 
h 1 . · f · fl d f "b ·1· · rc 62 t e ~~ts o our ~n uence an o our poss~ ~ ~t~es. The financial 
situation was thus,according to Katz,"absolutely terrible". 63 
61Heine to liebe Freunde (Sopade, Lisbon), 15 October 1940, 
EK Mappe 51. 
62 Katz to Curt Geyer, 8 December 1940, EK Mappe 61. 
63 German Labor Delegation to Ollenhauer, 25 December 1940, 
EK Mappe 61. 
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The secretary of the GLD excused himself with the unresponsive-
ness of the Jewish Labor Committee, for which he was largely responsi-
ble, himself. He could not secure the transatlantic ticket for Robert 
Groetzsch, an associate of the Sopade, who then received it from the 
HICEM. Nor could he get any assurance from the JLC on the six tickets 
for Friedrich Wilhelm Wagner, Rudolf Leeb and Georg Fuchs with their 
families. 64 He warned against optimism about their later acquisition 
65 
since the JLC, "our financial mainstay", was nwithout any means". 
This prediction was too pessimistic. All of these refugees came to 
New York in early 1941. On December 20, Katz reiterated that the JLC, 
which he condescendingly called "our men in the background" seemed to 
be "totally fund],ess". The Labor Committee itself had termed "any 
66 
expectations for further appropriations as hoepless". It did not 
even disburse the $5,000 it had promised the GLD earlier. Thus, the 
JLC left the GLD 11 completely in the lurch", according to Katz. This 
was a perfect alibi.for the GLD. Its secretary concluded that "the 
German Social Democrats and democrats 11 in the United States, that is, 
67 the GLD, could "not do more than they already have". Another alibi 
was the AFL with "its curious structure and its insufficient education 
in political solidarity for foreign movements". Katz was pessimistic 
about a prospective meeting with Green in Washington at the end of 
January 1941. Another appeal by the latter to the state, district and 
64Ibid. 
65 Katz to Curt Ge:t:er, 9 December 1940, EK Mappe 61. 
66 StamEfer, Katz to 20 December 1940, EK Mappe 61. 
67Katz to Ollenhauer, 5 January 1941, EK Mappe 61. 
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local union organizations would accomplish little. -The GLD secretary 
also pointed to the American "lethargy towards the great refugee drama". 
It was in his words "a typically American phenomenon that such waves 
[of sympathy for the refugees] rise and fall like a new fashionrr. 
Yet, the JLC was not as devoid of funds as Katz portrayed it to 
be. It had large funds at its disposal during the 1930's and 1940's. 
It had contributed $224,021 to the European underground movement up to 
1941. 68 In 1939, the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, one 
of the main members of the JLC, raised $250,000 for a special refugee 
fund. With the contributions of the employers, its total rose to 
$425,000. During the war years, the ILGWU collected over $7 million 
for re!ief funds, community chests and social service agencies, mostly 
from voluntary half-day and full-day pay contributions of its members. 
In 1942, it donated $75,000 to the purchase and the furnishing of the 
British Merchant Navy Club in London. 69 The JLC would have been capable 
of doing more for the GLD during the second rescue period. 
It was mainly the fault of the GLD if the JLC remained aloof 
during this period. The GLD attacks against Frank nearly deadlocked 
the Labor Committee on the issue of appropriations for German socialist 
refugees. Sometimes, it allocated a specific amount but put off its 
payment. Under these circumstances, the GLD insistence of relying ex-
elusively on the JLC made no sense. Besides, the latter resented the 
68 Jewish Labor Committee, Memorandum to the British Labor Party 
and to the Trade Union Congress, July 1941, EK Mappe 196. 
69Max Danish, The world of David Dubinsky (New York: 1957), 
pp. 104, 103. 
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laziness of the GLD. Estrin, who administered the JLC rescue effort, 
ndid not take well to K. [Katz] 11 • He explained that 11yes, if the GLD 
would come to us and say we need a total of thirty tickets, we will 
come up with ten of them; please, give us the money for the rest, this 
would then stand as a word". He felt that with the proper approach, it 
was possible to raise large amounts of money in the United States for 
a good cause. But the GLD had "never made any contribution" to the 
70 
rescue effort. In the first rescue period, it had made an unsuccess-
ful attempt at exploiting the Quaker connections of Sollmann. Seger 
and Grzesinsky negotiated for a sum of $10,000 with the American Friends 
Service Committee in Philadelphia. 71 But thereafter, the GLD failed to 
cultivate relations with the major American relief organizations. In 
the case of th~ Emergency Rescue Committee, it expected to win funds by 
being antagonistic. It limited itself to the JLC which it alienated by 
its political behavior. This approach demonstrated both ineptitude and 
disinterest in the rescue work. 
The Sopade executives in Lisbon and Marseille could only guess 
about what was going on in New York. Vogel and Ollenhauer were upset 
that they did not even receive some money for their sustenance. 72 
Vogel protested that "we ·could have starved to death" if it had not 
been for some financial aid from William Gillies, the head of the in-
ternational department of the British Labor Party. He sent the airfare 
70Maria Rinner to Heine, EK Mappe 102. 
71 Sollmann to Stampfer, 4 September 1940, Nachlass Stampfer, 
section I, group 13, Nr. 642. 
72 Vogel to Lenk, International Federation of White Collar Work-
ers, 11 January 1941, EK Mappe 139. 
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for nine tickets to London of which three were not used so that there 
was a reserve for food. 73 Ollenhauer protested to Katz that "your 
attitude of not doing a thing for Lisbon in two months is absolutely 
74 
untenable". Vogel was "seized by horror" when he thought of the 
Social Democratic refugees who might follow him to Lisbon. He still 
thought in terms of "the rescue effort for a larger group of peoplerr in 
the future. The two Sopade leaders could not see the point of evacua-
ting the refugees to Lisbon "if they don't even have the minimum for 
livelihood here". 75 They did not realize yet, that they would not have 
all that many successors in Lisbon. Heine also let the GLD know that 
"I am sick and tired. Today is the first day of Christmas and I fer-
vently wish that you may all go to hell." He told them that the Ameri-
can consulate in Marseille received "half a dozen and more visas every 
day -- for othersn. Almost the entire ISK group had received visas. 
Heine stated that "so far you have not contributed one centime in 
direct money. I would not have had a penny from you if it had not been 
for the small amount" that was recovered Ufrom the lightly squandered 
[boat] money". He found this absence of funds If all the more deplorable" 
since the Austrian refugees received substantial sums in November and 
December, 70,000 ffrs, or about $1,750, on December 23. He told the 
GLD that "you are responsible when things are not working out:.here the 
way they should •••• you are partly to blame when our friends ••• don't 
73 Vogel to Stampfer, 5 December 1940, Matthias and Link, Mit dem 
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 107, p. 476. 
74 Ollenhauer to Katz, 10 December 1940, Nachlass Stampfer, 
section I, group 9, Nr. 433. 
75 Ibid. 
180 
know on what to live ... when our friends in the provincial towns and 
camps starve to death. 11 He contrasted their indifference with the 
prospect that "the political situation could turn into a disaster any 
76 day and ruin our entire work". This was what nearly happened in 1941. 
The response of Katz to these complaints was unbelievable. He 
stated somewhat cynically that nwe don't expect any thanks nor are we 
sensitive about serious reproaches for what you call a bad job". 77 Yet, 
he claimed that "so far, none of our group failed because of lack of 
the necessary tickets". 78 This implied that all of the refugees failed 
because of lack of visas. He boasted of $10,000 which 11we invested in 
the rescue of the friends in Southern France, including you". In a 
letter of January 7, 1941, he claimed that the total investment of the 
GLD in 1940 was $15,000. 79 He elaborated later that "it is a miracle 
that we were able to collect the large amounts for the rescue wor~ that 
have been spent" .. But he complained that ''the expectations of all the 
comrades in Europe seem to have been raised by irresponsible genera-
tors of hope to such a degree that they find it difficult now to grasp 
completely the sad seriousness of the lack of any financial means" 80 
Katz usually spoke in the name of the JLC rather than the GLD. His 
statistics served his purposes. 
76Heine to German Labor Delegation, 25 December 1940,EK Mappe51. 
77 Katz to Geyer, 8 December 1940, EK Mappe 61. 
78 German Labor Delegation to Ollenhauer, 25 December 1940, EK 
Mappe 61. 
79
rbid., and Katz to Vogel, Ollenhauer, 7 January 1941, EK 
Mappe 61. 
80 Katz to Geyer, 22 January 1941, EK Mappe 61. 
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What poisoned the relationship with the Sopade leaders most was 
the lack of any sympathy of the GLD for the situation of the refugees. 
Katz termed their necessary evacuation condescendingly nthis philan-
thropic rescue operation11 • He answered the letters of Vogel, Ollen-
hauer and Heine only rarely, and then in a symptomatically arrogant 
tone. Vogel objected to "the general behavior of comrade Katz towards 
usn. The Sopade leaders in Lisbon ndirected a stream of letters and 
reports at him and SOS calls about our own situationn. The response of 
Katz was "one single letter and, to our SOS calls, the advice that we 
should exhause the Portuguese resources", that is, the American relief 
. i . L. b 81 organ~zat ons ~n ~s on. The background to this bitter relationship 
was the GLD policy of keeping Vogel and Ollenhauer out of the United 
States. Before its letter of unwelcome of November 1940, the GLD did 
not want to encourage the two Sopade leaders. After their remonstrances 
about this kind of treatment, Katz let them feel his anger. Heine com-
plained to the GLD that 11you play silence in all major and minor musical 
keys ..•. You treat me, your representative for more than four hundred 
friends, in a quite shameful manner." He had sent them rrprobably more 
than a dozen telegrams and certainly more than a hundred letters11 • He 
received one letter in October and another one on November 20. This 
prompted him to ask the GLD: "Do you think I am here for fun?" He 
thought that advice and information was the least that he could expect 
of them and wondered whether they realized 11 at all how our friends feel 
when I have to tell them again and again that there has been no mail 
81 Vogel to Stampfer, 5 December 1940, Matthias and Link, Mit dem 
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 107, p. 476. 
r 
r. 
82 from America for the last four weeks 11 • 
This relationship did not improve during the third rescue 
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period of the winter and spring of 1941. Heine complained in February 
1941 that Katz did not answer 1% of his questions. To a total of a 
hundred-fifty letters, he had received five answers,and to thirty tele-
grams, three responses. He told Stampfer that "this makes cooperation 
impossible11 • 83 He ended his "extremely one-sided correspondence with 
Katz" with letter NR. 155 when he left Lisbon in March 1941. 84 His 
successor Ernst Hirschberg did not fare any better. He received one 
nabso1ute1y insignificant" letter from Katz in his first month. The 
tone of these Katz letters remained also the same. Sometimes it was 
"patriarchal and pedagogicn, 85 sometimes "so terribly haughty and over-
b · th t .;t .;s h . · f · tt 86 ear~ng a • • orr~ y~ng . Katz related to Heine like to an 
ignorant "aborigine" in American union matters. Yet, the latter had 
first hand knowledge of that field from conversations with Cahan and 
Stampfer. 87 Heine concluded that "our American friends [the GLD] are 
82Heine to German Labor Delegation, 25 December 1940, EK Mappe 
51. 
83Heine to Stampfer, 23 February 1941, Nachlass Stampfer, 
section II, group 17, Nr. 45; and Heine to Lisbon, 17 January 1941, 
EK Mappe 51. 
84Heine to Freunde (Sopade, London), 19 March 1941, EK Mappe 51. 
85Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, II, EK Mappe 51. 
86Heine to Stampfer, 23 February 1941, Nachlass Stampfer, 
section II, group 17, Nr. 45. 
87Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, II, EK Mappe 51. 
183 
88 
really a cruxtr. He felt nhelpless and hopeless11 • While in Lisbon, 
he did not dare to go out into the countryside for a day because he was 
"apprehensive of reflection". He was afraid to think about !!what may 
become of the movementn and wondered whether 11we - the divided and de-
l . d i · h 11 d h · d · · rr 89 mora ~ze em grat~on t at we are - can rea y o anyt ~ng ec~s~ve . 
Nevertheless, the third rescue period was the only successful 
one. But the credit for its achievement belongs to Heine and the JLC 
rather than to the GLD. They prepared most cases of this period in 
1940 already on the basis of the emergency visa list of the JLC. The 
opportunity for their evacuation came in January 1941 when the Vichy 
government began issuing exit visas for obscure reasons. Refugees 
with visas could then either go to Lisbon or embark directly in Mar-
. 
seille for the French Caribbean island of Martinique, for Cuba or 
Mexico. From these countries, they could try to get to the United 
States. The French government stopped the Martinique voyages after 
British naval vessels seized a refugee ship in May 1941. Thereafter, 
it was very difficult to leave France. 
The JLC evacuated a sizable group of German refugees in early 
1941, starting in February. Its evacuation list, which includes the 
five evacuees of 1940, mentions fifty-three single or married German 
socialist refugees of whom thirty-seven were Social Democrats, eight NB 
members, six SAP members and two ISK members. With their families, 
88Heine to Freunde (Sopade, London), 28 April 1941, EK Mappe 51. 
89 . Heine to Stampfer, 30 May 1941, Nachlass Stampfer, section II, 
group 17, Nr. 47. 
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90 they numbered ninety-five German refugees. The cost of transporta-
tion between Marseille and New York consisted of possibly $75 for the 
train ride to Lisbon and of $175 for a transatlantic ticket, together 
$250. For ninety-five refugees, these expenses came to $23,750. The 
HICEM usually granted a discount:of $37.50 per transatlantic ticket, 
which may or may not have been included in the amount.of $175. Some of 
the refugees on the JLC evacuation list received their fare from other 
sources or had their own means. According to a laudatory memorandum of 
July 1941 to the British Labor Party and to the Trade Union Congress, 
the JLC rescued eight hundred European labor leaders at a cost of 
$300,000. 91 Of these, the proportional share of the fifty-three German 
labor leaders would be about $20,000. The JLC also sent two amounts of 
$500 to Lisbon, the first one in mid-March 1941. But of these, 
Marseille received only $313 while the Sopade retained $587 and the SAP 
and ISK refugees received $50 each. 92 Disregarding the expenses for 
the sixteen splinter group socialists on the JLC list, the evacuation 
of the GLD refugees cost about $20,000. That was much less than the 
amount claimed by Katz. 
In his German postwar memoir, he gave the total JLC figures a 
90
rnstitut f~r Zeitgeschichte, Munich, Sammlung Karl Frank, 
Varia, 1933-1951, Jewish Labor Committee, list of the German and Aus-
trian evacuees, compiled by Estrin. 
91Jewish Labor Committee, Memorandum to the British Labor 
Party and to the Trade Union Congress, July 1941, EK Mappe 196. 
92Heine, Abrechnung, Dollarkonto Einnahmen, spring 1941, EK 
Mappe 51; Curt Geyer to Stampfer, 20 March 1941, Nachlass Stampfer, 
section II, group 17, Nr. 38; and Heine to London, 23 March 1941, EK 
Mappe 51. 
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German context and created the impression that his number of a hundred 
sixty families or about eight hundred refugees evacuated in 1940 and 
1941 were all German. Besides, they are described as the families of 
"well known democratic personalities" rather than of mostly socialist 
93 
refugees. In another instance, Katz claimed that the GLD and the JLC 
rescued about a hundred German families at a cost of $100,000, that is 
about five times the actual amount. 94 His attempt of presenting the 
rescue as a family operation is curious. It allowed for more tolerance 
in the number of refugees. $1,000 for the transportation cost of one 
family is a high amount considering that many married refugees had no 
children with them in exile and that many refugees were single. So far, 
the misleading figures of Katz determined the contemporary view of the 
GLD rescue work. Stampfer gave them credence when he claimed that most 
German socialist refugees escaped Southern France before the German 
occupation in 1942. 
As shown above, most of the two hundred forty Social Democrats 
and unionists who were listed with the Heine committee were left behind 
in France. The actual number of the refugees was higher than two hun-
dred forty because Heine was "not in direct contact with all of themu. 95 
He resisted the pressure of the Sopade for his departure until mid-March. 
He had to remind the Sopade of nour many friends in the provinces and in 
the camps" and argued that "your appointment of me as your representa-
93 Katz, Die exilierte deutsche demokratische Linke in den USA, 
p. 26, Nachlass Stampfer, section I, group 9, Nr. 444. 
94Th "d ~ . ' pp. 29' 30. 
95Heine to Thorsten Nielsson, 30 May 1941; and Heine to London, 
30 May 1941, EK Mappe 51. 
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tive prohibits the brusque termination of the previous activity". He 
found it "difficult to agree with you that 'all the others can really 
help themselves more or less'". 96 To his knowledge, there were still 
two hundred six single or married Social Democratic and unionist refu-
gees in Vichy France in early 1941. 97 But he restricted himself to 
preparing the visa cases of "fifty or sixty of our most important 
friends". 98 By the time of his departure in mid-March, there were still 
a '~undred fifty-eight union members and Social Democrats with their 
f . 1' . h . d " ·99 am1 1es 1n t e unoccup1e zone • Significantly, by this time, the 
order was reversed to union members and Social Democrats. 
Heine's successor, Hirschberg, was even more pessimistic about 
further evacuations. He planned to leave Marseille in early June 1941 
since he was convinced that "by then, not the least bit could be any 
longer accomplished". He considered eleven or twelve cases as mandatory 
and could not "seriously believe that it would be impossible to find a 
solution for [them]". Actually, seven more single or married Sopade 
clients left .in April and May 1941. There were then still a hundred 
fifty married or single Sopade refugees in France, or about four hun-
dred persons including the children. 100 About himself, Hirschberg 
96Heine to Lisbon, 17 January 1941, EK Mappe 51. 
97Heine to Stampfer, 18 March 1941, Nachlass Stampfer, section 
II, group 17, Nr. 46. 
98Heine to Lisbon, 17 January 1941, EK Mappe 51. 
99Heine to Thorsten Nielsson, 30 May 1941; and Heine to London, 
30 May 1941, EK Mappe 51. 
100Ibid. 
1~ 
remarked sarcastically that he received an American visa "despite all 
the efforts of our friends". 101 But he did not manage to escape, pos-
sibly because his wife was pregnant at that time. 
Those refugees who could not leave Southern France did not fare 
as badly as Hirschberg predicted. When the French started to surrender 
hundreds of refugees in the summer of 1942, he was afraid that "very 
102 few of us will manage to survive the war". After the German occu-
pation, he los.t contact with the refugees. A number of them were 
deported to Germany. But the majority of them went into hiding and 
joined the French resistance. They re-emerged after the war, among 
them fifty-two Social Democrats and unionists in Southern and Central 
F d f 'f . h 0 f p . 103 ranee an ~ ty ~n t e reg~on o ar~s. 
The size of the Social Democratic evacuation and the preference 
given to one group over another reveal the politics that influenced the 
Social Democratic rescue work. The basic motive behind these politics 
was the ambition of the GLD which expressed itself in competition with 
the Sopade and in antagonism towards NB. The GLD was formed as a finan-
cial subsidiary of the Sopade which conferred on it a recognition of 
some value in its dealings with the American labor movement and govern-
ment. But politically, the GLD wanted to continue the conservative 
policy of the previous period. The refugee crisis of 1940 and 1941 
101Heine to Freunde (Sopade, London), 18 May 1941, EK Mappe 51. 
102Hirschberg to Heine, 28 August 1942, EK Mappe 51. 
103tiste der Mitglieder in der Provinz; Liste der Mitglieder in 
der Pariser Region (German socialist emigrants in France after the 
liberation], EK Mappe 124. 
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offered good opportunities for asserting this political independence. 
It nearly caused the demise of the Sopade. Its leaders lost their 
financial accounts in Paris and ended up in the internment camps of 
the Vichy government. After that, they depended on the GLD for their 
evacuation. The GLD took advantage of this situation. It welcomed, 
and contributed to, the geographical split of the Sopade which comple-
ted the decline of the SPD executive to a group of three members of 
whom only two were elected by the Weimar party. 
In this context, the GLD was not keen on evacuating the small 
group of Sopade associates about whom the SPD executive was most con-
cerned. They could only go to the United States since they were not 
admitted to England. The GLD was satisfied that these emigrants would 
be isolated ·in America where it ignored them. The GLD had no preferred 
clientele among the German labor groups. It was not interested in the 
unionist refugees either even though as the German Labor Delegation it 
claimed to represent the German unions. This conflict of rescue inter-
ests was intensified by a new difference in ideological outlook between 
the GLD and the Sopade. The GLD planned to continue the policy of the 
great coalition with liberal American and emigrant groups. The Sopade 
of Vogel and Ollenhauer rio longer attributed much significance to the 
so-called liberal emigration. They could not understand why the GLD 
rescued Center Party emigrants like Werner Thormann while most Social 
Democratic refugees were still in Southern France. In a further step, 
the GLD wanted to involve BrUning into its coalition activities by prom-
ising to help the Social Democratic friends of the former chancellor: 
Braun, Hilferding and Breitscheid. A marginal Social Democrat like 
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ties to groups which it antagonized politically. It expected them to 
rise above the political intransigence of the GLD which subordinated 
its rescue work to its politics. 
In the preference for their associates, the concern of the 
Sopade for the average Social Democratic or unionist refugee left much 
to be desired. There was talk of 11active" and 11passive" party members. 
Most of the evacuees on the JLC list belonged to the small circle of 
refugees who had been close to the Sopade during the first and second 
emigration. Those beyond this narrow group, Ollenhauer thought, could 
help themselves. Another characteristic of the Social Democratic res-
cue work was the neglect of the unionist refugees unless they were 
primarily party officials. Nearly all of them were left behind. There 
was no unionist emigrat~on in the United States to speak of besides a 
few individuals. Until nearly the end of the war, the GLD did not have 
to contest its self-assured role of union spokesman. 
The unionist refugees were.aware of their situation. In Janu-
ary 1941, they protested against their nclassification as inferior 
party members because we are unionists". They thought that this had 
happened "in the visa affair ... when SAP-ists, NB and ISK people were 
preferred to us". They vowed that ''we will not tolerate it any more". 104 
They were not aware of the _fact that the NB, SAP and ISK refugees in 
question were clients of the American Friends of German Freedom rather 
than of the GLD. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that 
the unionist refugees were foremost in opposing a premature departure 
104 .. . 4 Bruno Suss to He1ne, 13 January 19 1, EK Mappe 51. 
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of Heine. The union leader Bruno Suss wrote Heine that 11you cannot 
disappear like thatrr. Suss was corresponding with seventy-six ltADG 
people11 , that is officials of the former General German Trade Union 
Federation. They insisted that Heine appoint a successor before leav-
ing and suggested the formation of a committee of three with one member 
for the refugee correspondence in France, a second for the correspond-
ence with the Sopade and the GLD and a third for contacts with the 
Marseille refugee committees and with the American consulate. But these 
ff . . 105 e orts were 1n va1n. 
The geographical split of the Sopade was a mysterious affair. 
The SPD executive came to no conclusion in its debate on whether to 
emigrate to the United States or to England. Its members then did as 
they pleased. To Vogel, the United States was a remote and strange 
country. He thought that England would play the decisive role in a de-
feat of Germany. Rinner held the opposite opinion. But in the crisis 
of November 1940, Vogel and Ollenhauer thought that they would have to 
join Stampfer and Rinner in New York. In that situation, the GLD un-
necessarily told them that they would be of no use in the United States. 
Fortunately, they still received visas for England. The split of the 
Sopade came about naturally. But the GLD superfluously stated it as 
its policy. The Sopade complained bitterly about this treatment. 
Thereafter, the Sopade leader Geyer smelled'"a light odor of boycott 
in the air11 to which he attributed the ensuing neglect of the Lisbon 
refugees by the GLD. 106 
lOS Ibid. 
106 Geyer to Ollenhauer, 6 February 1941, Mappe 44. 
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This confrontation continued with the Thormann affair. This 
107 Center Party emigrant was "totally unknown" to Geyer. Heine remem-
bered that "Mr. Thormann and his clique attacked us for years in the 
Zukunft" during the Weimar Republic and fought the Social Democrats in 
the emigration. He asked the GLD: 11Why the hell do you bother with 
Mr. Thormann? ·Why do you even bend a finger for such people?n The 
Labor Delegation knew that there were "still a hundred families of 
people who are close to us 11 on Southern France. There were friends 
"who have devoted thirty to forty years to the movement ... two dozen 
and more underground workers who will be shot if they fall into the 
hands of the Nazis". 108 
In further pursuit of its policy of 11 the Great Coalition", the 
GLD tried to involve Bruning in its activities by exploiting his inter-
est in the evacuation of Hilferding and Braun. The GLD was slow in 
giving Bruning information about Hilferding and Breitscheid, the two 
inseparable Rudolf's. But Katz "abused the two conversations which I 
.. . 109 . •• had with him", according to Brun~ng. Sollmann told Bruning more 
bluntly that ni can't imagine what all these people want to do here". 
He thought that Hilferding and Breitscheid would adjust badly to the 
United States and assumed that Hilferding did not speak English, some-
107 Ibid. 
108Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, II, EK Mappe 51. 
109Jane Addams Peace Collection, Swarthmore College, Pennsylva-
nia, William Sollmann Papers, Heinrich Bruning to Wilhelm Sollmann, 
4 February 1941. 
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thing that Sollmann had learned only during the emigratLon. 
The case of Otto Braun, the former prime minister of Prussia, 
held more promise for the politics of the GLD. Brt7ning "wished nothing 
more" than to have Braun in the United States "even if it was only for 
his safety". But he intended to go further. He hoped that together 
with Sollmann, Braun would become "a representative figure for the for-
mer Social Democrats in this country". In that case, Bruning was "quite 
willing to discuss the possibility of a collaboration between the two 
11 · , , 111 groups , that is, between the GLD and the Center Party emLgratLon. 
Katz was eager to go along with Bruning. But Sollmann, a principal 
figure in this plan, had other ideas. He could not imagine that Braun 
could "help a lot here". He objected that Braun was too old, that his 
health had always been unstable, and that he did not speak a word of 
E 1 . h 112 ng LS , 
Sollmann had more conservative plans. He did not want to share 
his access to Bruning with other Social Democrats. He thought that Otto 
Strasser was a better candidate for an exile triumvirate. He had vi-
sions of a Volkssozialismus (ethnic socialism) as a blend of christian 
socialism, catholicism and nationalism. Strasser might fit into this 
scheme as one of the founders of the National Socialist Party who had 
-
110Nachlass Heinrich BrUning, in care of Claire Nix, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Sollmann to BrUning, 5 October 1940. This paper uses 
copies of the documents from this collection which Dr. Thomas A. Knapp 
was allowed to make on the basis of a private arrangement with Claire 
Nix. 
111 
.. . 1 4 1 4 11 BrunLng to Sol mann, February 9 1, So mann Papers. 
112
sollmann to Bruning, 3 August 1941, Nachlass Bruning. 
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broken away from Hitler and founded the Schwarze Front (Black Front) as 
a fascist opposition to Hitler. Sollmann was interested in the activi-
ties and projects of Strasser in the emigration: the Freie Deutschland 
Bewegung (Free Germany Movement) and an exile government in the form of 
a Nationalrat (National Council) in which BrUning and Sollmann were 
expected to participate. Sollmann presented Strasser as an advocate 
Iff d . th . d . 1 . 1. t. II 113 H h . d h or emocracy w~ w~ e soc~a ~mp ~ca ~ons • e emp as~ze t e 
Catholic views of Strasser "whose social ideas are closely related to 
those of the pope". He also minimized the antisemitism of Strasser 
who proposed full citizenship for German Jews under certain conditions 
at a time when they were persecuted by the German government. Sollmann 
conceded that he disagreed with Strasser "on the Jewish question11 but 
he thought that "from every Jewish standpoint ... it could only be use-
ful to rescue Strasser11 • He advised Strasser's agent in the United 
States to convince influential Jewish circles such as the Jewish Labor. 
C . h s . . . 115 omm~ttee t at trasser was not ant~sem~t~c. Personally, he thought 
that Strasser "may still go far in his political development and we are 
unable today to predict which alliances the future will force on us".ll6 
In this state of mind, Sollmann used all his pe'rsuasion to enlist the 
full aid of BrUning for Strasser, Bruning was not optimistic but he 
complied with the wishes of Sollmann. Eventually, Strasser was admit-
113rnstitut fi.ir Zeitgeschichte, Munich, Otto Strasser Papers, 
vol. 5, Sollmann to Kurt Singer, 5 October 1940. 
114sollmann to Singer, 5 October 1940, Strasser Papers, vol. 16. 
ll5Ibid. 
116sollmann toWels, 31 December 1935, EK Mappe 122. 
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ted to Canada but not to the United States.117 
In a further step, Sollmann tried to get Bruning to sponsor 
five members of the Black Front in Marseille. He said "I rack my brain 
about how I could help them" and resented the fact that "the emigration 
of the Left refuses to have anything to do with them". 118 He was dis-
consolate about Bruning's refusal. He asked for confirmation of 
Bruning's explanation that one of the five refugees was "an evil char-
acter" who had bee:t;J. a double agent for the Czech military police and 
for the Gestapo and had tried to hand Strasser over to the Gestapo. 
Members of the Black Front were so hard to come by in the emigration 
119 that Sollmann could not easily let go of these prospects. 
The relationship of the GLD with the Emergency Rescue Committee 
exemplifies its politics of rescue towards the German socialist splin-
ter groups. The ERC and the CAS wished nothing more than cooperation 
with the Social Democratic committees. In Marseille and Lisbon, such 
a positive relationship materialized. In the fall of 1940, Heine asked 
Fry to take over the affairs of the four groups for whom Bohn had been 
responsible including the German Social Democrats. He joined the CAS 
117Briining to So11mann, 29 August 1940; and Bruning to So11mann, 
20 September 1940, Sollmann Papers. See also: Sollmann to BrUning 
5 October 1940; and Sollmann to Bruning, 10 October 1940, Nachlass 
Bruning; and George N. Shuster, recommendation, 23 January 1941, 
Strasser Papers, vol. 5. 
118 .. . 1 4 .. Sollmann to Brun~ng, 1 September 19 0, Nachlass Bruning. 
119BrUning to Sollmann, 12 September 1940; and Bruning to Sell-
mann, 16 October 1940, Sollmann Papers. See also: Sollmann to Bruning, 
12 October 1940, Nachlass Bruning. 
r I . 
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as honorary political consultant and participated in its twice daily 
meetings. 120 The CAS had case files of many Heine clients and inter-
vened for them with the French authorities and the consulates. It 
corresponded with them and paid support to some of them. An ISK emi-
grant, who represented the ERC in Lisbon, included all Social Democrat-
ic refugees there in the assistance·program of the ERC. The latter 
went especially out of its way for Hilferding and Breitscheid whom it 
121 
offered various escape arrangements. Hirschberg also could not have 
conducted his affairs without the CAS. He expected to terminate his 
operations with the closure of the CAS. Heine and Hirschberg expected 
an equally close cooperation at the other side of the Atlantic Ocean 
between the GLD and the ERC. 
This put Katz into a dilemma which he tried to solve in his 
usual uncanny way. First, he had to justify the demands which he made 
on the ERC without giving away too much of the political background. 
For this purpose, he described the ERC as a politically neutral hour-
geois organization as though bourgeois organizations were politically 
neutral, especially when it came to socialists. Then, he had to ex-
plain to Heine why the ERC did not deliver, without taking the blame 
himself. Instead, he put it on Frank. But in this process, he contra-
dieted himself. If Frank played such a dominant role in the ERC the 
120Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, I; and Heine to New York, 
[n.d.], EK Mappe 51. 
121 Fry, Surrender on demand, pp. 18, 93, 167, 189. See also: 
Heine, Denkschrift, EK Mappe 51; and Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Bericht 
uber die Sitzung des Parteivorstandes der Sopade, 21 May 1935, Bundes-
archiv, Koblenz, Federal Republic of Germany. 
197 
latter could not have been an unpolitical committee. In his dealings 
with the ERC, Katz did not bother with such subtleties. He was a mem-
ber of the ERC as the representative of the GLD. But instead of con-
tributing his share of funds and efforts to a cooperative venture he 
tried to extort from the ERC the deal of the abovementioned Fahrkarten-
teilungsabkommen (ticket sharing ageeement). This kind of boldness was 
out of tune with the fact that the GLD would have had "serious finan-
122 
cial problems"without substantial help from the ERC. 
To Heine, Katz did not admit the political background of his 
relationship with the ERC. He told him that "over there you have ap-
parently not quite grasped the context. The ERC ... is a private non-
partisan foundation." 123 He claimed that the GLD cooperated "friendly' 
with the ERC since the latter had "far-reaching connections and exten-
124 
sive means". In so doing, Katz played skillfully on a typically 
socialist misconception of Heine. The latter agreed with Katz that 
the rescue of refugees was the responsibility of "the big American 
relief organizations". He did not want to see "the financial means of 
the labor movement applied to relief tasks which •.. ought to be met by 
b • th • lf • • II 125 ourgeo1s or o er pr1vate we are organ1zat1ons . Without realiz-
ing it too well, Katz contradicted himself in his above description of 
the ERC by adding in parentheses that Mrs. Paul Hagen, that is Anna 
122 Katz to Stampfer, 21 September 1940, Matthias and Link, Mit 
dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 105, p. 471. 
123Ibid. 
124Ibid., p. 472. 
125Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, II, EK Mappe 51. 
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Frank-Caples of the AFGF, was the second secretary of the ERC and 
126 Frank, himself, "one of the most active associates there". Later, 
he admitted that the GLD was "on very bad terms with the ERC whose 
office is dominated by Hagen and his people". He rationalized for 
Geyer that the ERC was "supposed to be a non-partisan, American office. 
127 (But] we realize that this committee grossly disfavors our people". 
Heine reacted equivocally to the problem of the relationship 
between the GLD and the ERC. He was confused but he was not completely 
ignorant since Katz had found it necessary to set the views of the 
Sopade leader about the American context straight. Also, Heine was on 
confidential terms with Fry. Without being fully aware of the politi-
cal implications of the problem, he thought that both the ERC and the 
GLD should improve their way~. In the fall of 1940, he made an ill-. 
advised attempt at settling the issue directly with the ERC. He com-
plained that the ERC had given to the members of the SAP, NB and the 
Richter [Buttinger] group assistance of three to five times their 
contributions as though he knew what these contributions were. He urged 
the CAS to ask the ERC to "reclaim the money ... from these three organ-
izations". The CAS sent "at least four or five telegrams of this 
tendency to the central office" in New York, suggesting that the ERC 
stop further payments to these groups until reimbursement. It seemed· 
to him that Frank and the NB emigrant Heinrich Ehrmann tried to seize 
control of the ERC. The latter responded with a cable which stated 
126Katz to Stampfer, 21 September 1940, Matthias and Link, Mit 
dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 105. 
127 44 Geyer to Sopade, 16 April 1941, quoting Katz, EK Mappe . 
that "the SAP, NB and Richter help us more than any other group". 
Heine noted with resignation that "it will hardly be possible to 
effect a stop of aid from here". 128 
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Even though he came to know something about the nature of the 
ERC and about "its practice and guidelines" his feelings about the ERC 
remained ambivalent. He knew that Fry was "instructed to take care of 
the members of those groups who gave him their mandate in America: 
primarily the SAP, the Richter group, NB, Neuer Weg, and the ISK, as 
well as all the people in whom the International Refugee Association 
takes an interest". But he could not properly understand this situa-
tidn and was frustrated about its results. It meant that "our friends 
had a priori no chance" of being accepted onto the visa list of the 
CA.s. 129 He resented the fact that "in the ERC,there are only Miles 
people" and that Frank "reigned exclusively". 130 
This did not keep Heine from charging Katz with ineffectiveness 
in the dealings with the ERC. He knew that sometimes the latter had to 
contact the CAS for information about Social Democratic refugees which 
Katz had fully at his disposal. 131 He urged Katz to emphasize that "we 
are not only the beneficiaries but also the benefactors [of the CAS] 
132 
and that I contribute,more than a number of employees (of the CAS]". 
128Heine to New York, [fall of 1940], EK Mappe 51. 
129Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, I, EK Mappe 51. 
130Heine to London, 15 May 1941, EK Mappe 51. 
131Hirschberg to Katz, 8 April 1941, EK Mappe 51. 
132Heine to New York, [n.d.], EK Mappe 51. 
200 
Hirschberg asked Katz to point out that the SPD committee had not been 
"ungenerous" and that it had cared for members of the smaller socialist 
groups and especially for refugees who stood in between those groups. 
He thought that "these efforts could increase the confidence [of the 
ERG] in us which could only be beneficial". In that case, there might 
"arise an atmosphere there [in New York] which uproots the worst abuses 
of group egoism". He also suggested that Katz submit to the ERC a list 
of GLD clients with the necessary data. 
The charge of ineffectiveness was substantiated by more neutral 
observers. According to the SAP emigrant who represented the ERC in 
Lisbon, the latter did not take up a refugee case on its own initiative. 
It waited until a sponsor group provided the affidavits before it ap-
proached the question of the passage money. 133 An ISK emigrant in the 
ERC in New York complained to Heine that "unfortunately, Katz does 
nothing in the provision of affidavits. He claims they could not do 
anything in this respect. It seems to me, though, that they could do a 
lot if they tried harder." Also, if not all the Social Democratic 
refugees in Lisbon were included in the ERC assistance program, "the 
fault lay with Katz who was not effective in New York". 134 With regard 
to the position of Frank in the ERC, the same ISK emigrant explained to 
Heine that the NB leader was "inseparable from the work of the commit-
tee. Besides, he has really performed extraordinarily and not only for 
133
rheodora Benedite to Max Diamant, 10 November 1941, Max 
Diamant Correspondence, vol. 2. 
134H · F d ( d d ) 18 . 94 eLne to reun eSopa e, Lon on , May 1 1, quoting 
Lewinsky, EK Mappe 51. 
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135 his own people." This information should have further clarified the 
conception of Heine of the problems in New York. 
At the end of the last rescue period, he heard more about the 
contradictory approach of Katz. The latter more openly conceded his 
knowledge of the connection between the ERC and the NB organization. 
He explained that "we have assumed a negative inheritance here with the 
Hagen complex. We are convinced that we will have to conduct many 
uncompromising fights against this adventurer". But the GLD wanted to 
postpone "the great confrontation which is inevitable". It did so 
"mainly because of the consideration for those who are still in France 
and Portugal". It still hoped "to get a few tickets and some assis-
tance out of [the ERC]". Katz still had the same illusions about his 
.11 . 1 h 136 1 og1ca approac • But Heine should have understood a little 
better why the ERC did not comply with the wishes of the GLD. 
In general, the rescue period was a frustrating episode in the 
history of the German socialist emigration in the United States. In 
Europe, the refugee crisis became a time of rapprochement between the 
various socialist emigrant groups. In the United States, this oppor-
tunity was lost mainly because of the attitude of the GLD. Its basic 
political approach required a continuation of the old intra-socialist 
antagonisms. Under this condition, it tried to square the circle by 
conducting its rescue work separate from, and parallel to, its political 
135Ibid. 
136Geyer to Sopade,l6 April 1941, quoting Katz, EK Mappe 44. 
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aspirations. This senseless strategy was bound to fail. The GLD can-
not claim credit for the rescue work of the JLC. The latter made its 
contribution despite of the GLD rather than because of it. In the end, 
the rescue period intensified the antagonisms between the German social-
137 
ist emigrant groups in the United States. 
137About the Emergency Rescue Connnittee, see also John M. 
Spalek and Joseph Strelka, eds. Deutsche Exilliteratur seit 1933, 
Band I: Kalifornien, Teil 1 (Munchen: Francke Verlag, 1976), 
pp. 214-219: Wolfgang Elfe, "Das Emergency Rescue Connni ttee". This 
article reluctantly mentions the possibility that the ERC was mainly 
sponsored by NB and its ideological friends. This ambiguity is curious 
since all the evidence of this dissertation on the German socialist 
emigration in the United States was made available to the editors of 
Deutsche Exilliteratur and to Elfe upon request after conversations 
with them in the spring of 1972 in Chicago. The article by Elfe also 
fails to politically identify the International Relief Association (IRA). 
The latter was also a socialist connnittee of an ideological orienta-
tion to the left of the ERC. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE GLD AS AN AMERICAN COMMITTEE: ITS AMERICAN POLITICS 
IN INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SOPADE 
The decline of the Sopade inspired the search for GLD indepen-
dence. With the internment of most of its executives, the Sopade 
ceased to exist for a while after the German attack on France. After 
the French defeat, it had to leave the continent. For this operation 
and for the rescue of the Social Democratic and unionist emigrants, it 
had to depend on the GLD. Thus, the latter gained the upper hand in 
its dealings with the exile executive and maintained an independent 
position from then on. This importance which the GLD assumed after the 
Fall of France energized some of its members in the way that "the sig-
nal for the attack affects an old battle horse". 1 The Gld held a 
meeting on 12 December 1940 about its future activities. It made plans 
for radio propaganda from England to the continent, for an emigrant 
coalition in the line of .the Great Coalition and for the Social Demo-
cratic equivalent of an ehtnic Popular Front. The emigrant coalition 
was called tne· Association of Free Germans (AFG), the ethnic coalition 
the German American Congress for Democracy (GACD) which tried to re-
place the DAKV. 
1 Anna Geyer to Sopade, 17 February 1941, EK Mappe 44. 
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With the AFG, the GLD tried to occupy the international emi-
grant limelight. With the GACD, it hoped to intervene in American 
politics. Seger, especially, expected the rise of a majority labor 
party in the United States as the revival of a crossbreed between so-
ctalism and progressivism. In this context, he hoped for a progressive 
union movement which would result from a unification of the AFL and the 
CIO. He also saw signs of a cooperative movement in America comparable 
to the Social Democratic equivalent of Weimar Germany. In this scheme 
of things, a German American progressive front could play a role. The 
plan for radio propaganda from England ignored the Sopade in its own 
country of exile. It symptomized the new attitude of the GLD towards 
a nearly insignificant Sopade. 
The GLD had tried to contribute to this state of affairs with 
its rescue policy. It had unnecessarily shown its eagerness to keep 
the Sopade away from New York and to split it geographically. These 
developments resulted naturally from disunity within the Sopade. In 
trying to force them, the GLD had betrayed its political intentions. 
Tw f h . s d b s f d Ri 2 h o o t e act~ve opa e mem ers, tamp er an nner, went to t e 
2Empfehlung fur Erich Rinner, 9 March 1941, EK Mappe 102. With 
a doctorate in economics, Rinner had been scientific consultant to the 
office of the Social Democratic Reichstagsfraktion from 1927 to 1933. 
He was also personal secretary to Hilferding while the latter was 
finance minister. He specialized in national and communal budgetary 
and tax policies. In 1933, he became a member of the SPD executive 
and then of the exile executive. After his detachment from the GLD, 
he worked on a government research project about German economic devel-
opment after 1933. Then, he was employed by the Office of War Informa-
tion. In 1945, he became financial consultant of a Wall Street firm 
and stayed in the United States. 
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United States where four dissident Sopade members already resided. The 
other four active executives eventually went to England. One of them 
soon dropped out because of ideological differences. Heine had been 
co-opted during the early emigration so that Vogel and Ollenhauer were 
the only two elected members of the rump Sopade in London. In the 
debate over its next destination, Rinner had insisted that the Sopade 
could do better in the United States. He believed that America would, 
before long, join the anti-Hitler coalition and would become the pre-
dominant ally because of its inexhaustible economic and technological 
resources. He also anticipated the future world role of the United 
States and expected Americans to look upon European affairs in an ob-
jective way. American nationalism would play a small role in an even-
tual peace settlement since Americans had ethnic ties with all European 
countries including Germany. American participation would guarantee an 
equitable and constructive postwar settlement unlike the Versailles 
treaty which England did not have the strength to resist. 3 
Despite these good arguments in favor of a move to America, 
Vogel and Ollenhauer decided to go to London. Unlike the United States, 
England had a strong socialist labor movement whose leaders they knew. 
Vogel's conception of the Second World War was European. He considered 
Britain as the major ally of any anti-Hitler coalition even if the 
United States should eventually join it. He remembered the belated 
American entry into the First World War which was followed by a relapse 
into isolationism. He did not understand very well the complexities of 
3Rinner to Sopade, 22 March 1942, EK Mappe 102. 
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American political attitudes and confessed that America was strange to 
him. He preferred the English closeness to the continent and counted 
on the historical tradition of English European interests which would 
also be influenced by the familiar internationalism of the British 
4 Labor Party. Actually, the British labor movement proved more nation-
alistic than Vogel had expected. Nevertheless, Rinner later conceded 
that the decision of going to England had been correct. He became dis-
illusione4 with an increasing American susceptibility to demands for a 
5 Carthaginian solution to the German problem. 
In the late fall of 1940, it seemed that Vogel and Ollenhauer 
would not be admitted to England. Geyer had preceded them to Lisbon. 
A delay in his immigration procedures gave rise to fears that later 
proved unfounded. In this uncertainty, they telegraphed Stampfer and 
Rinner in care of Katz. They were ready to reconsider their earlier 
decision even if the visa situation improved because of possible poli-
tical discrimination in England. Without referring the telegram to its 
addressees, the GLD decided to tell the Sopade leaders that they had no 
possibilities for political work in the United States, at a time when 
it developed its grand political design. It took the position that the 
party executives should be as close to Europe as possible. It also 
told the executives that, in all fairness to other needy refugees, it 
should no longer hold on to the blanco visas which it had reserved for 
4
ollenhauer to Reinhold, 30 March 1941, EK Mappe 80; also: 01-
lenhauer to Heine, 29 March 1941, EK Mappe 80; Vogel to Stampfer, 5--
December 1940; Matthias and Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, 
PP· 475-477. . 
5Rinner to Sopade, 8 December 1945, EK Mappe 102. 
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them as a matter of politeness. Privately, the GLD members prided them-
selves about having forced the hand of the Sopade leaders. Especially 
Grzesinsky seemed to be convinced that "he had decisively shaped the 
history of the next hundred years with this telegram". The executives 
assumed that this response expressed the opinion of Stampfer and Rinner 
so that the decision for England would have been unanimous. When ·in-
formed of the actual circumstances, they considered the telegram from 
Katz "as a direct message of unwelcome" which was added to his failure 
of communicating with them during their uncertain stay in Lisbon. With 
one exception, he had left their numerous letters, reports and tele-
grams from Lisbon unanswered. By the beginning of December, there was 
still 11a fifty to fifty probability that we have to go to America after 
alln. The executives decided to take "the next best ship to the USArr 
6 if they were not admitted into England by the end of December. The 
British Labor Party finally relieved them of their predicament. But 
the tone was set for the future relations between the executive and the 
GLD. Vogel reprimanded the latter severely for what he called, in a 
reference to Bismarck, another "Ems Dispatchn. 
_The next half year.of GLD - Sopade relations confirmed the pre-
vious trend. The exile executive in London could not supervise or in-
fluence the GLD by its two active executives in New York. Stampfer 
soon repudiated the Sopade in favor of the GLD of which he could not, 
otherwise, have become a member. In the case of the ''Ems Dispatch11 , he 
6
vogel to Katz, 25 November 1940, Matthias and Link, Mit dem 
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 106, p. 474; also: Vogel to Wilhelm 
Hagner, 29 March 1941, EK Mappe 139. 
resented what he called the awkward, bureaucratic tone of the Sopade 
letter which he considered 11absolutely nonsensicaln. 7 He told Rinner 
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that it was 11completely out of the question that we operate within the 
GLD as representatives of the party executive. He [Stampfer] refused 
to be ridiculed for such a Don Quixotery". To Rinner's question 
"whether he would silently stand by while the party executive was being 
pushed against the wall by the GLD", he answered that there was nothing 
left of the Sopade that could be pushed against any wall. He told the 
Sopade that "to cooperate permanently with Rinner as an organized part 
of our committee is technically impossible". 8 
Rinner faced an impossible task. He tried to impress upon the 
GLD its duties towards the Sopade. He rebuked the American committee 
for pretending to represent the Weimar labor movement directly rather 
than the exile party executive. 9 He attempted repeatedly to clarify 
11 the basic question of the relationship between the Sopade and the 
GLD". He insisted that the issues of a coalition committee and of 
radio propaganda from England could only be approached in cooperat~on 
with the Sopade. The latter had discussed the feasibility of radio 
propaganda with the International Secretary of the Labor Party after the 
German invasion of France. But both projects were impractical while the 
English government hesitated to define its war aims and was reluctant to 
7Rinner to Sopade, 16 December 1940, EK Mappe 102. 
8 Stampfer to Sopade, January 1941, Matthias and Link, Mit dem 
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 108, p. 478. 
9Rinner to Sopade, 16 December 1940, EK Mappe 102. 
209 
. h . 10 deal w1t any em1grants. Rinner conceded to the GLD only auxiliary 
functions. It should,for the present, take advantage of the unlimited 
availability of information in the most important news center of the 
world and keep the Social Democratic emigrants elsewhere up to date. 
For the future, it should deliberate about a program for Germany and 
Europe after the war, in close contact with the Sopade. The GLD should 
~ontribute materially and ideally, that is with financial support and 
political loyalty, to "a purpose oriented cooperation and a useful div-
ision of labor within the party executive". 
The GLD members unanimously rejected Rinner's appeals. Auf-
hauser proposed even that the remaining three executives in London stop 
calling themselves a party executive and act, instead, as a Social Demo-
cratic Auslandszentrale (exile center). The GLD felt relieved of a 
further obligation to communicate with the Sopade. That was,in its 
opinion, the function of Rinner, who was, nevertheless, excluded from 
the main deliberations of the GLD. He was only a guest to be invited 
at their discretion. Katz at first reimbursed Rinner for small Sopade 
expenses if they were conscientiously listed, down to the last postage 
item. Special permission was 'necessary for telegrams. Then Rinner was 
to conduct his correspondence through the office of Katz who finally 
told him that nin principlerr, the GLD was not liable to assume any 
11 Sopade expenses. The GLD rejected unanimously its original purpose as 
10
vogel to Rinner, 10 March 1941, EK Mappe 139; also: Vogel to 
Stampfer, 10 March 1941, Matthias and Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutsc~ 
land, Nr. 111, p. 488; Ollenhauer to Emil Stahl, 1 August 1941, EK 
Mappe 80. 
11Rinner to Sopade, 16 December 1940, EK Mappe 102. 
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a fund raising subsidiary of the Sopade. It gradually neutralized 
Rinner who gave up his attempts at mediating between the Sopade and the 
GLD in July 1941. 12 Vogel and Ollenhauer had encouraged him to stay on. 
They accepted the behavior of the GLD with equanimity and patience 
rather than with useless protests. They were not afraid that the Amer-
ican committee would outperform them since they had settled down to a 
more realistic and somewhat pessimistic appraisal of their political 
possibilities and those of the Social Democratic emigration in general. 
But they considered "the maintenance of a close contact between you 
[ Rinner] and us as the only practical possibility of the moment1r as far 
as their American relations were concerned. They were interested in 
that "not all connections are severed between you as our confidant and 
the GLD" and wanted "to maintain close contact with our comrades in the 
United States11 , including the numerous Social Democratic emigrants out-
side the GLD. In the meantime, they hoped that the aspirations of the 
GLD would "eventually return to a sensible level(( . 13 Without fully 
understanding the attitude of the GLD, they believed that the difficul-
ties between Rinner and the American committee were of a personal 
nature. Rinner was the special persona non grata of the GLD. But he 
realized correctly that the latter was 11 now by all means bent on estab-
lishing a political position for itself in this country. It considers 
itself the true representative of the party and uses Stampfer to assist 
12Rinner to Sopade, 12 July 1941, EK Mappe 102. 
13
ollenhauer to Rinner, 26 January 1941, EK Mappe 79. 
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it in this role with his name."14 
In this scheme, the Social Democratic emigrants had no place. 
. 15 The GLD dealt with them accordingly. It coopted only a few late emi-
grants for reasons of prestige like Stampfer and Aufhauser. It was a 
committee of only about ten permanent members that pretended to repre-
sent the German labor movement of the Weimar Republic. The GLD was 
subdivided twice more. Dnportant matters were prepared in an unofficial 
subcommittee of less than five members. Financial matters were nearly 
monopolized by Katz. If the Social Democratic emigrants had any policy 
making voice they could have forced the GLD into a different direction. 
If ignored completely, they could have started an organization of their 
own. Already in July 1939, the GLD decided that the formation of a 
special group of Social.Democratic emigrants was "not recommendableu. 
It designated the German branch of the SDF of which Katz. was the secre-
tary as the proper organization for accommodating Social Democratic 
emigrants. They could come to its meetings and discuss its lectures. 
But their opinions did not count. They soon lost interest. 
For the personal and legal needs of the refugees, the NVZ held 
a weekly Sprechstunde (office hours) which treated them as clients. On 
the recommendation of the GLD, the NVZ also registered the emigrants. 16 
They were potential subscribers to the NVZ. Stampfer and a few others 
were welcomed at the pier for publicity reasons. For the rest, Mrs. 
14Rinner to Sopade, 25 February 1941, EK Mappe 102. 
15 Robert Grotzsch to Vogel, 27 January 1942, EK Mappe 46. 
16
sitzung der GLD, 14 July 1939, Matthias and Link, Mit dem 
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 67, p. 408. 
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Rinner often waited alone for hours in the cold of mid-winter for a boat 
that might be several hours late. 17 The Sopade received almost unani-
mously negative reports about the GLD. But Katz disappointed the hopes 
of the executives that he would not be completely indifferent to the 
18 
reputation of the GLD abroad. A self-help organization could have 
used all the available talent for handling and referring special emi-
grant needs. The JLC and other American relief committees took care 
of the material needs o'f the emigrants of whom many received room and 
board in the fraternal Kongresshaus of the JLC. Others received the 
going welfare rate of $7 a week. 
The Sopade tried to do its best for the neglected American 
comrades. Several of them had belonged to "the inner circle", that is, 
the former Sopade bureau, for whom the GLD had especially little use. 
They had been reluctant to go to New York, especially after hearing of 
the bad ways of the GLD. The Sopade executives asked the Rinners to 
concern themselves with the refugees. They asked Mrs. Rinner to "report 
about each of them individually, how they are making out", specifically 
?lso about the whereabouts "of our other friends". 19 . The Rinners held 
weekly get-togethers in their house and kept in contact with as many 
emigrants as possible. 20 The Sopade also left Rinner with $300 to 
17Maria Rinner to Sopade, 26 February 1941, EK Mappe 102. 
18
vogel to Wilhelm Hagner, 29 March 1941, EK Mappe 139; also: 
Grotzsch to Vogel, 27 January 1942, EK Mappe 46; Ollenhauer to Katz, 
1 August 1941, EK Mappe 80; Ollenhauer to Reinbold, 30 March 1941, 
EK Mappe 80. 
19
ollenhauer to Rinner, 26 January 1941, EK Mappe 79. 
20Rinner to Sopade, 12 July 1941, EK Mappe 102. 
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administer in small sums to needy emigrants while doubting whether it 
was nin principle right11 to support the friends in America with party 
funds. Vogel and Ollenhauer wrote as many personal letters as possible 
in order to give the Social Democratic emigrants in America the feeling 
of belonging to the party and its emigration. 
But the Sopade failed in its attempt of-forming a Social Demo-
cratic organization in the United States. At first, it asked Rinner 
11whether it is not possible and advisable to organize our comrades in 
USA in some way ... so that they may feel to continue belonging to the 
party11 • They left the idea up to Rinner's judgement but they thought 
that 11we could not leave these people completely to themselves 11 • They 
proposed that their former associates,Gustav Ferland Rudolf Leeb, 
. . d . . 1 21 assLst RLnner a minLstratLve y. But the latter balked at this pro-
ject. He was tired of emigrant affairs and did not want to confront 
the GLD with it. A few months later, the Sopade approached Leeb, whom 
Friedrich Wilhelm Wagner and Hans Gaspari were to assist. The three 
emigrants planned a fraternal organization of all German Social Demo-
crats but they could not come to terms with each other. 22 They rejec-
ted the Sopade idea of registering the Social Democratic emigrants and 
collecting a membership fee. Rinner made the substitute proposal of 
creating "a better, informal bond11 by improving and distributing the 
Sozialistische Mitteilungen of the Sopade for a subscription fee. His 
main objection to the membership fee was that "more than anywhere else, 
21
ollenhauer to Rinner, 1 August 1941, EK Mappe 80. 
22Rinner to Sopade, 11 October 1941, EK Mappe 102. 
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the emigration in this country consists almost exclusively of officers 
of the movement if not of leaders". It lacked almost completely "the 
simple party soldiers",and the officers have "very little understanding 
for membership fees". In the absence of a general Social Democratic 
organization, the GLD remained in total control. 
The England project was to be the launching event for the poli-
tical plans of the GLD. As an emigrant organization, it needed a 
significant activity relating to Germany to its credit in order to gain 
recognition in the United States, especially from the government. It 
could no longer claim to have any contacts with a German underground 
movement whose extent was unknown. Shortwave radio propaganda was the 
only alternative. But the United States still had its neutrality 
legislation so that England, the exile territory of the Sopade, was to 
be the base of these GLD operations. The problem of the latter was 
that they depended on outside help for facilities and funds. But the 
relevant agencies could and wanted to conduct this propaganda better 
themselves in their own ideological terms rather than those of a sus-
pect emigrant organization. For these reasons, the GLD did not succeed 
in its first objective. 
At first, it intended to send two representatives to Canada or 
England. In a less ambitious scheme, Staudinger proposed to send 
propaganda records to England for broadcasts from there. Stampfer and 
Katz discussed these plans with Citrine and Schevenels, the two top 
officials of the International Federation of Trade Unions, who attended 
the annual convention of the AFL in New Orleans in November 1940. As 
an English labor leader, Citrine was to recommend the GLD proposals to 
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the proper English authorities, that is, the Labor Party, the Trade 
Union Congress, the government and the British Broadcasting Corporation. 
Instead of a second meeting, there was only a telephone conversation 
with Citrine who was not enthusiastic about the plan in view of an 
increasing nationalism of the English labor movement, which he probably 
23 
shared. The State Department and the English ambassador also refused 
to promote the plan. Vogel and Ollenhauer dissuaded the GLD by reiter-
ating the probable uselessness of the venture. In the face of GLD 
persistence, they welcomed the visit by GLD representatives for internal 
reasons, that is for promoting better relations between the two commit-
tees through personal discussions. There was so little coordination 
that Ollenhauer stated in August 1941 that 1~e have no longer any idea 
b t h t · · th d · th h t ;n · d" 24 a ou w a ~s go~ng on ere an w~ w a purposes L m~n . 
In February 1941, the project revived in a luncheon meeting of 
Katz and Stampfer with Held and Minkof of the JLC. According to the 
report of the two GLD leaders, Held spontaneously proposed to Stampfer 
a trip to London together with other American and emigrant representa-
tives. The JLC executives offered to pay the expenses and to get AFL 
sponsorship from Green. Held argued that the repeated attempts of the 
GLD for some recognition from the American government had only elicited 
a non-committal response. He explained that 11 the road from New York 
to Washington leads through London". The GLD representatives should 
try to win in London "some kind of recognition of your activity and 
23 
. s d 16 b 1940 102 R~nner to opa e, Decem er , EK Mappe . 
24 Ollenhauer to Ferl, 19 August 1941, EK Mappe 80. 
posit·ion here". Held was sure that out of 10% of it "we would make 
100% here in America". 25 He apparently meant that the JLC could then 
successfully intervene for the GLD with Washington. Somewhat incon-
sistently with his own feelings, Stampfer called the proposal by Held 
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"a romantic idea". It was, however, generally approved by the ensuing 
GLD meeting. Aufhauser welcomed impatiently this "attempt of the GLD 
at becoming politically active" and proposed to benefit from its 
impetus by issuing a Social Democratic Correspondence equal to the 
Germany Reports of the American Friends of German Freedom and superior 
to the Sopade Informations from London. This idea was postponed until 
after the England journey. Grzesinsky offered "the stupendous plan" of 
making the England mission the launching event for "an executive com-
mittee", that is, for an .emigrant coalition in the form of a government 
in exile of which he was the most impatient advocate. Stampfer ob-
jected to sharing the benefits of his England trip with Grzesinsky so 
that the latter had to wait until the summer of 1941. 26 In June 1941, 
the England project of the GLD took the form of a potential visit by 
two AFL representatives, possibly Green and treasurer George Meany, 
and Stampfer. This visit would have returned the courtesy of Citrine 
and Schevenels who had attended the'last AFL convention. But the 
secretary of the International Department of the Labor Party antici-
pated "serious difficulties" and telegraphically suggested that Green 
25 Rinner to Sopade, 25 February 1941, EK Mappe 102. 
26 Rinner to Sopade, 11 March 1941, EK Mappe 102. 
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d • C • • d • 1 II h • It f h . •· 27 in ~cate to ~tr~ne ~rect y t e prec~se purpose o t e Journey. 
The English labor leaders wanted to see representatives of both Ameri-
can union federations which did not appeal to the AFL. They were also 
concerned about the direct sponsorship by the AFL of the GLD plans for 
their country. As a result, the AFL leaders stayed at home. But 
Stampfer left for London on 12 September 1941. The JLC financed his 
trip with $1,800. 
Stampfer was not as pessimistic about his mission as he had 
sometimes pretended. While waiting in Baltimore for the departure of 
the plane, he was "very happy that I am not sitting around as a super-
fluous man that I am not a forgotten man .... The worst thing in 
28 these times is to be left out". In a memorandum to Clement R . 
. Attlee, the leader of the Labor Party and the deputy prime minister, 
he laid out a grandoise program that lacked credibility. He thought 
that radio propaganda could "organize the spiritual forces of anti-
Hitler Germany in a common effortH and prepare "revolutionary events11 
there. According to Stampfer, this propaganda task was the common 
responsibility of British, American and German emigrant labor. He 
proceeded to speak in the name of the "American Labor Movement" and of 
other American organizations. He pretended that all '.'the anti-Nazi 
organizations of America are planning a vast and well directed propa-
ganda offensive to be carried into Germany". This "new movement" was 
27 Stampfer to Vogel, 10 June 1941, Matthias and Link, Mit dem 
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 115, p. 507. 
28 Stampfer an seine Frau and Tochter, 12 September 1941, 
Matthias and Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 119, p. 516. 
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supposedly sanctioned by the American government which was still 
partially neutral. Also, for a common appeal to German labor, the AFL 
and the CIO would have had to cooperate. Green contented himself with 
participating in an appeal by the English labor movement to the German 
people. Part of the American movement was the growing German American 
movement against Nazism. Stampfer defined it as a combination of the 
Social Democratic organizations of the GLD leaving out other emigrant 
29 
organizations of which Attlee was, nevertheless, aware. As predicted 
by the Sopade, Stampfer accomplished nothing during his four months 
stay in England and returned to New York in frustration. Many of the 
British socialists and unionists favored the attitude towards Germany 
which was symbolized by Lord Vansittart and came to be called Vansit-
tartism. As one of the main foreign policy makers in the Foreign 
Office before rising to the House of Lords.in 1941, Vansittart believed 
that National Socialism thrived on the old traditions of German nation-
alism and militarism so that it was difficult to distinguish between 
the Nazis and a victimized German people. A minority of German social-
ist and Social Democratic emigrants in England also favored the Vansit-
tart theory and inevitably engaged in ideological disputes with the 
other emigrants. The visit of Stampfer intensified these antagonisms. 
He was a right wing Social Democrat who believed in a liberal Germany 
which could be revolutionized against Hitler. The German Vansittartists 
discredited the former editor of the Vorwarts with public references to 
29 Memorandum Stampfer to Attlee, 20 October 1941, Matthias and 
Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 120, pp. 517-519. 
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his patriotic and conservative attitudes during the First World War and 
the Weimar Republic. An article in the London Times also took up his 
past record and branded him as a nationalist. Under these circumstances, 
Stampfer could not even get to the first base of a labor recommendation 
30 to the English government. 
Nevertheless, the GLD kept emphasizing the need for psycholo-
gical warfare. Participation in the latter was the only way it could 
get accepted by the American government. Shortly after the return of 
Stampfer from England, the NVZ proposed the establishment of a longwave 
radio station in England which would be exclusively reserved for anti-
German propaganda twenty-four hours a day in order "to attain Hitler 
significantly in his own country". It wanted "a capable American, 
German speaking team" sent to England under American supervision. 31 
But the American government was not interested in GLD schemes. Soon 
after the American entry into the war, it created the Office of War 
Information (OWl) which envisioned emigrant cooperation but more on the 
ethnic homefront than in Europe. The Overseas Branch of the OWl em-
played only individual socialist emigrants. Their selection caused 
bitter recriminations between the two main emigrant groups. The GLD 
suspected the OWI of preference for NB people. It did not lend itself 
30 Ollenhauer to Leeb, 3 February 1942, EK Mappe 81; also: 
Ollenhauer to Stampfer, 17 February 1942, Matthias and Link,Mit dem 
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 124, pp. 531-535; Ibid., Erklarung der 
Union der deutschen sozialistischen Organisationen in Gross-Brittanien, 
February 1942, Nr. 125, p. 535; Ibid., Erklarung der Fight for Freedom 
Gruppe, 2 March 1942, Nr. 126, p. 538. 
31Neue Volkszeitung, 31 January 1942. 
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to much cooperation with the OWI because the latter intended to involve 
other groups which the GLD opposed. But it could not get the separate 
governmental recognition it wanted. Partly, also, the GLD members were 
afraid of becoming identified with American postwar plans that would 
compromise them in Germany. This predicament will be further discussed 
later. 
Thus, the timing for the formation of an emigrant coalition 
was influenced by many factors. At first, a German exile coalition 
conflicted ~ith American neutrality. Later, the American government 
had plans of its own for emigrant organization. Also, because of the 
jealousy among the GLD members, their plans were not integrated and 
did not start simultaneously. Stampfer pursued the England project and 
did not want to share its credit with Grzesinsky who pressed for an 
exile coalition. Seger pushed for an ethnic coalition in accordance 
with his ideas about an American political career after the war. Then, 
the period of rescue from the summer of 1940 to the summer of 1941 had 
a retarding effect. Also, several coalition antecedents influenced 
the project of the Association for Free Germans. 
In July and August 1939, there had been an "information confer-
ence" of the German American Popular Front, New Beginning, the SAP, and 
the GLD. The GLD delegate was not Katz because he had several years 
before been a candidate for the chairmanship of the German American 
Popular Front organization and had sharply attacked its members after 
his defeat. The conference was to nominate an emigrant representation 
which was especially important in the event of war. The GLD proposed 
to form a triumvirate as a nucleus for this representation. It was to 
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include Grzesinsky, Seger, and, as a third emigrant acceptable to the 
left wing, Aufhauser, Tillich or Hertz. This rump committee should 
complement itself by coopting "with priority, the political Right, 
Democrats, Center Party people and Volkspartei (People's Party) mem-
bers". But the GLD opposed Rosenfeld as emigrant representative because 
of his collaboration with communists. The other groups rejected this 
proposal so that the GLD felt then "free to act independently11 • 32 The 
GLD had already decided to intensify its talks with bourgeois emigrants 
like Bruning. But the latter did not respond. Apparently, he wanted 
to maintain his reserve until the outcome of the war was decided. The 
GLD then wanted to proceed without Bruning but did not make much pro-
33 gress. 
It participated for a while in the Council for European Peace, 
which consisted of two components, an organizing effort by the Social 
Democratic Kurt Grossmann and an initiative by some catholic emigrants 
under Erwin Kraft. 34 Grossmann discussed his project with his friends 
in New York including Seger. He planned to involve everybody including 
such socialists as Rosenfeld, Hertz, Toni Sender, Arthur Rosenberg and 
32
sitzung der GLD, 14 July 1939-,.Matthias and Link, Mit dem 
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 67, p. 410; also: Ibid., Staudinger to 
Stampfer, 1 August 1939, Nr. 68, p. 411; Ibid., Sitzung der Gld, 18 Aug-
ust 1939, Nr. 69, p. 414. 
33
sitzung der GLD, 28 September 1939, Matthias and Link, Mit dem 
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 73, p. 421. 
34 . .. .. Sammlung Hubertus Pr~nz zu Lowenstein, Institut fur Zeit-
geschichte, Munich, Band 6, Council for European Peace, Minutes of the 
meeting of the Federation Sub-committee, 20 February 1940; also Ibid. 
Council for European Peace, Grossmann to Karl Spieker, 20 February 1940. 
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and Tillich. 35 He wanted a representation of "the entire German opposi-
tion or of its largest part" which included not only the party political 
but also "the Kultur-political groups" as "art attraction even for the 
36 United States". At the end of December 1939, the Grossmann circle 
37 
and the Kraft circle agreed to join their efforts. Their program 
called for a federated Europe to which the individual countries would 
delegate most of their sovereignty. 38 It should include England but. 
not necessarily Russia. The catholic Kraft was for an inclusion of the 
latter, the Social Democrat Grossmann against it. There was more una-
nimity on the benefits for Germany. The Council wanted to save the 
R . h . h . ( . 1 . ) d d . . 1 d. b 39 e~c se~n e~t nat~ona un~ty an oppose terr~tor~a ~smem erment. 
It also opposed "a super-Versailles" in the form of "an educational 
40 government" imposed on Germany. The GLD participated in the connnit-
. 35 Sammlung Kurt Grossmann, Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, Munich, 
Komitee fUr einen gerechten Frieden, ein demokratisches Deutschland 
und ein foderatives Europa, New York, 1939-1942, Rundbrief, 3 November 
1939. 
36Ibid., Grossmann: Uber praktische Arbeit. 
37Ibid., Grossmann to Erwin Kraft, 29 December 1939. 
38Ibid., Grossmann: Thesen zur Kriegszieldiskussion, 5 January 
1940; also Ibid., Erwin Kraft: Some thoughts on a scheme for a federa-
ted Europe, January 1940. 
39Ibid., Father Gregory Feige, A one page program submitted to 
the Council for European Peace, 5 March 1940. 
40Ibid., Grossmann: Thesen zur Kriegszieldiskussion, 3 January 
1940. 
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41 tees of the Council with Brauer and Katz but soon dropped out. The 
Council lasted until 1942. 
Other Social Democratic efforts were those by Sollmann and 
Katz. Sollmann had refused to join the Council of European Peace be-
f . . .. 42 cause o ~ts compos~t~on. He considered the idea of the United 
States of Europe his own and formed the German Council for Liberty and 
Federation in December 1940 together with bourgeois emigrants43 like 
Ernst Meyer, a former German diplomat in America, and Gotz Briefs, an 
economist who had favored the Center Party and was then a professor at 
the Catholic University of America. Sollmann could not interest 
Bruning in the project despite his close relations with the former 
chancellor. In February 1941, during the refugee crisis, Katz tried 
again to involve Bruning in his schemes. The latter corresponded with 
the GLD on behalf of Hilferding. He complained that Katz "misused the 
two conversations I had with himtt. But Bruning was not always as un-
equivocally opposed to participating in emigrant activity as he often 
claimed. 44 He had several times expressed his wish of bringing together 
the various groups of the German opposition without, however, acting 
upon it. Katz asked him specifically whether he would welcome Otto 
41
sitzung der GLD, 10 November 1939, Matthias and Link, Mit dem 
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 78, p. 427; also: Ibid., Katz to Stampfer, 
14 November 1939, Nr. 79, p. 428. 
42 Sollmann to Grossmann, 10 November 1938, Sammlung Grossmann. 
43 Ermarth to Hubertus Prinz zu Lowenstein, 17 December 1940, 
Sammlung Lowenstein, Band 8. 
44 Otto Strasser to Bernhard Strasser, 5 February 1941, Sammlung 
Otto Strasser, Band 7. 
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Braun, the former prime minister of Prussia, in America who was rela-
tively safe in Switzerland. Bruning thought that Braun might, together 
with Sollmann, become "a representative figure for the former Social 
Democrats in this country". In that case, he was "quite willing to 
discuss the possibility of a collaboration between the two groups", 
h . b h S . 1 D . d h C p · · 45 t at ~s, etween t e oc~a emocrat~c an t e enter arty em~grat~on. 
Apparently, he would have liked to engage in emigrant politics with his 
choice of associates. His strenuous efforts for Hilferding are signifi-
cant in this context. In the case of Braun, he met with the resistance 
of Sollmann who questioned "the advisability" of bringing the former 
prime minister of Prussia to New York. 46 Under these circumstances, 
the GLD had to do without the prestige of Bruning. In July 1941, it 
formed the German American Council for the Liberation of_Germany from 
Nazism. In the fall of 1941, this council was registered with the State 
47 Department as the Association of Free Germans. 
The AFG stated defensively that it was not a government in 
exile. Such a claim would have been impossible without the participa-
tion of a prominent non-socialist former Weimar politician. It would 
also have brought c~arges against· the former office holders that they 
48 
wanted their positions back after the war. As little more than a 
45BrUning to Sollmann, 4 February 1941, Sollmann Papers. 
46 Sollmann to Bruning, 3 August 1941, Nachlass Bruning. 
47
sammlung Kurt Glaser, Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, Munich, 
Association of Free Germans, Band I, p. 9. 
48 Ibid., Band I, p. 37, an article about the AFG in the New 
York Herald Tribune, 11 January 1942. 
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Social Democratic committee, the AFG was a pretentious coalition. 
There was only one Center Party emigrant in its self-appointed adminis-
trative board, first the GLD client Thormann and then Karl Misch, a 
former political editor of the Vossische Zeitung in Berlin. 49 The AFG 
did not even have .the full support of the GLD, some of whose members 
referred to it as "the new club of Grzesinsky". Stampfer noted criti-
cally in his postwar memoirs that the AFG did not develop a sustained 
activity. 
In conflict with this background, the Association made claims 
and plans that approximated those of an executive group. In its search 
for status, it spoke for the democratic forces of the Weimar Republic 
in order to justify a similar claim for the postwar period. This par-
alleled the idea of trusteeship with which the Sopade justified its 
caretaker role for the SPD. As a government-like body, the AFG did not 
confine its role to the United States. It intended to 11organize free 
Germans in the United States and in other parts of the world". Ollen-
hauer considered this ambition as "propaganda". Otherwise, it would 
engender ''tensions since we do not think that such an activity will 
50 further our cause". Another executive idea was the project of 
Grzesinsky to organize a volunteer emigrant army. Somewhat embarassing-
ly, the AFG also made a promise as from one government to another to 
"cherish, maintain and extend the institutions of American freedom". 
49 Katz to Ollenhauer, 1 September 1941, Matthias and Link, Mit 
dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 118, p. 513, 514; also Sammlung 
Glaser, Band I, pp. 9, 30, 31. 
50 Ollenhauer to Stampfer, 17 February 1942, Matthias and Link, 
Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 124, p. 534. 
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In preparations for postwar negotiations, it planned to ''study and to 
draft plans in collaboration with representatives of other nations for 
the purpose of reconstructing a free democratic Germany and a peaceful 
Europe". 
In the absence of government recognition, the AFG hoped to lift 
up its status by cooperation with the newly established United Nations, 
also, as another detour to American support. In.the opinion of the 
NVZ, the Declaration of the United Nations of January 1942 offered a 
51 basic program for "a promising moral campaign into Germany". For 
this, the United States would hopefully take the initiative so that 
the AFG and the GLD could participate in the psychological warfare of 
the Allies. A step in the direction of official recognition was to be 
an AFG cosignature of the Declaration, something that the State Depart-
ment had suggested for free movements even if they did not constitute 
. .1 52 governments ~n ex~ e. After the signatures by a Danish and an 
Estonian committee, the AFG telegraphed Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
that the Washington Declaration would not be complete without a German 
signature. But in its opinion, it could only be rendered by emigrants 
who were legitimized by their Weimar past. Emigrant comp.etitors of the 
AFG who had not "a priori opposed any totalitarian dictatorship" as well 
as socialist dissenters would not be qualified. The AFG would not 
claim to represent the leadership of the second German republic, but it 
would be "the voice of the free, non-National Socialist Germany in 
America11 • Its foundation and its signature of the UN Declaration were, 
51Neue Volkszeitung, 10 January 1942. 
52 Ibid. 
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therefore, "a political necessity". Otherwise, those who claimed the 
identity between Germany and National Socialism would be correct. 53 
But, as an enemy alien committee, the AFG did not have the confidence 
of the State Department. 
In October 1942, the AFG attempted to strengthen its role by 
publishing "a sketch of a second German republic which ... will elim-
inate the weaknesses that permitted the rise of Hitler11 • This was 
presented "to the statesmen of the United Nations and to the people of 
the Allied countries'r. In its context, the AFG felt it could play 
11 an effective part both during the war and in the period immediately 
following it". Its members were ready "to cooperate with all of the 
agencies of the United States government". This statement was signed 
by the twenty-eight members of the AFG,of whom about two thirds were 
Social Democrats and the rest Weimar coalition party members of local 
54 importance who were patronized by the Social Democrats. 
In this sketch "for the free Germany of tomorrow", the AFG 
spoke in the name of the second German republic as the representative 
of the first. It vowed that 11 the German people will build a free 
Republic11 after "the complete victory" of the United Nations. Grzesin-
sky was confident that the German people would back the forces of the 
Weimar Republic. Without having to take into account their defeat, 
the latter would root out National Socialism, disarm and demilitarize 
53Ib. d ~ . ' 17 January 1942. 
54Programmatische Richtlinien der AFG, October 1942, Matthias 
and Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 135, pp. 567-570; also 
Sammlung Glaser, Band I, pp. 42, 43. 
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the country and establish an economic democracy that would permanently 
deprive rrpan-German militarism and imperialism" of their economic 
b . 55 as~s. 
The critical social element of postwar Germany would be the 
young people whom the old generation would have to reeducate. Grzesin-
sky was sometimes pessimistic about this prospect. He thought that 
they could 11not be converted to democracy" after their training in 
National Socialist ideology. This put the fortunes of the second repub-
lie back into the hands of '!their fathers and their mothers who have 
known a better Germany (and] will build the new Reich". This rehabili-
tation of the Weimar generation was selfserving. Yet, Grzesinsky 1 s own 
democratic attitudes were tinged by enlightened authoritarianism which 
reflected his former position of police chief of Berlin and Prussia. 
He promised that the new "state shall serve the interests of the 
peopl~r. It would "provide for the people ... freedom of speech and 
worship and freedom from want and fear11 • Grzesinsky complemented the 
program with the assurance that future attempts of overthrowing the 
democratic form of government would be checked "by adequate agencies 
to be established by the government", presumably·police agencies. 56 
This was to be another improvement on the performance of Weimar. But 
this program could not validate the claim of the AFG for representing 
the democratic forces of the German past and future. 
This Social Democratic vision of a second republic would be 
55 Ibid., p. 42. 
56 Ibid., p. 37. 
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possible if the Allies learned the lesson of the wrong treatment of 
Germany after the First World War. After their prospective victory and 
a total German defeat, they were to apply enlightened benevolence ra-
ther than interference in postwar German affairs. This would be a safe 
policy because National Socialism which had brought down the first re-
public would be over. This time, the Social Democrats would be correct 
in considering communism the real danger to a German republic. The 
latter circumstance would tie the hands of the Western Allies. Any 
dismemberment of Germany would cause "a Bolshevist Revolution11 that 
would spread irresistibly to France, England and the United States. 57 
The Social Democratic emigrants of the GLD anticipated a confrontation 
between East and West in which Germany would play a crucial role on the 
Western side. They considered East Prussia as an Eastern cultural 
front of Western civilization. Its cession would constitute the open-
ing appeasement of a Soviet Union bent on world conquest. 58 
The Social Democrats of the GLD thought that the communist 
threat should determine the policy and the strategy of the Western 
Allies during the war. They would have preferred a continuation of 
the Hitler-Stalin Pact, and deplored the East-West alliance of the 
United Nations. Under the latter circumstances, Stampfer clatmed that 
"the consequence of a Hitler defeat (would be] the victory of world 
bolshevism". It was immaterial "whether Soviet Russia does or does not 
fight or whether it fights on this or on that side". It remained al-
57 Ibid. 
58Neue Volkszeitung, 28 June 1941. 
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ways the same and its present democratic stand was only ncamouflage". 59 
Seger vowed that "we will continue to consider this war as a war of 
democracy against dictatorship regardless of the circumstance that 
Russia ... is today on the side of democracy. Russia has not the least 
in common with the democracies". Katz recommended to the American 
government to pursue the second of three possible outcomes of the war 
between Germany and Russia. A total defeat of Russia was probable but 
undesirable; the possibility of a Russian victory over Hitler was 
nimperceptibly small" so that the United States should opt for rra half 
defeat [of Russia] with a stable Eastern front". 60 Seger specified 
that the Allies should keep military help to Russia to a minimum so 
that this war could end "with the triumph of the democracies and with 
the defeat of the principle of totalitarian dictatorship". Otherwise, 
trthe devil Hitler would be replaced with the Beelzebub Stalin". The 
end of the Hitler-Stalin Pact was the occasion to let National Social-
ist Germany exhaust itself in a defeat of Soviet Russia. The Social 
Democrats could then rebuild the republic without the handicap of 
another Versailles. This was the only working solution to the German 
problem so that the GLD and the AFG deserved the exclusive attention of 
"the British and American labor movements 1r. 
The GLD attitude towards the Soviet Union also influenced its 
ethnic politics. After the conclusion of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, it 
hoped to monopolize the ethnic field and take over from the defunct 
59 Ibid. 
60
rbid., 5 July 1941 and 23 August 1941. 
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Popular Front. In June 1940, it formed the German American Congress 
for Democracy (GACD) in order to benefit from the activation of public 
opinion during that presidential election year. The GACD was to be an 
ethnic Great Coalition. But its first interest was that of replacing 
the Popular Front in access to the secondary labor organizations. Its 
method was that of denouncing the left-wing leaders of the latter. In 
this context, Stampfer was satisfied over nthe anamorphosis of pseudo-
Social Democrats into communists who take their place next to their 
intellectual kin, the Nazisn. Once properly identified, they stood 
out as people as dangerous as their predecessors in the Weimar Repub-
lic "which perished because of communist crimes" 61 They were Fifth 
Columnists 62 for whose containment the GACD was a "dire necessity". It 
could "help our German American people to success-fully withstand and 
63 
repel the onslaught of totalitarian propaganda in this country11 • 
What these ncomm.unists, fascists, pacifists, defeatists and other 
queers" achieved in Europe they could repeat in the United States. 64 
The NVZ thought that rrthe AKStK and the German speaking unions are 
naturally deeply interested in all these things 11 like the fight against 
Fifth Columnists, that in that respect 11 they would not leave the least 
61
rbid., 27 January 1940 and 3 February 1940. 
62
rbid., 20 July 1940. 
63The German American Congress for Democracy, press conference 
in New York, 26 February 1941, National Archives, Washington, State 
Department Central Files, Socialism. 
64
rbid., Rudolf von Hahn, Erwin H. Klaus to Stephen Early, 
Secretary to the President, 25 February 1941. 
doubt about their loyalty to American democracy'r. 65 
Sometimes, the NVZ tried to apply pressure on the left-wing 
leaders and members by hinting at potential governmental reprisals 
for disloyalty. In an appeal of October 1940 to the secondary labor 
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organizations, it emphasized that most of them faced "a very uncertain 
faterr and advised "political purity: out with the Nazis and connnunists 
of our ranks. An end to the Fifth Columnn. The NVZ established that 
"only he who is ready to defend the bourgeois, the political democracy 
of a capitalist country has the right of occupying a function in a 
labor organization since it is the capitalist, the bourgeois, the 
political democracy which makes our existence possible". 66 Another 
criterion was according to the NVZ the attitude towards the ongoing 
"war for freedom or ·for servitude". In a reference to the Hitler-
Stalin Pact, the NVZ identified the opponents of the war with the 
opponents of democracy. It implored the German American labor organ-
izations to defend their property, their camps and the funds of the 
AKStK by showing their true color and by forcing all their false friends 
to cast off the mask: "All men on board .... Group yourselves around 
the NVZ ••. ·• That is the best way of fighting for the defense and the 
expansion of democracy." In 1941, the NVZ defined the convention of 
the Federation of Workmen's Choirs in May and June of that year as rta 
conference of a political character",and expressed happiness about a 
meeting of "the friends of the NVZ among the Workmen's Choirs in the 
65Neue Volkszeitung, 8 February 1941. 
66 Ibid., 19 October 1940. 
whole country". Beyond that, the former left-wing Social Democrat, 
Toni Sender, addressed the ASB convention in the name of the GACD. 
The NVZ invited the conventioneers to a Fruhschoppen (Sunday morning 
beer), and distributed leaflets telling them that they belonged "into 
the ranks of the GACDu. 67 
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The latter, however, did not gain much ground in the secondary 
labor organizations. The former followers of the Popular Front did not 
go over to the GACD. They rejected the policy of the Great Coalition 
with liberals and conservatives. Many members of these organizations 
preferred a neutralist discretion on the war issue that derived often 
from a tradition of socialist pacifism and also saved them from turning 
against their country of birth. The DAKV faction of the AKStK resented 
the fact that the Fifth Column issue was used against them. In Septem-
ber 1940, the New York group of the Nature Friends dropped further 
support of the NVZ because of the incitement of "worker against worker", 
that ·is, for fomenting Hthe Fifth Column hysteria" and for supporting 
the war. The NVZ disqualified this criticism by countering that nthe 
Nature Friends belonged to those German American labor organizations 
which are abused by a small clique of communist party functionaries". 
It censured the national convention of the Nature Friends for "whipping 
through a resolution against Nazism and fascism [and] leaving out com-
munism as an enemy of freedom... It skillfully pointed out that the 
Nature Friends were in danger of losing their New York camp because of 
their communist activities and expected to score points with Nature 
67 Ibid., 31 May 1941 and 7 June 1941. 
Friends members for denouncing this deliberate jeopardy of valuable 
labor property. The NVZ hoped that "the doubtlessly non-communist 
majority of the Nature Friends •.. would make their stand [about the 
NVZ] clear to the clique C of their] leadersrr. 68 
With the end of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the GACD faced a new 
234 
situation with the resurgence of the Popular Front, which will be dis-
cussed in a sep~rate chapter. But it did not like the end of the golden 
times during which the communists and the Popular Front had been in 
limbo. It kept refusing to differentiate between National Socialists 
and communists and held on to the convenience of putting them both into 
the same category of Fifth Columnists. Even moderates like Siegfried 
Marek in Chicago, who had favored the first Popular Front, described 
an anticipated second front as an alliance of communist convenience. 
With his predilection for abstract formulations that were not always 
original, he claimed "the identity of Hitlerism and Stalinism under the 
common denominator of ... nihilism". 69 The fears of the GACD about a 
second Popular Front were justified. The latter was an uncomfortable 
period for the liberal ethnic coalition. At the annual convention of 
the Workmen's. Choirs of New York state, the delegates considered them-
selves "as enlightened people [who] could not remain indifferent to-
wards this fight 11 between Russia and Germany. A resolution expressed 
satisfaction with "the heroic resistance of the Russian people and its 
Red Armies, also with the honest will to fight of the English people", 
68 Ibid., 7 September 1940. 
69 Ibid., 28 June 1941. 
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in this order. It considered "their fight our fighter and asked for un-
. d 'd E 1 d d h S ' U · 70 restr~cte a~ to ng an an to t e ov~et n~on. 
Besides the membership of local branches of the secondary labor 
organizations, the composition of the GACD is unclear. Most of its 
71 
organizers were GLD-Social Democrats like Brauer, Katz and Seger. 
It was founded "by about one dozen groups of all circleslf which the NVZ 
described generally as conservative, liberal and Social Democratic, in 
72 that order. In early 1941, the delegates to the first national con-
vention of the GACD represented seventy-eight German American organiza-
tions with a combined membership of two hundred thousand. 73 These were 
probably various locals of a limited number of mostly secondary labor 
organizations. No conservative society was mentioned by name and only 
two liberal organizations to justify the claim of a Great Coalition; 
the German American Democratic Society or Rolandbund and the Central 
European Society. The latter was founded in July 1939 by the Austrian 
Rudolf von Hahn, a former publisher in Berlin who had come to the 
United States several years before. Among other things, it called the 
attention of the public to disloyal German Americans. The former was 
founded in 1930 as an antifascist and, according to Seger, as an anti-
communist organization. Its president was Erwin H. Klaus, an immigrant. 
In May 1940, it decided to expand, and made Frank Bohn the chairman of 
70Ib 'd ~ . ' 15 November 1941. 
71 Anna Geyer to Sopade, 17 February 1941, EK Mappe 44. 
72 Neue Volkszeitung, 22 June 1940. 
73Ibid., 8 March 1941. 
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its national organization committee. This provided a link with the GLD. 
Seger negotiated with the Rolandbund in the spring of 1940, before the 
formation of the GACD. He had to save both Klaus and Bohn from the 
communists, which was not an unusual undertaking for a Social Democrat. 
These two participated in protest organizations against the new alien 
legislation which Seger described as front organizations. The latter 
included the DAKV and the Workmen's Choirs., As members of the GACD, 
Bohn and Klaus had to be prominently displayed. Bohn became the c-hair-
man of the GACD and Klaus the vice chairman and national organizer·. 
The office of the Democratic Society served also the GACD. Hahn became 
the chairman of the arrangements committee for the first national con-
vention of the GACD. 74 Ironically, Klaus and Hahn, as the leaders of 
an organization that combated Fifth Co~umnism, were, themselves, sus-
pected of such activities in connection with the abovementioned protest 
organizations. Klaus appeared on a list which the Secretary to the 
President referred to the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion.75 Hahn was arrested and detained with his wife at Ellis Island 
for possible deportation. They had apparently overstayed their term 
. h . d 76 ~h t e Unite States. 
The GACD tried hard to win over conservative societies and con-
servative German Americans. Its first membership meeting criticized 
74Ibid., 9 March 1940; 16 March 1940 and 4 May 1940. 
75
watson, Secretary to the President - Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, State Department, 7 June 1940, National Archives, Washington, 
State Department Central Files, Socialism. 
76 Ibid., Division of Press Intelligence, an article about Hahn 
in the Sunday New York Times, 21 March 1942. 
--
237 
the Steuben Society for allocating funds to fight British propaganda. 
But it could not save that conservative organization from its coopera-
tion with the DAKV. The GACD addressed itself especially to rrthe 
freedom loving and democratically oriented German Americans 11 • In this 
endeavor, it indulged in some contradictions. It thought that those 
German Americans constituted a majority. It was, in the opinion of the 
GACD "an often made and often repeated error, but very definitely an 
error11 to believe that "our entire German American population is infes-
ted with an un-American Nazi doctrine11 • The number of the disloyal did 
"not amount to more than a handful of Americans of German stockrr while 
"the huge masses •.• despise and abhor Hitlerism as well as Stalin-
ism'r.77 Yet, the GACD admitted that German America was neutral. It 
vowed to fight .for its soul. It talked about "that considerable part 
of the ideologically wavering German Americans", those 90% of the nearly 
seven million German Americans who still hesitated in the middle be-
t f . d 'f . 78 ween asc1sm an ant1 asc1sm. In an attempt at their conversion, 
the GACD conducted a national rreducational campaign for enlightenment" 
which concentrated on exposing the living and working conditions in the 
Third Reich. It made records for radio stations and for "liberal and 
progressive11 local groups about such topics as the daily life of an 
average family under the Nazi regime. It tried to pressure the German 
Americans into patriotism by fomenting fears of undemocratic reprisals. 
An indifferent German American would be considered a half Nazi. Anti-
77 Ibid., press conference of the GACD in New York, 26 February 
1941. 
78Neue Volkszeitung, 4 June 1941. 
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loyalty in radio and in the press. He would have liked to carry out 
his supervising and loyalty testing of German American newspapers as an 
OWI official. But his employment was limited to an appearance with a 
Midwestern newspaper chain. The OWI imposed him as editor on a reluc-
tant owner who sabotaged him as best he could. In almost daily communi-
cation with Alan Cranston, the head of the Foreign Language Division, 
Seger brought the newspaper chain into line with the government view 
of the war. But he did not want to repeat this exhausting experience 
and returned to New York. In December 1941, after the United States 
entered the war, the Social Democratic weekly had to issue 'tan urgent 
appeal to our readers to remain loyal to the NVZ". It was concerned 
with 11overtimid readersn who did not want to "burden themselves now 
83 
with a German newspaper". The bourgeois German Americans were in-
tractable to Social Democratic berating. 
Under these circumstances, the GACD did not become a Great 
Coalition. The wife of the former Sopade member, Geyer, predicted 
already in the summer of 1940 that this ethnic coalition did tcnot have 
h f b • b • • • II 84 a c ance or ecom~ng a ~g organ~zat~on . It had a slow start and 
gradually gathered a limited momentum. The first public meeting took 
place in mid-July 1940; the first membership meeting in mid-September 
1940 and the first national conference in early March 1941. 85 The 
latter could not celebrate an expansion either in the secondary labor 
83
rbid., 24 June 1939 and 1 July 1939. 
84 Anna Geyer to Sopade, 17 February 1941, EK Mappe 44. 
85 Neue Volkszeitung, 20 July 1940 and 21 September 1940. 
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or the conservative fields even though it took a long time to prepare. 
But the conference decided to establish local chapters throughout the 
United States. The GACD would concentrate on the six states that com-
prised 60% of the seven million German Americans: New York, Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Ohio and New Jersey. ~en, it would deal with 
the 13% of German Americans in thirteen other states of secondary con-
centration before a full expansion into all other states of the Union. 86 
This plan was realized halfway with some locals in second stage cities 
like Los Angeles and San Francisco. But except for New York and Chi-
cago, the GACD locals carried on a limited number of activities. In 
many places, the late coming GACD could not dislodge the entrenched 
DAKV even during the good times of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. In Cleveland 
specifically, the DAKV local, which comprised the strong leftist fac-
tions of the German American labor organizations, hampered the estab-
listment of a GACD loca1. 87 The Congress for Democracy also issued the 
Air News which was sent to German radio commentators and to two hundred 
daily and weekly newspapers. 88 Thomas Mann became a member of the GACD 
but "the half-witted Germans in America who are even less respectaBle 
than the Bundists (the American Nazis)" did not join. 89 
The American government was critical of such mixed organiza-
86German American Congress for Democracy, press conference, 
26 February 1941, National Archives, Washington State Department 
Central Files, Socialism. 
87 Neue Volkszeitung, 12 July 1941. 
88 Neue Volkszeitung, 23 May 1942 and 6 June 1942. 
89 Ibid., 14 June 1941. 
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tions as the GACD. Hahn and Klaus asked for a message from the presi-
dent to the first national conference. But a memorandum of the State 
Department advised against this request in terms of the general prewar 
attitude towards antifascist organizations. The Department believed 
that encouragement should be limited strictly to American organizations 
'which represent themselves to be acting as Americans in the further-
ance of our national aspirations in contrast to organizations which 
either in their title, membership or otherwise imply a combination of 
Americanism with some other national affiliation". It objected thus 
to the designation German American Congress which "at once suggests a 
division in loyalty whereas the goal to be sought is unqualified unity 
as Americans, and Americans only". The State Department recommended 
90 
"a certain reserve in the degree of support extended to such groups". 
For this reason, it felt.that a message from the president to the GACD, 
"presumably to be read at the Conference, would be inappropriate". 
Hahn received only a letter from the Secretary to the President who 
assured him that the president desired to encourage "any group of 
American citizens organized with the objective to promote national 
unity in this country as well as the freedom of peoples throughout the 
world". But rrthe heavy pressure of official duties" prevented the 
91 president from preparing a message to the conference. Secretary of 
Labor, Frances Perkins, was supposed to address the convention. The 
90
state Department memorandum, 1 March 1941, National Archives, 
Washington State Department Central Files, Socialism. 
91
rbid., White House, Secretary to the President to Hahn. 
242 
Assistant Attorney General substituted for Attorney General Robert H. 
Jackson. The general attitude of the American government towards emi-
grant and ethnic organizations will be discussed in the chapter on the 
second German American Popular Front. It changed considerably after 
the American entrance into the war. 
Outside the field of German American politics, the concept of 
a Great Coalition did not apply. In American politics, the GLD-Social 
Democrats and especially Seger had visions of an independent labor 
party that could rival the Republican and Democratic Parties and equal 
the role which the SPD had played in the Weimar Republic. Seger con-
tributed to this theme in his regular Leitartikel, "The American Scene", 
in the NVZ. A significant GACD could have given him more stature. But 
the organizational tool with which he had to work in the field of Third 
Party politics was the German Branch of the Social Democratic Federa- . 
tion. As the watchdog of independent labor politics, the SDF tried to 
keep the American Labor Party in line, which was to be the nucleus of 
the movement. The SDF had been a member of the ALP since 1936 and had 
agreed to support all ALP candidates in local, state and national 
elections under the condition that the ALP remain politically indepen-
dent of the two major parties. Seger rejoiced in June 1939 that the 
ALP executive committee had decided against election deals and proposed 
a campaign "against the reactionary Republican Party and against a 
Democratic Party devoid of all political principles". 92 The main com-
mon deviation from this independent line was the support of the Roose-
velt administration and the vote for the reelections of the president. 
92Neue Volkszeitung, 24 June 1939 and 1 July 1939. 
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A meeting of the nationai executive of the SDF declared in January 1940 
that "the progressive, humane and democratic principles of the Roose-
velt administration in domestic and foreign policy must be maintained 
and expanded". But in non-presidential elections, the SDF was willing 
"to-collaborate on the formation of a third party with non-communist 
progressive labor and farmer groups". A plan was developed for setting 
up local progressive groups in industrial centers which would send 
delegates to the national convention of the SDF. 93 This strategy would 
also keep the ALP in the line of independent labor party politics. The 
SDF was deeply concerned about the defense of the ALP against its com-
munist faction. It supported the Liberal Labor Committee to safeguard 
the ALP against the efforts of the communist Committee to Rebuild the 
ALP. Seger was disappointed when the ALP disintegrated and the SDF 
made little progress. 94 
In the design of Seger, the role of the American unions was to 
be that of supporting an independent labor party in the way the General 
German Trade Union Federation used to support the Weimar SPD. He ad-
mitted that "the American unions have absolutely nothing in common with 
even a mildly socialist or Social Democratic economic concept". 95 But 
he hoped that they would eventually go for a de-ideologized progressive 
party. In their polarized state with the two national federations of 
the AFL and the CIO, they would not meet on this middle ground. Seger 
93Ibid., 20 January 1940. 
94Ibid., 2 March 1940 and 30 March 1940. 
95
rbid., 10 February 1940. 
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was therefore very interested in the unification of the CIO and the 
AFL and deplored the fact that the latter denounced the former as 
communist. His attitude was not always evenhanded. He would have 
liked a CIO without its president John L. Lewis. In the discussions 
for unification in early 1939, he criticized the plan of Lewis for a 
united American Congress of Labor by comparing it to the German com-
munist tactics of the Revolutionare Gewerkschafts-Organisation (Revolu-
tionary Trade Union Organization). He thought, however, that the 
principle of industrial organization which was still anathema to the 
96 AFL should be conceded. With the split of the auto workers from the 
CIO, he felt that the latter had not fulfilled ·the hopes of 1936. But 
he remained mildly critical of the AFL and objected to "ultra reaction-
ary and sometimes corrupt leaders of the AFL". He criticized especially 
the opposition by ten members of the AFL executive committee to the 
economic policies of the New Dea1. 97 After 1939, Seger was dissatis-
fied with both AFL isolationism and CIO ambivalence towards the Hitler-
Stalin Pact. 98 Even after the formation of the GLD which had opted for 
AFL sponsorship, he castigated mainly Lewis rather than the CIO. He 
branded Lewis as the Judas Iscariot of the American labor movement for 
supporting Wendel Willkie in the presidential election campaign of 
1940. 99 He also held Lewis responsible for undemocratic methods in 
96
rbid., 11 March 1939 and 18 March 1939. 
97
rbid., 10 February 1940. 
98 Ibid., 4 May 1940. 
99Neue Volkszeitung, 2 November 1940. 
,. 
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the CIO. But the changes in the American union movement for which 
Seger hoped did not take place. The CIO remained too radical and the 
AFL too conservative for the GLD. The two federations did not unite 
until long after the war. 
The American cooperative movement had also a place in Seger's 
design. He wrote more than ten articles about it in 1940. No incident 
was too small to nourish his hopes. The cooperatives acquired nearly 
the importance of a panacea and constituted something like extenuating 
circumstances for American capitalism. They became "the basis of a 
new world", constituted "practical democracy11 and were the answer to 
the necessary preservation of democracy by promoting economic equality. 
Seger celebrated incidents like the opening of the first cooperative 
gas station of the United States in Washington D.C. and of the first 
cooperative oil refinery in the world in Kansas. He was impressed with 
the Cooperative League of America and with the number of over one 
million of cooperatively organized Americans. For him, the United 
States was not only the most capitalistic country in the world, but 
also the leader in the cooperative field so that it was already well 
advanced on the road to economic democracy. Seger would have liked to 
see the cooperative movement grow to the importance of the Gewerk-
schaftliche Einkaufsgenossenschaften(GEG, Trade Union Wholesale and 
100 Retail Cooperatives) and its Konsum chain stores in Weimar Germany. 
100
rbid., 6 April 1940, 13 April 1940, 4 May 1940, 15 June 1940, 
13 July 1940, 27 July 1940, 10 August 1940, 7 September 1940, 21 Septem-
ber 1940, 9 November 1940, 30 November 1940, 7 December 1940, 28 Decem-
ber 1940, 18 January 1941. 
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This was another unrealistic expectation that failed to materialize. 
None of the political initiatives of the GLD during the first 
war years carried very far. They were typical emigrant undertakings. 
Based on Weimar precedents, they lacked realism and a sense of American 
categories and proportions. These great designs also fostered another 
Social Democratic legacy of the Weimar years, the intolerance towards 
other socialist groups, especially towards NB. The frustration of 
these great ideas intensified the antagonism towards the NB organiza-
tion. A certain jealousy was justified since the American Friends of 
German Freedom did creditable political work which will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE AMERICAN FRIENDS OF GERMAN FREEDOM AND ITS GERMAN SECTION 
AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
The AFGF was a unique organization because of the fusion of its 
American and emigrant elements. This structure was aptly designed to 
facilitate its political tasks and avoid the handicap of the enemy 
alien stigma. The American members were a leadership group with many 
personal ties. The German members considered Frank their indispensable 
leader. The American ex-socialists and the German democratic social-
ists were also compatible ideologically. The former held a rationalism 
for which democracy was the manifest destiny of the postwar world of 
which Germany was the pivotal case. The NB emigrants with their scien-
tific socialism liked this sober functional approach. Defeated Germany 
would escape a second Versailles. A new united democratic socialist 
movement could take over the work of reconstruction. The NB emigrants 
considered themselves as the exile part of the avant-garde of this 
movement. Its home section was the underground movement with which NB 
claimed to· have ·special ties. Thus, in all respects, the AFGF was a 
homogeneous organization that functioned smoothly throughout the war. 
The methods of the AFGF changed with the outbreak of the war 
and the American entrance into it. Before 1939, American public opinion 
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had been antifascist rather than anti-German. The AFGF had only to 
rally American support for the German underground which might succeed 
in overthrowing the National Socialist regime. After 1939, and es-
pecially after December 1941, military defeat became the alternative 
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to a German revolution,and nationalism the corresponding American 
attitude. Against the latter, the AFGF wanted to assert its rational 
approach to the German problem. For this purpose it planned to expand 
the organization nationally and emphasize propaganda in the United 
States. Since a second republic within a European federation was also 
in the interests of the victim nations of National Socialism and fas-
cism, the AFGF tried to promote its program by international coopera-
tion. In 1941, it started the International Coordination Council (ICC) 
which was to convey on the German emigrants the status of the exile 
groups of the victim nations. This rehabilitative effect was to keep 
alive the idea of "the other Germanyn, that is, the democratic Germany, 
in American public opinion so that the AFGF could continue its work. 
In 1942, when the military tide of the war started to turn, 
the AFGF made plans for recontacting underground groups in Germany. 
Frank submitted his ambitious formula to the Office of Strategic Ser-
vices and to the War Department. This plan wanted to organize the 
underground groups into an underground government ready to take over 
the reconstruction of the country after the demise of National Social-
ism. The Frank initiative derived from the avant-garde theory of NB. 
The latter did not share the liberal illusions of the Social Democrats 
about potential mass resistance in Germany. Radio propaganda from 
abroad was not a feasible approach. 
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All these plans hinged to a large extent on some token of 
unity within the German socialist emigration. The latter was a pre-
condition of them but, under the circumstances, it became one of their 
goals. In the process of executing its plans, the AFGF hoped to rally 
or to neutralize the GLD. The Free World Association supplanted the 
ICC as another international committee but one that had a chance of 
including the GLD. The Frank formula for an underground government 
also tried to enlist the GLD. When the OSS failed to support that 
plan, the AFGF relied on the War Relief Board of the CIO and the AFL 
for financial support of its contact work. This Board wanted to form 
a council of European emigrants with a German section that included NB 
and the GLD as well as the Popular Front group. But the identity of 
the GLD was incompatible with the position of a rearguard of a defunct 
Weimar Social Democracy. The Labor Delegation lent itself to no con-
centration with the NB emigrants. It continued a confrontation with-
out compromise which contributed to the failure of the AFGF plans. 
The attitude of various government departments and agencies was es-
pecially influenced by a GLD campaign against an alleged domination of 
the German section of the Office of War Information by Frank and his 
presumed friends. Thus, the AFGF initiatives of the first half of the 
war were unique and well conceived, but failed. For the second half, 
the AFGF concentrated on plans for reconstruction which the second part 
of this paper will discuss. 
As its name implied; the AFGF was. more a committee of political 
friends than a coalition of political groups. AFGF personalities were 
generally co-leaders of several American groups. Norman Thomas was 
,....-. 
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also chairman of the League for Industrial Democracy of which Niebuhr 
was vice president and Vladek had been a member of the board of direc-
tors. The executive secretary of the LID, Mary Fox, was also the 
secretary of the AFGF while her husband, the former socialist John 
Herling, was a member of the executive committee of the AFGF. Anna 
Caples was also connected with both organizations; in the AFGF, she was 
the executive secretary. The former president of the LID, Harry W. 
Laidler, was a member of the national committee of the AFGF. Tillich 
was doubly involved with NB. Some circles of German Christian Social-
ists in Berlin cooperated with NB underground groups there while he was 
a close theological and political associate of Niebuhr, one of the 
leaders of American Christian Socialism. Niebuhr, one of the founders 
of the Union for Democratic Action, was the chairman of the AFGF. Other 
UDA progressives like James Loeb and Roger Baldwin were also closely 
associated with the AFGF. The latter benefitted from the numerous poli-
tical acquaintances of its direct members. With this degree of estab-
lishment, it was beyond the reach of the GLD which had to center its 
attacks on Frank. 
But the AFGF was not the organization of Frank. It had an 
elaborate structure. It was directed by an executive committee of 
twenty-five members to which belonged Held, Fry, Alfred Baker Lewis, 
Paul Kellogg, James Loeb, and Zaritsky. The committee elected the 
officers of the organization, among them Frank as research director. 
The latter had few constitutional rights even though he was one of the 
driving forces of the AFGF. The executive committee met monthly and 
supervised, also, the disbursement of funds. It appointed a finance 
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committee which had to authorize expenditures over $100. All checks had 
to be double-signed and the financial books w~re audited annually by a 
certified public accountant. The AFGF also had a national committee of 
liberal personalities like Christian Gauss of Princeton University, 
Frank Kingdon, Laidler of the LID, Max Lerner of The Nation, David F. 
Seiferheld, Tillich, Franz Hollering and others. The German section of 
the AFGF was small. Frank gave its numbers at twenty emigrants. They 
included,probably, some sympathizers like Marie Juchacz and Emil Kirsch-
man~ also, both of whom had cooperated with NB before the war from 
their border station in Mulhouse, Alsace Lorraine. 
Frank and Niebuhr had commensurate political ambitions. The 
nee-liberals around Niebuhr hoped to establish a third, progressive 
party, possibly towards the end or shortly after the war. In this way, 
they expected to influence postwar reconstruction in a rational way. 
In defining the destiny of Germany, the AFGF emphasized the liberal 
tradition of Germany from the controversial revolution of 1848 to the 
equally controversial revolution of 1918 and the ensuing Weimar Repub-
lic. The Third Reich was an interruption of German democratic develop-
ment. Its end must serve the continuation of this development. This 
doctrine was necessarily out of tune with the nationalist attitudes of 
the Allied countries in their effort of total warfare against the 
National Socialist challenge. But the AFGF wanted to win at least a 
few thousand Americans over to its idealist concept. While Germany fit 
into the world plan of the American liberals, the antifascist and 
eventually victorious Soviet Union did not. This presaged their later 
Cold War attitude towards Russia. 
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The AFGF emphasis of the German liberal tradition abetted the 
emigrant concept of "the other Germany" and was to some extent a substi-
tute for it. The "other Germany" consisted of various elements like 
the emigration, the underground movement, the martyrs in the concentra-
tion camps,and the unorganized antifascist element of the population. 
Frank admitted that even in this combination it was as small as the 
National Socialist Germany, so that the majority of the German people 
placed themselves somewhere in between. But it had to do. Hertz, who 
generally considered the judgement of Frank as sober, had "the impres-
sion that he overestimates somewhat the degree of opposition and dis-
1 
content in Germany11 • Thus, the AFGF had two complementary driving 
forces, the ambitions and ideologies of its American and German members. 
Before the outbreak of the war, the concept of "the other Ger-
many" was not challenged: trAnti-Nazi sentiment at that time was in the 
main progressive, democratic and anti-totalitarian", not anti-German. 
The AFGF intended to be the "transformer to exploit the anti-Nazi 
energy ..• and drive the greatest international force to the mill of a 
democratic revolution in Germany". It had, therefore, "a very clear 
task" in encouraging and supporting the underground movement in Germany. 
It would have liked to implement "far-reaching plans to expand the 
2 
work" if both, underground and AFGF, had been stronger. 
1 Paul Hertz to Georg Frey, 14 June 1942, Hachlass Hertz, reel 31. 
2 Plan for action of the American Friends of German Freedom, sum-
mer 1940, Frank Papers, Hoover Institute; also ibid.: Paul Hagen, 
Frage I: Warum kein Verhandlungsfriede ausser mit einer demokratischen 
Vertretung in Deutschland. Frage II: Was unterscheidet die heiden 
Deutschland? 17 October 1941, 21 pages. 
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After 1939 and especially after December 1941, the American 
attitude towards Germany changed and, with it, the approach of the 
AFGF. The war broke almost all contacts with the underground movement. 
In this situation, the AFGF set itself three tasks: national expansion, 
propaganda, and international cooperation. It wanted to find new 
strength among Americans, German Americans, and exiled Germans. It 
wanted to upgrade its contacts outside New York into systematically 
working groups of American Friends and eventually into a national or-
ganization. The active support of a· few thousand progressive Americans 
was considered as "an extraordinarily important factor against European 
fascism today". It would not be the big transformer of American anti-
Nazism but it would amount to "a protection for democratic and progres-
sive movements in Europe tomorrow". It would be "the only bridge ... 
for a coming democratic revolution". The AFGF intended also to "reach 
important German labor and democratic elements in this country and in 
the Western hemisphere, professors, other intellectuals, scientists". 
But its plans for cooperation with German exiles and German Americans 
only circumscribed the difficulties with the GLD and with the German 
American organizations. The AFGF had no access to groups like the 
Worlanen's Benefit Fund. It considered, nevertheless, "a certain acti-
vity among German Americans". 3 Frank envisioned a potential merger of 
the AFGF with the German American Council for Democracy and with the 
Loyal Americans of German Descent under George N. Shuster. These plans 
were not feasible.· But the AFGF established some locals as,for example, 
3 . 
Private statement of policy, 11 June 1941, I: Winning the 
war; II: Winning the peace; Frank Papers, Hoover Institute. 
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in Pittsburg. 
The war made it necessary to "interpret the struggle of the 
democratic elements of Germany to the people of this country" so that 
anti-German feelings would not interfere with the proper solution of 
the German problem. The AFGF had to publicize its "conviction that 
only a German democratic revolution will finally solve the internation-
al crisis of our time". 4 It made remarkable efforts in the fields of 
publication and documentation. Since May 1940, it issued the monthly 
Inside Germany Reports. They intended to inform the American public of 
the conditions inside Germany and stressed the difficulties and the 
declining popular appeal of the National Socialist government. Frank's 
book, ''Will Germany crack?", sununarized the speculation about "the 
other Germany". In order to substitute for the lbss of original re-
ports, the AFGF established an archive for the systematic collection 
of secondary in~ation. In conjunction with this effort, the Research 
and Information Service of the AFGF issued the monthly "In Re: Germany" 
under the editorship of the emigrant Henry Ehrmann. It was a critical 
bibliography of books and articles on Germany with some ten subheadings. 
The AFGF also arranged seminars, political discussion groups and public 
forums. 
The critical question was the content of antifascist propaganda. 
The discrepancy between AFGF philosophy and American foreign policy 
presented a problem. According to Frank, propaganda had to deal with 
"progressive war aims" that described the new world whose construction 
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was to follow the war. For this purpose, he termed the Eight Points of 
the Atlantic Charter as insufficient. They fell below the standards of 
the Ten Points of Wilson and represented a compromise that offered 
neither a democratic solution of the national question nor contained 
even a discussion of the social question. They reminded Frank of ideas 
about a dictated peace and contributed little to the reinforcement of 
the democratic revolutionary elements in Germany. In order to improve 
these war aims propagandistically, he proposed a "method of positive 
interpretation of the Eight Points" together with demands for Allied 
promises of,postwar assistance and the use of representatives of the 
defeated nations. The absence of positive war aims beyond the Eight 
Points was a permanent threat to the emigrant ideology of 11the other 
Germany". 
Th~JFGF conceded the weakness of the German democratic forces 
but did not accept it as an excuse for any other German solution than 
its own. It realized that "the conscious nucleus" of the potential 
democratic forces was a minority almost exclusively found in "the pro-
ducing layers" of German society. The explanations for this state of 
affairs were somewhat weak. One of them was the alleged dilemma in 
which the opponents of the National Socialist regime were trapped. 
They felt called upon to defend the national interests of Germany, 
especially in their support of the war. The AFGF plans also detected 
"a passive mass resistance on the homefront'·', which was to be encouraged 
by radio propaganda so that millions of slow working Germans would be-
come important allies behind the military front. Finally, there was 
"the so-called layer of the recalcitrant malcontents" who represented 
! 
" 
the older generation "in varying degrees of a negation of the Nazi 
5 
system". In this situation, the AFGF could not deny that an Allied 
military victory was necessary. But in order to reconcile the latter 
with the need for a German revolution, Frank invented the formula of 
"the dependent revolution". Only the Allied armies could defeat the 
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military might of the Third Reich. With this outside help, the minor-
ity of democratic forces in Germany could organize for a political 
change. In this scheme. the underground movement could become "an ally 
inside Germany". 
The formula of Frank hinged a lot on a recurrence of the situ-
ation of 1918 when the Allied Armies did not enter Germany. The mili-
tary developments of the last war years necessitated readjustments of 
the AFGF solution for the German problem. But for the time being,the 
principle of "a dependent revolution" avoided the potential pitfalls of 
the NVZ prophets of a German revolution. The NVZ propagandists were 
eventually caught in their own rhetoric and could be dismissed on 
their own terms. According to the logic of their propaganda, a German 
people that did not revolt against Hitler deserved little postwar con-
sideration. 
In the field of international cooperation, the AFGF tried to 
make "the closest contacts with ... European democratic elements", 
especially with those in the American exile. It intended to cooperate 
5Paul Hagen, Was underscheidet die beiden Deutschland? 17 Octo-
ber 1941, Frank Papers; also ibid. Radio broadcast, 21 May 1942, a dis-
cussion between Alfred Baker Lewis and Paul Hagen about the American 
Friends of German Freedom. 
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with the national committees of Belgian, Czechoslovakian, Danish, 
Dutch, French, Italian, Norwegian and Polish exiles, especially with 
those of the respective labor movements. The idea was to build an 
American European Forum and an organization of American Friends of 
European Freedom. In the summer of 1941, the AFGF sponsored the forma-
tion of the International Coordination Council (ICC). In an interview 
with E~eanor Roosevelt about the refugee crisis of June 1940, Frank 
added that "I also want to talk to you about the setting up of a repre-
sentative delegation of exiled organizations and movements from the 
part of Europe occupied by the Nazis, a kind of European Congress in 
exile". 6 
The AFGF never emphasized directly the benefits it hoped to 
derive from the ICC. It described the latter always as an organization 
that existed for its own sake. Siegfried Jeremias, a young NB immigrant, 
knew that the European exile committees "naturally need us less than we 
do them". But his definition of the ICC covered up this circumstance. 
He explained that "the ICC was really conceived by Willy [Muller, i.e., 
Frank] as an organization which would offer to the European refugees ... 
a framework for common political activity under the benevolent sponsor-
ship of Americans, similarly to the arrangement of the AFGF". 7 Accord-
ing to its monthly Voice of Freedom, the ICC was "a common enterprise 
with a common goal". It was "an organization of those who must help one 
6Karl Frank to Eleanor Roosevelt, 15 June 1940, Frank Papers, 
box 6, Immigration. 
7
siegfried Jeremias to Paul Hertz, 23 July 1942, Nachlass 
Hertz, reel 32. 
r 
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another". It represented a coalition of various national groups with 
"a particular technique" for aiding and coordinating the various under-
ground wars in Europe. The Allies should recognize these enemies of 
Hitler, "however humble, as friends in a cormnon aim". The ICC and the 
corresponding national underground movements had established a Victory 
Front against Hitler and anticipated the United Nations as the proper 
approach to the Second World War. Accordingly, the ICC should also be 
8 
recognized as a kind of general staff of the European underground war. 
According to Frank, it was "an early forerunner of the idea of an anti-
9 fascist United Nations group". 
Thus, the International Coordination Council had to offer Euro-
pean and American benefits to the government in Washington. In the 
exposition of "the motivating forces behind such a Council"," an ICC 
memorandum attractively emphasized the "gigantic ... as yet untapped 
reservoirs of national resentment" against German occupation. It of-
ferred the organization of these forces as one "of the most important 
weapons for the ultimate victory". With the additional influence over 
the American foreign language groups, the ICC would have "power in 
Europe and influence in the United States". With this double recommen-
dation, the ICC was to be worthy of governmental consideration. With 
its ethnic extension, it acquired "a healthy character of true Ameri-
canism". The memorandum invited "at least the tacit approval of the 
8
voice of Freedom, published by the International Coordination 
Council, Volume I, Nr. 3, December 1941, Frank Papers. 
9Answers to accusations by Gunther Reinhardt against Paul Hagen, 
Frank Papers, box 7, folder 2; also Ibid., Autobiographical material, 
box 6. 
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United States government 1r. It also explained that New York was prefer-
able to London as a center for the international cooperation of exiles. 
London was the capital of a belligerent nation. The Interallied Center 
there harbored a number of official exile governments. But they depen-
ded for their status on the British government and shared in the British 
wartime animosity towards all Germans, including Social Democrats and 
socialists. Moreover, like the Polish group, they were not all demo-
. 11 . 1" d 10 crat~ca y ~nc ~ne . 
The ultimate purpose of the ICC was a liberal solution of the 
European problem. The Counci~ was interested in nthe discussion and 
clarification of mutual war and peace aims". Very simply, "the basic 
fact of this war ..• in kindergarten terms" was the realization that a 
lasting peace could only be found "through the active cooperation of 
the submerged and conquered peoples of Europe". The war years were 
"the strategic time for an aggressive effort to revitalize faith in 
democracy in all countries". The ICC anticipated "a world order based 
on liberty" from which defeated Germany could not be left out. 11 The 
mutual contacts of the ICC members served as "the preparation for the 
great cooperative effort of building the new united and democratic 
12 Europe that must emerge from this war". This solution of the European 
problem was somewhat futuristic. The consequences of the war p9stponed 
10 Memorandum on an International Coordination Council in the 
United States, Frank Papers. 
11 
. f d 1 3 b 1941 k Vo~ce o Free om, Vo . I, Nr. , Decem er , Fran Papers. 
12 Memorandum on an ICC, Frank Papers. 
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its viability. Also, a victorious Russia would not agree to a European 
federation from the Atlantic to the borders of the Soviet Union. The 
attempt of graduating "the other Germany" to Allied status by way of 
cooperation with the victims of National Socialism was problematical. 
Also, the chances for a united postwar German socialist movement were 
not very good. The ICC wanted to 11 reach the creative forces of the 
future; it should organize itself from among Americans and Europeans 
chosen less according to title and standing than according to capacity 
and promise. 11 It should initially at least be 11 limited ... to qualified 
13 
and progressive people11 • This attitude of the ICC was less one of 
free choice than of lacking alternative. The official Social Democrats 
of the GLD were not going to cooperate with the unofficial Social 
Democrats of NB. After 1945, the Western Allies relied on the conser-
vative forces of German post-Nazi society. 
The composition of the ICC reflected the influence of the AFGF. 
' 
One of the ICC antecedents was the Emergency Rescue Committ~e which had 
also been sponsored mainly by the AFGF. Frank Kingdon, who headed the 
ERC, was also the chairman of the ICC. The treasurer of the ICC was 
David T. Seiferheld who held the same position in the successor of the 
AFGF and in the later Council for a Democratic Germany. Nearly half of 
the American Friends of European Freedom were American Friends of 
German Freedom. The European members of the executive committee of the 
ICC were often close associates of AFGF leaders. The ICC included "one 
person from England, France, Italy and Germany, and a certain number of 
13Ibid. 
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representatives of smaller nations 11 • The German group was the largest 
with four emigrants: Frank, Carl Zuckmayer, Hans Simons and Ingrid 
Warburg, who was actually an American citizen. The Austrians Buttinger 
and Franz Hollering, who had been a leftist editor in Berlin, favored 
the German cause in the form of a Grossdeutschland (Greater Germany) 
that included Austria. Of the two British supporters, Isiah Berlin and 
John Wheeler-Bennett, the latter was an acquaintance of Frank and NB. 
He was in the service of the British Ministry of Information which also 
14 
employed some NB members. In 1939, David Astor of the British Minis-
try of Information was to visit the British Ambassador in Washington, 
Lord Lothian, in order to discuss the proficiency of British leaflet 
propaganda in Germany with a group of American and German antifascists. 
Astor sent, however, "a friend of his whom he thought ideally fitted 
for the purpose", that is, Frank. Edward C. Carter, the later vice 
. d f h ICC f h · f · f · 15 pres~ ent o t e , was one o t ~s group o ant~ asc~sts. 
The remaining nationality groups were listed with only one or 
two representatives. Some of them belonged to labor parties who had 
supported NB before the war in Europe as, for example, the Norwegian 
I 
Labor Party, whose parliamentary secretary was a member of the ICC. 
In general, these were the labor parties whose delegations to the 
Paris Congress of August 1933 constituted the militant minority in the 
debate over the response of the Socialist International to the rise of 
14Autobiographical material, Frank Papers, box 6. 
15 Edward C. Carter to Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant 
to the President, 25 April 1942, Frank Papers, box 6, Immigration. 
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National Socialism. They criticized the German Social Democratic fail-
ure of making a stand against the Nazis. They were more sensitive about 
this because their countries were smaller and more vulnerable to fascist 
aggression. Among the ICC nationality groups were the American Friends 
of Czechoslovakia, the American Friends 'of Polish Democracy and the 
Mazzini Society. The Czechoslovakian group and its Czechoslovakian 
American Relief Committee had assisted the Emergency Rescue Committee 
in its task of evacuation. 
The work of the ICC remained limited. It did not get far in 
reorganizing European underground contacts. It did some domestic prop-
aganda as for example with its Voice of Freedom, which lasted for less 
than a year. That monthly was to give "an authentic record of the 
struggle for freedom as it unfolds behind Hitler's lines'r. 16 The ICC 
formed committees for such tasks as o~erseas radio propaganda and post-
~/ 
war planning. The radio committee was its best going, and, eventually, 
most controversial concern. It analyzed German and Axis radio propa-
ganda and devised antifascist responses. Eventually, it survived the 
ICC and became an independent committee, the Shortwave Research Inc. 
When the American government entered the war and the business of war 
information, it relied on emigrant antecedents like Shortwave Research. 
It entered into work contracts with the latter and hired a part of its 
staff after its dissolution. 
Shortwave Research, as a post-ICC committee, was organized by 
the legal assistant of Colonel Donovan, the later director of the Office 
16
voice of Freedom, Vol. I, Nr. 1, September 1941, Frank Papers. 
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of Strategic Services, who approved of this non-profit organization._ 
This was done at the suggestion of James P. Warburg, the head of the 
Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information. According to Warburg, 
Shortwave Research "enabled the government to try out writers, transla-
tors and announcers". If they were suitable for permanent employment 
they were investigated by the Civil Service Commission before hiring. 17 
Within the general attacks on the government information agencies, 
especially in Congress, Shortwave Research was singled out as a commit-
tee of Frank that wasted government funds for leftist purposes. The 
GLD was also instrumental in this, and tried to gain political capital 
from distortions of simple facts. But Frank had no influence in the 
shortwave committee after the end of the ICC. He stated that HI was 
not 'the spirit of Shortwave Research' 11 • It was run by AFGF people: 
Marya Blow as president, Bertram F. Willcox as one of two vice presi-
dents, Carter as secretary, and Seiferheld as treasurer. The committee 
was apparently well endowed for the standards of antifascist work. 
After its dissolution, it had a surplus of "possibly $35,000" which 
probably came from private contributors like the Warburgs. This fund 
was distributed by the board of Shortwave Research among antifascist 
organizations like the liberal Italian Justitia e Liberta group in New 
York. The AFGF received, according to Frank's recollection, $1,000 or 
$1,500. 18 
17 James P. Warburg to David Seiferheld, 7 June 1944, Frank 
Papers. 
18A . . 1 b .• nswers to accusat~ons aga~nst Pau Hagen y Gunther Reinhardt, 
Frank Papers, box 7, folder 2; also ibid., Memorandum on the statements 
about Paul Hagen in the Gunther Reinhardt report. 
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The cooperation a£ the European nationality groups in the ICC 
·was somewhat reluctant. In the summer of 1942, Jeremias received the 
19 task of unifying them for a common effort. He worked for the CIO 
Committee for American and Allied War Relief in New York as its short-
wave radio director for broadcasts to Europe in cooperation with the 
Office of the Coordinator of Information, one of the predecessors of 
the Office of War Information. By 7 July 1942, the CIO was accorded 
fifteen minutes daily by the Coordinator, for labor propaganda to Ger-
many, France and Italy. Jeremias was also supposed to direct the short-
wave program of the AFL. The government would have liked to promote a. 
rapprochement between the two union federations but Philip Murray, the 
chairman of the CIO, told Jeremias that a cooperation between the CIO 
and the AFL was not even possible in the field of antifascist work. 
The latter had also to familiarize the CIO member unions with this 
antifascist work. He spoke to such union bodies as the executive board 
of the United Auto Workers and a plenary staff meeting of the steel-
k . 20 war ers un1.on. 
Frank thought that these CIO connections should benefit the ICC. 
Kingdon, the chairman of the ICC was also convinced that cooperation 
with the CIO could go much further than-,_pievious ly expected. He hoped 
to develop these relations on his own but the deliberate reserve of 
Jeremias taught him the indispensability of the CIO shortwave director~! 
19 Paul Hagen to Paul Hertz, 5 June 1942, Nachlass Hertz, reel 31. 
20
siegfried Jeremias to Paul Hertz, 13 August 1942, Nachlass 
Hertz, reel 32. 
21
siegfried Jeremias to Paul Hertz, 23 July 1942, Nachlass 
Hertz, reel 32. 
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The latter, at first reluctantly and then more enthusiastically, agreed 
to the project of Frank. He wanted to expand his connections and "es-
tablish good and solid relations ... with all union leaders of America, 
CIO or AFL" for the benefit of the ICC. Leading CIO officials suggested 
to him, Frank and the ICC to arrange a promotive banquet in which the 
most important union leaders from across the country would participate. 
Murray was willing to make "a fundamental declaration" about the CIO 
concepts of solving postwar problems and about CIO sponsorship of ICC 
programs. Eventually, the ICC formed a special labor group of which 
Jeremias became the secretary. Besides Frank, it consisted of two Nor-
wegian, two Polish, and one Czechoslovakian exile, among them the 
representatives of the Polish and the Czechoslovakian unions in the 
United States. Other exiles abstained for fear of creating the impres-
sion that this tabor group was meant as a rival of the unionist inter-
. 1 22 nat~ona . 
In the opinion of Jeremias, the ICC had to be solidified and 
its new labor group more firmly established before a drive for CIO 
sponsorship. He realized that the European labor exiles neglected 
thei~ ties with the ICC because they '~aturally need us less than we do 
them". Nevertheless, he considered a better coordination of these 
European laborites as "one of our essential tasks". The job of coordi-
nator was difficult. Jeremias felt that he was too young and not diplo-
matic or flexible enough for it. He had already differences of opinion 
with Frank who wanted to load the labor group with German socialist ex-
22Jeremias to Hertz, (July 1942), Nachlass Hertz, reel 32. 
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1 k 1 h d L . k 23 ponents i e Wa c er an ew~ns y. He also was pessimistic and 
thought that it would be 11useless to continue offering our cooperation 
to the other groups if they do not really want to cooperate". On the 
other hand, he believed that the presitigious Hertz was capable of edu-
eating them into cooperative allies. Their reluctance was supposedly 
based on lack of political understanding which Hertz would have the 
stature to clear up in hours of talks with each individual exile. They 
would have to adhere to the liberal ICC philosophy according to which 
the only alternative to involving the German labor movement in the re-
24 
construction of Europe was "the fascist suppress~on of Germany". 
Without a preliminary solidification of the ICC, Jeremias considered 
his task of winning CIO sponsorship impossible. Hertz was invited to 
return to. New York from Los Angeles in order to "pull together more 
actively and responsively the various national groups and committees 
h h b • • h II 25 t at ave een cooperat~ng w~t us Jeremias thought that the re-
form work of Hertz would take six months after which he would be "per-
sonally optimistic about the possibilities of the ICC11 • He hoped for 
"great political influence within the American labor scene" together 
with financial agreements that would keep the ICC afloat for the dura-
26 tion of the war. These hopes did not materialize. Frank discouraged 
reel 32. 
23 Frank Kingdon to Paul Hertz, 12 August 1942, Nachlass Hertz, 
24Kingdon to Hertz, 23 July 1942, Nachlass Hertz, reel 32. 
25Kingdon to Hertz, 12 August 1942, Nachlass Hertz, reel 32. 
26 Jeremias to Hertz, 27 July 1942, Nachlass Hertz, reel 32. 
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Hertz from coming to New York on the basis of a salary guaranty of only 
three months which Jeremias considered sufficient. The ICC was termin-
ated the same year under unclear circumstances. 
Frank claimed that the end of the ICC coincided with the appear-
ance of government agencies after December 1941 that absorbed some of 
the functions of the ICC. This would, however, have been the time for 
an intensified activity in order to assist these agencies and win some 
government recognition. A better reason for an end to the ICC was the 
formation of the United Nations in early 1942. The European antifascist 
groups joined their respective UN delegations. But, more credibly, the 
ICC was "liquidated ... partJy because another International Committee ... 
running more on a pro-Russian line at the time, attracted more interest 
. 27 
and got more official support". This was the Free World Association, 
an emigrant coalition of various national and political participation 
in which some militant socialists like Julius Deutsch were instrumental. 
The latter was a hero of the fight against the Austrian Heimwehren 
(national guard) and of the Spanish Civil War in which he had been a 
general of the International Brigades. He was well acquainted with 
Spaniards like Del Vayo who was one of the main organizers of the Asso-
ciation. 
But it was not the usual style of Frank to cede to competition. 
There was a chance that the Free World Association would realize a con-
centration of German socialist groups. It planned the formation of an 
International Labor Propaganda Committee under the direction of Deutsch. 
27 Answers to accusations against Paul Hagen by GUnther Rein-
hardt, Frank Papers, box 7, folder 2. 
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Del Vayo had repeatedly approached Frank in this context before Deutsch 
wanted to discuss directly with the latter "the ... political ques-
tions" of such a group in November 1942. Some German groups had 
promised their cooperation. Deutsch wanted to engage "the three main 
groups (Grzesinsky, Rosenfeld, Hagen)'', that is the GLD, the Popular 
Front and NB. He considered it "more practical" to discuss the impli-
cations of this plan with Frank alone before a joint meeting. 28 
Jeremias called the Association an organization engaged in "Luftgeschafte" 
(ghost activities). He was upset over Frank's preference of the Associ-
ation to the ICC. 
Another reason for the end of the ICC was its failure to pro-
mote the AFGF plan for "contact work" in Germany. Frank did not think 
much of "mere propaganda from a distance". 29 He had definite plans for 
reactivizing contacts "with the real underground movement over there". 
For this purpose, he got in touch with the NB groups in England and 
S d d . h NB f . d . 1· b 30 we en an wLt rLen s Ln LS on. The American government was ex-
pected to "give us facilities" for this project while respecting the 
political independence of the emigrants. 31 It seemed reasonable to ex-
pect some friendly consideration from the intelligence and propaganda 
.. 
agencies of the government. They cons is ted of the Office of the Coordi--
28Julius Deutsch to Paul Hagen, 30 November 1942, Frank Papers, 
box 5, Neubeginnen. 
29 .. Richard Lowenthal to Paul Hagen, 28 October 1942, Frank Papers, 
box 5, Neubeginnen. 
3
°Karl Frank to Max Hoffmann, 25 June 1943, Frank Papers, box 5, 
Neubeginnen. 
31Paul Hagen to Paul Hertz, 4 May 1942, Nachlass Hertz, reel 31, 
also ibid., Hagen to Hertz, 5 June 1942. 
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nator of Information and of the Office of Facts and Figures. These were 
reorganized into the Office of War Information and the Office of Stra-
tegic Services, the forerunner of the CIA. The AFGF had good relations 
with the first Coordinator, Arthur J. Goldberg, who had a similar back-
ground as the liberals or ex-socialists of the UDA. A Chicago friend 
of Goldberg and Frank arranged a meeting between these two in New York 
in May 1942. He believed that "you [Frank] will see in it an opportuni-
ty to further some of the ends which you and the AFGF have been seek-
ing". He recommended "your being completely frank with Mr. Goldberg ... 
a good and trusted friend of mine". 32 Two NB emigrants, Georg Eliasberg 
and Bernhard Taurer, were already employed in the Office of the Coordi-
nator. In the War Department was an isolated NB emigrant, Henry Ehrmann. 
Later, the AFGF had a friend there in Lieutenant Colonel Julius Klein, 
a graduate of the first class of the School for Military Government in 
Charlotteville, Virginia. His nephew and former assistant, Joseph Roos, 
was close to Hertz and Frank. He was the director of the News Research 
Service in Los Angeles which analyzed the foreign language press. 
For these agencies, Frank prepared first an outline and then a 
full fifty page "Plan to make contact with the German underground", in 
the summer of 1942. The outline was presented to the Coordinator in 
April and then to the OSS where Goldberg ended up after the termination 
of his former office, in June 1942. Frank had the opportunity of ex-
plaining the plan personally to Colonel Donovan, the chief of the OSS. 
He also negotiated with Donald Downes of the OSS and, through him, with 
32Richard A. Meyer to Paul Hagen, 24 April 1942, Frank Papers, 
box 9, letter M. 
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John Foster Dulles "whose agent in this matter I understand you to be". 
Several conversations took place with Allan Dulles about the details of 
the plan. In one of them, Anna Frank-Caples participated as a prospec-
tive member of a liaison team in Switzerland. But "a difference of 
opinion among members of the staff" of the OSS held up the proposals of 
33 Frank. It referred to a number of discriminating reports about Frank 
by Grzesinsky of the GLD who was then employed by the OSS. After this 
initial failure, Lt. Colonel Klein endorsed the full "Hagen formula" 
and recommended it to section G-2 of the General Staff with the offer of 
serving as the commanding officer of the project. The Office of the 
Chief of Staff believed, however, that the project fell under the juris-
diction of the OSS to which it was returned in September 1942. It was 
submitted there'to the Planning Committee of Psychological Warfare and 
was given "the fullest consideration", without any positive results. 34 
In October, Elmer Davis, the head of the OWI, also checked over the 
project of Frank. He thought it looked good but was "outside the field 
of my activity" so that his opinion would be of little value. Under the 
auspices of a united German emigration or even without the interference 
by the GLD, the plan might have met with a more positive fate. 
The Hagen formula was an ambitious project that aimed at the two 
major objectives of the NB emigration: the preparation of a German 
revolution and the concentration of the various socialist exile groups. 
33James P. Murphy, OSS to Lt. Colonel Julius Klein, War Depart-
ment, School of Military Government, 25 September 1942, Frank Papers, 
box 6, Immigration. 
34Ibid. 
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The initial outline of April 1942 was more limited but,with the endorse-
ment of Klein, a f~ll elaboration seemed in order. 35 The Lt. Colonel 
would have liked to continue his intelligence career with the execution 
of this plan. He had started out with an investigation of the German 
American Bund in 1933 and 1934. In his explanation preceding the under-
ground plan, he championed Frank and the German section of the AFGF be-
yond their own good. His evaluation reflected one-sided information 
which was useful to his purpose. According to Klein, the German emi-
grants represented "either only themselves individually or only remnants 
of former parties whose historical mistakes mean that they will never 
return to. a place of prominence or even a position of trust in Germany". 
After this disqualification of the GLD, he described NB as an under-
ground group "made up mostly of younger members of the former Social 
Democratic Party". It had developed "adequate techniques, a system of 
intelligence and information ... and a personnel of staff members" at 
the ready disposal of the War Department. Frank would be "one of the 
most suitable persons to be used for such activities" as contact work 
36 
with underground groups. 
The plan of Frank was so elaborate that its general objective 
"may never be reached before the end of the war". It promoted the ob-
jective of a dependent revolution which would follow a National Social-
37 ist collapse. Part IV, "The Decision" dealt with "an offensive on the 
35 Paul Hagen, 
underground movement, 
36E l . xp anat~on 
Papers, box 7. 
How to prepare collaboration with the anti-Nazi 
10 April 1942, Frank Papers, box 7. 
by Lt. Colonel Klein of the Hagen Plan, Frank 
37 Paul Hagen, A plan to make contact with the German underground, 
Frank Papers, box 7. 
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German home front". It would be "the chief task of the United States 
Army to make liaison with the nucleus of opposition, to strengthen, 
help and encourage its development, to attempt a possible coordination 
in an underground national organization with the aim of a democratic 
revolt against the Nazis". A special section responsible to the General 
Staff would direct these activities. But the implications of the 
"Hagen formula" went beyond the domain of the War Department or any 
other department. It concerned the general American postwar policy 
towards Germany and Europe, a policy that had to be negotiated with the 
other Allies. 
The Special Section in charge of executing the plan of Frank 
would have consisted of a chief of the rank of a higher intelligence 
officer like ~lein, and of a staff of the commanding officers of eight. 
subsections for political intelligence, liaison, field operation, pro-
paganda, research, special activities like sabotage and terror, and 
defense, that is, self-defense or counterintelligence. This apparatus 
resembled the structure of a government and could eventually have as-
sumed many governmental functions in postwar Germany. In fact, the 
ultimate goal of the plan was the establishment of a government-like 
underground representation in Germany and abroad. First, the Liaison 
Section had to develop "special staffs for liaison with existing nuclei 
of opposition" in Germany. They would consist of "labor contact staffs" 
for the trade unions, the Social Democratic Party, the socialist youth 
groups, the Communist Party, and the labor emigration in all exile 
countries. They would further include separate staffs to contact the 
religious opposition, the army opposition, war prisoners and foreign 
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labor in Germany, underground groups of exile governments, youth, sol-
diers and women. These liaison staffs would have been employed by the 
Field Operative Section. The initial task of that section was to es-
tablish and coordinate borderland sections in Switzerland, Sweden, 
Portugal, Turkey, Vichy France, Spain and Persia. The borderland sec-
tions had to set up "contact points" on the respective borders including 
those "in occupied Eastern Territories and in the Balkan area"; then 
"in the five most important German centers" of Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, 
Munich and Vienna; later in twenty more important centers. The border-
land sections and contact points would be directed by Field Operators 
who would supervise and protect the various liaison staffs in communica-
ting with the various German oppositional forces. 
The German forces should then be coordinated according to poli-
tical or social origin and encouraged to build up representative commit-
tees abroad so that there would be foreign delegations of the trade 
union movement, the Social Democratic and all other groups. Eventually, 
a concentration of inside and outside representative committees would 
result in a national underground organization and in "a united delega-
tion abroad (Vereinigtes Auslandsbtlro)". This ambitious scheme would 
practically comprise a secret inland government in addition to an exile 
government. According to the theory of a dependent revolution, it could 
still not have deprived the National Socialist regime of its power but 
it could have contributed to the defeat of this regime and assumed con-
trol thereafter. 
The plan of Frank would have overtaxed the human resources of 
the German emigration. As recruits, the Special Section needed 
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"reliable emigrants, volunteers among war prisoners, and specially qual-
ified American and Allied citizens". The liaison staff members and 
field operators should be ''perfectly qualified ... by knowledge of 
language, knowledge of territory and population, and by political ex-
perience". Among other duties, the Research Section had to assume the 
task of establishing "a careful card index" of personnel. It was to 
set up "an official research institute for German affairs which will 
register and mobilize the available intelligentsia in the German emi-
gration in the United States and England ... and which should have a 
subsection for political research in German American societies and 
clubs and among other foreign German settlements in South America". 
In awareness of the p,roblem of human resources, the plan considered 
the whole German emigration inside and outside·the United States as 
the proper recruiting ground for its needs. In the United States, it 
considered as "the largest and most important ... the Jewish emigra-
tion" with the American Jewish Committee, the German Jewish Aufbau and 
the JLC. Then followed "the academic emigration, professors, some 
elements of the former Republican administration [of Germany] and a 
large group of writers, artists, etc." with the special mention of the 
New School for Social Research in New York. This somewhat uncohesive 
collection of antif~cist forces was complemented with the recommenda-
tion of emigrant groups in London, the center of the Communist emigra-
tion in Mexico, "leftist connections 11 in the United States around 
Rosenfeld and the German American Emergency Conference of the second 
Popular Front, and cultural groups around Thomas Mann. This enumera-
tion omitted the GLn. 38 
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But the plan did approach the problem of emigrant cooperation in 
general rather than of a socialist concentration in particular. Only a 
united emigration could claim the necessary mandate for the plan of 
Frank which would otherwise represent a partisan approach. Frank pro-
posed that "an attempt should be made to arrive at a political coordina-
tion of the now split emigrant forces so that they might become a sort 
of a representation abroad". This regrouped German emigration could 
"prepare special statements of policy and produce worthwhile anti-Nazi 
literature in the German language". Thereby, it could also coordinate 
highly qualified individuals who were isolated "because of the lack of 
an emigration center". This. all-party coalition would have a subsidiary· 
function. It would be neutralized within-the proposed system·o"f "the 
other Germany". The plan specified that this emigration center should 
be kept separate from the Special Section as well as from the underground 
representation abroad. The proposal of Frank could not deal with the 
problematic GLD. 39 
Parallel to the Hagen formula, John Foster Dulles promoted an 
OSS scheme. It tried to enlist German emigrants in a Commission that 
would advise the American government on "political strategy directed at 
G . " 40 erman quest~ons . Frank did not want to alienate the OSS planners by 
unresponsiveness. By qualifying his interest, he demonstrated his pre-
ference for his own plan. The Commission was to comprise all activist 
38 Ibid. 
39
rbid. 
40Paul Hagen to D. Downes, 16 May 1942, Frank Papers, box 10, 
folder 5. 
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groups including that of Otto Strasser while omitting most socialists. 
For the future chief Cold Warrier of the United States, that was not an 
unusual arrangement. But Frank might be compromised in such company so 
that he objected especially to the composition of the projected emigrant 
center. Without Strasser, there was in it "already a bunch of right 
wing connections", including the former Center politician Karl Spiecker. 
Frank was afraid that "among them, I look like a lonely birch on the 
other hill". About the future Germany, he had "of course hardly any 
doubt". He believed that the impending change or revolt would be "a 
turn to the left by a hundred eighty degrees" which would call for "a 
streamlined modern bomber" like the Special Section rather than for 
"the old post chaise" of the OSS Commission. Frank recommended a more 
proportionate representation· of emigrant groups and advised Downes, the 
representative of Dulles, with some awkwardness, that the "old Social 
Democrats ... would be of some value ... in an all-round center. More 
so, German Communists or the Thomas Mann crowd". 41 The agents of Dulles 
might have been aware of the danger of a left turn in postwar Germany. 
Possibly, their Commission was designed to obstruct such a potential 
development. 
In his tactical response, Frank accepted the·offer of the OSS 
"wholeheartedly" but insisted on retaining full independence of the 
other members of the Commission. He wanted to be responsible to nobody 
but the officials of the United.States Government and claimed the priv-
ilege of withdrawing from the emigrant center whenever it seemed neces-
41 Hagen to Downes, 21 October 1942, Frank Papers, box 10, 
folder 7. 
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sary to him. He did not concede to Downes that his objections were only 
political. The independence of each group required the retention of all 
authority by the ass, in his opinion. In inconsistency with his own 
formula, he also raised the additional obstacle that authority could not 
be delegated "from one nation to another". Reliance on. "borrowed au-
thority"would make "puppets" out of the emigrants who would lose the 
confidence of German underground groups. Within the ass formula, Frank 
would have been an isolated participant with little control over deci-
sions. His criticisms promoted his own scheme. He emphasized that the 
latter avoided all the drawbacks of the ass plan. It "always only asked 
for facilities for the time of our [the German] interregnum". 42 The 
Hagen formula would also have depended on borrowed authority. But its 
ultimate objectives would have repaired that initial handicap with a 
national German underground organization and its united delegation 
abroad. The response of Frank amounted to a refusal. The ass formula 
was not implemented but neither was the Hagen formula. For the nascent 
ass, the latter was a good case study in counterintelligence. 
Simultaneously with the plan of Dulles, Goldberg requested in 
August 1943 a list of thirty to forty people willing to go to North 
Africa for his office. He told Ehrmann that they should be "all of 
German origin, whether American citizens or not". Ehrmann received no 
clear information about their prospective task. They would serve the 
same purpose as "the Italians we sent over" in the course of the North 
African campaign and the Allied landing in Sicily. The group of German 
42Ibid. 
emigrants would be under the authority of the OSS and would probably 
wear uniforms. In time, they would be "shifted to suitable places 
nearer to the fortress", that is, Germany. After a visit to North 
Af . G ldb ld k d f · · d · · 43 r~ca, o erg wou rna e more e ~n~te ec~s~ons. Apparently, 
nothing became of this project. 
After the failure of the ICC and of the Special Section, the 
AFGF relied on union help for rebuilding its European connections. 44 
In a letter to NB emigrants in England, Frank mentioned a council of 
European emigrants that was formed in connection with the War Relief 
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Board of the CIO and the AFL. The members of the council were asked to 
present their budgets for. their. work in occupied and fascist. countries. 
The AFGF intended to "strengthen liaison work from Sweden, Switzerland, 
and Lisbon" and to reorganize the former NB ~ontacts in Turkey, Africa 
and Palestine. It also hoped to get $300 a month for the London bureau 
of NB. 45 In June 1943, Frank wrote to Max Hoffmann in Lisbon that "we 
have made preparations here for an extensive support which would reacti-
vize some of our former activities in which you and Emil [Kirschmann] 
were participating from M"ulhausen [ Alsace]". Frank wanted to know 
whether Hoffmann could get "direct contacts into occupied territory in 
France" and send a courier to a designated address in Switzerland, 
probably Illner. The latter was recontacted and "has started to work". 
43 Henry Ehrmann to Paul Hagen, 2 August 1943, Frank Papers. 
44 Paul Hagen to Paul Hacke, Hans Martens and friends, (1945) 
Frank Papers, box 8, letter H. 
45 .. .. Frank to Schottle, Lowenthal, 29 June 1943, Frank Papers, 
box 5, Neubeginnen. 
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He reported that "word from comrades apparently scattered all over 
Germany is hopeful". The NB leaders SchO"ttle and Krioringen in London, 
who had operated border stations in Switzerland before the war, were 
asked to "help us with Swiss contacts for Illner". 46 Frank also made 
an effort to recontact NB members in Sweden. He wrote them that "we 
are against pointless activity but we believe that the time has come 
to take up old contacts and build new ones". Frank made "persistent 
efforts to get to Sweden or Switzerland" in person. In case of rapid 
developments on the military front and in Germany, the AFGF wanted to be 
able to deal with ''the problems we have been preparing for all these 
47 years". It testifies to the frustration of exile work that these 
attempts by the AFGF at reactivating its underground contacts were un-
successful, partly because of emigrant disunity and partly because of 
Allied unresponsiveness. 
The attitude of the GLD towards the AFGF remained consistently 
negative throughout the war years. The Social Democratic committee 
avoided the cooperation for which the AFGF was hoping, first in the 
International Labor Propaganda Committee of the Free World Association 
and then in the European Council of the AFL-CIO War Relief Board. The 
idea for this Council had come from the Jewish Labor Committee. Of the 
German groups, it included the GLD, the AFGF, the ISK, and the SAP. For 
Frank, "the great progress in this council is that the GLD, the SAP and 
we are considered on parity. For the first time, the fictitious mandate 
46Karl Frank to Max Hoffmann, 25 June 1943, Frank Papers, box 5, 
Neubeginnen. 
47 Ibid. 
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of the GLD has been restricted to a representation of itself and not of 
48 the whole movement." But the GLD cons ide red the Council not as a 
political arrangement, only as a conglomerate of "subsidy recipients". 
It was "an expedient" for getting money for 11 the so-called underground 
movements". The GLD refused to sit on the same table with Frank so that 
Hertz had to Subst;tute for h;m. 49 I b t t 1' · th • • t was en on neu ra ~z~ng e 
AFGF. For this purpose, it accepted the journalistic assistance of 
Cahan in the Jewish Daily Forward, of the emigrant Hans Gaidies in Gegen 
den Strom, of the German immigrant Gunther Reinhardt in his reports to 
various government agencies and of the emigrant Ruth Fischer whose Net-
k . d d . . 50 wor p0~nte out Re consp~rac~es. At the beginning of the war, Frank 
hoped that a bipartisan investigative committee would put an end to the 
rumours about him. But the GLD manipulated the committee to his disad-
vantage. It also raised a public controversy over the alleged influence 
of Frank in the Office of War Information which had a negative effect on 
the general reputation of the German socialist emigration in the United 
States. 
With the return of Frank to the United States in January 1940, 
the JDF and the NVZ had continued the editorial campaign against NB 
which they had started in 1939. An article of 9 February 1940 by Cahan 
48Frank to Schottle, Lowenthal, 29 June 1943, Frank Papers, 
box 5, Neubeginnen. 
49 
Katz to Ollenhauer, 29 May 1943, Matthias and Link, Mit dem 
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 145, pp. 595, 596. 
50
chronologische Tafel des Auftauchens von Verleumdungen, Ge-
ruchten etc. uoer Paul Haaen, Frank Papers, box 7, folder 2; Karl Frank, 
Memorandum uber die Anti-Hagen Kampagne, l February 1945, Frank Papers, 
box 7, folder 2. 
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was reprinted in the NVZ of February 24. It emphasized the importance 
of German Social Democracy in the fight against Hitler and described the 
NB Group as an obstacle in the antifascist work of the Sopade and of the 
GLD. It reprimanded the Social Democrats for being too indulgent with 
their NB detractors for the sake of socialist harmony, and insisted that 
the interests of the antifascist cause required an end to this modera-
tion. Cahan justified his attitude with the argument that Frank had 
allied himself during the split of the SPA with the enemies of Cahan 
who "inclined like [Frank] more towards the communists". 51 
A month later, the socialist emigrant Hans Gaidies repeated the 
NVZ and JDF arguments with an article in the journal Gegen den Strom. 
In the Czechoslovakian emigration, he had aroused the suspicion of Frank 
with militant proposals. He offered large sums from supposedly Czecho-
slovakian sources for such terrorist acts as the planting of a bomb in 
the Berlin public library. Frank warned the Sopade against Gaidies, who 
later joined the GLD campaign against NB in the United States. Gaidies 
claimed that Frank forfeited the Sopade readiness for cooperation with 
NB in 1934 with conspiratorial activities against the exile executive. 
According to him, Frank had arrogated the name of New Beginning for his 
group from the original movement which he had succeeded in splitting in 
1935. Besides this charge of political imposition, the article discre-
dited Frank by repeating the previous imputations of embezzlement, kid-
napping, bribery and sexual improprieties and warned the American labor 
51Neue Volkszeitung, 24 February 1940. 
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organizations against throwing their "money into the ocean" with contri-
52 butions to NB. These polemics were reprinted in the JDF of May 1940. 
Simultaneously, rumours spread in New York labor circles that Frank was 
a spy, presumably either a communist or a National Socialist spy accord-
ing to preference. Even Staudinger repeated this potentially harmful 
accusation. 53 Katz and Stampfer visited Pittsburgh where both the GLD 
and the AFGF had local supporters and repeated the list of accusations 
against Frank there. 
Under these circumstances, Frank applied for a bipartisan so-
cialist committee to investigate the charges against him and to issue a 
binding statement. But this attempt at clearing his political and per.-
sonal record coincided almost with the German invasion of France, with 
the French defeat and the resulting refugee crisis. The GLD dragged out 
the negotiations for constituting the committee until the beginning of 
October 1940. Then, five meetings took place between October 2 and 
November 6 at the faculty club of Columbia University. Besides the 
chairman, the committee was equally divided between the adherents of the 
two sides. Katz, Brauer, and the Jewish labor lawyer, Karlin, appeared 
for the GLD; Buttinger, the German emigrant lawyer Max Hirschberg, and 
the socialist John Herling, the husband of Mary Fox, for the AFGF. As 
witnesses appeared Frank, Mary Fox, Hertz and Ehrmann for the AFGF, and 
Gaidies and David Shub, a JDF writer, for the GLD. Seger and Stampfer 
52 Gegen den Strom, March 1940, pp. 8-13. 
53 Notes, Staudinger Komplex, 10 September 1943, Frank Papers, 
box 7, folder 2. 
---
283 
refused to testify. While Brauer was relatively moderate, the task of 
54 prosecution fell mainly to Katz. 
The general attitude of the latter was somewhat curious for a 
lawyer. He pretended that the AFGF had to disprove the charges against 
Frank. The membership of Frank in the SPD was positively established. 55 
Katz maintained that Frank could still have retained his membership in 
the KPD so that he would be a double agent. In order to escape the po-
litical complications of the investigation, the first chairman,who was 
a GLD sponsor, resigned from the committee. The second chairman reques-
ted an expansion of the committee in order to be relieved of his embar-
rassing position of sole arbitrator. That would have dragged out the 
investigation even further beginning with the negotiations about addi-
tional members and continuing with a repetition of the previously intro-
duced evidence. The length of the investigation alone would have re-
fleeted negatively on Frank while even an expanded committee could not 
guarantee a fair outcome. Eventually, the representatives of Frank 
proposed that the investigation be terminated with an indirectly exoner-
ating statement, especially since the chairman intimated plans for a 
trip abroad. After further procrastination during the rescue period, 
the NVZ responded with an article of 26 May 1941 entitled "A leader un-
masks himself". It implied that the investigation was terminated be-
cause Frank feared it would substantiate the GLD charges. The NVZ re-
54R f h C . . . . . h h . eport o t e ommLSSLon LnvestLgatLng t e c arges agaLnst 
Paul Hagen, November 1940, 316 pages, Sammlung Karl Frank, Vol. F 220/1, 
Institut fur Zeitgeschichte. 
55 Paul Hagen to the chairman of the Investigation Committee, 
13 pages, Frank Papers, box 7, folder 2. 
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ceived a series of counter-declarations from Buttinger, Hertz, Adler and 
others, but refused to print any of them, including the reply by the 
former secretary of the Socialist International. 56 The NVZ article ap-
peared when the rescue period was over for the GLD so that the latter 
no longer needed to exercise any reluctant restraint. It is interesting 
to note that after the war Katz became eventually the president of the 
second chamber of the German constitutional court, the equivalent of the 
United States Supreme Court. 
The attack on an individual rather than a rival group was an 
effective tactic in the emigration where a political leader could not be 
replaced. Katz practiced it to perfection. He wrote to Ollenhauer that 
Frank "is nothing else than an adventurer without conviction or con-
science. In old communist fashion, he is intent on building a personal 
organization and apparatus for himself". In America, it was "not too 
difficult" to raise money for somebody who was "skillful and unscrupu-
lous" enough to "fabricate the stories that Americans like to hear". 
Katz believed that Frank "pursued with undaunted determination the dis-
ruption of the old exiled movement in order to build his own apparatus 
all the larger from the pieces". The GLD was "more than ever determined 
to make an end to the fraudulent enterprise that centers around his per-
son". If the GLD followed the wishes of the Sopade for moderation, Katz 
reasoned, it would only help the latter in "digging your own grave 11 • 57 
But the AFGF only wanted the same kind of cooperation with the official 
56
neclaration on the case of Paul Hagen by Dr. Paul Hertz, 9 
pages, received from Mrs. Anna Frank, March 1973. 
57 Katz to Ollenhauer, 1 September 1941, EK Mappe 44. 
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Social Democrats that existed in England. It did.not engage in recrim-
ination against the GLD even after the abandonment of minimal restraint 
by the Labor Delegation in the summer of 1941. For this attitude, Katz 
had his own interpretation: "[Frank's] new tactic consists in not at-
tacking us but rather in pleading for good weather. He implores us 
through middle men of all kinds to desist from our 'fractricidal' at-
tacks. This is naturally only a new trick of his."58 
During the time of the rescue already, Katz had vowed that "we 
have to break Hagen before it will be too late". 59 By the summer of 
1941, he was afraid that it was already too late. He had "the feeling 
that we all made a big mistake in the past in dealing with this case • 
..• We should have moved against him much earlier and much more ener-
getically. He would then probably not have become as influential and 
60 financially as strong as it is now, unfortunately, the case." Con-
trary to the imagination of Katz, the AFGF was then already very limited 
in its resources and relied mainly on the liberal constituency of its 
own organization. In taking on the AFGF, the GLD confronted a part of 
the neo-progressive American establishment which it was incapable of 
discrediting or of dissociating from the NB emigrants. The anti-NB cam-
paign reflected also on the GLD and limited its chances of cooperating 
with government agencies as much as it did those of the AFGF. The 
58
rbid. 
59 Memorandum uber die Anti-Hagen Kampagne, 1 February 1945, 
Frank Papers, box 7, folder 2. 
60 Katz to Ollenhauer, 1 September 1941, EK Mappe 44. 
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result was a general neutralization of the German socialist emigration 
in the United States. 
When the period of rescue was over, the GLD intervened with the 
ICC and the OSS. Katz, Grzesinsky and Brauer complained to the Norwe-
gian ambassador in Washington about his sponsorship of the AFGF pamphlet 
"Norway does not yield". They described the AFGF as a semi-communist 
organization led by the notorious communist, Frank. The ambassador in-
formed the Norwegian members of the ICC about this GLD intervention. 
Held similarly attacked the AFGF at the farewell dinner for Stampfer 
before the trip to England. Hedwig Wachenheim, a member of the GLD, 
considered this as one of the latest attempts to eliminate the NB 
61 Group. The GLD also sent a number of anti-NB reports to the Office of 
the Coordinator of Information. Goldberg inquired back to Frank about 
the charges of kidnapping and of disputed illegal trips into National 
Socialist Germany, of which the latest had taken place in December 1938. 
Frank sent him a list of available witnesses but Goldberg took his dis-
tance from the ICC for fear of getting involved in interemigrant rival-
ries. 
Simultaneously, the GLD provided newspapers and journals that 
published Frank articles with derogatory information. Stampfer attacked 
Kingdon for defending the record of Frank during the Weimar Republic. 
62 He ridi.culed him for discovering "the KPD as an academy for democracy". 
Adler thought that he had never read a "more repulsive" article by 
61 Memorandum uber die Anti-Hagen Kampagne, 1 February 1945, 
Frank Papers, box 7, folder 2. 
62Neue Volkszeitung, 15 August 1942. 
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Stampfer. He deplored that the latter ttpartook personally in the des-
picable personal campaign of denunciation which the NVZ has unwittingly 
made one of its chief tasks". Considering Stampfer's renegade attitude 
towards socialism, he objected to his exclusive thinking in bourgeois 
democratic categories .and to reevaluating the time of socialist promise 
in the 1920's in these belated terms. 63 In connection with the same 
incident, Adler told Seger that he considered it "hopeless to discuss 
with you the behaviour of the NVZ in the case of Paul Hagen". He had 
"always hoped that you redeemed enough of your better past to dissociate 
64 yourself from the methods of your editorial colleague [Katz]". In 
frustration over his setbacks, Frank discussed with Hertz the possibility 
of going to Canada, possibly on a lecture tour, before returning to New 
York for a new start in emigrant politics. 
The GLD continued its anti-NB efforts with the American war in-
furmation and intelligence agencies in 1942 and 1943. The initiative 
by Grzesinsky while he was an expert on the German emigration on the 
Foreign Nationalities Board of the OSS has already been discussed. One 
of his reports on Frank was given to the Jewish Labor Committee as a 
65 government report. Staudinger also warned the OSS official Dorn 
against the AFGF. 66 The OSS eventually ordered an investigation of 
63Friedrich Adler to Friedrich Stampfer, 31 August 1942, Nach-
lass Hertz, reel 40. 
64F . d . h r~e r~c 
Hertz, reel 40. 
Adler to Gerhard Seger, 26 September 1942, Nachlass 
65 Memorandum uber die Anti-Hagen Kampagne, 1 February 1945, 
Frank Papers. 
66 Notes on Staudinger Komplex,lO September 1943, Frank Papers, 
box 7, folder 2. 
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Frank and several of his associates. The inquiries to which they were 
subjected dealt with the standard GLD accusations about the use of 
pseudonyms by Frank, his supposed double membership in the SPD and the 
KPD and the conspiratorial nature of the NB Group. 
The most irrational diatribe of the GLD was directed against the 
alleged influence of Frank in the Office of War Information. The Social 
Democratic committee derived its fears from a few harmless circumstances. 
Elmer Davis had written the preface to Frank's book "Germany after Hit-
ler" before becoming director of the OWI. This association made Frank 
actually ineligible for an OWI job. Eliasberg and Taurer had been 
transferred from the prewar_COI to the OWI. James Warburg, the cousin 
of Ingrid Warburg, became the head of the Overseas Branch of the OWI in 
New York. His association with Shortwave Research Inc. was interpreted 
as a partiality for NB. Actually, the extreme antagonism between the 
GLD and NB and the bad political behaviour of the Social Democratic 
committee were reasons enough to exclude their members from the intelli-
gence agencies. Eliasberg and Taurer were special cases. They were 
needed as specialists in intelligence work because they had spent sever-
al years in German underground work and in German prisons before their 
emigration. The OWI commissioned a study of the underground movement 
from them which appeared in 1943 as "The silent War" with a foreword by 
Reinhold Niebuhr. Several Social Democratic refugees who had been asso-
ciated with the Sopade but not with the GLD got low paying clerical OWI 
jobs. Seger failed to get an important job with the OWI. He was disap-
pointed when he was sidetracked to Minnesota in a curious mission 
against a chain of unpatriotic German American newspapers. He inter-
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vened repeatedly with Davis and prided himself in March 1943 in Pitts-
burgh with his latest intervention with the OWI director. He had ener-
getically demanded a stop to any collaboration with the friends of 
Frank. 
In order to counteract this alleged relationship, the GLD en-
listed especially the services of Gunther Reinhardt. By then, the 
latter was already an experienced informer. He was from Heidelberg 
where he spent his youth and college years. He left Germany before the 
takeover by Hitler and eventually came to the United States to rejoin 
his Jewish mother. From 1934 to 1935, he was an investigator for the 
Dickstein-McCormick Committee, that is, for the House Un-American Af-
fairs Committee. Then, he was employed for a while by the American 
Jewish Committee which fired him for sending reports about AJC officials 
to government agencies. According to himself, Reinhardt worked for the 
FBI from 1935 to 1936. During his two years with the New York Daily 
News from 1939 to 1940, he prided himself about having a dossier about 
every German emigrant in New York. The Daily News fired him for passing 
on information to Walter Winchell of the Daily Mirror. During the war 
years, Reinhardt worked occasionally for the Alien Department of the New 
York police and became an investigator for the Dies Committee, the suc-
cessor of the Dickstein-McCormick Committee. He specialized in reports 
about the German emigration in Mexico which was predominantly communist, 
about ''communist" Jewish organizations in the United States, and espe-
cially about emigrant organizations like the AFGF. Among his one hundred 
sixty-seven reports were several about the OWl and Frank. Apparently, 
Reinhardt telephoned almost daily with Katz in New York. 67 
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In March 1943, Reinhardt finished his long report about the 
number of leftist European emigrants and the alleged influence of Frank 
in the OWI. He forewarded it to seven government agencies like the FBI, 
the OSS, and the Civil Service Commission. The report to the OSS was 
accompanied by a letter from Grzesinsky which termed Reinhardt as a 
"neutral" source. In the tabulation of the latter, ten out of sixteen 
radio script writers of the OWI had past communist or radical affilia-
tions. The same percentage of "key people ... owe their job and alle-
giance to an alien ex-communist and exconvict", that is, Frank. Suppes-
edly, the head of the German Department, Franz Hollering, rejected all 
applications by "politically reliable and professionally competent 
German Americans" and depended on the approval of Frank and his OWI 
friends. Reinhardt also claimed that seven of the nineteen stenogra-
phers and typists in the German Department were placed there through the 
influence of Frank. According to him, fifty-six out of sixty-four per-
sons employed in the German Department were aliens. He concluded that 
Frank "practically controls the personnel and the ~..rriting policies of 
68 the German Department". 
67
vorlaufige Feststellungen uber Gunther Reinhardt, 29 September 
1943, Frank Papers, box.?, folder 2; also: ibid., Nachtrag zum Material 
uber Gunther Reinhardt; 30 September 1943; Joseph Roos, Memorandum uber 
Gunther Reinhardt, Nachlass Hertz, reel 33; Merkblatt uber einige Deut-
sche und andere Mitarbeiter von Rex Stout, Frank Papers, box 7, folder 
2; Gunther Reinhardt, Dies Investigator und Freund von Katz, Seger, 
Grzesinsky, 30 pages, Frank Papers, box 7, folder 2. 
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Reinhardt claimed that Warburg, the head of the Overseas Branch 
of the OWT, colluded with Frank in hiring European refugees through 
Shortwave, Inc. He received help from the Department of Patriotic In-
telligence of the Constitutional Educational League in New York which 
claimed in its Factogram of September 1943 that Shortwave Research 
ttapproved and recommended hundreds of European refugees for appointment 
to the government payroll" and that three hundred sixty of them were 
given jobs with the OWI. 69 Roos thought that "Reinhardt and his SP 
[ SPD] friends want to get a criminal angle on him [Frank] to convict 
h , II 70 ll!l • According to Rosenfeld, Seger was also determined to get Frank 
into prison. Economizing Southern Democrats and right wing Republicans 
in Congress used the available reports on the OWI and on Frank as argu-
71 
ments in the discussion over the OWI budget. A number of newspapers 
like the Hearst chain printed excerpts from the Congressional Record 
about Frank, Davis, Warburg, and others. As a result of his work, Rein-
hardt claimed that Frank topped the secret deportation list of Senator 
Dies. 
The accusations by Reinhardt had little factual basis. The 
Civil Service Commission called the main report slanderous and refused 
to reinvestigate the OWI employees in question, even though the FBI re-
69
Department of Patriotic Intelligence of the Constitutional 
Educational League in New York, Factogram, 10 September 1943, Frank 
Papers, box 7, folder 2. 
70 
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opened its investigation. The implicated OWI employees credibly refuted 
the charges against them. Hollering assumed that the government took 
the accusations not very seriously since all the officials in question 
were still employed. He obviously was not interested in hiring any 
GLD people. But he did not need Frank for his establishment in the 
United States. He had been able to emigrate early to America because 
of his work as a foreign correspondent in New York for the Ullstein 
Publishing House of Berlin. He was not hired by Warburg but by another 
official of the COI for his distinguished record as a journalist and 
editor of antifascist papers. These had not been communist papers. 
Hollering stated that he had never been a member of the KPD. He had re-
signed his editorship of the Arbeiter Illustrierte Zeitung, which he 
described as a working class Life Magazine, in 1928 when the KPD ac-
quired an interest in the paper that threatened his editorial indepen-
dence. He defined the Berliner Zeitung am Mittag, of which he had been 
the editor in chief, as a popular democratic paper. He founded the 
Prager Mittag as the first antifascist daily of the German emigration. 
He served as its editor in chief until June 1934 when he left for the 
United States. This daily was owned by politically independent busi-
nessmen and subsidized by the President of Czechoslovakia, Thomas G. 
Mazaryk. Hollering rejected categorically the idea that Frank had any-
thing to do with his selection of OWI employees. His participation in 
the ICC had not been based on personal relations with Frank. He hired 
people who did not know Frank or were hostile to him. He discussed the 
professional qualifications of all the OWI employees he had hired. 
None of them was an NB emigrant. Eliasberg and Taurer preceded 
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him at the Office of the Coordinator and at the OWI. He had never met 
them before. 72 
Warburg maintained that he had personally nothing to do with 
selecting the staff of the German section of the OWI. He had not been 
directly involved in Shortwave Research, Inc. from where some OWI em-
ployees were recruited. He had met Frank only once before entering 
government service and once during his work with the COI in early 1942. 
At that time, Frank had suggested that the Office of the COI allow his 
organization to broadcast to Germany. Warburg had declined this request 
as contrary to COI policy which did not accord radio time "to any of 
th . f . " 7 3 e varLous groups o expatrLates . 
A fair number of refugees were employed in the German section of 
the OWI. The latter could not help employing them since a full command 
of German was indispensable for radio propaganda into Germany. Eleven 
identifiable German socialist emigrants appear on the OWI list. Most of 
them were women, some of them wives of socialist emigrants. They held 
mostly clerical jobs for $1,440 to $2,000 a year. Most of them had been 
affiliated with the Sopade, one with the ISK, one with the KPO and one 
of them was the daughter of a NB sympathizer. The NB members Eliasberg, 
Taurer, and Friedrich Schmidt were script writers at $3,800 a year. The 
notion of socialist emigrant influence in the OWI is incorrect. It can 
not be used to disspell the notion of a generally insignificant social-
72 •• Franz Hollering to David F. Seiferheld, 12 June 1944, Frank 
Papers, box 7, folder 2. 
73 James P. Warburg to David F. Seiferheld, 7 June 1944, Frank 
Papers, box 7, folder 2. 
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ist emigration in the United States. 74 
The idea that a single emigrant leader like Frank could have 
controlled the propaganda of the German section of the OWI from the 
outside was crazy. The various sections of the OWI were subject to a 
strict system of broadcast control. As deputy director for propaganda 
policy, Warburg was responsible for drafting all policy directives. 
Then, they had to be approved by the director of the OWI and by repre-
sentatives of the State Department and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
All scripts were checked by the Broadcast Control Division before being 
issued to the radio announcers. Also, the latter were monitored so that 
h ld t d f h d . 75 t ey cou no epart rom t e prepare scr1pts. 
The legend of vast NB influence in the OWI was in ludicrous con-
trast to the difficulties, frustrations and failures of the AFGF. The 
latter made well organized antifascist efforts which fell victim to 
emigrant obstruction and government insensitivity. The same circum-
stances prevailed during the second half of the war. In this period, 
from 1943 to 1945, the three major German socialist emigrant groups, 
the second German American Popular Front, the GLD, and the AFGF made 
intensive plans for German postwar reconstruction. 
74 Memorandum on the statement about Paul Hagen in the Gunther 
Reinhardt report, 26 June 1944, Frank Papers, box 7, folder 2. 
75 Warburg to Seiferheld, 7 June 1944, Frank Papers, box 7, 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE SECOND GERMAN AMERICAN POPULAR FRONT, 1942 TO 1945 
The German attack on Russia gave rise to the second Popular 
Front with its German American component. Since this attack was unex-
pected it took some time to revive the Popular Front and to overcome 
the disillusionment over the Russian diplomacy of 1939. The military 
emergency of Russia made her defense a legitimate concern even for non-
socialists. As a member of the United Nations, the Soviet Union was in 
alliance with the West. The propaganda of the second Popular Front fit 
even into the context of American foreign policy. German American sup-
port of the war became a serious concern of the American government 
which did not mind the efforts of the Popular Front to achieve it. 
For the German American front, the cultural approach was outdated but 
that did not make it easier to achieve the desired ethnic and emigrant 
unity. This second movement was of an even more composite nature than 
the first. The German American Emergency Conference (GAEC) was cen-
tered in New York, the German American Anti-Axis League (GAAAL) in 
Chicago. The German American trade unionists in New York,and some of 
their leaders, had ambitions of their own. They formed the independent 
Victory Committee of the German American Trade Unions (VC-GATU). The 
paper of the GAEC was the German American which granted separate space 
to the other two organizations. The DAKV still existed and was asso-
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ciated with the GAEC but it remained in the background. 
The second Popular Front cooperated eagerly with the govern-
ment. The Office of War Information wanted to unite all German Ameri-
can organizations, including the Popular Front, in the United Americans 
of German Descent (UAGD). After the government lost interest and the 
GLD dropped out, the Popular Front and the conservatives remained the 
uneasy partners of the UAGD that could not even agree on staging a 
national convention. One of the reasons for this failure was the 
change in purpose of the Popular Front. With Russian victory all but 
certain, the latter became concerned with winning the peace. It could 
not gain conservative support for its plans of postwar reconstruction 
so that the UAGD became a liability. In this situation, Gustav Faber, 
the main leader of the trade unionists, tried to circumvent the UAGD 
with a new organization. The Independent National Committee of German 
Americans for the Re-election of FDR (INC) appeared to have only a tem-
porary function. But after the elections, it continued as the German 
American National Committee. As with the other socialist groups, 
reorganization served the purpose of planning for reconstruction, 
This planning was difficult even among various Popular Front 
elements. Their national and international concerns had to be often 
adjusted. The Popular Front tried hard to harmonize its German and 
Russian loyalties, especially towards the end of the war. Its main 
hope was that the Soviet Union as a member of a peacetime United Na-
tions would follow its international socialist conscience and work for 
a positive treatment of Germany. In this frame of mind, the Popular 
Front supported the decisions of the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and 
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Potsdam. When German interests suffered, it had recourse to the argu-
ment that the German people had forfeited Allied consideration. It had 
always maintained that a revolution against Hitler was crucial for the 
postwar fate of Germany. If it occurred, German and Russian postwar 
interests could harmonize within an internationalist approach. Other-
wise, German interests would have to concede precedence to Russian 
interests. The GAAAL nearly fell victim to these conflicting national-
ist and internationalist tendencies. But its pro-German wing prevailed. 
The Popular Front could not solve the problem of emigrant unity. 
The UAGD nearly brought all emigrants together. But anti-communism was 
the main reason for the GLD eventually to drop out of the government 
sponsored coalition. After that, some GLD members considered momentar-
ily a socialist concentration .. But the Labor Delegation pursued its own 
isolationist re-organization which determined and limited its plans for 
reconstruction as the next chapter will discuss. 
1 The GAEC was formed on March 1st, 1942. Its monthly paper was 
inaugurated two months later. For membership, the Emergency Conference 
turned to the constituent organizations of the DAKV, the secondary labor 
organizations, which were then doubly represented in the Popular Front. 
The GAEC eventually built up a semblance of a national organization with 
branches in San Francisco since April 1943, in Cleveland since June 1943, 
in New Jersey since July 1943 and in Philadelphia since December 1943. 2 
1New York Public Library, The German American, New York, 1 May 
1942 to date, sponsored by the German American Emergency Conference, 
edited by Rudolf Kohler and Kurt Rosenfeld, July 1942, p. 1. 
2The German American, April 1943, p. 12; June 1943, p. 3; July 
1943, p. 12; December 1943, p. 12. 
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The GLD was naturally hostile to the purpose of the GAEC. Katz con-
sidered Russia at first as a secondary theater of war and hoped that 
American assistance to the Soviet Union would be kept at a minimum. 
Competition for the fraternal organizations between the Popular Front 
and the Social Democrats continued as before during the first Popular 
Front. They both usually sent speakers to the national conventions of 
the fraternal organizations, especially the Workmen's Benefit Fund. 
The leader of the GAEC was the centrist emigrant, Rosenfeld. Heym had 
enlisted in the American army and Hall had vanished from the scene. 
The latter probably was too compromised from his first Popular Front 
activities. After the death of Rosenfeld in October 1943, the native 
centrist Sattler became more prominent again. The communist emigrants 
did not seek the limelight as in the first Popular Front. 
The GAAAL grew out of the Workmen's Benefit Fund. This circum-
scribed the initiative of Kruse who was a functionary of the AKStK in 
Chicago. He and his group used the editorials in the AKStK journal 
Solidarity for ideological discussions in the Chicago branches in order 
to confront the "social pacifist and other prejudices 11 in the secondary 
labor organizations. According to Kruse, ''the organizational forms 
3 followed soon after". On February 1st, the AKStK called a loyalty 
rally in the Social Turner Hall on Belmont Avenue, to which it invited 
representatives of the fraternal organizations. A continuation commit-
tee organized similar gatherings in other parts of the city which 
3
rbid., May 1943, p. 2. 
299 
4 
eventually led to a comprehensive delegate conference on June 28. In 
between, the League organizers tried to benefit from a conference for 
ethnic unity to which Mayor Kelly invited representatives of all German 
American organizations on February 13. 5 But the non-labor societies 
were ·not interested in the Popular Front so that the GAAAL was formed 
without them. Rosenfeld attended the constitutional conference of June 
28. Its main organizers were Kruse, Jaeger and Schrotter, the organi-
zer of the first Chicago Popular Front. It consisted of thirty-three 
delegates from "labor, fraternal, cultural, sports, musical and other 
organizations" representing in Popular Front perspective approximately 
one hundred thirty thousand German Americans. Besides the AKStK, the 
Native Friends and the Workmen's Choirs, a number of CIO locals were 
represented by their German American members. T~ey included the 
Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America and 
the United Electrical, Radio Workers' and Machinists' Union. This 
rather leftist membership was complete with German American members of 
the International Workers Order and of the German American Workers' 
Club (Arbeiterklub) of Milwaukee. Kruse was elected secretary and 
Jaeger chairman of the GAAAL. Schrotter remained more in the back-
ground with maintaining contacts with community groups like the Office 
of Civilian Defense and the YMCA. 6 
4
chicago Historical Society, "Where do you stand?'', pamphlet 
published by the German American Anti-Axis League, (summer 1942); also 
German American, June 1942, p. 2; July 1942, p. 8. 
5 German American, January 1943, p. 3. 
6 German American Anti-Axis League, "Where do you stand?". 
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Unlike the first Chicago Popular Front, the GAAAL remained of 
local importance. Its activities were reported in the German American 
under the regular section of "News and Views from Chicago". It tried 
to win local acceptance by participating in war related community and 
ethnic programs. Thereby, it hoped to win the support of non-labor 
German Americans. At the United Nations Parade for the demonstration 
of ethnic unity, the GAAAL was the only German American group to parti-
cipate with a float, despite the sponsorship of the event by City 
Hall. 7 The League was also the only German organization to commemorate 
publicly the first anniversary of Pearl Harbor. This was done in a 
Catholic high school where a group from the Veterans of Foreign Wars 
8 presented the colours. The GAAAL also participated in the North Side 
Win 'the War Committee which was co-sponsored by the OCD and the YMCA. 
Kruse functioned as program chairman. 9 
But these activities did not impress the conservative German 
Americans. An issue that involved the latter more directly was the 
yearly German Day celebration. By 1943, the GAAAL claimed to have made 
some progress in the way the latter was organized. At its insistence, 
government speakers were invited and the League was also allowed to help 
10 
stage a patriotic rally. In December, the GAAAL participated in the 
German American Committee for an Allied Nations victory. The latter 
7 American, 1943, German January p. 3; 1 May 1943, p. 2. 
8Ibid., December 1942, P· 12. 
9Ibid., November 1942, p. 13. 
lOib;d., 1 J 1943 2 
.... une , p. . 
--
301 
consisted of a group of progressive German American intellectuals, pro-
fessors and supposedly businessmen. It included the author Hans Leo 
Reich. Schrotter represented the GAAAL in the Committee. 11 
The GLD and its ethnic arm, the GACD, soon challenged the GAAAL, 
despite the circumspection of the latter. AKStK representatives sub-
stituted for the League in sponsoring a mass meeting for pro-adminis-
tration candidates in the mid-term state elections of 1942 which the 
Republican Party won. The other sponsors were the GACD and the Inde-
pendent Voters' League. In the view of Kruse, this joint sponsorship 
successfully demonstrated German American unity. But guest speaker 
Seger,. :from the GLD, gave an interview to the Chicago Daily Sun in which 
he called Kruse a communist and the GAAAL a communist affair. 12 In 
this way, the GLD reaffirmed Social Democratic interest in the AKStK 
and the other secondary labor organizations. 
The Victory Committee of the German American trade unionists 
was organized by immigrants like Faber and Emil Romberg. As a sixteen 
year old, Faber had joined the youth group of the Deutsche Metallar-
beiter Verband (German Metalworkers' Union). Later, he became a func-
tionary of that union. As a mechanic in shipbuilding, he worked in the 
dockyards of Wilhemshaven, Kiel and Hamburg where the uprisings of 1918 
started. In 1924, he immigrated to the United States where he co-foun-
ded the transport workers union. He became the treasurer of this union 
11 Ibid., January 1944, p. 12. 
12 Ibid., December 1942, p. 12. 
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which had one hundred fifty thousand members in the 1940's. 13 Romberg 
was born in 1901 in the Ruhr area. As a labor functionary, he was 
president of the Jungsozialisten (Young Socialists) in Northern and 
Western Germany and the secretary of the free metalworkers' union of 
the Rhineland. In 1927, he went to the United States where he joined 
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. Besides the 
VC-GATU, he also represented the Victory Committees of the German 
American Divisions of the Red Cross and of the National War Fund. 14 
The VC-GATU was a very active Popular Front element. A section 
of each issue of the German American was reserved for it under the head-
ing "Union Spotlight". Its labor conferences were synchronized with 
those of the GAAAL. Together, they advocated a greater war effort in 
productivity, exposing fascist agents and saboteurs and the protection 
of "loyal German Americans" against discrimination from often German 
American employers. The first Labor Conference of Greater New York 
took place in January 1943. 15 The simultaneous GAAAL conference of 
trade union delegates in Chicago hoped "to secure the maximum mobiliza-
tion of tens of thousands of German American workers". The support of 
the German underground movement also served as a psychological rallying 
point as did the emphasis on the anti-labor policies of the Third Reich. 
In appeals to the German workers, the conference felt a "great responsi-
bility to assure a people's victory ... the world over". The trade 
l3Ib1.'d .. , J 1 1944 3 u y ' p. . 
14 
Ibid., December 1944. 
15Ibid., December 1942, p. 12; January 1943, p. 1. 
303 
unionists also wanted to promote socialism at home. R. J. Thomas, the 
president of the United Autoworkers,which was then part of the CIO, 
sent a letter of support to the New York Labor Conference. The secre-
tary of the Greater New York Industrial Council of the CIO addressed the 
conference. The latter was attended by union delegates so that it is 
difficult to assess the numerical strength of the VC-GATU. 
The first New York Labor Conference adopted a new structure for 
the VC-GATU and a plan for expansion. Faber became the secretary of 
the Committee. Specific victory committees were to be established in 
each union local, branch, shop or office that employed a sufficient 
number of German Americans. Each VC member was to receive a contribu-
tion card and pay monthly dues of 25¢. Of the six thousand members of 
Local 1 of the Bakers' Union, for example, two thousand were German 
American. But only fifty of these joined the VC of this local which 
was established with the consent of its officials. The VC of Local 1 
did not let a meeting of the local pass without an appeal for the Popu-
16 lar Front. In the German American neighborhood of Yorkville on the 
East side of Central Park, the trade unionists established the United 
Yorkville for Victory Committee, together with some merchants of 86th 
Street. Its activities in that basically conservative area were repor-
ted in the German American under the heading "It happened in Yorkville"~? 
The second New York Labor Conference followed in March 1943. 
According to the German American, representatives from eighteen CIO 
16Ibid., May 1943, p. 3. 
17 Ibid., November 1942, p. 12. 
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and sixteen AFL affiliated union locals were present. The third confer-
ence took place in December 1943. It was welcomed by letters from 
Wendell Willkie, Mayor LaGuardia and Victor F. Ridder, the conservative 
publisher of the New York Staatszeitung who was also involved in form-
ing a national organization of German Americans. It restated the goal 
of establishing victory committees in all locals with a large German 
American membership and considered it important to circulate the German 
American "as a means of mobilizing" all German American workers. Faber 
recommended the formation of an interethnic council of victory commit-
tees. In this context, the Greek American Labor Conference and a 
. 1 C "1 f H . T d U · . · d lS Nat~ona ounc~ o ungar~an ra e n~on~sts were ment~one . 
These conferences and the activities of the GAEC were timed to 
influence the preparation of a national convention of the United Ameri-
cans of German Descent. The latter was promoted by the Foreign Language 
Division of the OWI whose head was Alan Cranston, the later Democratic 
Senator from California. The job of the Foreign Language Division was 
to improve, maintain or establish unity among the various ethnic groups 
in order to insure their full support of the war. The Division had a 
Press Section and a Radio Section to supply war information to the 
ethnic media. It could also impose its information by pressure, for 
example, by threatening to recommend revocation of the second class 
postage status of a specific newspaper. In general, its methods were 
more discrete, if not always successful. In the field of the ethnic 
organizations, the Foreign Language Division liked the device of uniting 
18 Ibid., December 1943, p. 3; January 1944, p. 9. 
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all those within a certain ethnic group which,in the German American 
case, was almost impossible. The Popular Front rejoiced over such an 
idea but its single-minded enthusiasm eventually embarrassed the OWI 
which was already a favorite target of conservative and isolationist 
Congressmen. The Social Democrats would have liked to associate with 
conservative organizations but they had a hard time accommodating them-
selves to leftist groups which they considered communist. The most 
valuable groups were the conservative societies. They represented the 
majority of the German Americans and were not a potential hazard to the 
image of the OWI. 
The attitude of the American government towards the emigrants 
had changed considerably after December 1941. The government knew that 
it could not clearly distinguish between emigrant and ethnic g~oups 
since several of the latter were led by socialist emigrants. Before 
Pearl Harbor, the State Department resented the opposition to its offi-
cial policy of neutrality by socialist and Social Democratic emigrants. 
Its policy statement of 10 December 1941 regarding "free movements in 
the United States" was still ambiguous. It explained that "in general, 
the government of the United States does not favor 'free movements' ... 
which carry on activities contrary to the established policies, domestic 
or foreign". This referred to interventionism as well as socialism. 
The statement elaborated that the State Department "has taken cognizance 
of the existence of a number of committees ... but has not extended any 
form of recognition to them, formal or informal". It was mainly con-
cerned with the potential division of "allegiance of any group of 
American residents between the United States and foreign governments, in 
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existence or in prospect", that is, exile governments. It preferred 
that "the governing committees of such [free] movements be composed of 
citizens of the foreign country". It disapproved of ••any attempt to 
enlist the support of American citizens of like racial background11 • 
The State Department conceded, however, that 11 in harmony with the basic 
principles of liberty, the people of the United States do have a sympa-
thetic interest in movements by aliens in this country who desire to 
liberate their countries from Axis domination11 • It would have preferred 
that most German emigrants were not socialists, but American sponsorship 
19 
of their groups had always been tolerated. 
After Pearl Harbor, the government came to view antifascist, 
socialist emigrants as helpful in rallying ethnic support for the Ameri-
can war effort. A memorandum of June 1942 from the White House to the 
Foreign Language Division of the OWI contained an interesting initiative. 
It was written by Gabriel Lorenz of the Office of Emergency Management. 
An accompanying questionnaire was designed ••to explore, for the first 
time -- and fully -- the significance of Free movements, their place in 
the prosecution of the war and the molding of the peace 11 • The memo~n-
dum proposed that the government intervene in the organization of the 
Free movements and streamline them into efficient factors of the morale 
front. The questionnaire was to establish ••rating for recognition11 • 
19 Institut f~r Zeitgeschichte, Munich, Deutschsprachige Presse 
in den USA, 1941-1945, collected by the author from the State Department 
Central Files in the National Archives in Washington, and from the files 
of the Office of War Information at the National Records Center in 
Suitland, Maryland, pp. 1, 2: Department of State, Policy regarding 
11 Free Movements•• in the United States, 10 December 1941. 
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Lorenz was aware of "the mushroom growth" of organizations for "nation-
alism, socialism or just propaganda purposes". There were "many 
duplications ... and organizations within organizations" which required 
understanding of inter-group antagonisms and intricate front arrange-
ments. The questionnaire wanted to take stock and find out "who is 
h ? " b . f . . 20 w o. as a asLS or government LnterventLon. 
Lorenz thought that "taken collectively, these movements are as 
yet an untapped reservoir of energy and resources which should, and 
can, be harnessed to the war effort". It was important to achieve 
"UNITY ... in one conunon effort for victory". He believed that their 
"potentialities [are] enormous" for the homefront, the Victory-front, 
that is, the continental underground front, and for the front of cor-
responding language groups in other countries, mainly Latin America. 
The role of these Free movements in "building up the morale on the 
home front, its influence on the production line among the millions of 
workers which these organizations represent" seemed obvious. But 
Lorenz considered "the repercussions on the V-front in Europe and 
Asia ... even more important". The main reason for this attitude was 
that nobody conceived yet of an Allied invasion of the continent and 
of the total occupation of the Axis countries. 
In this context, the emigration was to be used to activize the 
underground movement. By consolidating the free movements in the 
United States, the underground groups could be united abroad. Lorenz 
20
rbid., pp. 3-5, Executive Office of the President, Office for 
Emergency Management, Gabriel Lorenz to Alan Cranston, 30 June 1942, 
Rating for Recognition, questionnaire form for Free Movements. 
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did not realize that this had already partially happened in the cathar-
sis of underground existence. In a more negative view, the illegal 
groups had to be saved from the ideological differences in the Free 
movements in America. It was "obvious that unity here would beget a 
united front abroad and thus eliminate the hazard which may come to 
the underground movement from that disunity w~ich has so effectively 
played into the Nazi divide-and-conquer tactics". For the sake of the 
underground movement, the government should bring harmony to the Free 
movements in the United States since "every united front we create 
here in the ranks of the Free movements is a victory scored on the 
morale front in Europe". The V-front was "a real second front and, 
unlike a military front which can be defeated and dispersed, it remains 
a permanent stronghold which grows stronger with every s~tback and 
every execution, and grows wiser with every mistake". It would "grow 
bigger in size and scope with every message of unity from the new 
world". If a similar strategy could be applied to the ethnic commun-
ities of Latin America it would result in "unlimited horizons of 
support for our war effort". A combination of all three fronts would 
have an enormous impact: "by good organization and a keen sense of 
international strategy, we have in our Free movements a potential for 
converting mass Fifth Columns into mass Columns for Democracy." 
In this sense, the memorandum was "not only probative but 
creative". The government should enter this "strange magnetic field 
of freedom" and attract the Free movements to it so that they "emanci-
pate themselves from their limited objectives to the limitless horizons 
with which we must look upon the present struggle". In an atomic way, 
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Lorenz viewed the Free movements and their underground and ethnic tan-
dems as pieces of a global world structure. He believed that 
sooner or later, we will have to separate once and for all time the 
New Free World from the Nazi New World Order in a political fission 
which is final and irrevocable .... this division must be made so 
that when the broken world is pieced together again it will not be 
of different pieces but all of one piece, victory for Freedom.21 
The abstract enthusiasm of this memorandum did not lead very far. The 
policy of unconditional surrender changed this assessment of the Free 
movements. From then on, the American government was only interested 
in ethnic unity at home. 
A unification of the German American organizations in favor of 
the war was a priority of the Foreign Language Division of the OWI. 
The latter knew that the ethnic organizations under German emigrant 
leadership had already the proper attitude. The question was whether 
they would cooperate in bringing the conservative organizations into 
the same fold. The Division was not fully aware of the potential dif-
ficulties of an association between leftist and conserva'tive German 
Americans. It believed that the patriotic issue of the war should 
override whatever alienations there could be. Under the circumstances, 
it considered it best to initiate the project with George N. Shuster, 
the president of Hunter College in New York City and the close friend 
of Bruning whose patriotism did not let him speak out against the Third 
Reich during wartime. Shortly after the establishment of the OWI in 
the summer of 1942, a representative of the Foreign Language Division 
discussed "the entire German American situation" with Shuster. The 
21 Ibid. 
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latter agreed to draft a German American manifesto which could be used 
as an appeal to German American organizations for joining in a national 
federation and demonstrating their loyalty in a national conference in 
22 the fall of 1942. The favorite name of German American Congress for 
Democracy was already preempted by the Social Democrats so that the 
prospective federation was named the United Americans of German 
Descent (UAGD). This was a derivation of the Loyal Americans of German 
Descent, a group organized by Shuster. 
The initial recruitment went smoothly. Shuster was to contact 
a group of original signers of the manifesto which included the organi-
zation leaders with whom Rutz, the chief of the German Desk of the 
Foreign Language Division, corresponded, himself, in September 1942. 
There was first the trio of the Popula~- Front: Sattler as the national 
secretary of the AKStK, Bonnheim as the secretary of the GAEC, and 
Rosenfeld as the chairman of the DAKV. The Social Democrats had fewer 
organizations from which to send representatives. Seger participated 
as a leader of the GACD. Manfred George as the editor of the Aufbau 
represented the German Jewish immigration. All of these representatives 
agreed to a preliminary meeting which would also be joined by delegates 
of a few other groups: the VC-GATU and the Workmen's Choirs as Popular 
Front groups, the Neue Volkszeitung as a Social Democratic newspaper, 
the conservative Staatszeitung of Ridder, the conservative Vereinigte 
Deutsche Gesellschaften (United German Societies) of Greater New York, 
the Karl Schurz Turnerbund and "possibly" the Steuben Society if a top 
22
rbid., p. 31, David Karr to Alan Cranston, 12 August 1942, 
re: Dr. Shuster. 
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leader was available who had not been "too pro-Nazi in the past". This 
preliminary meeting would decide what other organizations should be 
invited to join the UAGD and to help prepare the national convention. 
According to Rutz, "all persons contacted expressed a desire to get 
going and promised to forget their past differences". 23 
The difficulties of the preliminary UAGD committee soon became 
apparent. The conservative groups held back so that the two left 
factions were over-represented. The proceedings were slow and the 
second meeting was only held on November 17 at Hunter College. It 
formed three committees: a convention committee was to set the place 
and date of the convention and formulate an agenda, an organization 
committee was to prepare "a list of a thousand or more organizations" 
which would be invited to send delegates, and a third committee was to 
take care of the financial aspects of the convention. Among the three 
members of the convention committee were Seger, as chairman, and Rosen-
feld. To the four members of the organization committee belonged Katz 
and two representatives of the VC-GATU, one of whom was also an editor 
of the German American. In the three member financial committee, the 
Popular Front was represented by a DAKV leader. As a result, the Social 
Democrats were unhappy with "the Rosenfeld group" which had four dele-
gates in the three committees and introduced another two members who 
had not been invited, one from the VC-GATU and one from the DAKV. But 
Rutz was more troubled by the general predominance of "the two left 
23 Ibid., pp. 34-35, Henry Rutz to Alan Cranston, 17 September 
1942, re: New York situation. 
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factions", especially since "the six or seven groups representing the 
conservative societies" did not attend the second meeting. He was 
still optimistic about getting them to the third meeting and about the 
UAGD convention in general. With some contradiction, he described the 
meeting as "a very harmonious affair with the different factions 
patting each other on the back and all factions giving the government 
a big hand for the work it has done to date in getting the groups 
together". But the date of the convention was postponed to mid-January 
1943. 24 
The strength of the Popular Front in the preliminary committees 
and the enthusiastic Popular Front campaign for the UAGD convention 
bothered the OWl and the GLD. The GAEC had prepared for a national 
all-German American conference of its own. Then it dropped its own in 
25 favor of the more promising OWl plan. In September 1942 the German 
American had already spoken out in favor of the UAGD and exhorted all 
the factions to exercise mutual restraint. Certain labor groups were 
reprimanded for their reservations about sitting down at the same table 
with formerly pro-Hitler groups whose "loyal members" must be helped 
"to clean their house". 26 The Labor Conference of the VC-GATU and the 
Midwest Labor Conference of January 1943,sponsored by the GAAAL, dis-
cussed "the issues to be raised at the convention of the UAGD". Rutz 
became concerned with this identification of the UAGD with the GAAAL. 
24 Ibid., pp. 39, 40, Henry Rutz to Alan Cranston, 25 November 
1942, re: New York Conference. 
25 German American, July 1942, p. 8. 
26
rbid., September 1942, pp. 1, 12. 
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He had "hoped to rally some of the working class groups which have been 
'taken in' by the Anti-Axis League" to a prospective Midwestern conven-
tion of the UAGD. But he felt that the GAAAL conference was "not going 
to make it easier for us to attract the large German American organiza-
tions in Chicago to our proposed conference". He was equally concerned 
about the pro-UAGD propaganda of the New York Labor Conference and the 
German American. 11If this publicity goes out into the general German 
American press", Rutz feared "additional arguments" at the next meeting 
27 
with conservative German American leaders on 20 January 1943. 
It was a quarrel between the conservatives and the Social Demo-
crats which eventually caused the failure of the UAGD convention and 
the withdrawal of the OWI and the GLD. It led to a temporary resigna-
tion from the UAGD by Ridder in December 1942. According to Rutz, 
"things had been going smoothly" when this episode occurred. A repre-
sentative of the OWl was assigned to attend all the committee and 
subcommittee meetings of the UAGD. Ridder provided the space in his 
office for her daily paperwork. He had also promised to raise $3,000 
for the convention. Its detailed program was to be approved at the 
next meeting of the preliminary committee. At this point, Ridder was 
attacked by the administrative chairman of the New York Anti-Nazi 
Labor League, of whose executive board Seger was a member. It was 
probably the AFL sponsored Anti-Nazi Labor League. The latter 
27 Institut !ur Zeitgeschichte, Deutschsprachige Presse in den 
USA, 1941-1945, pp. 44-46, Rutz to Cranston, 9 January 1943, re: German 
organizations in Chicago; also, Rutz to Cranston, 9 January 1943, 
re: German American Trade Union Victory Conference in New York. 
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threatened to expose the alleged Nazi domination of an annual bazaar 
for the benefit of poor German American families in New York, of 
which Ridder was the chairman. Unless the latter asked for the resig-
nation of the objectionable officials, the League would send an open 
letter to the press. Shuster and Rutz tried to mediate between the 
League and Ridder but they could not prevent the threatened publicity. 
After that, conservative leaders like Theobald Dengler, the head of the 
Treasury Bond Drive among German Americans and the chairman of the 
German American USO Committee in New York, agreed that Ridder should 
take no further risks by enlisting conservative leaders for the UAGD. 
Rutz met for six hours with Seger, Shuster, and Sattler before the 
scheduled UAGD meeting, without succeeding to patch up these differ-
ences. The UAGD meeting discussed the Ridder affair and wondered 
whether German American unity was still possible instead of considering 
and ratifying the convention program of the UAGD subcommittees. Every-
thing was postponed until after another appeasement trial. Rutz was 
asked to stay in New York and either induce Ridder to reconsider or 
persuade the conservative leaders to cooperate without Ridder. Seger 
resigned from the executive board of the Anti-Nazi League. Despite 
this concession, Shuster and Dengler also threatened to drop out of 
the UAGD. Under these circumstances, the OWI lost interest in the UAGD 
convention. 28 
Rosenfeld still tried to salvage the convention. He emphasized 
that there were no differences of political opinion. There was only a 
28
rbid., pp. 41-42, Rutz to Cranston, 15 December 1942, re: 
Ridder's resignation from German American Conference. 
distrust of intentions, that is, a deeper seated issue of which the 
Ridder affair was only a symptom. He asserted that there would be an 
equitable distribution of delegates and speaker assignments at the 
convention and that only unanimous decisions would be valid. 29 But 
with the withdrawal of the OWI, the UAGD lost its attraction for a 
GLD that would not be caught associating freely with Popular Front 
groups. The latter and some of the conservatives, including Ridder, 
stayed on and tried to make the UAGD function. 
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The relationship between the Popular Front and the conservatives 
was complex. It is not clear what the latter expected to gain from 
their membership in the UAGD. For Ridder and his publishing enter-
prise, it meant welcome government protection instead of harassment. 
The absence of the GLD was also a plus because the latter was less 
tolerant towards German American media than the Popular Front. Shuster 
was genuinely antifascist, but the few conservative leaders were care-
ful not to cooperate too closely with the Popular Front. They consen-
ted only to projects that centered around government programs. The 
Popular Front exploited the latter for its own purposes as best it 
could. It tried desperately to make the conservatives comfortable and 
commit them to a national convention which was the main cause of their 
discomfort. In one of the conservative initiatives, the Loyal Ameri-
cans of German Descent tried to rally the German Americans in a protest 
meeting against the National Socialist persecution of the European 
Jews, without much response from either the German Americans or the 
29G A . erman mer~can, March 1943. 
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German Jewish refugees. Ridder organized_a dinner meeting of old UAGD 
officials and a number of new leaders from somewhat unpolitical singing, 
sports, and dialect groups. For the German American, this modest event 
d h f d . f . d . G Am . 1 · · 30 lai t e oun at~on or a w~ er rang~ng erman er~can coa ~t~on. 
In July 1943, the Committee of the United German Organizations of New 
York became interested in more ·cohesion among its member .organizations 
and in a more patriotic program. The GAEC urged the UAGD to use the 
opportunity for tying this conservative group closer to the United 
A . 31 mer~cans. 
The third Labor Conference of the VC-GATU in December 1943 was 
again timed to generate momentum for a prospective national convention 
in January 1944. A timely front-page editorial of the German American 
appealed for overcoming mutual prejudices. It claimed that the wall of 
alienation between progressive and bourgeois German Americans had been 
skillfully erected by National Socialist propaganda. A national con-
vention would therefore be a defeat for National Socialism. The 
progressive groups should not thoughtlessly suspect the conservatives 
of National Socialist sympathies and the bourgeois groups should shed 
their prejudices against the laborites "as dangerous radicals". 32 In 
order to facilitate better harmony, the German American portrayed the 
Popular Front as the work of the centrist Rosenfeld. Even after his 
death, the latter was still of symbolic memorial value in the convention 
30Th 'd ~ . ' June 1943, p. 2. 
31Th. d ~ . ' July 1943, P· 12. 
32 Ibid., January 1944, pp. 1' 3. 
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publicity of the Popular Front. This approach was helpful. Even Ridder 
stated that "America could use mapy more Kurt Rosenfelds", which did 
not necessarily apply to the Popular Front. 33 None of the communist 
leaders of the Popular Front stepped into Rosenfeld's shoes. Instead, 
the centrist Sattler joined in a triumvirate of prominent togetherness 
with Ridder and Shuster. 
But the conservatives in the UAGD were only ready for a War 
Bond rally in February 1944 in cooperation with the German American War 
Bond Committee of the Treasury Department whose chairman was also a 
UAGD leader. The German American defined th~ rally as "a stepping 
stone in the history of the German Americans". Purchases of $6 million 
in War Bonds were made, which was only possible if some of the fraternal 
organizations invested part of their insurance funds. The UAGD had 
been "a loosely knit central body of organizations" 'ivhose unity was 
"hindered ... by politics·, economic vie';vs or religious convictions". 
After the rally, the UAGD 'tvas to become "a permanent organization''. 
The GAEC thanked the UAGD which had made it possible "for the first 
time in this war to unify the various German American groups by 
eliminating the overemphasis of divisive issues". The Popular Front 
paper was confident that "the movement of unification of the Americans 
of German Descent will irresistably march on". The VC-GATU planned 
another Labor Conference in preparation for a national convention. 
The conservatives were more cautious and warned the Popular 
33
rbid., 1 October 1944, p. 5. 
34Ibid., February 1944, p. 1; March 1944, pp. 1, 3, 5. 
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Front against too far-reaching goals. The chairman of the German Ameri-
can ~.Jar Bond Conunittee and UAGD leader, Dengler, described the rally 
as "an occasion where the various parties put aside their differences 
as to politics, their opinions as to economics and their beliefs as to 
religion". This was a tribute to the collection of $6 million of War 
Bonds. In a subsequent GAEC meeting, Dengler suggested getting together 
on "similar patriotic and conununity endeavors" like a Red Cross drive 
or a USO campaign. But he disagreed "with some of my friends that such 
unity as I speak of should be strongly pressed and hurriedly urged". 
He thought that "it should come by itself" and that it must "necessarily 
be slow". He did "most certainly ... not want any single individual 
dictating to us" but he hoped that agreement on the above community 
programs would "create that intimate connection and exchange of opinions 
which will foster greater harmony and a spirit of appreciating each 
other's viewpoint". He opposed attempts "to inject controversial sub-
. t " . t th k f . f . . - 35 Jec s Ln o e wor o unL LcatLon. The UAGD never held a national 
convention. Before the next target date of January 1945, the re-
election of President Roosevelt intervened as a divisive issue between 
laborite and conservative German Americans. Then, the impending end of 
the war took the patriotic pressure off the conservatives while the 
Popular Front could no longer disregard the issues of postwar recon-
struction. 
To the Popular Front it became obvious that the UAGD would 
never settle down enough for a discussion of postwar policies which had 
35 Ib;d., A '1 1944 3 .... prL ·, p. . 
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been delayed by the organizational problems of the United Americans. 
Even the Aufbau had been optimistic. It had considered the War Bond 
rally as "a cultural and political activation ... which will exert 
36 its influence over the questions of the German future". But if the 
conservatives could not be lured to a national convention they could 
even less be talked into support of Popular Front postwar policies. 
In this situation, Faber tried to circumvent the UAGD. He was by then 
the secretary of both the VC-GATU and the UAGD. Yet, he chose to form 
a new German American coalition around the issue of presidential re-
election. As former isolationists, the conservatives did not like 
Roosevelt. It was patriotically possible for them to oppose a presi-
dent who wanted an unprecedented fourth term. But the Popular Front 
had always staked all its American hopes on Roosevelt. Faber formed, 
therefore, the Independent National Committee of German Americans for 
the Reelection of FDR (INC). The American Turners participated in the 
new committee. Their national chairman, a German American judge and 
former congressman from Detroit, became the chairman of the INC. Faber 
served as secretary-treasurer. After the reelection of Roosevelt, the 
INC continued as a general German American National Committee and put 
its "energy into the further service of German American-dom". 37 The 
German American supported this strategy editorially so that the INC 
replaced the UAGD in Popular Front publicity. Faber entitled a front 
36 Aufbau, 1934 to date, published by the German Jewish Club 
in New York, 18 February 1944. 
37G A . erman mer~can, 1 October 1944, p. 1; 15 December 1944, p. 3; 
15 February 1945, p. 1. 
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page editorial: '~at we German Americans need". His answer to this 
rhetorical question was "a national leadership and a national represen-
tation". Besides discussions with UAGD officials like Ridder in New 
York, talks began in December 1944 in New York, Chicago, Detroit and 
Milwaukee with other German American public figures like Judge Joseph 
Gutknecht of Chicago, the chairman of the German American War Bond 
Committee there. Faber conceded that there was "little need for a new 
individual organization". But he professed his intention of winning 
thousands of existing German American organizations for the program of 
the INc. 38 
During its association with the UAGD, the Popular Front made 
numerous appeals for German American and German emigrant unity. These 
were meant as propaganda for the UAGD or any other possible coalition. 
They also played a role in the ongoing arguments about the necessary 
war and postwar treatment of Germany which will be discussed in the 
last part of this chapter. One of these appeals was made in January 
1943 at the occasion of the Rhineland Conference in Germany. The latter 
was a Popular Front coalition of the German underground movement to 
which the German American devoted its entire issue of February 1943. 
The information about it carne from the New York daily press rather than 
through any direct channels. This conference was attended by a Catholic 
priest, a Reichswehr captain rather than a Wehrmacht captain, a member 
of the former Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German National People's 
Party), representatives of the SPD and of the KPD, railroad and metal 
38
rbid., 1 February 1945, p. 1. 
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industry unionists, rural representatives and even a member of a 
National Socialist opposition group. Its composition fulfilled all 
Popular Front requirements. The conference had issued a manifesto 
with a ten-point program that was broadcast over the illegal station of 
the Deutsche Volkssender (German People's Station). It demanded an 
immediate end to German military operations, advocated the overthrow 
of the Hitler regime and the formation of "a national democratic 
government for peace". It appealed to Germans of all social classes, 
religions, and parties,but gave little advice beyond the advocacy of 
sabotage. In keeping with a proper Popular Front program, it was 
economically vague promising nothing more than work, just pay and an 
eight hour day. Applying the principle of the tip of the iceberg, 
Rosenfeld saw in the conference the makings of "a great national German 
peace movement" and considered its manifesto as "a historic document". 
The Rhineland Conference called in his opinion especially for the uni-
fication of the German Americans and for a national conference that 
would pledge its support to "justice for the German people". Finally, 
it should be the occasion for a conference of the German emigration 
"from the bourgeoisie to the communists", in the United States and 
abroad. The manifesto represented in his view "a vivid platform for 
the unification of the political German emigration". 39 In the opinion 
of the novelist Carl Zuckmayer, the conference called for "the common 
front of freedom" of all emigrants and Germans in other countries 
39 Ibid., February 1943, pp. 5, 6. 
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especially as a pressure group for positive Allied war aims. 40 
Another potential catalyst for the unfication of German Ameri-
cans and German emigrants was the formation of the National-Komitee 
Freies Deutschland (NKFD, National Committee for a Free Germany) in 
Moscow in the summer of 1943. The latter was a Popular Front committee 
of literary and political emigrants and of German war prisoners, 
especially officers. Their ideologically generous manifesto could 
appeal even to disaffected National Socialists. It aimed at the dis-
integration and possibly the overthrow of the Hitler regime as an 
alternative to Allied occupation, especially from the West, and to 
unconditional surrender. The German American considered the National 
Committee as "a visible center" of the German anti-Hitler movement and 
its formation as "a step that benefits all peoples". It hoped that 
this committee would have a revolutionary effect on the German anti-
f . . . 41 lf d d asc~st oppos~t~on. A re Nor en, one of the writers of the German 
American, wished that "the German emigration in the United States [and] 
the German Americans put aside the old party barriers". 42 Zuckmayer 
thought that the Moscow manifesto presented an opportunity and offered 
the basis on which to unite "here, too, the divided German emigration 
for C Stat t d • • t • . 11 43 ammon emen s an common ~n~ ~at~ves . When Committees of 
Free Germans were formed in England, Mexico, and France, only the 
40Ibid., 1 April 1943, pp. 1, 5. 
41 Ibid., August 1943, p. 1, 5, 12. 
42Ibid., November 1943, p. 7. 
43 Ibid., September 1943, p. 1. 
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German Americans and the German emigrants in the United States fell 
behind this international movement, in the opinion of the German 
American. The Free German movement was "gaining ground everywhere" 
and ought to be extended into the United States. Sattler devoted a 
special issue of the Solidarity to the NKFD. Another AKStK official, 
who was also the assistant secretary of the GAEC, considered the de-
cisions of the Benefit Fund convention of October 1943 as "a minimum 
program that can be submitted to all German American groups, a program 
that will lead to unity". 44 
In this mood, the German American Popular Front tried to keep 
all doors open, even those which were already closed. It assumed a 
conciliatory attitude towards the Social Democratic Landeskonferenz 
(National Convention)_ of June 1943 in New York City. The latter was 
a reorganization effort that disdained even a socialist concentration 
without communists. Nevertheless, the German American approved the pro-
gram of the National Convention as barely distinctive from "the pro-
gram of various left oriented Social Democratic or communist emigrant 
45 groups". One of the Popular Front motives for this moderation was 
the desire to tone down the reaction of the GLD to the NKFD and the 
Free Germany movement. But the GLD lost no time in rejecting the 
latter. In an article of the New York Tribune, Katz ridiculed the 
intimation "between the lines" of the manifesto that the German people 
"have nothing to fear from Russia" and considered it as an invitation 
44 Ibid., October 1943, p. 6; November 1943, pp. 12, 14. 
45Ibid., August 1943, p. 4. 
Jl 
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to go "over to (the Russian] side". 46 He insisted that the Soviet 
Union wanted to make a deal with the Reichs>vehr. In a letter to the 
editor, Rosenfeld objected to this "speculative and dangerous interpre-
tation of the manifesto". 47 Sattler was unhappy because the GLD called 
the manifesto a communist document only because it had been elaborated 
in Moscow. But the rejection by Hedwig Wachenheim at the October con-
vention of the AKStK was even more polemical. She thought that "the 
NKFD promises everything to everybody". In this context, she objected 
especially to a second front. It would facilitate the plans which the 
Soviet Union promoted by their sponsorship of the NKFD. The armies of 
the Reichswehr were to be maintained and relieved on the Eastern front 
by a separate peace so that they could fight with better concentration 
"against the Anglo-Saxon Allies". The latter should not give them 
this opportunity. The German American called Wachenheim's speech "an 
abuse of the AKStK". As health insurance, the latter ought to have 
spared its members the stench of "the living corpses" of outdated 
48 
anti-Russian propaganda. 
-While the UAGD was dragging its feet, the abovementioned Free 
World Association offered an opportunity 'for unification. The German 
American supported its preparation of "a big rally of the German emi-
gration and of the German Americans" in October 1943. But no more was 
heard of it and no Free Germany Committee was formed in the United 
46 Ibid., October 1943, p. 5. 
47 . Ib1.d. , p. 6. 
48Ibid., p. 15. 
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States. In the spring of 1944, the Popular Front emigrants were able 
to participate in an emigrant coalition organized by the American 
Friends of German Freedom. This was the Council for a Democratic 
Germany which will be discussed in the last chapter. Besides this 
CDG and the precarious INC, there were eventually only the original 
Popular Front constituents, that is, the GAEC, the VC-GATU, the GAAAL, 
and the German American, to promote leftist plans for postwar recon-
. 49 struct~on. 
The Popular Front had an internationalist approach to recon-
struction. It wanted peace at home and abroad and did not separate 
domestic from foreign issues. A peaceful postwar world depended on 
the coexistence between socialism and capitalism with the necessary 
compromises in disputed areas like central Europe. A peacetime United 
Nations was its diplomatic cornerstone. In this design, the positions 
of Russia and Germany were ambivalent which benefitted the former and 
hurt the latter. In the socialist context, Russia was the only hope 
for the future and deserved support. During the war, the Popular Front 
advocated, therefore, Allied aid to Russia and a second front in the 
West. In this same context, German~ which had once been a socialist 
stronghold, was a fallen member. It was in need of rehabilitation 
optimally by an antifascist revolution and in need of reeducation, but 
also deserved the protection of the Soviet Union. In this unequal rela-
tionship, Germany could lose when it deserved punishment for insuffi-
cient regeneration and when the concerns of the Russian protector took 
49Ibid., p. 6; November 1943, p. 14. 
precedence over those of her protege. In the pragmatic context, all 
diplomatic deals were acceptable for what they were worth to Russia. 
Thus, the new Eastern border could be rationalized in several ways. 
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In general, the Popular Front was pro-German as far as possible. In 
case of conflict, its pro-Russianism usually won out. But some German 
American Popular Front members had a harder time dealing with their 
German nationalism. 
The second front was first necessary to relieve the Soviet 
Union of military pressure and then to make her victory as good as 
possible. The German American started campaigning for a second front 
in June 1942. Schreiner was its specialist in military and political 
warfare. He resented the explanation of the German disaster in 
Stalingrad by a miracle rather than by the high morale of the Russian 
armies and the Russian people. But the second front was still neces-
sary to keep the German armies from regrouping. The war could still be 
lost. Its outcome should not be jeopardized by the postponement of a 
Western front. At times, he was so optimistic that he thought with 
such a front Hitler could be defeated in 1943. He was emphatic about 
an Allied landing in Western France. North Africa, Sicily and Italy 
were "not the real second front". They were, at best, good prelimin-
aries for an attack across the Channel. He took the same attitude 
twoards the "air warfare extremists". Bombing campaigns would not 
lead to fast results. In the meantime, the Soviet Union would have to 
keep sacrificing its soldiers and carry the main burden of the war. 
To Schreiner, the second front was the test of sincerity of the alli-
ance. When it finally materialized in June 1944, it did so for the 
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wrong reasons of which the major one was the advance of the Russian 
armies. 50 But the GAEC, the GAAAL and the VC-GATU welcomed it with a 
joint D-Day declaration. It was still expected to serve the cause of 
G Am . . 51 erman er~can un~ty. 
W~th the progress of the war, the emigrant question "What is 
to become of Germany?" became central. With a victorious Russia and a 
superior West, nothing could save Germany from an unprecedented anni-
hilation except drastic changes at home. The communist emigrants of 
the Popular Front understood the realities of rehabilitation which only 
a German revolution could achieve. They were more uninhibited in their 
views because they were not afraid of a strong Russian influence in 
Germany. The centrists were more realistic about the probability of a 
German revolution. With somewhat more nationalistic concern than their 
partners, they hoped that "the other Germany" would find Allied con-
sideration even it if did not pass the ultimate test. Because of 
these divergencies in their views, the political line of the German 
American, the GAEC and the other Popular Front groups was often ambi-
valent. The GAEC had its first forum on "the future of Germany',' in 
late November 1942. Bonheim established the junctim between the right 
of the Germans to "decide their own destiny" and the overthrow of' 
Hitler. Johann R. Becher, the later composer of the East German nation-
al anthem, emphasized the urgency of the German situation in a poem 
50
rbid., June 1942, p. 4; September 1942, p. 4; January 1943, 
p. 3; February 1943, p. 11; May 1943, p. 7; October 1943, p. 4; 
July 1943, p. 6; January 1944, p. 4. 
51
rbid., 15 June 1944, p. 1. 
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entitled "Noch eine Stunde". That was all the German people had to 
make up their minds. But Rosenfeld still expected changes from the 
Allies. He belabored a theme that was designed to impress them when 
he stated that "we cannot win the war, and it will be more difficult to 
win the peace without our ally inside Germany". He recommended Stalin 
who had said that "the Hitlers are coming and going but the German 
people will remain". Rosenfeld argued that "if Joseph Stalin ... can 
make such a statement then it must be certain that there exists a 
Germany which will help to defeat Hitler and bring about a revolution". 
But it needed Allied encouragement. Alfred Kantorowicz established 
"the other Germany" by a different deduction. He based it on the num-
ber of National Socialist executions and encampments implying that 
they reached only a percentage of the German opposition. He did not 
consider the alternative that especially a National Socialist dictator-
ship would indulge in overkill. 52 
Rosenfeld felt encouraged at the occasion of the Rhineland 
Conference. The communists used the latter more as a stimulus for 
Popular Front unity in America. But Rosenfeld felt also on more solid 
ground "from the standpoint of shaping the postwar world and of answer-
ing the much discussed question: What is to become of Germany?" He 
expected the Allies to express their solidarity with the Rhineland 
peace manifesto by guaranteeing "the national existence and indepen-
53 dence of Germany". Feuchtwanger and Tillich also believed in the 
52
rbid., December 1942, p. 3. 
53
rbid., February 1943, pp. 5, 6. 
p 
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importance of the German underground movement. To Zuckmayer, the 
Rhineland Conference proved the existence of "a determined opposition 
in Germany .... All hopes for a future, free and really democratic 
Germany rest on this opposition". He did not mention the unconditional 
need for a stronger manifestation of this opposition. According to a 
German American fraternal leader, the conference was a good opportunity 
for reminding German Americans of their duty to oppose "the Reaction" 
whose plans for postwar Germany had just surfaced in an article of 
April 1943 by Kingsbury Smith in the American Mercury. It alleged 
State Department plans for the decentralization of Germany. Even 
Walter Winchell discussed the manifesto of the conference extensively 
in a radio commentary of March 21. The German American mass-distribu-
ted a special leaflet about the conference entitled "The signs of 
awakening". 54 
When the National Committee for a Free Germany was formed in 
Moscow, Bonheim was especially interested in its revolutionary effect 
on the German underground.· In his speech at the American Soviet 
Friendship Congress in November 1943 in New York, he insisted that 
"only by participating in the final struggle against the Nazis, will 
[the German people] win the right to decide upon their own fate. This 
is the only way of saving the very existence ... of the German nation 
... to avoid the dismemberment of Germany [and the] destruction of her 
. d . 11 55 1.n ustr1.es . 
54Ibid., 1 April 1943, pp. 1, 5. 
55Ibid., December 1943, p. 5. 
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At a later stage in the war, the same differences between the 
communist and centrist Popular Front members surfaced in the debate 
over the issue of unconditional surrender. Rosenfeld thought that the 
latter should not preclude an Allied interest in the German under-
ground, the German emigration and political warfare. Unconditional 
surrender should be expected only of the National Socialist establish-
ment in which his "five points" included those groups who served as 
the economic and social basis of National Socialism in traditional 
socialist theory. The German masses, however, should be convinced 
"that the United Nations are their friends" who do not plan the dis-
memberment of Germany. This commitment to political warfare would 
speed up the war considerably,in his opinion. To Rosenfeld, UN cooper-
ation "with the enormous democratic forces ·within Germany" would prove 
that the Allies were engaged in "a war against National Socialism and 
not against the democratic development of the German people" which 
alone could guarantee German pacifism. In the unqualified sense, he 
opposed unconditional surrender as well as "the continuous bombing of 
the Reich",which Katz kept applauding in the NVz. 56 
Especially towards the end of the war, the German American 
tended to support the policy of unconditional surrender. In January 
1945, it severely reprimanded Dorothy Thompson, the pro-German comrnen-
tator, for claiming that the cause of Allied military problems was the 
policy of unconditional surrender. Her series of articles in the New 
York Post under the heading "Why Germany can not surrender" was counter-
56 Ib1.' d., J 1 1943 13 u y ' p. . 
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productive in the view of her critics. It "strengthened all Nazis and 
pro-Nazis in this and in other countries .... The demise of the 
formula ... would be a moral victory of the first order for the Hitler 
regime. According to the German American, it was erroneous to believe 
that her polemics against the policy of Casablance could shorten the 
57 
war. Kruse, the leader of the GAAAL, came, however, to the defense 
of Dorothy Thompson in the next issue of the German American. In his 
opinion, she had only urged an explanation of the policy of uncondi-
tional surrender by the Allies who should "particularize their policy 
toward the various categories of Germans". The Popular Front did not 
concede that this Allied policy implied a punitive treatment of Germany. 
It only meant that "nobody will negotiate with the Nazi regime" 58 The 
Popular Front relied on the United Nations. Whatever that alliance in 
which a victorious Russia would have a strong voice would present as a 
policy towards Germany would be acceptable to it. 
But Popular Front propaganda experienced more and more problems 
with United Nations policy. It knew, however, how to handle them. 
There were still safe issues on which any Popular Front member could 
speak out without prejudicing actual developments. One of them was 
reeducation of Germans and German war prisoners. This was also a 
procrastinating issue. It centered on the proper German state of mind 
which could still be judged insufficient if necessary. The INC had 
ambitiously proclaimed its interest in "What is to be done with 
57Ibid., 1 January 1945, p. 2; 15 February 1943, p. 3. 
58Ibid., 1 March 1945, p. 11. 
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Germany?". Yet, it did little more than center on reeducation. Its 
chairman advocated the dispatch of "a special commission to Germany 
to educate the people into the practical workings of a free democracy 
[sic] ". Faber headed an INC delegation to Washington for discussions 
with several government departments. He proposed to Secretary of 
State Stettinius a German American delegation "to inspect Germany". 
He also applied to the War Department and to General Eisenhower. In 
order to substantiate his request, he made the exorbitant claim that 
the nearly six million German Americans in this country were "in one 
way or another attached to organizations affiliated with our council 11 • 59 
The GAAAL and the VC-GATU paid special attention to the reedu-
cation of German war prisoners. The GAAAL arranged forums for the dis-
cussion and the publicity of the POW question. Kruse proposed an 
"American way of handling German war prisoners". He objected to 
allowing National Socialist prisoners to terrorize antifascist POW's. 
Some cases of torture and even of executions were reported. Kruse 
recommended to keep the common soldiers separate and to organize them 
according to municipal and regional origins in the form of discussion 
groups in order to develop nuclei of democratic regeneration. One of 
the GAAAL forums was held at the International Relations Center on 
East Randolph Street. It attracted representatives from the army, the 
OCD, and the Chicago Civil Liberties Union. Besides Kruse, Schrotter 
was one of the main GAAAL participants. He was also a consultant of 
59 .. IbLd., 15 May 1945, p. 3; 1 July 1945, p. 3. 
333 
the OCD in its Psychological Warfare Commission. 60 William L. Shirer 
concurred with all these attempts of "stamping out Nazism among prison-
61 
ers of war". 
The VC-GATU, which was also headed by Faber, concerned itself 
with the reeducation of POW's rather than with an inspection of Germany, 
which was more safely requested by the INC. Faber was especially in-
censed over the p.olicy of releasing the officers before the other men. 
The Office of the Provost Marshal General and its POW Division adhered 
strictly to the stipulations of the Geneva convention. The officers 
also did not have to work. The preferential return of some fifty 
thousand officers to Germany "as useless Nazis" seemed unjust to Faber. 
He had also problems with distributing the German American in the 
camps. The censorship office of the POW Division objected to "the 
extreme anti-Nazi views" of the Popular Front paper. They might be 
"misunderstood" by the POW's and "encourage political dissension" among 
them in violation of the Geneva convention. Eventually, the German 
American was admitted to the camps. Faber considered two hundred twelve 
subscriptions in one camp alone as a success. The NVZ had to overcome 
62 
similar objections to its distribution in the camps. 
Another safe issue for the Popular Front was the economic system 
of postwar Germany. Russia did not expect to gain anything from a 
60 Ibid., February 1944, p. 12; 1 May 1944, p. 2; 15 May 1944, 
p. 9; 1 June 1944, p. 5. 
61
rbid., 1 June 1944, p. 12. 
62 Ibid., 15 May 1945; 1 June 1945, p. 5; 1 July 1945, p. 5; 
February 1944; March 1944. 
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German deindustrialization. Schreiner editorialized that Morgenthau-
like plans competed with National Socialism in using racism as a theory 
of political domination. Their brand was Vansittartism which claimed 
h h 1 h d . . . . 63 I f tat t e German peop e a ~nnate aggress~ve ~nst~ncts. none o 
the forums of the German American which was entitled "What about 
Germany?", Schreiner shared the speaking assignments with William 
Dodd,Jr., the later ambassador to West Germany. Their joint topic was 
"Germany's economy --destruction or nationalization?". Schreiner 
considered the second alternative as the only promising approach to 
the problem of the German question. He advocated nationalization, 
without compensation, of the large estates, the big banks, the key 
industries,and foreign trade,in order to destroy "the economic war 
criminals". This nationalized sector could be left under Allied con-
trol as long as international security required. This degree of nation-
alization would not amount to socialism which was for Schreiner objec-
tively the most appropriate system for Germany, but it was politically 
undesirable. Socialism had to leave precedence to the maintenance of 
peace, that is, of the East-West coalition of the United Nations. The 
system of Schreiner would be a good compromise between the interests 
of Western capitalism and Eastern socialism. Deindustrialization would 
bring destitution to nearly thirty-five million workers. They would 
willingly accept arms from abroad and fight in the interests of a 
great power which Schreiner did not specify. A Vansittartist solution 
would accomplish the opposite of its desired objective. It would de-
63 Ibid., February 1944, p. 6. 
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prive Germany of "the basis for becoming a peaceful, democratic 
state". 64 The Popular Front generally appreciated the anti-Vansittar-
tist attitude of the GLD on the economic issue. A GAAAL meeting of 
January 1944 passed a resolution that deprecated "blanket slurs against 
representatives of the Social Democratic Party of Germany". In this 
case, it defended Seger and Marek whose book "Germany, to be or not to 
be" had been criticized by the Vansittartist Society for the Prevention 
of World ~.J'ar III. 65 
The territorial issue became the main ideological dividing 
line between the Popular Front and the 9ther German and German American 
socialists. The former tried desperately to find positive interpreta-
tions for the decisions of Teheranl Yalta, and Potsdam. It dealt with 
.territorial issues only in toto as the dismemberment of Germany which 
it was safe to reject. But when equivocation became impossible,as on 
the question of the new Eastern frontier of Germany, it sided with the 
Soviet Union. After the Conference of Teheran, the German American 
impressed on the German Americans, the German emigrants and their organ-
izations "the responsibility of supporting the decisions of the Moscow 
Conference of Allied foreign ministers". The latter agreed mainly on 
closer Allied military cooperation a few months before the opening of 
a Western front. But the Popular Front paper centered its attention 
64
rbid., 1 December 1944, pp. 5, 9. 
65 Ibid., 1 February 1944, p. 12; the Society for the Prevention 
of World War III was founded in December 1943. It was headed by Rex 
Stout,a writer of detective stories, and included such emigrants as 
Friedrich ~vilhelm F'orster and Emil Ludwig. 
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on side issues. The statement about the severe punishment of war 
criminals encouraged the German American to believe in an Allied "dis-
tinction between them and the rest of the Germans, clearly and unmis-
takably". The Popular Front paper claimed that the Moscow decisions 
disappointed those who advocated the condemnation of the German people 
as a unit and the dismemberment, deindustrialization and unlimited 
military occupation of Germany. These were the strongest terms possi-
66 ble and the easiest to refute. 
Later, the Popular Front unreservedly hailed the decisions of 
67 Yalta and Potsdam. The annual Eastern Conference of the VC-GATU in 
April 1945 proposed to organize support for the decisions of the Yalta 
68 Conference. The German American was mainly interested in the main-
tenance of the UN alliance which meant collective secu~ity for Russia. 
Without the United Nations, the Soviet Union would be confronted with 
"a new cordon sanitaire". 69 The German American criticized the NVZ 
and the New Leader for publicity in that sense which anticipated the 
Cold War. It also deplored the anticommunist reaction of Shuster to 
the Yalta Conference. The UAGD official dwelt on "the Elbe line" as 
the future divider between the Western and "the Russian part of Ger-
70 
many". The Popular Front socialists were uncomfortable with this 
66 German American, December 1943, pp. 5, 6. 
67 Ibid., 15 February 1945, p. 1· 
' 
1 March 1945, p. 1· 
' 
15 April 
1945, p. 3. 
68 Ibid., 1 April 1945, p. 10. 
69
rbid., 15 June 1945, p. 1. 
70 Ibid., 1 }-farch 1945, p. 11. 
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anticipation of the Cold War. They protested against this discussion 
of "a dismemberment of the German unity and a destruction of the German 
national future". But the new Eastern frontier and the transfer of 
German populations were accepted as consequences of German aggression. 
The German American observed that the Allied powers could not "find any 
extenuating circumstances for the misdeeds of the Germans against other 
countries". .It emphasized "the responsibility of the German people" 
which had not redeemed itself by an antifascist uprising. 71 
In the GAAAL, there was dissension over these issues. Jaeger 
thought that the whole German people was responsible for the National 
Socialist atrocities and rejected the idea of extenuating circumstances. 
He motioned to dissolve the GAAAL rather than getting involved in a 
discussion of postwar and especially territorial issues. But the pro-
German majority did not put the motion to a vote. Instead, the name 
of the League was "temporarily, at least" changed to German American 
Anti-Fascist League. Kruse pressed for the discussion of the sensitive 
issues. He opposed "a purely punitive dismemberment of Germany" but 
considered the transfer of East Prussian Estates to Polish farmers as 
. bl 72 equ~ta e. 
Its lack of territorial nationalism excluded the Popular Front 
from association with the other German and German American socialists. 
The Popular Front emigrants participated in the Council for a Demo-
cratic Germany which split, however, over the Eastern territorial 
71 Ib"d ~ . ' 15 August 1945, pp. 1, 9. 
72Ib.d ~ . ' 1 June 1945, p. 3; 15 June 1945, p. 3. 
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question. The German Labor Delegation was equally exclusive in follow-
ing the opposite ideology of the Popular Front, an uncompromising anti-
communism and nationalism. It pinned all its hopes on the Western 
Allies, especially the United States, at a time when the latter was 
still tied to Russia in the UN alliance. In this sense, the GLD an-
ticipated the times of postwar Western inflexibility which contributed 
to the results against which it polemicized. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE GERMAN LABOR DELEGATION: REORGANIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
Reorganization was necessary to give credibility to the plans 
for reconstruction. But the GLD was handicapped in its quest for reor-
ganization because of the position which it had assumed in the German 
socialist emigration and which it was unwilling to abandon. To make 
matters worse, the GLD experienced serious internal difficulties. They 
were precariously resolved with the resignation of its chairman and his 
replacement by two co-equal chairmen. Each of them represented a fac-
tion within an already small GLD, a state of affairs which contributed 
to the problems of reorganization and reconstruction. The GLD reorgan-
ization took the form of a Landeskonferenz (National Convention) in 
July 1943. It arrived at this format by fighting off pressures from 
within itself and from the Sopade for a genuine reorganization, that is, 
of a democratic expansion and an intersocialist cooperation. Thus, the 
National Convention did not reach new members. It did not even consol-
idate the old GLD. Individual members at the conference spoke sometimes 
in their own name only. The conference generated little momentum. The 
ensuing initiatives of the GLD lacked persistence. 
Under these circumstances, the GLD plans for reconstruction 
were inconsistent. The majority of the GLD tried to deal with its 
fears of a victorious Soviet Union by bespeaking the panacea of a 
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German revolution, that is, of a political revolution without much 
socialist content. The more socialist minority was not interested in 
a rather bourgeois revolution. It accepted early an Allied occupation 
of Germany as the outcome of military defeat. The controversy between 
these· two groups marked the National Convention and the later initiatives 
of the GLD until, towards the end of 1944, some of the optimists des-
paired of their revolutionary hopes. In this emergency situation, the 
GLD and the NVZ centered on the territorial issues of postwar recon-
struction. They ignored American proposals for a dismemberment of 
Germany and focused on the Russian threats to German territorial integ-
rity. They sought refuge in the advocacy of an Atlantic community and 
warned the Western Allies against appeasing the Soviet Union. Their 
Easter Declaration of 1945 expressed these concerns. In this anticipa-
tion of the Cold War, the GLD and the NVZ were a few years ahead of the 
times. When the American government continued to compromise with Russia 
at the expense of Germany, they finally became anti-American. They 
turned against Washington which was the pillar of all their plans for 
postwar reconstruction. In this impulse of self-destruction, the GLD 
nearly hanged itself with its own ideological rope. 
At the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943, the GLD was nearly 
paralyzed by intrigues. Stampfer thought that the Delegation was "in 
a critical state". He regarded it no longer as "a corporative represen-
1 tation of the party". It consisted then only of ten members, including 
1 Stampfer to Sopade, 25 August 1942, Matthias and Link, Mit dem 
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 133, p. 561. 
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Rinner who had rejoined it. The main problems within this small body 
concerned "purely personal things like the qualification in intellect 
and character" of certain members, mainly of its chairman Grzesinsky 
and of its secretary, Katz. Everybody objected to the continued chair-
manship of the former because of his "indomitable supervisor tempera-
ment". More than half of the GLD members, including Rinner, but not 
Stampfer, also wished to discard Katz. If this majority would not 
change its mind, there would be, in Stampfer's assessment, "no coopera-
tion and no activity at all". He did not know "how we will get out of 
this situation". As a temporary solution, he tried to collaborate with 
Katz and Brauer without the chairman. He deplored the paralysis of the 
GLD at a time of necessary reconstructive planning for which "we need 
a reputable representation in the USA". 2 
Then, Stampfer devised an ambitious proposal for a radical 
solution of the GLD crisis which would only have compounded the com-
plexity of the situation. In his correspondence with the Sopade, he 
sounded out their reaction to the revival of an old plan that he had 
previously rejected when it was proposed by Rinner in 1941. By 1942, 
he thought that the foundation of a Sopade branch in the United States 
might solve the personnel problems and the deadlock within the GLD. 
For this purpose, he wanted to recruit four of the SPD executives in 
the United States. He talked to Rinner and Aufnauser, the former Sopade 
rebel. Aufhauser had in his estimation changed favorably and was on 
2
stampfer to Sopade, 23 November 1942, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 136, p. 570; also Stampfer to Sopade, 10 January 1943, Matthias and 
Link, Nr. 137, p. 574. 
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good terms with him and Rinner. Stampfer also defended Juchacz. She 
had, in his opinion, been badly hurt by the Sopade and had never re-
ceived any apologies. She was by 1942 "quite amicable with us". 3 But 
the Sopade could not support this scheme. In order to spare the sensi-
bilities of Stampfer, it did not reject his proposal outright but 
countered with conditions he could not meet. Ollenhauer brought up 
the problem of the other elected party representatives in the United 
States, Hertz, Dietrich, and Sollmann, who could not be included in an 
American Sopade branch and would question· its arbitrary composition. 
He also considered an understanding with Katz indispensable. He hoped 
that Stampfer would find a way of establishing "an undisputed Social 
Democratic representation without alienating the GLD" which was im-
possible. Stampfer theri reluctantly conceded that the idea of a 
5 Sopade branch was "at this time not opportune". 
The leadership problem of the GLD was resolved in early 1943. 
At first, Grzesinsky rejected the suggestion by Aufhauser that he 
resign. He argued that he had not been elected to his position so that 
he could not be removed from it. Then he resigned without an explana-
tion. For the two factions within the GLD, there were two candidates 
for the succession. Brauer was the candidate for the faction around 
3 Stampfer to Sopade, 25 August 1942, Matthias and Link, Nr. 133, 
p. 561. 
4 Ollenhauer to Stampfer, 28 September 1942, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 134, p. 564. 
5 . 
Stampfer to Sopade, 23 November 1942, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. l3y, p. 571. 
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h .. h h . 6 Katz which objected to Auf auser as t e new c aLrman. In a compromise 
solution which was "a phantasy of Katz", Brauer became the first and 
.. h d h . 7 Aufhauser t e secon c aLrman. Eventually the two chairmen were con-
sidered to have "equal rights". 8 Stampfer disliked this solution and 
wondered how long it would last. But he thought that with it "a better 
functioning of the organization was possible". 9 In 1944, Aufhauser 
joined the Council for a Democratic Germany and became involved in a 
severe confrontation with the GLD about unionist representation. 
Brauer remained, then, as the only chairman of the GLD until the end of 
the war. 
After these preliminaries, the GLD was ready for some reorgani-
zation. Because of outside pressure it arrived at its own choice by 
eliminating in inverse order first the most far-reaching option, that 
of intersocialist cooperation. Twice already, it had associated with 
the other socialist emigrant groups but only for financial benefits and 
only after clarifying that the International Labor Propaganda Committee 
of the Free World Association10 and the inter-group council of the 
American Labor Conference on International Affairs did not imply any 
6 Stampfer to Sopade, 10 February 1943, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 140, p. 581. 
7 Stampfer to Sopade, 1 March 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 141, 
p. 585. 
8 Stampfer to Sopade, 12 April 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 142, 
p. 587. 
9 Stampfer to Sopade, 10 February 1943, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 140, p. 581. 
10Julius Deutsch to Vogel, 30 November 1942, EK Mappe 42. 
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11 political recognition of the partner groups. Ollenhauer could not see 
the difference between the AFL and CIO sponsored American Labor Confer-
ence and the Union of German Socialist Organizations in London. 12 In 
March 1942, he suggested that the GLD establish some political cohesive-
ness by following the anti-Vansittartist stand of the Londoners with a 
public statement by the socialist emigrant groups in America. The 
Union had issued a joint policy statement in order to counter an anti-
. 13 
nationalistic declaration by the Fight for Freedom Group Ln London. 
But the GLD preferred to ignore the controversy over pacifist socialism. 
Stampfer pointed out that there were only a few pacifist socialists in 
the United States like Emil Ludwig and Friedrich Wilhelm Forster whom 
the NVZ had always eagerly castigated. He claimed that emigrant Van-
sittartism was hardly a problem in the United States and resented the 
hints at a parallelism in the situations of the two countries of exile. 
Less subtly he stated that "the declaration of the Union is not viable 
h • 1 b • h • II 14 ere precLse y ecause ~ve are agaLnst t e UnLon . 
11 Stampfer to Sopade, 10 January 1943, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 137, p. 573; also: Stampfer to Sopade 10 February 1943, Matthias 
and Link, Nr. 140, pp. 481, 582; Stampfer to Sopade 12 April 1943, 
Matthias and Link, Nr. 142, p. 587; Varian Fry to Frank, 17 August 1944, 
Frank Papers, box 8, folder F; Katz to Ollenhauer, 29 May 1943, Matthias 
and Link, Nr. 145, pp. 595, 596. 
12
ollenhauer to Heine, 27 June 1943, EK Mappe 82. 
13
ollenhauer to Stampfer, 22 March 1942, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 127, p. 544. 
14 Stampfer to Sopade, 22 April 1942, Matthias and Link, Nr. 129, 
p. 548. 
r 
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The GLD also responded allergically to a membership meeting of 
the London Union in late November 1942 which discussed plans for post-
war reconstruction. 15 Stampfer militated especially against a speech 
by Ollenhauer on this occasion about the possibility and the tasks of 
a united postwar socialist party in Germany. He saw the Social Demo-
cratic mission in the emigration in the preservation of the old party. 
It was difficult to even acknowledge the other German socialist groups, 
"first, because Karl Frank and Paul Hertz are here, and secondly, 
because in the American labor movement a Social Democrat is already 
considered as a dubious minority representative who is suspected of 
communism or of pro-communism and is a nearly impossible figure". 16 
The GLD was all too happy to oblige the AFL in this respect. The 
November meeting of the Union caused a counterinitiative by the GLD 
chairman Brauer in a meeting of the German branch of the SDF in 
January 1943. He proposed to convene a general conference of Social 
Democratic emigrants in the United States and suggested to invite the 
Sopade chairman Vogel to this occasion. This would identify Vogel 
with GLD policy. The meeting appointed a commission for pursuing the 
idea of Brauer which led to the National Convention of July 1943. 17 
Sollmann and Staudinger also suggested more tolerance towards 
the other socialist emigrant groups. The former wondered, in the summer 
15 Ollenhauer to Stampfer, 26 January 1943, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 138, p. 576. 
16 Stampfer to Sopade, 1 March 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 141, 
pp. 583-585. 
17 Stampfer to Sopade, 10 February 1943, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 140, p. 580. 
f 
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of 1943 whether the time had not come "to establish contact with the 
Hagen Group••. He acknowledged the success and the general good reputa-
tion of Frank. 18 At the end of May 1943, Staudinger made 11 confidential 
recommendations on the question of reorganization••. He considered ••the 
clarification of our relationship to the other democratic socialist 
emigrant groups 11 as very important. Only then would the American labor 
movement, th~ public, and the government view the socialist plans for 
reconstruction favorably. Staudinger considered it 11 wrong and deceptive 
to still consider today the party executive as the representation per se 
of the German workers••. He did not propose an outright union, only 
11 a modus vivendi 11 which could best be found in joint discussions with 
the other groups about postwar reconstruction. These talks could lead 
to joint declarations especially against "reactionary and conserva-
tive", that is, Vansittartist and monarchist, solutions. He also con-
sidered ••a common attitude towards German communism11 possible. He 
thought that the NB organization had in the past adopted a much clearer 
attitude against cooperation with German communists than the GLD mem-
bers. He had discussed this question with Ehrmann of the AFGF and with 
others. Also, the NB organization consisted of younger socialists whom 
the GLD should not repudiate in his opinion. He had found out that 
many of the charges against the NB Group and Frank were not true. In 
general, he thought that personal attitudes towards Frank should not 
18 Sollmann to Stampfer, 20 August 1943, Nachlass Stampfer, 
part I B, Nr. 682. 
p 
matter. The latter should be treated as the leader of a significant 
19 
emigrant group. 
The uneasiness of Staudinger, however, could not sway the GLD 
into a more positive attitude towards the other socialist emigrant 
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groups. Stampfer claimed that he had "worked in silence to synchronize 
our attitude with yours [that of the Sopade in the Union] and to ~-
20 prove ~he relationship to the groups". But he conceded that the 
London Union "causes us stomach aches enough" and insisted that the GLD 
in conjunction with the Sopade was "the only legitimate representative 
of the old German labor movement". The rest were "insignificant group-
21 lets". 
Sopade. 
"bl " 22 ~ e . 
The GLD resented their encouragement by the attitude of the 
Stampfer asserted that "now is the time for us to be inflex-
Katz requested a new letter of legitimation for the GLD from 
the International Federation of Trade Unions. In the absence of 
Schevenels, his deputy Stolz deplored the conflict between the GLD and 
Frank and made the reservation that his telegram to the National Con-
vention might not be used "as a weapon in this conflict". 23 
19
vertrauliche Vorschlage zur Reorganisationsfrage von Hans 
Staudinger, May/June 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 146, pp. 596-601. 
20 Stampfer to Sopade, 1 March 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 141, 
p. 584. 
21 Stampfer to Sopade, 12 April 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 142, 
p. 587. 
22 Stampfer to Vogel, 13 May 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 144, 
p. 594. 
23 . Vertraul~che Vorschlage von Hans Staudinger, May, June 1943, 
Matthias and Link, Nr. 146, p. 596; also: Ollenhauer to Katz, 6 July 
1943, EK Mappe 82. 
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The GLD was only interested in drawing individual socialists 
over to its side. An Arbeitsgemeinschaft (Study Commission) of the 
German branch of the SDF part~y served this purpose. It was formed in 
October 1942 and was supervised by Leeb, Glaser, and Alexander Stein, 
who was on friendly terms with the NB organization. Its reports and 
discussions deal~ among other things, with the defeat of fascism and 
the role of the national and social fight for liberation and with the 
physiognomy of the postwar world. Members of other groups were 'admit-
ted "if invited by us". But this commission could only make recommen-
dations and did not survive the National Convention. According to 
Leeb~ disunity contributed partly to its failure. 24 As another gesture, 
a small political subcommission of the GLD headed by Wachenheim, 
Aufhauser, and Braunthal, published a correspondence on the future 
German labor movement and elaborated memoranda on postwar reconstruc-
tion. The correspondence was open for contributions to all former 
members of the SPD. In this way, the GLD hoped "to win NB members over 
to our side". 25 
The Sopade and Staudinger also recommended the second option 
for reorganization to the GLD. Ollenhauer remonstrated with Stampfer 
about flthe complete isolation of the GLD from the friends who have 
26 
come there from France". Staudinger thought that the GLD was at the 
crossroads. It had not developed much of a political activity. Yet, 
24 Rudolf Leeb to Ollenhauer, 19 October 1942, EK Mappe 71; 
also: Leeb to Ollenhauer, 6 July 1943, EK Mappe 71. 
25Hedwig Wachenheim to Vogel, 9 June 1943, EK Mappe 143. 
26 Ollenhauer to Stampfer, 22 March 1942, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 127, p. 545. 
349 
some of its members intended to fully politicize a committee for recon-
structive planning that had only been a group of select emigrants. But 
the GLD made only a feeble attempt at expansion by forming a commission 
for studying the question of new admissions. The majority was for "a 
gradual process in this direction" which Staudinger deplored. He hoped 
that this decision would later be revised. In order to legitimize a 
new political activity, the GLD had,in his opinion, to "open the door 
to all those who ... feel that they belong to the old Social Democratic 
27 
movement". But the GLD bucked the issue of a democratic expansion. 
It only toyed with the idea of enlarging the Social Democratic commit-
tee by cooptation. It showed some flexibility in the prospective 
number of these cooptations but never implemented even this insufficient 
degree of reorganization before the summer of 1944. 
The pretensions of the National Convention caused its major 
complications. The conference was called by the GLD, the NVZ, and the 
German branch of the SDF. This array of organizations looked impres-
sive but it amounted only to the few members of the GLD. The editors 
of the NVZ were GLD members, as were the leaders of the SDF. Yet, 
this exclusive group wanted to express "the viewpoint of German Social 
28 Democracy and of the free German labor movement". In practice, it 
neglected what members of this movement were available. The Social 
Democratic emigrants in the SDF had no democratic voice in policy 
making. For this reason, many Social Democratic refugees were not 
27 Vertrauliche Vorschiage von Hans Staudinger, May/June 1943, 
Matthias and Link, Nr. 146, pp. 596-601. 
28 Katz to Ollenhauer, 20 March 1943, EK Mappe 61. 
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interested in the SDF or the GLD. The National Convention did not 
change their status, a circumstance that kept a lid on their enthusiasm. 
They were only expected to lend their presence to a scenario devised 
to impress the American government, labor movement, and public. The 
Sopade was put in the same position. The GLD remained emphatically 
independent of the exile executive and claimed to represent the German 
labor movement as much as the latter. It did not mind the Sopade pleas 
for a more democratic treatment of the Social Democratic emigrants and 
rejected the Sopade policy of more inter-group communication. Yet, it 
expected Vogel to lend his dignitary presence to its conference. The 
latter was not interested in this kind of humiliation. He replied 
that he was "very depressed" about his disappointments with the social-
ist emigration and "mentally not flexible enough" to justify the ex-
f 1 . . 29 pense o a transat antLc trLp. In any case, the JLC was unwilling 
to provide the necessary means. 
The GLD also wanted to attract the independent Social Democrats 
like the executive Juchacz. It invited "all Social Democrats who be-
longed to the Social Democratic Party before the takeover by Hitler". 30 
This definition was ill chosen because it excluded the members of the 
SAP and the ISK but not those of the NB Group, including Frank. In 
response to this invitation and to several personal inquiries, Hertz, 
Hirschfeld and Juchacz discussed the condition of their attendance 
29 Vogel to Stampfer, 6 April 1943, Nachlass Stampfer, part II, 
section 17, Nr. 22. 
JOE kl'' . . h d h d 1 4 r arung von DLetrLc , Hertz an Juc acz, en of June 9 3, 
Matthias and Link, Nr. 147, p. 602. 
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with Aufhauser. They demanded some influence over the organization of 
the convention in the form of official speaking assignments. They also 
hoped that the convention would be the first step towards a concentra-
tion of the various socialist groups. Juchacz thought that the GLD 
should have been put on "a democratic basis" several years ago in order 
to justify its claim of a general German labor representation. The 
National Convention was, in her opinion, the last opportunity for re-
organizing the GLD. Only this intention would qualify the GLD to call 
31 
such a general conference. But the GLD would have none of this. 
Leeb claimed that the demands of Juchacz and her friends were too high. 
They wanted equal rights in the preparation and in the discussions of 
the convention, an elected Social Democratic committe~ and the admission 
f F k h . 32 o ran to t e convent~on. But Juchacz stated that minor concessions 
from the GLD would have induced her and her friends to attend the con-
vention. Aufhauser refused to even interpret their demands to the 
other GLD leaders. He replied that it had been very difficult to make 
the invitation as comprehensive as it was. After that, Juchacz, Hertz, 
and Dietrich declined "in the name of another seventy-two former mem-
bers of the SPDn to participate in the conference. They waited until 
the end of June for this declaration in order to escape the charge that 
they intended to interfere with the convention. 33 
31 Juchacz to Vogel, 20 August 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 155, 
pp. 622-626. 
32 Leeb to Ollenhauer, 6 July 1943, EK Mappe 71. 
33Erkla:rung von Dietrich, Hertz and Juchacz, end of June 1943, 
Matthias and Link, Nr. 147, p. 602. 
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Probably for publicity reasons, the National Convention floated 
another proposal for cooptation, this time by fifty members. Juchacz 
replied that she would not be coopted. Somewhat unrealistically, she 
and her friends hoped that with some help from the Sopade the GLD would 
expand more democratically. She remonstrated with Vogel that the Sopade 
had "never urged an imitation of the London example" on the New York 
Social Democrats. Th . h 1 . . f . 34 ~s was t e u t~mate t~me or ~t. Vogel answered 
ambivalently that "the old organizational distinctions of the time 
before Hitler or of the first period of the emigration ... have lost 
much of their old significance 1'. Yet, he did not want to uphold the 
London example to the GLD because "our friends in the USA consider the 
same policy of cooperation as impossible for personal and objective 
reasons". He hoped that the cooptation plan would make it possible to 
"bury the old differences". 35 This was wishful thinking. The GLD did 
not even implement its limited plan. 
The course of the National Convention and the GLD reports about 
it did not harmonize. Stamp fer remarked that ''on the surface", things 
went very well. There was "a strong sympathetic publicity". Ollen-
hauer was told that "several hundred comrades" attended the conference .. 
This meant that,to his surprise,there were more Social Democratic emi-
grants in the United States than in England. Yet, there was still "no 
Landesgruppe (comprehensive group) of emigrant Social Democrats" as in 
England, possibly because many of the emigrants were in the process of 
34 Juchacz to Sopade, 28 May 1943, EK Happe 8 2. 
35 Vogel to Juchacz, 19 October 1943, Hatthias and Link, Nr. 157, 
PP~ 632, 633. 
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becoming American citizens. Ollenhauer wondered what they could do for 
36 the future SPD. According to Leeb, there were one hundred thirty 
delegates and guests at the convention. Juchacz stated that there were 
sixty participants the first day and one hundred the second day. They 
. 1 f k . 1 . . h . 37 came maLn y rom New Yor to a natLona conventLon Ln t at cLty. 
Some of them were older German Americans so that the organizers proper-
ly spoke of "German speaking" rather than German Social Democrats. 
There was also a limited number of American guests. The AFL was repre-
sented by a functionary from New York, the CIO not at all. Most of the 
European labor groups did not attend. Adler replied that he could not 
accept an invitation of only one German emigrant group. Most seriously, 
the National Convention revealed the disunity of the GLn. 38 There were 
two or three subgroups represented by Aufhauser, Stampfer and Wachen-
heim. Aufhauser, the one GLD chai~man, left the conference before its 
conclusion because he disagreed with the summarization by Brauer, the 
other GLD chairman. These differences also expressed themselves in 
the conference stand on German reconstruction, which will be discussed 
later. 
~he National Convention was followed by a brief period of ini-
tiatives in the summer and fall of 1943. A delegation to Washington 
and two unsuccessful plans for further conferences constituted the 
extent of the GLD efforts after July 1943. Under these circumstances, 
36 Ollenhauer to Kurt Heinig, 22 September 1943, EK Mappe 82; 
also: Ollenhauer to Katz, 18 October 1943, EK Mappe 82. 
37 Juchacz to Vogel, 20 August 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 155, 
pp. 625, 626. 
38 Stampfer to Sopade, 14 July 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 151, 
p. 613. 
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GLD plans for reconstruction lacked a proper basis. The delegation 
consisted of the two GLD chairmen Brauer and Aufhauser and of the exe-
cutive secretary, Katz. On August 17, they discussed the results of 
the National Convention with Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle. 
They confused the latter with both the revolutionist and the gradualist 
approaches to German reconstruction. But they made it clear that the 
Social Democrats should play the major role in postwar Germany. They 
called themselves the representatives of the major German democratic 
forces of the past, present and future. They emphasized their role in 
the Weimar Republic and their "consistent war against Nazism" before 
1933, a time when they actually had failed to perceive the seriousness 
of the National Socialist threat and were preoccupied with the enemy 
to the left. They expected the American government to ignore the other 
socialist emigrant groups as unreliable, even though the latter had 
been.alert to the danger of National Socialism from the beginning. 39 
But the Assistant Secretary did not commit himself. He told Aufhauser 
later that "this government does not make a practice of sponsoring or 
otherwise giving official recognition to movements of the kind you pro-
pose, but rather permits them to lay their case before American public 
opinion". He referred the GLD chairman to his statement about American 
policy towards exiled leaders in general which had appeared in the 
press of August 30, that is, shortly after the visit of the GLD leaders 
in Washington. It based the American attitude on the precarious status 
39 fh'' . Au auser, Brauer, Katz to Ass~stant Secretary of State 
Adolph A. Berle, 30 August 1943, Institut fUr Zeitgeschichte, vol. Fb 
225' p. 60. 
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of exile groups. Their degree of support at home could only be con-
jectured. Berle emphasized that "the decision upon their claims rests 
not in the hands of this government but in the hands of their own 
40 people". He meant that the emigrants were of little value to the 
American government because they were supposed to have no constituency 
in their home countries. 
The plan for the two conferences were designed to further es-
tablish the role of the GLD in postwar reconstruction even in competi-
tion with the Sopade. The GLD planned an international Social Demo-
cratic conference to follow up its National Convention. In early 
August it already tried to contact the Social Democratic group in 
Sweden without .the mediation of the Sopade which had kept in close con-
tact with the 1atter. 41 From Sweden it wanted to invite Fritz Tarnow, 
the chairman of the Exile Committee of the German Trade Unions and 
former vice president of the General German Trade.Union Federation; 
Kurt Heinig, a former member of the Reichstag; and Emil Stahl, an SPD 
executive; from England, Vogel, Ollenhauer and Hans Gottfurcht, the 
leader of the German Trade Union Group; from Switzerland, Otto Braun, 
the former minister president of Prussia, and Wilhelm Hegner, a former 
B . . . f . . 42 avar~an m~n~ster o JUSt~ce. 
40 . .. . Ass~stant Secretary Berle to Aufhauser, 2 October 1943, 
National Archives, Washington, State Department central files. 
41 Stampfer to Sopade, 7 August 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 153, 
p. 617. 
42 fh'' . Au auser, Brauer, Katz to Ass~stant Secretary Berle, 30 Au-
gust 1943, Institut fUr Zeitgeschichte, vol. Fb 225, pp. 60-63. 
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The other conference ~vas to consist of "representatives of all 
Democratic Germans", that is, representatives of the Democratic Party, 
the Center Party, and other "liberal groups". Among others, the GLD 
envisioned inviting from the United States Bruning, Oscar Meyer, the 
former president of the Democratic Party, Erich Koch-Weser~ a Demo-
cratic Party member and former Reich Minister, and Paul Schwarz, the 
former German Consul in New York; from Canada, Spiecker and Treviranus, 
and, "possibly", from Switzerland, Joseph Wirth. These were all poli-
tical figures of the past who played no more role in postwar Germany. 
The conference was to organize "a permanent Council of Free Democratic 
43 Germans". It was to be a new Great Coalition similar to the Associa-
tion of Free Germans which was only a national organization that had, 
however, not yet been dissolved. The plan for this Council was urgent 
because of the formation of the National Committee for a Free Germany 
in Moscow. According to Stampfer, the proclamation of the latter had 
had the effect in America of "a rock avalanche crashing into a pond". 44 
The GLD hoped to benefit from this reaction. It even praised the 
Russian approach to German politics and expected the United States to 
give similar recognition to its emigrants. The prospective Council 
would not be a government in exile but it would "act as a trustee of 
German Democracy". It would have to maintain, its independence from 
the American government but it could not function without "a certain 
43 Ibid. 
44
stampfer to Sopade, 7 August 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 153, 
p. 618. 
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moral assistance from the United Nations, especially the United 
Statesn. 45 The GLD also expected visas for the foreign delegates from 
the American government. 
The latter responded cautiously to this plan of a Great Coali-
tion, but still more positively than to the exclusively Social 
Democratic demands of August. The Division of European Affairs of the 
State Department welcomed the prospective Council. In a memorandum of 
September 4, it noted that "it had seemed that the German Social Demo-
cratic exiles would never pull themselves together sufficiently even 
to propose such an amalgamation and organization of their forcss". The 
European Division viewed the proposal with favor "because any move 
which strengthens and consolidates any of the democratic and moderately 
left German elements will tend to aid us as we attack the problem of 
postwar Germany". The Social Democratic emigrants were "essentially 
friendly to us and· ... represent the best of the Weimar elements". 
The memorandum noted favorably that "no anti-Prussians of the Forster 
type", nor any Bavarian separatists were included and that Sollmann, 
too, was omitted. It objected to Treviranus and Spiecker because of 
their past friendliness with Otto Strasser. It advised to influence 
the organizers not to include these two. 46 
But the State Department did not react to the NKFD as expected 
by the GLD. The European Division proposed to limit official support 
45 .. Aufhauser, Brauer, Katz to Berle, 30 August 1943, Institut fu"r 
Zeitgeschichte, val. Fb 225, pp. 60-63. 
46 H. Freeman Matthews to Assistant Secretary Berle, 4 September 
1943, memorandum, Division of European Affairs, State Department, 
Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, val. Fb 225, p. 65. 
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of the prospective Council to a minimum "for one consideration". The 
latter might be "construed as an imitation of, and rival to, the 
'National Committee' in Moscow". Even tacit American consent could 
lead to "irritating complaints vis-a-vis the Russians". The European 
Division believed that "careful handling on our part can probably 
obviate such an interpretation'.'. But the State Department should only 
make "a rather routine acknowledgement" of the GLD memorandum. It 
should repeat the official policy which it had adopted in December 
1941. The latter expressed only "a sympathetic interest in movements 
by aliens in this country". For this purpose, the government need "not 
go beyond watching the activities of this group [the GLDJ with a sym-
pathetic air". The State Department was glad "to have them keep in 
h • h f • • • h • d • • • II 47 touc w~t us rom t~e to t~me concern~ng t e~r propose act~v~t~es . 
Because of the sensitivity of the issue for the alliance, the 
State Department wanted to obtain the views of the British government. 
A telegram to the American Embassy in London stated that the initiatives 
of the GLD could be "of advantage to us if handled in such a manner as 
to avoid disturbing our relations with the Soviet Union". The American 
ambassador Winant was instructed to tell the Foreign Office that "nor-
mally, we would be disposed to lend considerable encouragement to this 
group but we feel that at this time it is most important to avoid 
giving the impression that we are encouraging a possible rival to the 
Free German Committee in Moscow". The State Department believed that 
47H. Freeman Matthews to Berle, memorandum, Division o£ Euro-
pean Affairs, State Department, 7 September 1943, Institut f~r Zeit-
geschichte, vol. Fb 225, p. 67. 
the United States and the United Kingdom should "follow the same line 
48 in regard to this matter". It wanted to share the risk with the 
3S9 
British government. It reconunended, therefore, that "the German labor 
people in Great Britain" should be brought into this organization, 
which was not in the interest of the ambitious GLD. The Department 
thought that "it might even be possible to bring about cooperation 
between this group and the German Free Movement in Moscow". 49 Thus, 
the goals of the State Department ran exactly counter to those of the 
GLD. The latter was better off giving up its conference plans. 
Stampfer had told the Sopade from the beginning that he did not believe 
in the realization of these "very ambitious congress projects". In re-
lation to the financial situation of the GLD, they appeared "nearly 
II h • so grotesque to ~m. But the failure of these plans could not easily 
be foreseen. Stampfer usually tried to sit on both chairs. 
Without official recognition and without the necessary harmony 
and sense of purpose within itself, the GLD sombered through the last 
two years of the war tvhich \vere important for reconstructive planning. 
A year later, Seger tried again to win government approval of an 
inunigrant rather than an emigrant project. In September 1944, he pro-
posed to Secretary of State Cordell Hull an Advisory Conunittee of former 
Germans. It would reconunend administrative measures to the American 
occupation authorities. He believed that the latter needed such assist-
48Department of State to American Embassy in London, 9 September 
1943, National Archives, State Department central files. 
49 H. Freeman Matthews to Berle, 7 September 1943, Institut fUr 
Zeitgeschichte, vol. Fb 22S, p. 67. 
so Stampfer to Sopade, 21 October 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr.lS8, 
p. 63S. 
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ance and "'auld best get it from naturalized Americans like himself. 
His advice would be free from self-interest. He would no longer run 
the risk of being considered a Quisling by the German people, a worry 
which dominated most emigrant plans usually as a way of dealing with 
the American government. Seger and other naturalized emigrants would 
be mediators between the German people and the American government by 
explaining the measures of the military government to the German people 
and reporting back its reaction. They would also assist in de-Nazifica-
tion, that is, they would recommend the proper perronnel for the initial 
1 1 d . . . 51 oca a m~n1strat1ons. This proposal was very modest compared to 
former GLD ambitions. Seger was more interested in his own postwar 
political career in this country than in the GLD. He eventually became 
an adviser in the Nuremberg trials but his project as a whole was not 
accepted py the State Department. 
With the failure of the plan for an international Social Demo-
cratic conference, the relationship between the GLD and the Sopade 
became dormant again. In May 1944, Ollenhauer remonstrated with Katz 
for not having received a letter since the beginning of the year, nor 
any information about the new Council for a Democratic Germany,which 
52 
will be discussed in the last chapter. The financial hopes of the 
Sopade were also disappointed. The GLD was unable and unwilling to 
mediate assistance for the Sopade. The latter had received its last 
51 Seger to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 11 September 1944, 
memorandum, Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, val. Fb 225, pp. 84-87. 
52 Ollenhauer to Katz, 18 May 1944, EK Mappe 83. 
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contribution from the JLC in May 1943. It had consisted of $500 as the 
second part of an allocation of $1,000 for 1942. This state of affairs 
was also due to JLC disinterest in the GLD. In addition, the JLC did 
not want to interfere in the affairs of the English Labor Party which 
had limited itself to supporting only one Sopade executive under pres-
sure from its strong Vansittartist wing. During the first war years, 
the GLD had remained aloof from the Sopade and from the socialist emi-
grant groups in America in the hope of attaining a dominant position 
with the help of the American labor movement and the American govern-
ment. During the last two war years it was no longer possible to 
rationalize the complete isolation of the GLD. 
The GLD could not resolve its ideological differences which be-
deviled its plans for reconstru.ction. This state of affairs had 
already become apparent in the speeches and resolutions of the National 
Convention which held both the revolutionist and the gradualist approach. 
The former was intended to cut the Gordian knot with a political revolu-
tion on whose liberal content there was an alleged popular consensus. 
The latter conceded that a socialist republic needed much time for pre-
paration so that there would first have to be a military defeat and a 
total occupation of Germany. The former approach was conceived in 
terms of the revolutionary situation after the First World War which 
had not been due to the planning of the SPD. It had 'come' as the 
result of a popular state of mind. Supposedly, a repetition of this 
situation was nearly inevitable so that it was not so difficult to 
prove the existence of "the other Germany" and its readiness for a 
second republic. The general resolution of the National Convention 
362 
expressed emigrant solidarity with the European underground movement and 
hope for its early success before dealing with the United Nations and 
their victory which was also desirable. 53 The conference resolution 
on the future governmental structure of Germany stated that "the con-
ference would welcome the outbr~ak of the revolution". This would 
demonstrate the German will of liberation "which the world could not 
54 
refuse to respect". 
Especially Stampfer and Aufhauser maintained the illusion of 
the revolutionary potential of the German workers. It could lead to 
a popular outburst as in 1918. Stampfer believed that "only a Social 
Democratic revolution can save the German people". He considered it 
"dangerously _wrong to say today already that [the revolution] will not 
come". That would be arrogant. Stampfer returned the charge of illu-
sion by calling "the belief that things could go back to normal after 
such a war without a revolution, an illusion, the saddest of.them 
all". He maintained that the revolutionary soul of the German labor 
movement still existed despite the destruction of its organizational 
forms by Hitler. But the German workers needed Allied help. In its 
way stood the growing Vansittartism which had even taken hold of the 
British Labor Party. The latter's conference of June 1943, one month 
before the National Convention, had adopted an anti-German resolution 
53Resolution der Landeskonferenz deutschsprachiger Sozial-
demokraten und Gewerkschaftler in den USA "zur politischen Lage'', 
4 July 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 149, p. 608. 
54Resolution zum kunftigen Staatsaufbau Deutschlands, Sozial-
demokratische Landeskonferenz in New York, July 1943, Sammlung Kurt 
Glaser, Institut fu'r Zeitgeschichte, vol. I, pp. 83, 84. 
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which Stampfer had denounced furiously. He claimed that international 
socialist solidarity with the German workers had always had positive, 
if not definitive, results. The Second International helped build the 
League of Nations and secured German admission to the latter, as well 
as German reconciliation with France at Locarno. It had "dissolved, 
one after the other, the strong fetters of Versailles". A reorganized 
international would do even better after the Second World War. It was 
the only hope for world peace. It would be disastrous if ''the blind 
nationalism which has succeeded in entering certain sections of the 
International" would interfere in a second German revolution in the 
55 
way the communists interfered in the first one. 
The viewpoints of Katz and Grzesinsky also fit into the picture 
of a liberal German people with a revolutionary consciousness that 
would not need any specific leadership, not even that of the under-
ground movement. In his correspondence, Katz liked to use the phrase 
of "the so-called German underground movement". If the latter did not 
amount to anything, its socialist and possibly pro-communist cadres 
could do no harm. Grzesinsky implied that the German workers would be 
more revolutionary if the Allies would commission the emigrants to 
enlighten them. He believed that the German people knew nothing 
about the National Socialist atrocities or about the attitude of the 
world towards Germany. It thought it was fighting a defensive war. 
Yet, Grzesinsky was convinced that "the great mass of the German 
people, especially the formerly organized workers, oppose the war and 
55 Rede Stampfer's: "Der Wiederaufbau der Arbeiter- Internation-
ale", 4 July 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 148, pp. 603-607. 
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the Nazi regime". But the National Socialist terror contained any oppo-
sition, down into the production cells of the armament industry. Never-
theless, he still hoped that "a revolutionary wave would arise from the 
people and sweep away the Nazi regime" 56 In its resolution addressed 
to the German people, the National Convention insisted that a military 
defeat was inevitable and called on the amorphous m~sses to "shake 
[Hitler] off! Liberate yourselves! You only need to have the will 
57 
and you can shake off the Gestapo''. Many Social Democratic emigrants 
hoped that the German situation would turn into a revolution "before a 
soldier of the Allied powers stepped on German soil". They expected a 
combination of circumstances like military defeats, war weariness, 
psychological warfare and positive war aims such as the territorial 
integrity of Germany, to facilitate such a development. Then, the 
emigrants hoped that the Allies would stop their military advance and 
await the outcome of the German revolution. After that, they could 
58 
offer "formal peace treaties" to a new German government. This 
would have duplicated the events of 1918. 
In the conflict between high expectations and actual develop-
ments, the Social Democratic attitude towards the Western Allies became 
uncertain. The GLD emigrants were generally happy with Allied military 
56Albert Grzesinsky: Die staatliche Neugestaltung Deutschlands, 
3 July 1943, Sammlung Glaser, Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, vol. I, 
pp. 105, 107, 112. 
57Resolution XII: An das Deutsche Volk, Landeskonferenz, July 
1943, Sammlung Glaser, vol. I, p. 102. 
58 R 1 . k"" f . S fb hl d 4 1 eso ut~on zum un tlgen taatsau au Deutsc an s, Ju y 
1943, Landeskonferenz, Sammlung Glaser, vol. I, p. 83. 
progress. They hoped that it would demoralize the National Socialist 
regime and disinhibit German discontent. In January 1943, the NVZ 
11\vholeheartedly" welcomed the decision of unconditional surrender of 
the Casablanca Conference. The latter ruled out a deal with National 
Socialist Germany an·d contained "a definitive Allied plan of offen-
sive", that is, a second front in the West. 59 Katz also approved air 
warfare. He welcomed the efficiency of Allied bombing which would 
365 
destroy one industrial German town per mission, out of about fifty major 
towns. He realized that the bombs would not only hit factories but 
"innumerable houses vJith all their belongings [sic]". He approved of 
"this unavoidable side effect" which would bring about "a greater 
demoralization of the German social body" than mere industrial bomb-
ing.60 Stampfer thought that psychological warfare would be more than 
b . f b b. 61 a su st~tute or om ~ng. The NVZ criticized the decisions of Casa-
blanca for their silence on political and psychological warfare. In 
February 1943, Katz deplored the Allied tendency toward a national war 
instead of a war of liberation which would also benefit "the enslaved 
part of the German people". He considered "the collective hate 
against the enemy nations" as "a partial victory for Hitler". He had 
hoped for "something different" but he still had not given up on Wash-
62 ington and London. 
59Neue Volkszeitung, 30 January 1943, p. 4. 
60 Ibid., 29 May 1943, p. 4,and 12 June 1943, p. 4. 
61 Ibid., 11 March 1944, p. 1. 
62 Neue Volkszeitung, 20 February 1943, p. 4. 
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Similar fears had surfaced during the National Convention. In 
its general resolution, the latter raised its "voice against any poten-
tial attempt to contain this movement", that is, the revolutionary 
63 
movement in Germany. Grzesinsky hoped that "the strong plutocratic 
circles of the democracies of the world will not tie the arms of the 
German people". The Social Democrats had been moderate in the revolu-
tion of 1918. They could have instituted "the dictatorship of the pro-
letariate" but had preferred a democratic republic. With Allied help 
instead of obstruction, the first republic could have endured. The 
vies tern Allies had another chance. They should prepare for entering 
into contact with the "democratic opposition" in Germany and offer 
clear war aims. The United Nations should apply the Atlantic Charter 
to Germany without equivocation. 64 The Social" Democratic emigrants 
did anything but admit their own historical mistakes. 
The National Convention also planned for reconstruction in case 
of a total occupation of Germany. The resolutions considered this 
possibility only reluctantly in second place. But many of the plans 
were made for that eventuality. In the case of the latter, they pro-
posed that "the German people be again given the opportunity for a 
democratic development", more precisely, the German labor movement 
63Resolution der Landeskonferenz "zur politischen' Lage", 
4 July 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 149, p. 609. 
64Grzesinsky, Die staatliche Neugestaltung Deutschlands, die 
neue Reichsverfassung, 4 July 1943, Sammlung Glaser, vol. I, p. 127; 
also: ibid., Die staatliche Neugestaltung Deutschlands, pp. 104, 
108-111. 
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beside _a small democratic bourgeoisie, that exceptional part which had 
not compromised itself during the Third Reich. 65 Even without a 
revolution, the German labor movement had, in the opinion of the GLD 
planners, the resources for building a second republic. The Social 
Democratic Party and the unions would rebuild themselves fast from the 
local to the national level. In the past, the German labor movement 
had been "the only popular movement" that had supported democracy and 
the republic. They would again be "the pioneers of democracy in the 
state and in the economy". Aufhauser asserted that "the collectivism 
of the German workers" had survived, despite Hitler and Rimmler, in 
the productive units of the factories. There, the workers maintained 
their "community of destiny". On this basis, the postwar unions could 
be reconstructed without delay. With their practice in self-government 
and self-help, the workers would ''prepare the foundation of the future 
66 democracy". The Allies should not interfere in this development. 
Their occupation authorities should only be accorded secondary 
functions. 
After the SPD and the unions, the civil administration could be 
rebuilt on all levels so that a central administration could be formed 
in a short time. It ~vould perform the task of disestablishing the 
National Socialist administration without Allied help. Grzesinsky was 
especially explicit in his demands for purging the civil service on all 
65 Resolution der Landeskonferenz "zur politischen Lage", 4 July 
1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 149, p. 608. 
66Resolution zur Gewerkschaftsfrage, 4 July 1943, Sammlung 
Glaser, vol. I, pp. 90, 91. 
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levels. He also proposed special local courts for the trial of National 
Socialist criminals. In the face of the National Socialist extermina-
tion policy, his idea of the death penalty for crimes like severe 
h • 1 • II • h h d b • II d d • 67 p ys~ca m~streatment w~t a ar o Ject soun e na~ve. The central 
administration would cover all of Germany. The Social Democratic plans 
expected the same concessions from the Russians as from the ~Iestern 
Allies. 
The other major task of the central administration would be the 
economic reconstruction of Germany. This administration would assume 
control of heavy industry, the chemical and electro-technical industry, 
the large banks and the large estates. This would be the special econ-
omic contribution of the second republic to a saf,er system. It would 
preclude the recurrence of a rise of reactionary forces with the help 
of monopoly capitalism. It would emphasize the production of consumer 
goods. Together with a policy of international economic cooperation, 
this would lay the economic basis for a peaceful Germany. A policy of 
"public works of a gigantic order" would help to bring about permanent 
full employment which would leave no appeal to potential reactionary 
68 groups. 
The National Convention had an interesting approach to emergency 
provisions. Resolution VIII expressed the fear of "civil war-like cir-
cumstances" and of "anarchy" in Germany if a revolution did not mater-
67Grzesinsky, Die staatliche Neugestaltung Deutschlands, Ein-
heitliche Besatzungsmethoden unter den Allierten, 4 July 1943, Sammlung 
Glaser, vol. I, p. 120. 
68Resolution zum Wiederaufbau der Wirtschaft, 4 July 1943, 
Sammlung Glaser, vol. I, pp. 88, 89. 
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ialize. The term of 11 anarchy" circumscribed the old Social Democratic 
fear of communism in case of severe economic distress. The resolution 
recommended "social security" as the best antidote. 69 For this purpose, 
the United States was expected to provide "the necessary food and 
clothing". For the implementation of this aid program, resolution XI 
offered the reorganization of the Konsum-Cooperatives. They could be 
an effective vehicle for the proper distribution of food and clothing. 70 
Not even in this area of material dependency, were the Social Democratic 
emigrants willing to cede much control to the occupation forces. 
They were especially sensitive on the question of educational 
reconstruction. Resolution III denied that the doctrine of National 
Socialism had had a devastating influence on the German people. It had 
only conquered "the mass of the party and of certain age groups". 
Grzesinsky hinted that the young adults would be one of these groups 
when he proposed to raise the voting age to twenty-five years. Yet, 
the convinced National Socialists of the 1920's and 1930's were, by 
then, between thirty-five and fifty years old. According to the re-
solution, not even the groups of the civil servants, the estate owners, 
the officers, and the capitalists were National Socialist-minded. They 
had only followed their own social interests. Under these circumstances, 
the task of reeducation did not require foreign intervention. It could 
only be "the job of the democratic Germans themselves, that is, essen-
69Resolution betreffend Massnahmen zur Bekampfung von Anarchie 
und Hunger, 4 July 1943, Sammlung Glaser, vol. I, pp. 94, 95. 
7 0 R 1 . T.T. d . . f . G 1 h f 4 J 1 eso ut1on zur w1e ererr1c~tung re1er ewerKsc a ten, u y 
1943, Sammlung Glaser, vol. I, p. 100. 
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tially of the workers". The Allies should impose neither a high com-
missioner of education nor foreign teachers on the German schools. The 
emigrants also rejected "the importation of finished textbooks of demo-
cratic indoctrination". In a reference to the moral failure of the 
academic class, the resolution proposed "a severe restriction-of the 
higher schools and of the universities ... but the full maintenance of 
the Volksschulen (Public Grade Schools)". The universities would only 
be expanded after the children of the working class received equal 
71 
access to them. 
To the Social Democratic solution of the German problem corre-
sponded the internationalist solution of the European problem. The 
Social Democratic emigrants expected the rise of Social Democratic 
systems in other European countrieso A European federation would safe-
guard the democratic participation of Germany in the new order. A new 
labor international would also be helpful. Any other solution than 
72 their own would lead to a third world war. The emigrants used this 
argument frequently in order to impress their program on the American 
government. But the National Convention was unrealistic in its expec-
tation that the Allies would content themselves with a secondary role 
after their victory and that either the American or the Russian govern-
ment would favor a Social Democratic solution of the German or the 
European problem. The later Social Democratic plans for reconstruction 
71Resolution zur Erziehungsfrage, 4 July 1943, Sammlung Glaser, 
vol. I, pp. 85-87. 
7 2R 1 . . d fb d b . . 1 S eso ut1.on zum W1.e erau au er Ar e1.ter-Internat1.ona e, amm-
lung Glaser, vol. I, pp. 92, 93. 
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were less rather than more flexible. 
The memorandum which the GLD delegation handed to the Assistant 
Secretary of State after the National Convention offered both approach-
es to reconstruction without transition. The delegates told Berle that 
"the Nazis in Germany are today a minority". The anti-Hitler opposi-
tion included "all strata of the population" but "the industrial work-
ers 11 constituted "the most active and powerful forces". They were 
engaged in "a single common effort against Nazism". Even without their 
organizations, "their spiritual fellowship 11 lived on. They were ready 
to take "direct action" against the Hitler regime in accordance with 
military developments. Information and encouragement from abroad could 
prepare them "for the day of the great decision". For this purpose, 
the American government and the United Nations should establish "demo-
cratic war and peace aims", mainly by reaffirming and clarifying the 
Atlantic Charter. 73 
Then followed the statement that ten years of Hitler dictator-
ship and terror destroyed the German democratic organizations. They 
had to rebuild ''from the bottom up''. The GLD delegates recommended to 
Berle the reestablishment of the former self-governing local authori-
ties and of the local trade union organizations ''immediately after the 
defeat of Hitlerism''· They were tuned in enough to the sensitivities 
of the Assistant Secretary, not to mention the Social Democratic Party 
specifically. They claimed that the labor unions would not compete for 
73 fh.. 1 4 Au auser, Brauer, Katz to Ber e, 30 August 19 3, Institut 
fur Zeitgeschichte, vol. Fb 225, pp. 60-63. 
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influence with other democratic groups like the Protestant or Catholic 
Churches. The implication was that the latter would be needed in a 
Great Coalition against communism. In this line, the GLD memorandum 
omitted the other German socialist emigrant groups in the United States. 
It also deplored that the German workers had to "endure day and night" 
the radio propaganda of Moscow in addition to that of Gobbels. It 
assured Berle, ~vhose Department was sensitive to the alliance with 
Russia, that the NKFD in Moscow found "no response whatsoever" among 
the German workers who were interested in a democratic solution of the 
74 German problem. 
The GLD memorandum on the prospective conferences were less 
explicit about either approach. The conferences would be "an effective 
way of organizing the Democratic forces within Germany to cooperate 
successfully with the democratic forces of the United States". The 
Council of Free Democratic Germans would have the responsibility of 
"communicating with the German people, thereby expediting the downfall 
of the Nazi regime" 75 
The controversy over the two approaches continued for the re-
mainder of 1943. It was carried on by both sides in the form of 
editorials in the NVZ in a rare exhibition of democratic debate. The 
advocates of the first approach consisted mainly of the editors of the 
NVZ: Stampfer, Katz, and Seger, including Aufhauser, Fritz Karsen and 
others. To the proponents of the second approach belonged Frankel, 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
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Wickel, Hamburger, Marek, and Tejessy. Braunthal tried to conciliate 
between the two sides. According to Frankel, the reconstruction of 
the German labor movement had to precede that of the second republic. 
But it would take a while until which time the republic should be post-
poned. German labor was too "disorganized" and "disillusioned" to 
attempt a revolution. He hoped that there would be no such attempt 
which could only fail and demoralize German labor more completely than 
it already was. The latter should be rebuilt "from below" under the 
settled circumstances of an Allied Military Government. The Social 
Democratic emigrants had the obligation of winning the American govern-
ment over to such a pro-labor policy as "the only guarantee of a peace-
76 ful German development". They should demonstrate to Washington the 
democratic·development of Germany in historical perspective. American 
democracy had developed before the industrial age. The first German 
republic had depended largely on the support of labor. A memorandum of 
the AFL also pointed out these differences in an attempt to convince 
the American government of the importance of German labor for postwar 
d . . 77 emocrat~c reconstruct~on. Tejessy agreed with the strategy of re-
building from below. He considered the German underground movement as 
. 78 
too weak for a revolution. Marek pointed out the difference between 
the First and the Second World War. In 1918, the German labor organi-
zations had remained intact to replace the imperial system. After the 
76Neue Volkszeitung, 18 September 1943, p. 7. 
77 Ibid., 25 September 1943, p. 1. 
78
rbid., 16 October 1943, p. 5. 
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Second World War, there would be "an unprecedented anarchy" which would 
preclude a repetition of 1918. 79 This group was mainly interested in 
the social or socialist aspects of reconstruction which would require 
planning and preparation. It also conceded that the Western Allies 
could not unilaterally determine postwar policy in Germany. 
Katz was not interested in a social revolution which was "im-
probable" and "unnecessary" for the limited socialization of Social 
Democratic reconstruction. The latter involved only a fe>-7 thousand 
families in a population of seventy million. He thought that "a normal 
democratic regime" could effect this change. He rejected the fear that 
a victorious Soviet Union would have a controlling influence in postwar 
Germany. He believed that the only way to prevent that was a political 
revolution which would ~ake place automatically. He regarded the ap-
proach of Frankel as the product of "a defeated mind". Katz was indig-
nant about the argument that 1918 could not be repeated because the 
German labor movement was destroyed by Hitler. He considered this 
state of affairs as negligible because it was easily repairable. He 
thought that Frankel could not find "the proper proportion for the 
defeat of the German workers since 1933". His antagonist had a "com-
plex of destructedness". In the view of Katz, "an interruption of ten 
years [was] , historically speaking, relatively short". He claimed 
that "the political conviction" of the German workers in their totality 
79 Ibid., 30 October 1943, p. 3. 
had remained ''essentially the same''. They could be reorganized ''in a 
80 few months". 
In this spirit, Katz praised American journalists like Walter 
Lippmann and Dorothy Thompson. The former opposed a total occupation 
and an Allied Military Government for Germany. He recommended to 
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1 1 . d 1 G . lf 81 contra on y strateg~c centers an eave ermany to ~tse . Thompson 
warned that an Allied occupation would prevent a civil war between 
National Socialists and antifascists, and thereby hinder the natural 
development of "a historical process''. Germany could be better super-
vised from her frontiers. 82 This strategy would also keep the Russians 
out of Germany,which was the main interest of the GLD. But the State 
Department did not want to affront the Russians. It also distrusted a 
Social Democratic kind of revolution. 
The GLD Social Democrats could not indefinitely hold out for a 
German revolution. Eventually, Stampfer conceded his error in a curious 
overstatement, 'full of bitterness. In October 1944 he told a meeting of 
the SDF in Chicago that "there is in Germany no power of the workers 
at all. . .. The German workers are nothing but mute slaves". Most of 
them were in the army. The factories which Stampfer had previously 
considered as the cells that preserved the Social democratic tradition 
were "crowded with foreign slave workers". He pointed out that even 
80Ib. d ~ . ' 2 October 1943, p. 1· 
' 
also~ 25 September 1943, p. 3. 
81 b"d I ~ . ' 9 October 1943, p. 4, reporting on an article by 
Walter Lippmann in the New York Herald Tribune of 5 October 1943. 
82Neue Volkszeitung, 16 October 1943, p. 1. 
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the revolution of 1918 took place only after military defeat. 83 In a 
NVZ article, he discussed these "destroyed illusions". He conceded 
that "the revolution which was necessary to save Germany and which is 
still necessary if Germany is ever to have another chance of recovery, 
did not take place". As a consequence of this failure, "the Allied 
camp [advocated] the recipes ... of the old nationalist and imperialist 
1 . , II 84 power po ~t~cs . 
Katz could not admit his error directly. For a long time he 
was at no loss for apologies. He claimed that "popular movements 
against a modern despotic regime can only become visible at the moment 
of its demise". He compared this situation to the pressure of vapor 
that becomes apparent only wheri the boiler explodes. Accordingly, he 
still considered all c~iticism about the absence of signs for a German 
85 
revolution as "superficial and, in nucleo, wrong". He blamed the 
absence of Allied war aims and of psychological warfare for the delay 
of the predicted explosion and pointed out the dilemma of the anti-
fascists in Germany. Every German was partially loyal to his govern-
ment and vacillated between loyalty and rejection, opposition and 
rebellion. As a result, "this majority. of the inner-German antifascists 
upholds by and large ... the line desired by Hitler. [I~ plays auto-
matically the game of the Nazis". 86 This kind of rationalization was 
83Rede Stampfers vor der Social Democratic Federation in Chicago, 
29 October 1944, Matthias and Link, Nr. 170, p. 671. 
84Neue Volkszeitung, 2 September 1944, p. 1. 
85 Ibid., 29 January 1944, p. 4. 
86 Ibid., 25 December 1943, p. 4. 
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not unusual for Katz. He raved about the revolutionary German masses 
and welcomed the bombing of the German cities where they lived. He 
blamed the Allies for the absence of a German revolution. They did not 
do enough to convert the undecided Germans so that they were justly 
punished by "an unbroken German fighting spirit". In February 1945, 
he predicted that the end of Hitler would come "in October 1945 rather 
than in July . . . or in April". If the Allies wanted a quicker end, 
they would have to rely on "the rest of the German people .... from 
that corner could start any day the collapse of the whole Hitler 
87 
structure". Yet, in his postwar memoirs, Katz claimed that the emi-
grants had "no illusions about how slim ... the chances were for an 
88 
overthrow attempt". 
With the National Convention, the GLD finalized its attitude 
towards the other socialist emigrant groups. It maintained its compre-
hensive claim of representing the whole German labor movement, including 
the unions. This was crucial because its main American sponsorship was 
union based. The latter consisted of the JLC and the AFL. But this 
arrangement was challenged in the summer of 1944 by the attempt of 
Aufhauser and Hertz of organizing a German Trade Union Delegation (GTUD) 
in collaboration with the International Federation of Trade Unions, of 
which the AFL was a member. The latter was not satisfied with the GLD 
which cared even less about unionist emigrants than it did about Social 
Democratic emigrants. Towards the end of the war, it made plans for 
87Ibid., 14 October 1944, p. 4. 
88Katz, Memoiren, Nachlass Stampfer, part I, section 9, Nr. 442. 
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the reconstruction of the European trade union movement. It became 
interested in a separate German trade union representation in the United 
States and initiated its formation. 
The general secretary of the IFTU, Schevenels, acted in collu-
sian with Hans Gottfurcht,who had formed the Landesgruppe deutscher 
Gewerkschafter in Gross Britannien (exile group of German trade union-
ists in Great Britain). Its office was in the building of the IFTU in 
London. Gottfurcht was not on the best terms with the only other emi-
grant unionist group, the Landesgruppe deutscher Gewerkschafter (exile 
group of German trade unionists) in Sweden, under Fritz Tarnow Hho was 
also the president of the Exile Committee of the German Trade Unions 
and a former vice president of the General German Trade Union Federa-
tion. With a cooperative exile group in America, Gottfurcht could 
represent the German unionist emigration better with the IFTU which in 
turn would have a bigger voice in the reconstruction of the German 
unions. Gottfurcht approached Schevenels in March 1944 about the for-
89 
mation of a German Trade Union Delegation in the United States. Later, 
Schevenels attended a conference of the International Labor Office, a 
League of Nations adjunct, in Philadelphia. There he met with Auf-
hauser, Hertz, and a few other unionist emigrants. He commissioned 
them to organize a trade union committee as a liaison body between the 
IFTU and the American union federations, especially with the AFL. 90 
89 Hans Gottfurcht to Katz, 30 October 1944, Nachlass Plettl, 
Archiv des Deutschen Gewerkschaftbundes. 
90 .. Aufhauser to Werter Kollege, 15 September 1944, Nachlass 
Plettl. 
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Despite his promise of also visiting the GLD in New York, he made the 
mistake of ignoring the Social Democratic committee. It was safe to 
91 
work with Aufh"auser who figured as "the man of Gottfurcht" and with 
whom the conservative Tarnow had refused to cooperate in the late 
1930's. The latter was not well informed about the plans for a GTUD 
in the United States. He had to be updated by Ollenhauer. 92 
After their meeting with Schevenels, Aufhauser and Hertz organ-
93 ized a preliminary meeting of prospective members on 25 June 1944. 
Gottfurcht and Schevenels expressed their strong support of these 
efforts: The latter agreed with the composition of the GTUD and 
''strongly advised that your committee should be set up immediately as 
an advisory committee to the International Federation of Trade Unions 
and to the American trade union organizations in view of solving .our 
mutual problem of the reconstruction of free trade unions in Germany". 
He also enjoined the prospective GTUD repeatedly "to collaborate close-
94 ly and permanently" with the exile group of Gottfurcht. After these 
preliminaries, Aufha~ser and Hertz invited a wider circle of unionists 
to join the GTUD and to voice their opinions in a second meeting on 
September 23 about this new "subsidiary of the IFTU". 95 
91 Ibid., Plettl to Katz, 4 December 1944. 
92 Ollenhauer to Tarnow, 19 February 1945, EK Mappe 83. 
93 .. Aufhauserz Hertz to Schevenels, 15 July 1944, Nachlass Plettl. 
94Ibid., International Federation of Trade Unions, Schevenels 
to Aufhauser, 18 August 1944. 
95 fh"" Au auserz Hertz to Schevenels, 15 July 1944. 
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The GLD took immediate steps to abort the formation of this new 
unionist committee. When it received from Hertz and Aufhauser the list 
of the prospective GTUD members whom it had neglected until then, it 
asked the latter to join the Labor Delegation. Among them were Martin 
Plettl, Paul Levi, and Willi Snell. Plettl was amazed about the change 
in the GLD attitude towards "unionists and out of town people not 
wanted". But he made clear his strict anti-communism and his opposi-
tion to Aufhauser, which made him accept the invitation of the GLD. He 
expected Schevenels to understand why "I and all my well known German 
unionist friends do not want to collaborate with Aufhauser". The latter 
was "an ingrained opportunist" and separatist who had organized the 
Independent White Collar Workers' Federation in the Weimar Republic,and 
prevented the ADGB from becoming the comprehensive German union federa-
tion. In the Czechoslovakian emigration, he had opposed the Sopade 
. 96 
with his group of the Revolutionary Socialists of Germany. He had 
not been wanted in the GEADE. Plettl expected "the fellow traveler of 
today" to become "the communist of tomorrow" if "the present chances of 
Stalin" last, that is, a Morgenthau policy which would lead inevitably 
97 to the Bolshevization of Germany. The attitude of Levi and Snell 
towards the GTUD was moderate. 
The GLD also wanted Ollenhauer to oppose the GTUD and to put 
pressure on Gottfurcht and Schevenels. But the Sopade did not want a 
conflict with the IFTU and with the German unionist group in England. 
96Plettl to Schevenels, 4 December 1944, Nachlass Plettl. 
97 Ibid., Plettl to Katz, 16 November 1944. 
98 Ollenhauer considered "a purely negative attitude not as useful". 
The Sopade itself coexisted with a separate union representation. In 
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the United States, also, such a group could do "useful work". It would 
be "appropriate that the members of our GLD join the [unionist] 
representation". Ollenhauer hoped that the GLD would establish "good 
friendly and neighbourly relations from the beginning" even though the 
GLD would have to readjust its identity. He considered this advice to 
be in the interests of postwar reconstruction and of the,need for a 
consensus between unionists and Social Democrats. 99 
The GLD complained that the Sopade did not understand the 
emigrant situation in America. There was "no indication whatsoever why 
the German Labor Delegation should not be considered as the representa-
tive of the old free German Labor Movement in USA, either by the AFL 
or by the IFTUH. 100 The GTUD was organized by Aufhauser for aims that 
were "strictly personal". He had left the GLD for the Council for a 
Democratic Germany where he was a member of the executive committee and 
chairman of the labor subcommittee. The formation of the GTUD was his 
f . . AFL . . f h .1 101 way o w~nn~ng recogn~t~on or t e Counc~ . This had to be done 
surreptitiously because the AFL was anticommunist. But it was clear 
that Aufhauser pursued a United Front policy and was 11 apparently 
98 Ollenhauer to Stampfer, 17 August 1944, Nachlass Stampfer, 
part II, section 18, Nr. 89. 
99 Ollenhauer to Katz, 17 August 1944, EK Mappe 83. 
100 Katz to Ollenhauer, 16 September 1944, EK Mappe 61. 
101Katz to Gottfurcht, Ollenhauer, 5 October 1944, EK Mappe 44; 
also: Stampfer to Sopade, 14 October 1944, Matthias and Link, Nr. 169, 
pp. 668, 669. 
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selected by the Moscowites to become the successor of Rosenfeld in the 
United States 11 • 102 He made this "competitive maneuver" only "in order 
to shine in the Tillich Committee [CDG] as chairman of the unionist 
103 group". In the end, "the whole thing ... seems to be invented by 
104 Tillich and Hagen". The Council was the prime target of the GLD. 
According to Katz, the latter objected only to cooperation with commun-
ists. If Aufhauser left the CDG the GLD would cooperate with his 
. . 105 un~on~st group. 
Other arguments were equally contradictory. Katz argued that 
the GTUD was a political rather than a unionist committee. It brought 
together Social Democratic emigrants with members of the splinter 
groups. In this capacity, it was unnecessary because there was already 
the Council for the Underground Labor Movement in the Axis dominated 
countries of Europe. This was the already discussed AFL advisory group 
whose German contingent comprised emigrants like Brauer for the GLD, 
Hertz for NB, Hans Hacke for the SAP, and Eva Lewinski for the ISK. 106 
Yet, Katz had denied previously that this group had any political sig-
nificance and was anything more than a bureaucratic channel for the 
distribution of promised AFL funds. The GTUD supposedly also jeopar-
102 Katz to Plettl, 18 October 1944, Nachlass Plettl; also; Katz 
to Ollenhauer, 11 November 1944, EK Mappe 61. 
103 Stampfer to Sopade, 14 October 1944, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 169, pp. 668, 669. 
104 Katz to Schevenels, 9 October 1944, Nachlass Plettl. 
105 Ollenhauer to Katz, 16 November 1944, EK Mappe 83. 
106Ibid. 
3$3 
dized the German benefits from a one million dollar AFL fund for postwar 
reconstruction. But Ollenhauer still considered it "more appropriate" 
for the unionist members of the GLD to participate in the GTUD. 107 
Schevenels and Gottfurcht also maintained their support of the 
GTUD. The former insisted that the GTUD was "set up at my request and 
by no means on the initiative of the Council for a Democratic Germany 
or any labor subcommittee". He had demanded that the GTUD be "abso-
lutely non-political" and open to all unionist emigrants. The IFTU had 
"never considered that the German Labor Delegation had any representa-
tive character whatsoever from the trade union point of view". The 
unionist emigration needed a separate American group in preparation for 
unionist reconstruction. The GLD had "never drawn a clear distinction 
between political and trade union representation". 108 This view of 
Schevenels was sound despite his inept handling of the issue. The GLD 
claimed trade union representation only for its own political purposes. 
Gottfurcht was upset about the attitude of Katz who could not be de-
d b 1 . 109 terre y any exp anat~on. 
The GTUD needed the recognition of the AFL which accepted, 
however, the interpretation of the GLD. Matthew Wall, a vice president 
of the AFL and chairman of the AFL committee on international labor 
relations and union reconstruction, settled the issue with Schevenels. 
His examination of the GLD material convinced him that the GTUD was 
107 Ollenhauer to Stampfer, 5 December 1944, EK Mappe 83. 
108 Schevenels to GLD, 24 October 1944, Nachlass Plettl. 
109Gottfurcht to Katz, GLD, 30 October 1944, EK Mappe 45. 
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planned as "a communist front subsidiary to the Council for a Democratic 
Germany, a Popular Front organization ... corresponding to the Committee 
for a Democratic Germany set up in Moscow [the National Committee for a 
Free Germany]". He believed that the GTUD was "set up solely for the 
purpose of facilitating [the] capture by the Communist Party" of the 
postwar trade union movement in Germany. He told Schevenels that the 
AFL endorsement of the GLD was still valid and urged him to withdraw 
his endorsement of "the proposed Aufhauser delegation". 110 When the 
efforts of the GLD and the AFL deterred a certain number of prospective 
members from joining the GTUD, Schevenels defined this as 11 a serious 
setback". Yet, Sollmann, for example, was willing to join the GTUD 
under the condition that it had nothing to do with the CDG. 111 Snell 
had joined the GLD but urged the latter to. cooperate with the GTUD. 
Schevenels attempted to change the minds of the reluctant unionists. 
They were to receive copies of his correspondence which separated the 
GTUD from the CDG. Aufhauser and Hertz carried out this assignrnent, 112 
which Katz cons ide red only as a "face saving" device. In the face of 
AFL opposition, Schevenels admitted that he could do no more than 
"register that, for the time being, it is impossible to have such a 
German representation in the USA". 113 Katz felt reassured. According 
110 Matthew Wall, AFL to Schevenels, 9 November 1944, Nachlass 
Plettl. 
111 Sollmann to Ollenhauer, 11 October 1944, EK Mappe 122. 
112 f .. Au hauser, Hertz to Werter Kollege, 12 January 1945, Nachlass 
Plettl. 
113 Schevenels to GLD, 11 December 1944, Nachlass Plettl. 
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to -him, the support of the IFTU was "for us, relatively worthless". It 
was doubtful whether the latter would survive the war for long. He did 
not believe either that the CIO would later recognize the GTUD. The 
former might even prefer the GLD to the latter. The Labor Delegation, 
itself, still intended to gain CIO recognition. It had temporized only 
in order to protect its relations with the AFL. 114 
After the Conference of Teheran, the isolation of the GLD-grew. 
In a reaction to the conference decisions, the Social Democratic com-
mittee turned its propaganda against the United Nations. Inter-Allied 
negotiations were signs of inter-Allied territorial deals at the 
expense of Germany. The GLD might as well have been suspicious of the 
British and the American government. But with all hope for a German 
revolution gone, the Social Democratic emigrants had to rely exclusively 
on the Western Allies. They chose to ignore rumors about Western plans 
for a decentralization of Germany which had surfaced in early 1943. 
They could not know that, at Teheran, the United States had actually 
submitted a plan for partition which was only shelved because the 
Allies could not agree on any method of partition. In particular, 
Russia disliked it because the industrial centers in whose exploitation 
she wanted to share lay in Western Germany. In its dilemma, the GLD 
preferred to see the territorial questions of Germany only in terms of 
the Russian appetite. At the time of the final battle for Germany, 
it proposed a change in the United Nations alliance. Its attitude 
towards Russia was a mixture of inferiority and superiority feelings. 
114 Katz to Snell, 27 January 1945, Nachlass Plettl. 
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Katz claimed in his memoirs that the Social Democratic emigrants did 
"not consider it inevitable that Moscow had to be conceded such a 
115 
strong influence in the reconstruction of Germany". Stampfer asked 
the editorial question: "Must Germany become Russian?" 116 He answered 
it with the proposal for an Atlantic community. He claimed that there 
was "in Europe from Poland to Portugal, a strong feeling of belonging 
together with [America], becaus~ the awareness of an Atlantic civiliza-
tion is alive, because the only thing which connects these mutually 
antagonistic and resentful nations is the common sympathy for America 
and t.he respect for America". 117 Thus, Western Europe could only derive 
cohesion from a common anticommunism under the aegis of the United 
States. The latter was to be the mediator of "a Europe west of the 
Russian border". In its role of a disinterested and objec·tive referee, 
it could clear up all territorial questions in Europe to the satisfac-
.tion of everybody including Germany.· The latter would be "democratic 
d f 1 . 1 1 . . h w . . 1. . II 118 I an peace u ... ~n c ose re at~on w~t estern c~v~ ~zat~on . n 
the opinion of Stampfer, the Soviet Union needed not be afraid of a 
Western Europe since Russia would remain for a long time the strongest 
military power on the two continents of Europe and Asia. Under these 
circumstances, there was also no need for "a violent confrontation 
llSibid., Nr. 444. 
116N lk . 30 eue Vo sze~tung, December 194~, p. 1. 
117A "k 1 S f rt~ e tamp ers in der NVZ vom 14. August 1943: "America 
muss bereit sein", Matthias and Link, Nr. 154, p. 622. 
118 
Stampfer to Sopade, 9 March 1944, Matthias and Link, Nr. 161, 
p. 643. 
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119 between communists and Social Democrats in Germany". Germany and 
Western Europe would be neither Americanized nor Russified. 120 Yet, 
the postwar world would be global. Stampfer did expect America to 
neutralize Russia in Europe for the benefit of Germany which would 
eventually become,again, the strongest country there. 
In order to be ready for its role of a detached protector of 
Europe, the United States would have to change its attitude towards 
Russia. Stampfer asserted that alliances are only meant to last for a 
certain time and that the end of a war was normally also the time for 
confrontations between the victors. He did not believe that the future 
peace could be founded on a big power alliance. It required "an inter-
national democratic order", that is, the end of the wartime alliance 
with Russia. The latter coul"d be neither a member of a future "demo-
cratic federation of the world" nor of one of the subgroups of "a 
f d f . 121 democratic e eration o Europe". This meant the isolation of· 
Russia from these two anticommunist federations. Some articles of the 
NVZ discussed more moderate solutions of the German problem. They were 
written by outsiders or Americans. Hans von Hentig foresaw a postwar 
world of two superpowers in which Germany would play a minor role 
122 
resembling neutralism of the Swiss type. Dorothy Thompson thought 
119N lk . 2 1945 1 eue Vo sze~tung, June , p. . 
120A 'k 1 S f 14 A 1943 h' d . k rt~ e tamp ers vom . ugust , Matt ~as an L~n , 
Nr. 154, p. 622. 
121 Rede Stampfers vor der SDF in Chicago, 29 October 1944, 
Matthias and Link, Nr. 170, pp. 680-683. 
122N lk · 8 J 1944 1 eue Vo sze~tung, anuary , p. . 
123 that such neutralism could prevent a division of Germany. 
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In their anticipation of a Cold War, some Social Democrats drew 
parallels with the early Western attitude towards Hitler. Stampfer 
claimed that the Western democracies were as soft towards Russia in 
1944 as they had been towards Hitler in 1939. He was afraid that "the 
consequences will not only be the same but much worse11 • Eastern Europe 
would be lost to the Russians who would also nplay the first violin in 
Berlin" in case of an occupation of Germany. The Anglo-Saxons would 
eventually only have the alternatives of retreating from the continent 
or confronting the Soviet Union. There was no sense in an appeasement 
of Russia. If the Western democracies kept shirking their anticommunist 
duties, there might be "no other road for Germany than the road to 
124 Moscow". The warnings by Seger were more timely. He waited until 
June 1945 before emphasizing the growing spread of rumors about a war 
between Russia and the United States. He noted that the State Depart-
ment considered them intense enough to respond with an official denial 
of any such plan. Seger did not fully believe the assurances of the 
liberal Assistant Secretary of State, Archibald McLeish, that a con-
. d A . R . . . d b 125 t~nue mer~can uss~an cooperat~on was not ~n ou t. 
By late 1944 and early 1945, the Social Democratic emigrants 
could no longer ignore the changes in the American attitude and in 
123Ibid., 2 September 1944, p. 1. 
124 Stampfer to Sopade, 30 August 1944, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 165, p. 657. 
125Neue Volkszeitung, 2 June 1945, p. 1. 
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126 American policy towards Germany. They vented their frustration in 
bitter denunciations but they could not come to terms with these devel-
opments because they had no alternative to reliance on the United 
States in their plans for postwar reconstruction. According to Seger, 
the American public had reacted negatively to the Morgenthau Plan in 
the summer of 1943. By the summer of 1945, he acknowledged that a 
large proportion of public opinion approved of a severe treatment of 
Germany. He defined the agreements of Potsdam as 11 a compromise 
between the reconstruct~on of Germany and the policy of retribution 
127 
which a large part of American public opinion demanded". Stampfer 
was stunned by what he called "a mass conversion to Vansittartism". He 
d • h • h II h d b 1• 11 128 note w1t surpr1se t at t e unexpecte ecomes rea 1ty . He reac-
ted very bitterly to this change. When President Hutchinson of the 
University of Chicago, in a graduation speech, termed the German and the 
Japanese people as fully responsible for the war crimes, he wrote about 
"the conquest of the United States by Hitler". 129 The German Americans 
were of no help either. They could be won over neither to the anti-
fascist cause nor to the patriotic cause of German territorial integ-
rity. In the view of Stampfer, "Germany has lost nothing and America 
130 has gained nothing in these people". 
126Ibid., 2 September 1944, p. 
127 Ibid., 11 August 1945, p. 1. 
128Ibid., 2 September 1944, p. 
129 Ibid., 23 June 1945, p. 1. 
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In their state of impotence, some GLD members resorted to 
threats about the disastrous consequences of the wrong postwar policy . 
When Churchill declared in February 1944, that the Atlantic Charter did 
not apply to the enemies of the United Nations, Stampfer predicted that 
no German would accept any annexations. Differences of opinion would 
arise only over the methods of restoring lost territories. These 
methods could be peaceful or violent but the advocates of revenge would 
131 probably win out within "twenty, thirty, fifty years". Stampfer 
thought that there would be only "an interim of exhaustion" which 
132 
would not last very long. A dismemberment of Germany would mean 
"a catastrophy for all mankind. For, if you divide Germany into ten 
pieces you will have,some years later, ten Hitlers instead of one."133 
This nationalist reaction would operate in alliance with the Russian 
Bolshevists. Also, an unfair treatment of Germany might lead directly 
to world domination by Russia. Vogel termed the expression of a German 
nationalist desire for revenge as idiotic. He made concessions to 
emigrants who felt compelled to deal realistically with Russia. He 
hoped that Stampfer and the GLD emigrants would understand if the 
Sopade participated in a general emigrant representation which included 
h li d . 134 cat o cs, protestants, an communLsts. In his opinion, the NVZ did 
131
rbid., 26 February 1944. 
132 Stampfer to Sopade, 30 August 1944, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 165, p. 657. 
133Rede Stampfers vor der SDF in Chicago, 29 October 1944, 
Matthias and Link, Nr. 170, pp. 672, 681. 
134 Vogel to Stampfer, 15 December 1943, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 159, p. 638. 
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not contain everything that he thought about the wide field of Russia 
d . 135 an commun~sm. 
In response to the decisions at Yalta and Potsdam, some GLD 
emigrants became anti-American. Stampfer complained that Germany was 
not only victimized by the territorial imperialism of Russia, but also 
by "the commercial imperialism of America and England", which intended 
1 . . . . . 136 to e ~m~nate German econom~c compet~tLon. He termed the plans for 
the transfer of populations from German Eastern territories as insane 
and blamed the Western Allies for their cooperation. 137 To him, 
Potsdam was "a peace of dictatorship and of dictates", not a democratic, 
138 permanent peace. For Seger, who was then an American citizen, Pots-
dam was "not the realization of the principles for whose vindication we 
carried on the war against fascism and National Socialism". 139 After 
the war, Stampfer proclaimed that Social Democracy would not capitulate 
to the victors of the Second World War. 140 Suddenly, he stopped 
limiting himself to American political terms and remembered his social-
ist vocabulary. In October 1944, Stampfer had already proposed "some 
decisive st~s in the direction of planning and etatism" for the 
Nr. 28. 
135
vogel to Stampfer, Nach1ass Stampfer, part II, section 17, 
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138
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139
rbid. 
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pp. 729, 730. 
392 
European postwar economy. He thought that "it may be the historical 
task of Germany to prove that a system of state ownership and planning 
141 
can be executed without hurting human rights and personal freedom". 
After Potsdam, he claimed more resentfully that "the American stereo-
type of a private economy does not befit a people like the German 
people". The reconstruction of Germany and Europe could, in his opinion, 
"almost only be executed in the Social Democratic spirit". Germany had 
to go "her own way between the American and the Russ ian way!'. 142 
Shortly before his return to Germany in 1948, he philosophized that 
Western civilization predated capitalism and would survive it. He saw 
the Social Democrats as the defenders of this civilization. They would 
"capitulate neither to 'Wall Street' nor to the Kremlin". Against Wall 
Street, they would d~fend "the rights of Europe to be as socialist as it 
d , b • , , 11 143 es~res to e ~n ~ts own ~nterests . Seger and Katz were equally 
disappointed but they were more careful in their public statements. 
The editorial attitudes of the NVZ could not escape official 
notice. At the German Desk of the OWI, Hans Hoffmann was upset about 
the nationalism of the NVZ. He scored the excitement about the possi-
bility of losing "an inch of holy German soil", in the case of his 
memorandum, the city of Eupen on the German Belgian border. When the 
NVZ called its communist detractors the "Moscow Nazis", Hoffmann 
141Rede Stampfers vor der SDF in Chicago, 29 October 1944, 
Matthias and Link, Nr. 170, pp. 681, 682. 
142Neue Volkszeitung, 21 July 1945, p. 1. 
143Artikel Stampfers in der NVZ vom 8.Mai 1948, Matthias and 
Link, Nr. 187, pp. 729, 730. 
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recommended the term of "New York Nazis" for the NVZ emigrants. He 
regretted the concentration on territorial issues by "men with an 
/ originally true socialist and anti-Nazi background". He suggested to 
revoke the NVZ license for the POW camps. The "vicious" propaganda of 
the NVZ would only strengthen the National Socialist mentality of the 
G . 144 erman pr~soners. Hoffmann regretted that the OWI had no legal 
means of stopping NVZ circulation among German Americans. He also 
scored the anti-Russianism of the NVZ which was, in his opinion, par-
tially caused by the territorial losses in the East. He deplored this 
unpatriotic attitude at a time when the Russian armies were needed to 
145 defeat Germany. Otherwise, the government continued to ignore the 
GLD. 
Despfte Social Democratic exasperation, the Easter Declaration 
of the GLD was more realistic. It was the only o£ficial follow-up 
program on ·reconstruction since 1943. The occupation of Germany was 
then already a fact. The Declaration proposed only moderation and 
certain arrangements which were designed to prevent a division of 
Germany. It warned against completely separate zones of occupation 
and recommended unlimited authority for the central Allied control com-
mission with regional interallied control commissions in all parts of 
Germany, including the East. In this way, the Russians would have 
to share any occupational authority and would always be outnumbered. 
144 Hans Hoffmann (OWI) to Achilles N. Sakell, 23 September 1944, 
Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, vol. FB 225, p. 88. 
145 Hoffmann to Sakell, 12 September 1944, IfZ, vol. Fb 225, 
p. 90. 
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This state of affairs should end as soon as possible with the establish-
f G d . 146 ment o a new erman emocrat~c government. The Easter Declaration 
opposed the cession of Eastern or Western territories that had belonged 
to the Weimar Republic without the consent of the populations involved. 
Beyond this primary concern, it dealt with industrial reconstruction 
which was closely related to territorial integrity. It wanted indus-
trial restriction limited to the purpose of ensuring German disarmament 
without eliminating any branch of production like heavy industry. For 
a European recovery, German reparations alone would be insufficient. 
They should be gauged to German economic capacity which would be very 
low for some time to come. They should also be made "for a limited 
time only". The GLD advocated reparations in kind in order to ensure 
German and international financial stability. The GLD opposed expli-
. 1 h d. 1' f f . d h 1 f h. 147 c~t y t e ~smant ~ng o actor~es an t e remova o mac ~nery. 
With its Easter Declaration, the GLD found even less response 
than in 1943. It was completely isolated. With the war nearly over, 
the State Department was even less interested in emigrant groups than 
before. It stated that it was "our policy now to play down these move-
ments and not to get involved in them if we can help it". As a measure 
of GLD weakness, the State Department was only concerned about the sur-
vival of the Social Democratic committee within the socialist emigra-
tion. It noted that the Council for a Democratic Germany held "a 
considerably stronger position than the German Labor Delegation" which 
146
ostern 1945: Erkl~rung der German Labor Delegation, Matthias 
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147 Ibid., p. 692. 
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had refused to join in the emigrant coalition. It considered the GLD 
"at present ... too weak to offer much more than a target for attack". 
It hoped that with sufficient AFL support the GLD could recover and 
become a stronger element in the emigrant discussions on German recon-
. 148 struct~on. 
The sponsor groups of the GLD also withdrew in an atmosphere of 
rising anti-Germanism. The latte·r could not fail to affect the Jewish 
Labor Committee because it was intensified by the revelations about 
the National Socialist extermination camps. The GLD expressed little 
regret over these facts. It resented only the harm which their revela-
tion could do to its theory of "the other Germany". In early 1945, 
the NVZ,including Stampfer who was Jewish, believed that these revela-
tions were mainly propaganda. Hans von Hentig explained that the heaps 
of corpses on the released pictures could be German Christians, victims 
149 
of Allied bombardments or of a typhoid epidemic in occupied Germany. 
Katz resented "the agitation of certain circles" after the discovery 
of the inhumanities in the camps. He reported about "a counter cam-
paign" by the GLD, that is, a declaration by Americans like Varian Fry, 
Oscar Garrison Villard, and Alvin Johnson, against the identification 
150 
of National Socialists and Germans. Katz complained that the GLD 
had "enormous difficulties with the Morgenthau wing of the JLC". But 
148 State Department, memorandum on the relations of the GLD to 
the AFL, 23 May 1944, National Archives, State Department central files. 
149Neue Volkszeitung, 9 June 1945, p. 4. 
150Ibid. 
F 
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he explained that the resentment of the latter was based on '"irration-
151 
al feeling' that will disappear in a few months''. But under the 
circumstances, the JLC was not in a mood of making financial pledges 
to the GLD for the reconstruction of the German labor movement. 
The AFL would rather deal with the postwar German labor move-
ment directly. It was interested in conservative unions but not in a 
Social Democratic party. In the spring of 1944 already, Matthew Woll 
wanted to use the attitude of the State Department as an alibi for 
withholding support from the GLD. For this purpose, he wanted to dis-
cuss GLD aid with the European Affairs Division. The latter understood 
that the AFL had "a lessening inclination to contribute financially to 
the German Labor Delegation". It advised against an involvement in the 
affairs of the GLD,which suited the AFL. 152 
Under these circumstances, the Easter Declaration elicited no 
echo. It was a document for the historical record as Grzesinsky, the 
former GLD chairman, pointed out. He was then associated with the 
Council for a Democratic Germany together with Aufhauser, one of his 
GLD successors. They no longer recognized the GLD as the full Social 
Democratic representation in the United States. The former thought 
that the Easter Declaration could have been a new start if·it had been 
151 Katz to Ollenhauer, 17 November 1945, EK Mappe 61. 
152 State Department, memorandum on the relations of the GLD to 
the AFL, 23 May 1944, National Archives, State Department central 
files. 
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signed "by everybody", that is, by the other socialist and non-socialist 
emigrant groups. 153 Despite its isolation, however, the GLD was not in 
a conciliatory mood. It wanted to say what it had to say whether any-
body would listen or not. 
The Easter Declaration was still based on the GLD interpreta-
tion of the theory of "the other Germany". Thus, it rejected the idea 
of collective responsibility as a justification for punishment in the 
154 form of unfavorable settlements. F. W. Wagner polemicized in the 
NVZ against the suggestion of Marek that Germany serve the penalties 
imposed by the Allies slowly and fully. 155 The best way of defying 
collective notions would be the trial of the National Socialist crim-
inals in special German courts. The GLD fought with all possible 
arguments the threats t9 its solution of the German problem. It still 
wanted a replay of the liberal approach of 1918. Stampfer saw "no 
signs of re-awakening mass movements except of the Social Democrats 
and the communists". He thought that the call of destiny would go 
again to the Social Democrats as in 1918. He hoped that "Social Demo-
cracy will remain the party of the educated elements of the working 
class [sic] .... The nucleus of this new movement will consist of the 
old one who succeeded to survive." He called the Social Democratic 
program of 1818 "our Declaration of Independence, ... our New Deal". 
153Grzesinsky to Stampfer, 15 April 1945, Nachlass Stampfer, 
part I, section 6, Nr. 247. 
154Neue Volkszeitung, 30 October 1943, p. 4. 
155Ibid., 19 March 1945, p. 2; 
,... 
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The end of the latter had not so much been due to Social Democratic 
negligence as to "the recurrent swings of a pendulum that ,.;ent back 
and forth between revolution and reaction since 1789". According to 
this deterministic concept, the revolution of the common man had been 
interrupted with each swing back but had nevertheless come closer to 
final victory. In Germany, that would come after the Second World War. 
The latest reaction under Hitler had left the constitutional framework 
of the first republic intact for the formation of the second and final 
156. 
one. The Weimar constitution would automatically be in effect after 
Hitler, unless the Allies wanted to continue the National Socialist work 
f d . 157 o estruct~on. The Easter Declaration claimed that only a consti-
. 1 b 1 ld h h w . . . 158 tuent nat~ona assem y cou c ange t e e~mar const~tut~on. 
The GLD occupied a strange point in the ideological development 
of the Social Democratic Party. Its ancestors of the Wilhelminian era 
had been considered "vaterlandslose Gesellen11 (unpatriotic fellows). 
Yet, the GLD changed from an antifascist committee into a nationalistic 
159 group which William Shirer, a former supporter, castigated severely. 
It did not foresee that in a conservative Western Germany, the Social 
Democtats would again be regarded as a menace to the state. 
The isolation of the GLD, which the Easter Declaration sympto-
156Rede Stampfers vor der SDF in Chicago, 29 October 1944, 
Matthias and Link, Nr. 170, pp. 673, 675. 
157Artikel Stampfers vom 5. August 1944 in der NVZ: "Vor 25 
Jahren -Weimar", Matthias and Link, Nr. 164, p. 654. 
158Neue Volkszeitung,31 March 1945, p. 1. 
159
rbid., 12 August 1944, p. 2. 
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mized, inhibited also the plan of the Sopade for a reconstruction of the 
party executive (PV) which would supersede the exile executive and also 
play a role in postwar Germany. Like the Declaration, this plan was 
designed for a return to Germany. The old PV would be back in Germany 
before the reconstruction of the SPD. It could be a bond between the 
-nascent Social Democratic Party groups in the four zones of occupation. 
It could also address the German people which was subject to the same 
fragmentation. But the plan of Vogel depended on the circumstances of 
the emigration in the United States. Of the twelve exiled PV members 
seven lived in America, four in England, and one in Sweden. In England, 
only Vogel and Ollenhauer were original members of the Sopade. Heine 
was coopted and Geyer had resigned because of his Vansittartist atti-
tude-. Of th~ seven American members, only Stampfer was with the GLD. 
Rinner and Sollmann were isolated and had become American citizens. 
The remaining four members, Aufhauser, Dietrich, Hertz, and Juchacz 
were united in their disapproval of the GLD which had shut them out 
from the National Convention in 1943 and had not consulted them in the 
formulation of the Easter Declaration. The GLD continued to oppose 
their policy of Socialist concentration to which the Sopade had made 
concessions. It did not want to see these left wing Social Democrats 
in a reconstructed PV which would have more authority than the anemic 
Sopade. Its members wanted to return to Germany on the merits of the 
GLD without other ties. 
Vogel tried to circumvent the crucial problem of the relation-
ship between the PV members in America and the GLD. After some deliber-
ation in the Sopade about the plan, Vogel sounded out Stampfer first in 
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4 h 1 1 b . II 160 December 19 4 on this "somew at ess p easant su Ject . The latter 
was non-commital as usual. Then, Vogel tested the reaction of the PV 
members outside of England with a circular letter. In his presentation, 
he insisted on the legitimacy of the PV mandate of the last Reichs-
konferenz of the SPD in April 1933. As a basis for PV reconstruction, 
he elaborated on the participation of the Sopade in the London Union 
without dealing with the attitude of the GLD. As a basic political 
consensus, he offered the anticommunism of the Sopade: no cooperation 
with communist emigrants and no recognition of the communist Free 
G C . 161 ermany omm~ttees. Vogel made his proposal to some extent for the 
historical record. After its return to Germany, the Sopade could 
report that "we made such an attempt and that it failed because of 
the attitude of the other side". He overcame his fear that some PV 
members might interpret his plan "as a weakness" and took on the "un-
1 II k f • h 162 p easant tas o contact~ng t em. Stampfer finally considered the 
undertaking as "fairly hopeless" which was an inevitable assessment. 163 
It sheds, however, some additional light on the problem of a Socialist 
concentration in the United States and elsewhere. 
160
vogel to Stampfer, 25 December 1944, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 171, p . 684. 
161Rundschreiben Vogels an die Mitglieder des PV: Juchacz,· 
Aufhauser, Dietrich, Hertz, Rinner, Sollmann, Stampfer, Stahl, 16 March 
1945, Matthias and Link, Nr. 172, pp. 687-689. 
162
vogel to Stampfer, 25 December 1944, Matthias and Link, 
Nr. 171, p. 684. 
163 Stampfer to Vogel, 16 January 1945, Nachlass Stampfer, 
part II, section 17, Nr. 28. 
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The independent PV members in America did find a joint approach 
to the proposal by Vogel in the form of a counterproposal which neu-
tralized the tactical advantage of Vogel. For them, the reconstruction 
of the PV was a symbol of the politics of the old movement. They re-
jected the validity of the mandate of 1933 as a relic of this movement. 
The Sl'D Reichskonferenz of 1933 had not intended "to confer such a 
mandate for half a generation" during which the national and the inter-
national situation would change radically. The Second World War was 
not anticipated then. The postwar situation required the unity of the 
socialist movement which the PV could not bring about. According to 
this argument, "a mechanical reconstruction of the old party executive 
would create the impression that "we consider ourselves as the legiti-
mate leadership of a new Social Democratic movement in Germany". 
According to the counter-proposal, the forces of the antifascist resis-
tance would "create a new movement and give it form and content". Even 
if they survived in large numbers, "the forces of the old movement" 
could not by themselves create a new party. Also, the latter would 
originate locally and rise "from below" so that it could not possibly 
be led by a largely emigrant PV. All the emigrants could give was 
" d . d . " 164 a v1ce an ass1stance . 
The alternative plan proposed to further develop the coopera-
tion that was begun with the Union in England, that is, apply it to the 
American situation. The Union should convert itself into the Auslands-
zentrale (center abroad) of the new German socialist movement. In that 
164 
· S h 'b A fh;. . . , d Geme1nsames c re1 en von u auser, D1etr1c, Hertz un 
Juchacz to Vogel, 25 May 1945, Matthias and Link, Nr. 175, pp. 698-700. 
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case, the PV members in America would approve an appeal to the German 
workers. The ideology for such a center would have to be "a renewed 
confession of socialism" based on the revolutionary Sopade manifesto 
of January 1934 and the manifesto of the Union of October 1943. The 
alternative plan advocated the unity of a new German labor movement, 
the concentration of the socialist emigrant groups and a joint approach 
to the German policy of the Allied governments. It demanded that the 
Sopade motivate the GLD to align with such a new center. The GLD should 
1 d . 1 . f . h G . 165 a so rop ~ts c a~m o represent~ng t e erman un~ons. Juchacz 
admitted that she did not think the Sopade capable of changing the mind 
of the GLD. She would also have considered it "disastrous if people 
like Stampfer would significantly influence the political course over 
there". He was one of those Social Democrats who were so absorbed in 
the defense of German national interests that they forgot their social-
. . . 166 ~st m~ss~on. 
The Sopade rejected the counter-proposal. If the mandate of 
1933 was invalid, Vogel could not find the authority for establishing 
. b d 167 a representat~on a roa . This concern with formal authority was a 
drawback of the German socialist emigration. As long as the various 
socialist groups agreed on a joint policy, they needed no further 
authorization. This democratic way would have accomplished more than 
165
rbid. 
166 Juchacz to Vogel, 29 May 1945, EK Mappe 58. 
167 Vogel to Stahl, 17 July 1945, EK Mappe 142; also Vogel to 
Stampfer, 17 July 1945, Matthias and Link, Nr. 177, p. 703. 
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the interpretations of an old mandate. But the controversy over the 
latter recalled the ideological differences in the Weimar SPD which 
also figured in the later debate over the causes of the Social Demo-
cratic defeat at the hands of National Socialism. Neither side wanted 
to make any concessions shortly before a possible vindication by·postwar 
developments. Aufhauser thought that the response of Vogel was "quite 
168 insensible" and did not even merit an answer. Hertz and Juchacz 
169 
agreed. Rinner had not even responded to the first proposal. 
This conflict over a rehabilitation of the party executive 
exemplified again the negative influence of the GLD in the German 
socialist emigration. In its complete isolation, the German Labor 
Delegation achieved nothing in German postwar reconstruction. Some bf 
its members returned to Germany and had significant political careers 
on the basis of their conservative ideology which fit well into the 
era of the Cold War. 
168 .. Aufhauser to Juchacz, 16 July 1945, EK Mappe 58. 
169 Hertz to Juchacz, 24 August 1945, EK Mappe 58. 
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CHAPTER X 
LIBERAL REORGANIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION: THE AMERICAN 
ASSOCIATION FOR A DEMOCRATIC GERMANY AND THE 
COUNCIL FOR A DEMOCRATIC GERMANY 
The American Friends of German Freedom devoted itself most 
vigorously to postwar reconstruction. This was due to its double 
character as an American liberal and an emigrant democratic socialist 
organization. These two elements reinforced and complemented each 
other ideologically. The American liberals in the AFGF had a worldwide 
approach to postwar reconstruction. They revived the old dream that a 
war can be fought to end all wars. Their rationalist plan advocated a 
democratic Western and Central Europe in unison with the United States. 
Its centerpiece was a democratic Germany. A peacetime United Nations 
was to take the sting out of this arrangement for the Soviet Union and 
allow for co-existence between the unequal worlds of liberalism and 
communism. The American liberals in the AFGF believed that this de-
sign would soon win mass support as the only peaceful system possible. 
In order to prepare for this rise in their fortunes, they reorganized 
the American Friends of German Freedom into the American Association 
for a Democratic Germany in May 1944. The former had served the pur-
pose of helping the German underground movement to reestablish German 
freedom by overthrowing Hitler. The latter expressed the change in 
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approach when the Allies were winning the war and were going to shape 
the peace. The AADG was formed to lobby with the American government 
for a rational solution of all postwar problems of which a democratic 
Germany was the major element. The main flaw was the central impor-
tance which Germany played in this plan and the corresponding under-
estimation of the Russian postwar role and of the complications of 
East-West relations. When their rationality could not keep up with 
events the liberals became the most ideologically motivated Cold 
Warriors. They were going to vindicate liberalism by containing the 
Soviet Union. This change of strategy also determined their policy of 
reconstruction in postwar Germany. 
The German arm of the AADG was an emigrant coalition that 
could later resume contacts with democratic forces in Germany. This 
was the Council for a Democratic Germany which lasted from the spring 
of 1944 until early 1946. It included all emigrant groups but its 
communist members were so few that it was not proper to call it a 
Popular Front organization, as all of its contemporary critics did. 
The pragmatic basis of this diverse coalition was the consensus on the 
need for continued East-West relations which alone would make a peaceful 
reconstruction of Germany possible. In this scheme, all emigrant groups 
had a place and a contribution to make. The formation was hastened by 
the appearance of the National Committee for a Free Germany in Moscow. 
If the Western Allies would not sponsor an equivalent emigrant coalition, 
the NKFD might gain an undue influence in German reconstruction. 
Its origin and composition caused the main problems of the CDG. 
Its financial dependence on the AADG tended to limit it to the role of 
407 
an extension of the Association. This state of affairs fit the plans of 
the NB emigrants. But the other groups, especially the Social Demo-
cratic emigrants, resented it. Their unsuccessful attempts at making 
the CDG more independent caused serious friction which put into relief 
the misunderstanding on which the Council was based. ·The other groups 
were handicapped by the circumstance that they were not organized out-
side the CDG like the NB emigrants. They had joined as individuals a 
coalition dominated by the AADG. In the plans for reconstruction which 
the CDG elaborated, the various groups made few concessions. In a mood 
of exalted nationalism, each of them added some of its favorite goals 
to the CDG plans,including religious education in the case of the 
Catholic emigrants. On this basis, the Council was unable and unwill-
ing to face the hard realities of the German defeat and work out~a 
compromise of its divergent interests. The questions of German war 
guilt and of territorial cessions did not exist for the Council. This 
indicated that it expected the best of all possible worlds from the 
victorious Allies. It was shocked by the decisions of Yalta and 
Potsdam and fell into the dilemma of disliking the results of a diplo-
matic arrangement that was the basis of its hopes for postwar Germany. 
It took a few months before the CDG was able to work out a compromise 
reaction to the decisions of Yalta. For the decisions of Potsdam, 
this was no longer possible. The Social Democratic members reluctantly 
joined the communist members in an acceptance of the Allied decisions. 
But the NB members were unyielding in their opposition to the Russian 
encroachments on Eastern Germany to which the Western Allies had 
nevertheless agreed. Frank and his friends left the Council in October 
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1945 and the Association dissociated itself from its former creation. 
The other groups failed to keep the CDG alive beyond early 1946. 
The departure of Frank from the Council was caused by a change 
of strategy. In the new situation of international relations, he 
wanted to return to Germany as a liberal envoy from America. For this 
purpose, the CDG which stood for East-West harmony was useless but the 
Association could serve as a liberal backer of Frank. He proposed, 
therefore, to reactivate the AADG in the fall of 1945. But the Ameri-
can government refused to let him return to Germany. After 1945, the 
'Association tried to win new liberal support in Germany where it made 
many new contacts. Since the general NB Group had been absorbed by 
the new Social Democratic Party, it also wanted some recognition from 
the SPD executive and from the AFL. For this purpose, it was willing 
to accept some former GLD members into its national committee. In 
order to facilitate this adjustment, Frank withdrew largely from his 
positions in the Association. But the SPD executive under Kurt~Schu­
macher ignored the initiatives of the AADG. In its postwar political 
work, the Association criticized the occupation policy until 1948 when 
the American attitude towards Germany changed with the new policy of 
containment of the Soviet Union. In that situation, the AADG could 
have found better times. But in 1951, it suspended its activities in 
the atmosphere of inquisition of the McCarthy era. 
The preparations for the Council for a Democratic Germany began 
after the Free Germany Committee in Moscow issued its manifesto of 
July 1943. Frank was motivated by "the events in Europe" and thought 
that "a group of reputed Germans and German Americans should attempt 
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a sort of balance to the so-called German National Committee of Moscow". 
He expressed his concern that the Russians pursued more than "transitory 
tactical plans" with the Committee and proposed that something should 
be done about "a strategy of potential German Russian separate actions". 
In the absence of any counteractivity, the National Committee could 
acquire undue importance and prepare a future socialist party "of uni-
1 lateral dependence". 
Frank thought that Thomas Mann was best qualified to bring and 
hold together an emigrant coalition in America. The latter had reacted 
favorably to Frank's book "Germany after Hitler" and called it in a 
letter of 13 July 1943, "the clearest, most reasonable and realistic 
preview of the things in store for Germany". He hoped that it would 
have "a favorable regulative effect" on American politicians. 2 Frank 
invited Mann to come to New York from California to discuss the forma-
tion of an emigrant council. He told Mann that he had not approached 
anybody before writing to him. He thought that Mann should be the 
president over a conference that was to work out an independent posi- · 
tion on German reconstruction. The latter should "not foremost be a 
counter-declaration to the Moscow National Committee, but an independent 
declaration with a certain counterweight" against the Moscow committee. 
Frank considered the prospective members of a German emigrant council 
1 Frank to Thomas Mann, 26 July 1943, Frank Papers, box 10, 
folder 8; also, AFGF statement to the press about National Committee 
Free Germany, 12 August 1943, Frank Papers, box 1, folder 1943. 
2 Thomas Mann to Frank, 13 July 1943, Frank Papers, box 9, 
folder M. 
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as "a vanguard or at least as an outpost of German Democracy". The 
time for an independent opinion was especially propitious in 1943, 
according to him. The dialogue between the West and the East was near 
conclusion but a compromise at the expense of Germany could still be 
prevented, especially if the strong liberal potential of public opinion 
in the United States and in England would rally to the cause of the 
G . 3 erman em~grants. But Mann was evasive and postponed a visit to New 
York until October. 
The political views of Mann did not suit a prospective emi-
grant coalition. He was also afraid of losing his intellectual privacy 
if he got involved with political groups. Mann was especially depressed 
over the National Socialist crimes and was convinced that "only a gen-
uine, sincere, purifying revolution ... could rehabilitate the German 
people in the eyes of the world, of history and of itself". He was 
pleased with the Moscow manifesto because it encouraged a German revol-
ution without any talk about socialism. For this reason, he partici-
pated in a group of German exile writers in Hollywood who intended to 
express their public support of the National Committee in Moscow. But 
when he wanted to add his independent statement he was overruled and 
withheld his signature. Mann was not interested in preserving the 
German people from the consequences of its passivity. He was little 
inclined to become upset "over anything that might happen to Germany 
after the defeat". He granted the victors "the right to act according 
to their inclinations 11 • He considered :'the patriotic zeal" with which 
3 Frank to Thomas Mann, 10 August 1943, Frank Papers, box 10, 
folder 8. 
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most socialist and other emigrants claimed that nothing detrimental must 
happen to Germany as "not quite natural''. Their call for a strong 
German democracy was to him a call for "a strong Germany with a large, 
efficient red army". Despite his anticommunism and anti-socialism, 
Mann thought that the Russian ambassador in postwar Berlin could assume 
"the role of Lord Protector" so that the Allies would not commit "irre-
parable ... stupidities". Mann was concerned about American inexperi-
ence in foreign policy but he was sensitive to the wishes of the Ameri-
can government. The latter did in his opinion not want "unsolicited 
advice" from "enemy aliens" and "premature antifascists''. 4 
Frank tried unsuccessfully to overcome the resistance of Mann. 
He told him that he would find out in Washington directly whether an 
emigrant union was desirable. On the other hand, he fought Mann's 
consideration of American wishes with the argument that an independent 
voice on German reconstruction was necessarily also independent of the 
American government. Since Mann was wary of the Moscow Committee he 
could not object to "an independent counter-voice". But he eventually 
declined the role which Frank offered him. The latter thought that 
"the intervention of Seger and Co." was instrumental in this refusa1. 5 
Stampfer stated that Mann had a conversation with Undersecretary of 
State Berle who thought that the German emigrants lacked contrition and 
were mainly .interested in saving Germany from just punishment, an 
4 Thomas Mann to Frank, 6 August 1943, Frank Papers, box 9, 
folder M. 
5Frank ·to \.filly Brandt, 19 March 1958, Frank Papers, box 8, 
folder B. 
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opinion which Mann shared. 6 The latter did not even sign the initial 
declaration of the CDG of March 1944. He implored Niebuhr to postpone 
its publication because the time had not yet come for emigrant inter-
vention. He criticized the declaration for its exclusive desire to 
spare Germany and its concomitant insensitivity to the feelings of 
those European peoples who had suffered most under German aggression. 
In reference to a phrase of the declaration, Mann stated that 11 there 
is no such thing as an unjust peace for Germany" regardless of the 
eventual settlement. 7 
Tillich was a more appropriate chairman for the CDG. He was a 
friend of Niebuhr which emphasized the connection of the CDG with the 
NB sponsor organization. His Christian Socialist views which he shared 
with Niebuhr were in tune with the prospective CDG. He believed that 
Western society needed as much reform as Eastern society. Only a gen-
eral transformation of the world could prevent another world war. For 
Tillich, democracy was "the fertile soil out of which the aggressing 
forces have grown". It has "created Communism" by defending social 
injustice and has "nourished Fascism" as a tool against Communism. 
Liberal democracy was a failure. Tillich considered "the status quo 
liberals as a great ... danger to the future of Europe and of the 
world". The first war aim was therefore the transformation of Western 
society. A safe social system should be based on "a planned economy in 
which enough liberal elements are included to prevent another form of 
6
stampfer to Sopade, 9 March 1944, Matthias and Link, Nr. 161, 
p. 643. 
7Thomas Mann to Reinhold Niebuhr, 23 April 1944, Nachlass Hertz, 
reel 33. 
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totalitarian tyranny". This was the internal aspect of the postwar 
order. It was designed to guarantee the freedom of the individual by 
protecting him against the exploitation of an unchecked liberal economy~ 
The external aspect of Tillich's new order concerned the rela-
tionships between nations. It was designed to guarantee the freedom of 
each individual nation by protecting it against imperialist exploita-
tion. For this purpose, laissez faire nationalism had to end. As the 
second war aim, Tillich proposed a supernational unity of all countries 
in the form of a federal union. It was to replace the balance of power 
system of the nationalist era. Tillich considered a league of govern-
ments like the former League of Nations as incapable of preserving 
peace. In a federal union, each nation had to give up its military, 
economic, and diplomatic sovereignty. It could only retain a cultural 
autonomy. As a preliminary step, Tillich demanded "the federal union 
of the European continent" which presumably included Russia. But he 
did not judge the prospects of a European union critically. He real-
ized that the New European Order of National Socialist Germany had 
aroused "a tremendous nationalistic reaction". He warned that "if- this 
reaction cannot be overcome together with the Nazi conquerors, no hope 
for Europe is left". But he believed that the rational forces of 
history will be strong enough to overcome its irrational forces. 
The participation of Russia in a European federation was also 
a soluble problem. Tillich believed that the Russian alliance with 
8
"Why war aims? What war aims? ~{hose war aims?'; Paul Tillich 
in The Protestant, pp. 8-22, n.d. , Frank Papers. 
f' 
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the West might "modify the totalitarian character of the Russian gov-
ernment". The reciprocal effect was expected for Western society. He 
realized that such a development was not in the interest of British 
imperialism or American capitalism. The former was interested in the 
continued division of the European continent, the latter in "a dis-
integrated and dependent Europe as a half-colonial hinterland for 
American business activities". For these reasons, Tillich distrusted 
an Anglo-American peace without the corrective of the Soviet Union. 
The continued existence of the United Nations was vital for a federal 
reconstruction of Europe around a peaceful Germany. For this trans-
formation, Tillich counted on such diffuse elements as the British 
Labor Party, the German underground movement and President Roosevelt, 
who had called for freedom from fear and want. The idea of a rapproche-
ment between Western and Eastern society was a somewhat mechanistic 
speculation. But this ideological confidence of Tillich was his source 
of energy in organizing and running the CDG for which.he performed 
11 the work of Sisyphus••. His war aims were unrealistically dogmatic 
but they coincided with the main aspirations of the CDG: an undivided 
Germany within a new European order and a Social Democratic Germany 
with a planned economy. 9 
The composition of the CDG was problematic. Except for the NB 
emigrants, the other members joined the Council as individuals which 
left them at a disadvantage in claiming their share of control. There 
were SAP, ISK, Catholic Center Party emigrants, including the former 
r 
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GLD protege Thormann, and Social Democratic emigrants. Of the latter, 
Aufhauser and Grzesinsky were former GLD chairmen. They were both 
disenchanted with the Labor Delegation. Aufhauser complained that the 
11 small group" of the GLD lacked "the necessary unanimity in nearly all 
politically important questions''. He described the divergence of 
ol'inions in the GLD as "a gap that cannot be bridged". It was respon-
sible for "the sterility of the GLD in its political work". Aufhauser 
believed in "holding together the Social Democratic forces" by a cen-
tralist orientation towards the United Nations rather than a unilateral 
inclination towards either the East or the West. He had wanted the 
GLD to follow the example of the Sopade. At least, the advocates of 
a Western and of a centralist position should have had equal rights. 
Instead,. the former abused the latter. For these reasons, he tended 
towards the Council which had, in his opinion, a political potential 
which the GLD should recognize. The CDG could have effected a socialist 
rapprochement which was for Aufhauser a valid goal in the international 
situation of 1944. For the sake of GLD unity, he went along with a 
January decision about the abstention of the GLD from the Council. But 
he resigned from the Labor Delegation when its conservative members 
used the Social Democratic Federation and its German branch for the 
adoption of resolutions that denounced the Council as communist. 10 
Stampfer played down the switch to the CDG of Aufhauser who was always 
"anxiously concerned about being as radical" as necessary. Like all 
10 .. Aufhauser to GLD, 23 February 1944, Nachlass Stampfer, part I, 
section 1, Nr. 25. 
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disciples of Breitscheid, Aufhauser had a leftist tendency which he 
followed in every critical situation. Grzesinsky was considered oppor-
11 tunist by nature. But the loss of two chairmen to the CDG was a 
serious blow to the GLD. 
·It could have been avoided. At first, the GLD showed interest 
in the Council. Starnpfer claimed that the Labor Delegation could have 
formed an emigrant union. It had been encouraged "by an influential 
agency" which he did not identify. 12 Since the GLD did not move, 
Tillich invited its representatives to preparatory discussions for the 
Council. The critical issue was "the admission of the Moscow faction", 
that is, of the three communists Bonheim~ Norden, and Schreiner. The 
GLD emigrants expected the Council organizers to choose between them 
and the communists which was an unacceptable alternative. In GLD per-
spective, this meant that the Council organizers preferred the commun-
. 13 1.sts. 
After the first round, rejection, carne the second round, 
denunciation. Katz claimed that the formation of the CDG was "a pre-
arranged affair between the members of NB and the communists". In his 
description, the three communists and the three NB members were pre-
po~derant in the nineteen member CDG. Allied with them were five 
fellow travelers, including Tillich. Together they outnumbered three 
renegade Social Democrats and five bourgeois emigrants whom Katz classi-
11
starnpfer to Sopade, 30 August 1944, Matthias and Link, Nr. 185, 
pp. 656-658; also Nachlass Starnpfer, part I, section 13, Nr. 692. 
12 Starnpfer to Sopade, 9 March 1944, Matthias and Link, Nr. 161. 
13 Ibid. 
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fied as innocents. He believed that the CDG aimed at "breaking up the 
f h . . II 14 democratic groups o t e German em~grat~on . Frank was "the moti-
vating force of the Tillich committee". He had accepted the communist 
assignment of bringing as many Social Democratic and bourgeois emigrants 
as possible into the Popular Front-like Council. This was the condi-
tion for "full absolution" for Frank's departure from the KPD in 1928. 
It seemed to Katz that Moscow had,given "the signal for a concerted 
attack on everything Social Democratic''. Even William Shirer, who had 
become critical of the GLD, had allegedly received his information from 
"the two communists Alfred Kantorowicz and Henry Kassirer", two emi-
grants in the German shortwave service of the Columbia Broadcasting 
System. He was an innocent who was "not talented enough to grasp the 
full context" of what these two members of the CDG told him. 15 The NVZ 
reprinted an article of the Jewish Daily Forward whose title "Moscow -
London - Mexico - New York" put the CDG in line with the communist 
16 inspired Popular Front groups. In his own NVZ article, Katz inter-
preted the formation of the Council as "the Stalin coup in New York". 
The three communists in the nineteen member executive committee "guar-
anteed the conformity with the general line of the policies of Moscow". 
The mass of the committee were like ants without a chance against the 
Russian bear, that is, the small minority. Whoever was not against the 
14 Katz to Ollenhauer, 15 June 1944, EK Mappe 61. 
15 Ollenhauer, 12 August 1944, EK Mappe 61. Katz to 
16 Neue Vo lkszeitung, 8 April 1944, p. 3. 
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CDG was for it. Distrust was not enough. It had not saved the Weimar 
Republic. For the sake of a second republic,the GLD had the duty of 
11active opposition" to the CDG. 17 After an opportunity for cooperation, 
the Labor Delegation ended up in extreme opposition to the Council, an 
attitude that was not without risks for the GLD. 
Several observers were concerned about the GLD and its attitude 
towards the CDG. The Sopade deplored the divisive effect of the Coun-
cil on the Labor Delegation. Ollenhauer advised moderation and cooper-
ation. He did not fully accept the version of Katz. He could not 
detect any communists among the signers of the CDG declaration. 18 He 
made "only one remark" on the issue. He did not expect Katz "to draw 
any practical consequences from it" but he asked him "to take it into 
consideration". Ollenhauer did not believe that the NB members played 
the game of the communists. He considered it useful that "we base our 
good or bad relations to neighbor groups in the emigration on facts 
that can be ascertained at any time". He thought that the NB Group 
had changed and that it was more Social Democratic than in the 1930's. 
He advised Katz "to consider the situation for once in this perspec-
tive''. 19 Even Sollmann thought that it was "a mistake that you [the 
GLD] did not establish contacts in time with Hagen". He was impressed 
by the liberal American support for the NB Group and had repeatedly 
advised Seger to seek a rapprochement with the latter without sue-
17 Ibid., 6 May 1944, p. 4.! 
18 Ollenhauer to Kurt Heinig, 23 May 1944, EK Mappe 83. 
19 Ollenhauer to Katz 2 27 July 1944, EK Mappe 83. 
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20 
cess. The State Department concluded that the Labor Delegation had 
been outmaneuvered. It \vas interested in .;1 recovery of the GLD with 
AFL assistance. On the other hand, it did not want 11 two strong German 
groups, at loggerheads with each other and backed by rival American 
organizations 11 , that is, by the AFL and the CIO. This might serve only 
11 to sharpen the conflict between American citizens over an issue which 
• im • 1 f f • d ' ' II 21 LS pr arL y one o oreLgn an enemy orLgLn 
But Katz was optimistic. He thought that the Social Democratic 
signers of the CDG declaration were still on the side of the GLD, which 
had advised them against this step but took 11 for the time beingn no 
action against them. The content of the declaration was acceptable 
even to Katz. But the Social Democratic signers would eventually wake 
up to the sinister designs of the CDG. Katz was also happy about the 
refusal of uthe most important personalities of the German emigra-
tion ... to associate with the CDG: Bruning, Sollmann, ... Hubertus 
Lowenstein11 • Together with the GLD, these individual emigrants repre-
sented 11 95% of the >veight of the German democratic anti-Nazi emigra-
tion11.22 As long as these symbols of the Great Coalition remained 
aloof, the GLD felt safe even though it could accomplish little in an 
isolation that Sollmann and Lowenstein did not favor. 23 
20 Sollmann to Hertz, 28 January 1943, Nachlass Hertz, reel 35. 
21 .· 
Memorandum on the relations of the GLD to the AFL, 24 May 
1944, Department of State central files, National Archives. 
22 Katz to Ollenhauer, 15 June 1944, EK Mappe 61. 
23H b t P ' 1·· . S f 9 F b 1944 u er us rLnz von owensteLn to tamp er, e ruary , 
Nachlass Stampfer, part I, section 10, Nr. 477; also: Ibid. Lowenstein 
to Stampfer, 24 March 1944, Nr. 478. 
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The Network only slightly outdid the GLD in denouncing the 
Council. It was published by Ruth Fischer with the help of Adolph 
Weingarten and others and specialized in the detection of international, 
that is, Moscow-led, communist conspiracies. Fischer was, herself, a 
victim of the Comintern. In the early 1920's, her dominant ultra 
leftist faction had lost its influence in the KPD in the wake of a 
power struggle in the Russian Communist Party. The Network treated all 
signers of the CDG declaration as active members and issued an elaborate 
classification of them. The first group consisted of ten "German com-
munists under the discipline of the Communist Party of Germany, the 
American· section of which is controlled by Hans Berger", the brother of 
Ruth Fischer. It included Schreiner, Bertold Brecht, Bonheim, Alfred 
Kantorowicz, Norden, a~d Karl Obermann. Then, there was a group of 
important.contact men, a group of communist literati, artists, and 
theatrical people, a group of fellow travelers, and a group of Social 
Democrats converted to the Moscow cause. There were also the members 
of so-called independent groups organized by former communists like 
Frank, Walcher, Sternberg, and their friends, Hertz, Juchacz, Kirschmann, 
Erich Schmidt, and others. In this distorted presentation, all the emi~ 
grants associated with the CDG were either communist or communist 
24 
related. Aufhauser was insensed about the propaganda front between 
Trotzkists and Social Democrats, that is, the Network and the NVZ. He 
severely rebuked Stampfer who should have been the guardian of the 
24The Network, New York, [n.m.] 1944, published by Ruth Fischer, 
Frank Papers. 
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1 . d. . f . 1' 25 Socia Democrat~c tra ~t~on o JOUrna ~sm. The CDG had tried to fore-
stall some of this negative publicity, especially that of the NVZ. 
This had been the purpose of its open approach to the GLD which Frank 
had never expected to join the Council. 
Otherwise, Frank was satisfied with the early results. After 
the initial declaration of March 1944, he thought that the affairs of 
the CDG were "more positive11 than could have been expected "from such a 
mixed society". He anticipated that the Council would "hold together 
for a while". In that case, it would "bring us a number of better 
26 
contacts. That is the minimal goal". More significantly, Frank 
thought that the CDG was "in its composition a mirror of the political, 
social and intellectual forces that must be the basis of a democratic 
Germany". In that case, it afforded the NB Group a new legitimacy and 
could serve as an Ersatz (substitute) government in exile. 27 This was 
an overstatement. 
Without the GLD as the only other well organized emigrant group, 
there remained only the strong relationship of the Council with the 
NB sponsor organization. This unilateral orientation confused the pur-
pose of the CDG. It was unclear which of the two groups served the 
other or whether they were to be equal partners. The NB sponsor organi-
zation started out playing the role of the parent in control of the 
25 .• 
Aufhauser to Stampfer, 12 April 1944, Nachlass Stampfer, 
part I, section 1, Nr. 24. 
26 
Frank to Henrv Ehrmann, 15 March 1944, Frank Papers, box 10, 
folder 8. 
27 
Memorandum by Tillich, October 1943, Nachlass Hertz, reel 20. 
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purse-strings. As soon as the CDG had proven feasible the liberal 
American friends of the NB Group expanded their organization. On 
18 May 1944, they established the American Association for a Democratic 
Germany during a conference at the house of Roger Baldwin. 28 Eventu-
ally, the AADG was to become a mass organization and play in America 
the role which the CDG was expected to play in postwar Germany. As a 
more substantial committee, it was ready to sponsor the Council without 
being absorbed'by that task. Principally, the Association assumed the 
financial assets and liabilities of the American Friends who had raised 
from $11,000 to $19,000 annually between 1940 and 1943. In May 1944, 
their accounts were balanced, if low. 29 
The new Association would "support the Council financially 
without limitations". It established~ joint budget with the Council 
which was fixed at the somewhat high amount of $34,000 for the first 
year. This was indicative of the high ambitions of the AADG. But the 
financial realities were more modest. The joint fundraising program 
contained an emergency plan for the collection of $2,800. Between 
May and September 1944, the Association raised $2,349.46, of which more 
than $1,000 came from old sources of the American Friends. 30 The 
Council collected only $375 up to September 1944. 31 The proposed joint 
28Niebuhr to [ n.n.] , 23 December 1942, Nachlass Hertz, reel 20. 
29David F. Seiferheld to Hertz, 11 August 1944, Nachlass Hertz, 
reel 20. 
30Agenda of meeting of executive committee of the AADG, 25 May 
1944, Nachlass Hertz, reel 20. 
31cDG Finanzlage, 21 September 1944, Nachlass Hertz, reel 20. 
423 
budget for the first quarter amounted to only $4,228 and was later re-
duced to $3,651. Between March and July 1944, the Council received 
only $405.10 so that a substantial percentage of the budget was re-
served for the AADG. The latter also paid for the telephone, paper 
and translation costs of the CDG which was left only with the expenses 
for stamps, the publication of its Bulletin, and the part-time work of 
the AADG secretary. Yet, by September 1944, it had a deficit of $350 
32 
which meant that the Association did not as fully provide as planned. 
Soon, the competition between the various groups in the CDG 
came to a head. The Association held back with funds while a group 
around Grzesinsky claimed that the former needed no funds for other than 
CDG purposes. The AADG was only to be an auxiliary of the Council 
specializing in fundraising and leaving the political work to the 
C "1 33 ounc~ . The Grzesinsky group blamed the Association for insufficient 
financial support which was responsible for the political inactivity of 
the CDG at a crucial time. They thought that "the decisive hour is now 
and not in three or four months". The summer of 1944 was "the time for 
our Council to enter into a stage of utmost activity"'. The CDG should 
"gain publicity ... with a well prepared program for the construction 
of a peace-minded and trustworthy postwar Germany". The Grzesinsky 
group, therefore, sent "an urgent plea for immediate support of our 
Council" to the Association "as the sponsors of our Council". They 
32 Ibid. 
33 Otto Pfeiffenberger to David Seiferheld, 27 July 1944, Frank 
Papers, box 7, folder 1. 
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needed $500 to $1,000 "most urgently within the next few days in order 
b . . d • • • 11 34 to eg~n Lncrease actLvLt~es . 
Despite this financial dependence, the Grzesinsky group wanted 
to establish the independence of the CDG. It wanted to conduct the 
work of the Council 11 hand in hand but not together with the AADG". It 
wanted an independent executive secretary for the CDG because the 
secretary of the AADG represented 11 a certain faction in the CDG11 • The 
Council report to the Department of Justice deliberately omitted the 
name of the AADG. The Grzesinsky group recommended that the latter be 
dropped also from the statutes of the Council. Yet, they expected the 
Association to pay for this independence. The separate office would 
cost about $300 to $400 a month. Another $400 to $500 were necessary 
for the publication of the weekly or semi-monthly bulletin. This 
amounted to about $1,000 for each of the next three months. The 
Grzesinsky group was aware that "we have no right to demand anything". 
Their letter was meant as a plea to the Association "to whom we already 
owe so much1'. By the end of August, they complained again about insuf-
f . . f. . 1 f h A · · 35 LcLent LnancLa support rom t e ssocLatLon. 
Niebuhr was exasperated over the claims of the Grzesinsky 
group. He requested in the executive committee of the AADG that the 
financial relations between the Association and the Council, be changed. 
The obligations of the former to the latter should be 11 limited rather 
than unlimited 11 • The Council should raise its own funds. The Associa-
34Ibid. 
35Grzesinsky, Pfeiffenberger to AADG, end of August 1944, 
Nachlass Hertz, reel 20. 
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tion should hand over to the Council only those funds that it raised 
explicitly for the work of the CDG. It should accept the proposal for 
a separate office of the Council and should offer the latter a special 
sum for implementing this change immediately. Niebuhr considered fur-
ther discussions in the finance committee of the CDG, of which he was a 
member, as "useless" and asked the American committee of the CDG to 
d h f h . . . h h A . . 36 con uct t e urt er negot~at~ons w~t t e ssoc~at~on. 
He admitted that "the financial arrangement was only part of 
the problem." The rest concerned the question of whether the Association 
was an independent organization with other tasks beside the sponsorship 
of the Council. It concerned, also, the question of "giving the Asso-
ciation a broader basis which changes the impression that it represents 
only the former organization of the AFGF under a different name" .. 
Niebuhr advised to communicate and discuss his recommendations separ-
ately with Tillich, Bcinheim, Aufhauser, and a few others who were 
probably less antagonistic towards the Association than the Grzesinsky 
group. The next meeting of the Council should then decide about the 
new political and financial relations between the Association and the 
Council. Until then, "we must be completely passive". Members of the 
AADG should not participate in committee meetings of the Council. The 
Association should not assist in the publication of the Bulletin. 37 
The Grzesinsky group tried also to win more control by investing 
the authority of the Council in a system that would function like a 
36Niebuhr to executive committee of the AADG, 23 December 1944, 
Nachlass Hertz, reel 20. 
J? Ibid. 
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government in exile. The CDG should not be a large study commission 
'~ut a political group that is capable of fast initiatives towards 
the outside". In August 1944, the group submitted a statute to the pro-
cedural committee which proposed an executive committee of seven mem-
bers representing all the factions in the Council. The general member-
ship should be limited. Sympathizers could be accommodated as advisers 
with few rights. The statute opposed the foundation of local chapters 
with a say in the affairs of the Council. 38 
The Grzesinsky group disliked the response of Tillich to their, 
plan. The latter wanted the CDG to attract "as many new forces as 
possible". He thought that the proposed system was "too club-like and 
inadequate for a very dynamic movement". He also opposed "the technical 
faction principle". He considered the membership of the Council in the 
summer of 1944 as "a small clique" and proposed to broaden the basis of 
the CDG. Besides full members, there should be members who would only 
partially participate in the affairs of the Council. They would, how-
ever, have full voting rights at the plenary sessions. Tillich would 
39 
also have preferred three executive committees instead of one. But 
the Grzesiri.sky group disliked this kind of a "mollusk-like" system. 
They thought a diffuse arrangement was perhaps expedient in the begin-
ning. But it became later partly responsible for the indecision and 
38Grzesinsky, Pfeiffenberger, Erwiderung auf Kritik von Tillich 
in der Vorlage des Geschaftsordnungsausschusses fur ein Statut des CDG, 
end of August 1944, Nachlass Hertz, reel 20. 
39 Ibid. 
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. . . f h c "1 40 ~nact~v~ty o t e ounc~ . By January 1945, Tillich conceded the need 
for a political committee of seven members with equal representation. 
Besides himself, this body should consist of Aufhauser, B'arwald, 
Budzislawsky, Frank, Haussman and Schreiner. 41 An attempt at forming 
a committee of only four members that would exclude Frank, or only 
allow him to alternate attendence with Aufhauser, was rejected. 42 
Under the circumstances of factional fights in New York, the 
foundation of a local CDG chapter in Chicago failed. It was undertaken 
by the Chicago businessman Walter W. Marseille, a friend of Frank. He 
was a member of the AADG and was close to the Chicago chapter of the 
Union for Democratic Action. In July 1944, Frank was to come to 
Chicago to speak at a luncheon meeting for prospective CDG sponsors in 
Chicago. The UDA wanted the.meeting to be called in the name of the 
Chicago CDG chapter which Marseille considered premature. But for both, 
the purpose of the meeting was fundraising for the Council even though 
the invitations did not mention it. After this occasion, Marseille 
continued raising funds for the CDG in the summer of 1944 among his 
"American friends and business acquaintances". His story for the Field 
Foundation, for example, was that "the money is for the Council and that 
the Association is the Council's sponsor and financial trustee'' so that 
checks were to be made out to the Association. Thus, a Chicago chapter 
4
°Friedrich Haussmann to Tillich, 29 August 1944, Nachlass Hertz, 
reel 20. 
41 Protokoll der Verwaltungsausschussitzung des CDG, 11 January 
1945, Frank Papers, box 9, folder M. 
42
walther Victor to Frau Hauptmann, 7 January 1945, Frank 
Papers, box 9, folder V. 
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would have contributed to the control of the AADG over the Council. The 
relations of Marseille with the CDG were therefore difficult. Marseille 
soon complained about "the poor handling of the correspondence at the 
New York end". According to him, "every Chicagoan" who dealt with the 
Council made the same experience. Eventually, the Marseille group de-
cided to cease working for the CDG because of "matters of principle" 
which will be discussed in the following section on reconstruction. 43 
Under these circumstances, Marseille did not pursue his work 
for better relations between the German Labor Delegation and the 
Council. He had urged Snell, Marek, and F. A. Hermens, who belonged 
to his group, to reason with Seger and other GLD members and demand 
from them "a more positive attitude towards the Council". Snell was 
~he Chicago chairman of the German American Congress for Democracy, 
which was a GLD foundation. He had "a kind of five years' plan to 
bring the Social Democrats of his group together with us [the Marseille 
group]". But Marseille realized that Snell was practically alone "with 
his relative friendly attitude towards the Council". He advised Frank, 
therefore, to win over some of the influential people of the GACD, 
h . h b h . 'bl 44 w LC was y t en LmpossL e. 
The "matters of principle" of the Marseille group exemplified 
the shortcomings of the CDG plans for reconstruction. Because of its 
precarious composition, the Council had to postpone the clarification of 
43 Walter Marseille to Frank, 19 July 1944, Frank Papers, box 9, 
folder M; also: Marseille to Tillich, 25 May 1944, Frank Papers, 
box 9, folder T. 
44Marseille to Frank, 26 June 1944, Frank Papers, box 9, 
folder M. 
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basic issues until they were forced upon it by events. Then, it could 
not digest them. Marseille considered most important the topics of a 
collective German responsibility and of East Prussia. They comprised 
the realities of the postwar situation for Germany: What was the atti-
tude of the Allied Victors and what would be their policies towards 
Germany? Because of their omissions, the CDG programs lacked a politi-
cal basis. They were unrealistic maximum statements of what would be 
the best possible fate for postwar Germany without regard to Allied 
interference. The panacea of the CDG was a postwar United Nations. 
Frank urged "the incorporation of the vanquished nations including 
Germany under equal sovereignty into the world organization11 • 45 The 
Council members thought that a continued cooperation between East and 
West constituted the best international circumstances for their kind of 
reconstruction. They did not consider the alternative of Allied deals 
at the expense of Germany. 
The initial CDG declaration of March 1944 stated that "any kind 
of unilateral settlement in Europe would lay the foundations of new 
world wide conflicts". But within a multilateral system, there would 
be no risk in giving Germany :'political leeway from the beginning", and 
in leaving the German ecomony and German territorial integrity alone. 
There was a hint that "the German people will have to bear the conse-
quences of the war into which Hitler has driven them". 46 But these 
45 Frank, Proposal for a statement by the AFGF, 1943, Frank 
Papers, box 1, folder 1943. 
46 Program of the CDG, May 1944, Matthias and Link, Nr. 163, 
p. 649. 
consequences were painted in moderate colors. There was no reference 
to the destruction caused by the German armies or to the crimes of 
National Socialist antisemitism. 
The declaration did not deal with basic issues because there 
430 
was no consensus on postwar realities within the Council. The bourgeois 
and the NB members maintained the fiction of "the other Germany". There 
was no justification for territorial cessions .because there was no 
collective responsibility. The communist members temporized. In their 
Popular Front mood, they went along with the majority position. But 
sub rosa, they believed in a German war guilt and related it to a new 
settlement of the Eastern borders. The Marseille group opposed this 
position from the beginning and wanted a clarification even if it drove 
the communists out of the Council. It denied that the two issues were 
related. Marseille thought that the Council should insist on a dis-
tinction between the National Socialists and the German people "in 
the sense that National Socialism is not the genuine expression of the 
German national character". But it should admit that the German 
people had "failed tragically in the fight against fascism". Beyond 
the question of individual guilt, "there exists the collective re-
sponsibility of the German people". The CDG should concede that "the 
German people must in its totality accept responsibility for the crimes 
that were committed in the name of the German people11 • For Marseille, 
this admission was a matter of self-respect without which the German 
people could not return to a status of equal rights among the countries 
of Europe. He considered it a matter of pride to reject secondary ex-
planations like the severity of the Versailles treaty or the appease-
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ment policy of the West in the 1930's. If the German people was in-
capable of assuming responsibility for its recent past, "a more than 
temporary occupation" would be morally justified. Marseille also pro-
posed that the CDG take a more positive attitude towards reparations. 
The German people should forego any improvement of its living standards 
beyond the state of reconstruction in the devastated European coun-
. 47 tr~es. 
This was more of a German American position. For the sake of 
moral decency, it demanded a German mea culpa and a change of mind 
that would help to clear the German name. Atonement should go as far 
as possible. But all this was necessary in order to forestall the 
loss of East Prussia and a communist expansion to the West. Under the 
proper circumstances, the CDG could request that the Atlantic Charter 
48 app~y also to Germany. It would have the right and the duty to 
oppose any cession of German territory. Marseille rejected the argu-
ment of Tillich and Frank that the issues in question needed more time 
for study. He concluded that Frank believed "in postponing and cover-
ing up of differences for organizational reasons". His motions were 
not even submitted to a Council meeting. Under these circumstances, 
he was no longer interested in a CDG chapter in Chicago. He was will-
ing to raise more funds for the American Association "if it meant any-
thing apart from the Council". 49 The latter could do without the 
47Marseille to Tillich 25 May 1944, Frank Papers, box 9, 
folder T. 
48 Ibid. 
4_9~M~a~r~s~e~i~l~l~e~t~o~F~r~a~n=k, 2 August 1944, Frank Papers, box 9, folder M. 
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Marseille group. But an emigrant coalition without communist members 
could not expect to find any favors in the eyes of the Soviet Union. 
On the question of German war guilt, the CDG still expected to 
be vindicated by a German revolution. It was not yet ready for a con-
sensus on dismissing that eventuality. For this reason also, the 
initial declaration was so noncommittal. In July 1944, Barwald, Auf-
h~user, Frank, Schreiner, and Walcher submitted a report about the 
reconstruction of the German unions which still considered the short 
range perspective of a revolutionary overthrow of Hitler. They based 
their hopes on the natural indestructibility of the Betriebsgemein-
schaft (factory community of the workers). Even without organized 
unions, the workers of a factory formed a collective group which was 
aware of its class interests. The main evidence for this collectivism 
was "the catastrophic decline of the Deutsche Arbeiterfront", the 
National Socialist workers' organization. This deprived the regime of 
a permanent mass basis so that the endurance of the factory community 
spelled almost in itself the doom of National Socialism. Despite the 
lack of any visible acts of resistance, "the collectivist mentality" 
of the factory communities was reliable. The latter constituted "quite 
automatically a communal organization in itself without requiring an 
outwardly visible form of organization". For a long time, the German 
workers had engaged only "in 'permissible' actions" that kept the col-
lective spirit alive. They were interested in improving working 
conditions with "flowers in the factory windows" or with better light. 
They proposed perhaps na modest Christmas bonus" or a weekly payment of 
wages rather than every ten days. They did all this in order to arrive 
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at '1the solidarity of all workers in the factory". In this way, they 
achieved "the union of socialists, christian workers, communists 
and ... discontented National Socialists ... with a hundred percent 
completeness". They would eventually fight for the overthrow of the 
dictatorship "with the same solidarity". For this reason, they wasted 
no time and effort on isolated acts. They thought about "the real, 
decisive confrontation in as organized a way as possible". 50 
Frank still thought that the Western Allies should assist the 
underground movement and "take the lead ... in directing ... political 
warfare' 1 • ~ut the NB sponsor organization was aware that the American 
and the British government did not favor the Russian approach of poli-
tical-warfare. The two governments wanted to "avoid any kind of a 
gene·ral revolution before or after the mil.itary defeat" and planned "a 
more or less permanent occupational regime" 51 But in this long range 
perspective, also, the German problem could not be solved ''without the 
active cooperation of the democratic forces of the German people". The 
reorganization of the unions would be "a simple and safe way of demo-
cratic consolidation". The unions could represent "a democratic 
organization of the people" which would crowd out the National Socialist 
grass roots support and illegal underground organizations after the 
defeat. With their tradition of self-government, they could also fill 
50
unterausschuss des Studienkomitees fur Gewerkschaftsfragen, 
Bericht uoer den Wiederaufbau einer Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Deutsch-
land, July 1944, Sammlung Glaser, vol. I. 
51 Frank, proposal for a statement by the AFGF, 1943, Frank 
Papers, box 1, folder 1943. 
434 
the political vacuum before the establishment of a central administra-
tion. They could take on interim governmental functions like the 
distribution of food and the organization of health care, welfare and 
l l d . . . 52 oca a m~n~strat~on. 
There was no controversy over the type of the new unions. 
There would be an Einheitsgewerkschaft, a single comprehensive union 
with a vertical and a horizontal federat structure. Each industrial 
branch would be organized in local, district and regional unions and 
finally, in an industrial federation or Industrieverband. Horizontally, 
the local unions of every industrial branch would form the Local Cartel 
or Ortskartell. The Local Cartels would compose the District Group or 
Bezirksverband; all of the latter, the central union federation or 
Gewerkschaftsbund. This structure would allow for more local autonomy 
than during the Weimar Republic. The new unions would be politically 
comprehensive and religiously neutral. They would -be a significant 
improvement over their Weimar predecessors and could be better pillars 
53 
of democracy than before. 
After the controversies over organizational matters, the CDG 
elaborated specific memoranda for most fields of administration in 
late 1944 and early 1945. It behaved like an executive that provides 
itself with a program. The subcommittees of the Council corresponded 
to the ministries of a government. Logically, the CDG did not dis-
cuss the constitutional question. But the implicit consensus was that 
52Bericht uber den Wiederaufbau einer Gewerkschaftsbewegung in 
Deutschland, July 1944, Sammlung Glaser, val. I. 
53 Ibid. 
435 
the Weimar constitution was still in effect and could be amended in 
the light of the National Socialist experience. The administrative 
program of the Council was based on a few principles acceptable to all 
members: nationalism, centralism with some authoritarianism, and 
socialism with varying emphases and balances in specific memoranda. 
Some socialism was even acceptable to the emigrants of the Center Party. 
The latter had never been a pro-business party, a function that was 
left to the former nationalist parties in the Empire and the Republic. 
The living standards of its constituency had not been above those of the 
Social Democratic voters. It had supported national programs in educa-
tion and healthcare which required a strong central government. It had 
not been ideologically opposed to economic planning. Its special 
religious and ethnic interests were respected in the CDG program. They 
were abetted by the principle of local and provincial self-government to 
which the Council had to resort as a measure in its emergency planning. 
In the field of the industrial economy, Aufhauser applied the 
socialist principle in an interesting way. He envisioned an economic 
democracy which would avoid the bureaucratic domination of the economy 
by the state as in the National Socialist or in the communist systems. 
There would be constitutional economic organs consisting of elected 
representatives from the employers, workers and consumers. They would 
determine economic policy directly by establishing a one or multi-year 
plan to regulate production and consumption. The state bureaucracy 
would only execute the economic plans and directives of the economic 
organs. This execution would be 11 subject to the permanent supervision'·' 
of the bodies of economic self-determination. Aufhauser explicitly 
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disqualified "the political parliamentary democracyr! from economic 
planning. This "formal democracy" had failed in the past. The parties 
of the ~-leimar Reichstag made political concessions to eacwi&-ner at 
' 
the expense of the economy. Aufhauser advocated "a separation of the 
economic problems from the merely political, parliamentary discussion". 
The economic organs would be vertically structured. There would be 
factory councils, local, district, and regional councils, and a national 
economic council. Aufhauser expected the occupation authorities to 
consent in their own interest to the formation of these councils even 
before the governmental organs of postwar Germany were reestablished. 54 
The balance between local, regional and national economic con-
trol was a unique feature of the plan of Aufhauser. Also, he advocated 
only a socialization of the basic inaustries. Between the all public 
and the all private sector, there was to be a mixed economic sector of 
factories owned partly by the state or by municipalities. For indus-
tries with private monopolies, Aufhauser -proposed the traditionally 
progressive idea of antitrust legislation. He also recommended to pro-
teet the small and medium sized agricultural and commercial establish-
ments which were the special concern of the bourgeois emigrants. 55 
The agricultural plans of the CDG which were prepared by the 
bourgeois emigrant, Joseph Kaske~ contained several socialist ideas but 
intended also to balance industrial democracy with agricultural 
54cDG Unterausschuss fur Wirtschaftsfragen, Bericht, pp. 45-48, 
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democracy. Some proposals were inevitable. They had become general 
antifascist property like the dissolution and resettlement of the 
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landed estates, one of the alleged pillars of National Socialism. The 
owners should be compensated "within narrow limits", that is, with a 
modest life pension or an average sized farm. The type of resettlement 
remained a matter for compromise. Kaskel claimed that "the question had 
no political character; socialists and non-socialists have argued for 
both forms" in the past, that is, for settlement by individual farmers 
and for a collective system. Actually, the CDG plan recommended to 
limit the latter to a minimum. It >vas unnecessary to transfer the 
"centralist and uniformist" tendencies from industry to agriculture. 
Production in the latter should constitute "a counterweight11 to modes 
of industrial production. Agriculture should preserve "a more free 
and individualist form of life in the sense of the Jeffersonian demo-
cracy". Rural cooperatives were sufficient to afford the farmers 
with the advantages of collective methods. They should limit them-
selves to the provision of equipment, machinery and loans and to the 
sale of livestock and commodities. In special cases, collective 
settlement would be appropriate as, for example, for city youths who 
decided to live off the land. The Palestinian collectives were recom-
mended. The Russian collective should also be "studied even though it 
operated under very different conditions." There could also be a 
mixed form of operation where the farmers would receive small parcels 
of land for their private use. In case of individual settlement, the 
farmers would have to buy the new land at regulated prices \vith the 
assistance of government loans. They would be obligated to cultivate 
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it and could not resell it. 56 
Grain prices could not be "left to the free play of forces" in 
the agricultural market. The new German agriculture needed some pro-
tection in the form of stable rather than high prices. This could be 
achieved by a government import monopoly. It would apply flexible 
tariffs in accordance with world market prices rather than the high 
tariffs of the past which had favored the Junkers. Cheap imported 
grain could be stockpiled for years of scarcity. More grain could be 
imported to benefit the workers and the export of industrial goods. 
Even the agricultural planning of the CDG contained much centralism. 57 
The latter principle applied especially to a new German govern-
ment. The CDG plans recommended local self-government as a principle 
of "the political fights in Germany during the last century and at the 
beginning of the present". But they warned against particularist and 
separatist tendencies and envisioned local self-government mainly as 
an emergency measure of the first hour. In the long run, the latter 
would create an administrative chaos. Necessary was "a coordinated 
handling of administrative and economic affairs". It was "indispens-
able" to maintain the ten Reichs-Spitzenbehorden (central agencies) and 
other Reichs-Spitzenverwaltungen (central offices). These were "absol-
utely necessary because their tasks can under no circumstances be 
56 CDG Unterausschuss fur Landwirtschaft, Bericht, Sammlung 
Glaser, vol. II. 
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delegated to regional and even less to local agencies". Even conununal 
self-government was impossible without "uniform administrative guide-
lines on the scale of the Reich". There was to be no federalism of 
the contemporary ~-lest German type. As precedents for this system -.;.;ere 
enumerated the constitutions of 1848 and 1918. 58 
The establishment of a new civil service could "satisfactorily 
only be solved by a central agency 11 • For a new start, a conunittee for 
personnel questions was necessary which would effect the denazification 
of the old civil service with the help of provincial and local commit-
tees. The democratic attitudes of the civil service were more important 
than a perfect administrative system. For this reason, the German 
antifascists at home and abroad should have the necessary freedom of 
action. The republican reliability of the judges was considered 
I 
especially vital. The judges should lose their former privileges so 
that they could be deposed or transferred like other civil servants. 
Until enough new judges could be trained the judiciary should use a 
larger number of lay people. A Popular Court or Volkstribunal should 
function as a court of republican review and supervision over the ad-
ministration and the judiciary. This supreme court could interfere in 
any trial and alter or abolish a verdict based "on politically unre-
liable motives". It would consist of forty judges and would be assisted 
by regional tribunals. The police should have "far-reaching 'dis-
cretionary' powers" like arrest without a warrant and preventive custody. 
58 .• CDG Unterausschuss fur Rechts- und Verwaltungsfragen, 
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In the fight against the National Socialist establishment and under-
ground, its hands should not be tied "by misplaced generosity and 
inappropriate sentimentality11 • Against abuses, there was the right to 
a complaint in court which could not be deferred. 59 
The principles of centralism, socialism, and,sometimes, 
nationalism applied also to CDG planning for health care, education 
and information. The Council plans advocated "a basic change in the 
whole structure of the health care system". This was especially urgent 
because of the additional health problems of the postwar period with 
which a local system could not deal. The practice of the Weimar Repub-
lie had been "a good basis and a safe point of departure" for the 
reconstruction of the postwar system. But since 1933, the need for 
health insurance and social security had 11 deepened enormously". 
Denazification of the medical profession was important because the 
latter had identified closely with the tenets of National Socialism. 
All physicians who had been licensed by National Socialist insurances 
should be dismissed since they were "all ... suspect of being National 
Socialists". The new Reichsminister for Healthcare had to decide 
about reinstatements. The exclusive recruitment of doctors from the 
middle class which had been especially amenable to National Socialism 
should end. A comprehensive scholarship program would allow the chil-
dren of blue and white collar workers to enter the medical profession. 60 
59 Ibid. 
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" Education was to be administered by a central office. There was 
to be no state, that is, provincial autonomy in this field. The 11 class 
character'' of secondary education "must be broken" by a social scholar-
h . 61 s ~p program. The question of denazification was even more important 
in this field. All teachers should be dismissed and then readmitted 
according to their behaviour during the Third Reich. Any active member 
of the NSDAP or of the SS was to be permanently fired. The members of 
the antifascist opposition should be favored as candidates for teach-
ing. All "democratic forces" should cooperate in elaborating new 
school books. The CDG objected to any Allied interference in the re-
construction of the German educational system. The latter was "the 
task of the German people itself, of which it cannot be relieved by 
62 
anybody". 
On the question of the future relations between church and 
state, there was unanimity except on the issue of religious instruction. 
In general, the principle of separation between the two organisms 
would apply. The state would not support the churches financially and 
would not impose and collect a church tax. It would demand political 
neutrality from the churches. They could "not sanction a specific 
economic doctrine and a specific theory of property relations". Reli-
gious instruction in public schools was an issue for disunity which 
resulted in the presentation of two reports. The bourgeois emigrants 
61cDG Komitee fur Erziehung und Wissenschaft, Massnahmen fur 
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some of whom were clerics, insisted on religious education. They based 
this demand on the democratic principle of religious freedom and on 
the parental right to demand education. They proposed an agreement 
between the state and and various denominations that would be incorpor-
ated in a Reichsschulgesetz (National School Law). It would resemble 
the former concordat with the Vatican and should respect "the histori-
cal situation". Religious groups should also have the right to 
establish schools of their own. The other report stated that the two 
positions could "not be reconciled objectively, only tactically". It 
referred to "the School Compromise" of the Weimar constitution but 
adopted a less compromising attitude for a postwar system. Education 
had to conform to the principle of separation of church and state. But 
this requirement need only be satisfied to the extent that the schools 
nad no longer the obligation to provide religious instruction for which 
attendance had been free. They should offer this instruction only on 
the explicit demands of the parents. The churches should not have the 
63 
authority to enforce attendance .. 
Concerning a free information system, the emigrants of the for-
mer Center and Democratic Parties had no ideological objections to an 
anti-capitalist organization of the postwar German press and news 
service. Capitalism was considered as one of the breeding grounds of 
National Socialism. For this reason, the new press had to be "inde-
pendent of the influence of uncontrollable financial interests". It 
63cDG Komitee fUr Erziehung und Wissenschaft, Referate uber die 
Frage der weltlichen und kirchlichen Schulen, I: MU1ler und Forell, II~ 
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served exclusively the purpose of public information and should exclude 
profit-making private interests. News was not a commodity protected by 
property rights. Every newspaper was to submit to a public audit of 
its income and general finances. The use of secret funds was to be 
prohibited. No single investor could own more than a fraction of the 
capital of a paper publishing association. The use of strawmen for 
concentrating ownership was to be forbidden. Advertisers should have 
no influence over the editorial policy of a paper. The government 
should supervise the advertising activities of all papers. One idea 
was to ''communalize" the advertising business which meant making a pub-
1 . . f . 64 ~c serv~ce out o ~t. 
Another guarantee for a free information system was a high de-
gree of central control by the democratic forces during a postwar 
interim period and by the new democratic German government thereafter. 
A Kontrollinstanz consisting of active antifascists would license the 
editors and the contributors of the newspapers and magazines. The 
"complete freedom [of the press] without control and without any pro-
tection against abuse" which had existed in the Weimar Republic \vas not 
recommendable. With its "general control", the new German government 
would suppress newspapers that rejected the principle of the freedom of 
the press. The newsservices should not be provided by one or two pri-
vate agencies as in the Weimar Republic. There should be a central news 
agency with a monopoly over the collection of news. Initially, the 
64
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government should maintain this agency. Later, it should become a co-
operative of all newspaper publishing associations. This centralization 
within a democratic system was the best safeguard against a political 
reaction. Also, the new republic should monopolize broadcasting as the 
Weimar Republic had done. This method had proven successful. The CDG 
went too far in planning to prevent a recurrence of fascism by adminis-
trative means. The Weimar Republic had largely failed because of the 
. ff. . . . 1 f . t d . . 65 ~nsu ~c~ent v~g~ ance o ~ s emocrat~c part~es. 
Since the time for an antifascist revolution in Germany had 
passed, even the partial implementation of the CDG plans hinged on 
support by the American government. But the latter was elusive. The 
reaction of the German Desk of the OWI was sceptical. Hoffmann noted 
the strange bedfellowship within the CDG of protestant theologians like 
Tillich, leftwing authors like Brecht and Zuckmayer, Social Democrats 
. and communists. This "marriage" >vould not last. It would founder on 
"the typical German disunity" about practical matters. Also, to Hoff-
mann, the initial declaration of the CDG sounded as beautiful as the 
Weimar constitution which did not save the first German republic. With 
unacknowledged antisemitism and with some exaggeration, he objected to 
the large number of German Jewish emigrants among the signers of the 
declaration. In his opinion, they jeopardized the reconstruction of a 
country where antisemitism was rampant. He put his finger on the 
neuralgic point of lacking Allied support. At the same time, he sug-
· 
65 Ibid. 
gested that the American government give "no support or advice what-
ever" to the CDG or any rival group. 66 The OWI should follow the 
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development of these groups "with watchful (though by no means unfriend-
ly) eyes". More important for the government was the organization of 
German American support for the war and peace effort. The reeducation 
of Germany should also get its impulses from German American elements 
and from rehabilitated German war prisoners in the United States. Emi-
grant intellectuals like those organized in the CDG were too unrealistic 
and had been absent from Germany for too long to do any good in this 
67 
area. With Allied victory certain, the State Department was not 
interested in emigrant groups towards the end of the war. 
In this situation, the CDG made a virtue out of a necessity. 
Since it could not get any official recognition it declared that it did 
not want to be a government in exile even though it acted like one. 
The Council tried to exploit the positive side of its circumstances. 
In a strategy meeting of August 1944, Barwald declared in his keynote 
speech that the CDG should "avoid the impression that we wanted to form 
a government based on the bayonets of the Allies". The CDG kept insist-
ing that it was ';entirely independent and not sponsored by any official 
government or party agency!!. This was an appeal to German nationalism. 
Also, the CDG decided to reverse its former practice and abstain from 
66 Hans M. Hoffmann to Constantin Poulos, German Desk, OWI, 
5 April 1944, Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, Vol. Fb 224, OWI, Deutschland 
Propaganda, p. 68. 
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interference in American politics including the presidential elections. 
It should not count on rewards for political support. 68 A perfect 
patriotic record was more important. An Allied occupation regime could 
maintain order and tranquility but it could not prevent the rise of a 
National Socialist underground. As a first emergency measure, that 
required the immediate participation of the democratic sections of the 
German people in the government of the country. Only a democratic re-
activization at the grass roots could control a National Socialist 
f~Wehrwolf" (underground). The Allies could not circumvent the German 
democratic forces and their emigrants. 69 When Tillich was informed 
that there might not be a new German government for some time to come, 
he concluded that the CDG must "try to help the democratic movement in 
Germany to impose itself". 70 
The CDG wanted to rely on American public opinion. Barwald had 
.the illusion that it was "out of the question that the American people 
will support a Vansittartist peace". He proposed that the CDG prepare 
for the end of the war by establishing new contacts with American 
liberal groups and personalities. It should attempt to ''win a much 
71 larger basis of support". Frank cultivated new liberal circles like 
the New York State Citizens Council for a Durable Peace. Its members 
68
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were educational and civic personalities. It intended to organize 
citizens' groups in every corrununity within the state for the sake of 
carrying out 11 the irrunense 'grass roots' job of planning and building 
public opinion for the peace". Its second annual conference in July 
1944 in which Frank participated was sponsored by various state govern-
ment departments and by such private organizations as the Carnegie 
d f 1 d h F . p 1' A . . 72 En owment or Internationa Peace an t e ore~gn o ~cy ssoc~at~on. 
The CDG also contacted legislators like Congressman Charles M. 
73 LaFollette. 
The relations with the CIO seemed promising. Paul R. Porter 
corresponded with Frank about the resolution which he had drafted for 
the CIO convention in Chicago in November 1944. It proposed the re-
establishment of German trade unions irrunediately after the war. Porter 
also wanted Hertz and Aufhauser to attend the convention so that he 
could introduce them to a number of CIO leaders. But despite a strong 
plea by Walther Reuther, who also corresponded with Frank, the conven-
tion adopted an alternative resolution with an indefinite CIO policy 
on postwar German labor. Porter attributed this development to the 
opposition of communist CIO leaders. 74 An interesting contact was the 
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dinner meeting which Cornelia Bryce Pinchot, the wife of the Governor 
of Washington, and Mrs. Dulles organized for Frank in December 1944 
when he was on a visit in Washington. It was attended by several 
officials of the State Department, including the chief of the Division 
of Central European Affairs, and by an official of the White House 
staff. They requested that there be no outsiders present, but conceded 
that "it would be all right to ask the Vice President" who had ex-
d h . h 75 presse t e w~s to come. 
Such examples were exceptional. There was more evidence for 
anti-German feelings. The Writers' War Board,which served the OWI as 
a clearing house for literary contributions to war information and 
national morale, opposed the CDG out of patriotism. The idea of German 
reconstruction resembled a soft peace. It was anathema to a propaganda 
organization that wanted to rid the country and the world of the German 
danger. The president of the WWB, Rex Stout, a writer of detective 
stories, believed that the German emigrant organizations paid "mere 
lip service to the democratic ideal". Before Hitler, all major German 
parties had been "colored by Pan-Germanism" and agreed with the master 
race theory including the Social Democrats and the communists. Germany 
must remain "on probation" at least for a generation. 76 To this argu-
ment, Dorothy Thompson reacted with biblical generosity towards the CDG 
75
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in the New York Post. She proposed that if ten Germans could be found 
77 
who favored the CDG program, "then let us take the ten Germans". 
Max Lerner refused to opt between the group of Stout and the CDG. He 
h h h h . d h h f d. ff . 7 8 t oug t t at eac s~ e saw t e trut rom a ~ erent perspect~ve. 
Stout was also president of the Society for the Prevention of 
World War III to whose advisory council belonged the historian Allan 
Nevins and William L. Shirer. In this capacity, he declared that the 
signing of the CDG declaration was "the most unforgivable performance 
of a group of American liberals in the history of our country". He was 
sure that the latter had not read the declaration and proposed that the 
Germans who wrote it "ought to be shot". He described the CDG as "a 
79 device for Germany's escape". The Western countries had been fooled 
once by German democracy and should refuse to be fooled again by another 
one. It would be only "a front for the manipulations of the militar-
ists". The Society of Stout was partly inspired by the German emigrants 
F. W. Forster and Emil Ludwig. 80 Nevertheless, American public opinion 
77 Karl 0 .· Paetel, Bericht uber die Presseausserungen zum CDG, 
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could in general only be anti-German after several years of an unneces-
sary world war. The revelations about the German extermination policy 
in the concentration camps cleaned up any remnants of American sympathy 
for postwar Germany. For too long, the German emigrants held illusions 
about American public opinion and about the strength of American liber-
alism. They should have realized earlier that their plans for recon-
struction had no legs on which to stand. 
With the decisions of Yalta and Potsdam in February and July 
1945, it became obvious that Allied cooperation would not work out in 
favor of German reconstruction. This called the basis of the CDG into 
question. If Germany were to be divided, plans for the reconstruction 
of its Western half required an anticommunist liberal attitude which 
the Council with its communist members cou~d not provide. The apparent 
uselessness of East-West cooperation for German reconstruction pulled 
the ideological rug out from under the CDG. The death of President 
Roosevelt which occurred between the two conferences added to the pes-
simism of the liberal members of the Council. After the conference of 
Yalta, the latter agonized for several months over a joint comment on 
its decisions. Under the circumstances, the bourgeois and the NB 
emigrants wanted to criticize the Allied decisions for their potential 
harm to German national interests. They tried to pin down the pro-
communist members to this reaction as a matter of consistency with the 
initial CDG declaration which had objected to the ideas of collective 
German responsibility and of a German dismemberment. The issue was 
therefore whether a Yalta article of the CDG should refer to this 
declaration. A compromise reaction could consist of a balance of 
---
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criticism and praise of the Yalta decisions. 
In the resulting tug of war, Tillich produced a compromise 
statement in the form of an article for the Bulletin. As a counter-
action, the publication of this Bulletin issue was postponed. Hermens 
conceded that the CDG could do nothing about the plans of Stalin but 
he objected to giving the impression that it would "lick his (Stalin's] 
boots". He believed that the policy towards Germany would produce 
"major friction" between the Allies which could cause a breakdown of 
East-West cooperation. In that case, "public opinion in this country 
is liable to change" in favor of Germany. The COG should stake its 
hopes on such a reversal of international relations. In the meantime, 
the CDG and the AADG could provide the American public with proper 
information. This would counteract excesses of anti-German feeling 
even if the government wanted "to inflame [these] sentiments". 81 While 
Tillich was ill, the meetings >vhich discussed a new Yalta article "took 
a peaceful course". Fran~who was away teaching the spring semester at 
an Illinois college, insisted in his correspondence on a reference to 
the initial CDG memorandum. Aufhauser and Haussmann, that is, a left 
and right,ving member of the CDG, drafted a corresponding Yalta article. 
When the latter was not mailed out either, "a serious situation" re-
sulted. The COG committee reached ::an impasse11 82 Committee members 
like Aufhauser, Schreiner, Norden, and Bonheim did not attend, but 
81F. A. Hermens to Frank, 22 March 1945, Frank Papers, box 8, 
folder H. 
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mailed suggestions for changes in the prospective Yalta article. 
Schreiner withdrew his consent to the article with the reference to the 
1944 declaration. B'onheim thought that so many things had changed that 
the CDG could not stand by its position of 1944. Norden took a view of 
the guilt of the German people "which was ·contrary to the declaration 
of the Council [of 1944 ]' 1 • It implied that the German people should 
submit to the consequences of defeat because it had failed to overthrow 
83 Hitler. 
After this, Hertz was convinced that the communist members acted 
in unison and wanted to "thrmv out the basic prit:-ciples of the Council", 
that is, German territorial integrity rather than East-West cooperation. 
He felt that a failure of the CDG was preferable to "a capitulation" to 
the communist members. Hertz had a discussion with Anna Caples-Frank, 
Taurer, Eliasberg, and Erich Schmidt. He also awaited the reaction of 
the absent Frank for the next Council meeting. An anticommunist major-
ity seemed assured to which the communist members would hopefully sub-
mit. But Tillich, Budzislawski, and Walcher took a centrist position. 
Walcher objected to a reference to the manifesto of 1944. He considered 
it "wrong!' to protest against the Yalta decisions which were an accom-
plished fact. The Council should not back away from the original 
Tillich article. 84 The eventual CDG memorandum on Yalta praised the 
Allied determination to root out National Socialism and militarism in 
Germany. The Yalta decisions offered the hope for "a decent life for 
83Hertz to Frank, 11 April 1945, Frank Papers, box 8, folder H. 
84Ibid. 
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Germans and a place in the community of nations:~. On the other hand, 
the memorandum objected to "a vivisection" of Germany that would cause 
the death of the patient. German reconstruction should not be jeopard-
ized by a new border that ignored "a historically developed economic 
organism". The loss of Eastern provinces would cause an imbalance in 
85 the relationship between industrial and agricultural German areas . 
. To the decisions of Potsdam, the CDG could not find a joint 
reaction. Actually, the conference definitely dropped the idea of a 
general German dismemberment and decided on a central German adminis-
tration. But the expulsion of the Germans from the Eastern provinces 
had begun by July 1945. The Western Allies acquiesced in the loss of 
these provinces for Germany. The CDG tried for months to work out a 
compromise statement on Potsdam. But in anticipation of a change in 
East-West relations, the NB emigrants wanted an unequivocal rejection 
of the Potsdam decisions. The Social Democratic members under Aufhauser 
still believed that cooperation with the Soviet Union was inevitable 
and were willing to accept the decisions reluctantly. In the process 
of taking a stand on Potsdam, the existence of the Council was at stake. 
By the end of September 1945, Tillich wanted to resolve the 
issue. He called for a plenary session of the CDG and for a meeting of 
its executive committee from 20 to 22 September. Certain members of 
the executive committee, that is, Aufhauser, Barwald, Frank, Haussmann, 
and Schreiner were to explain their views on Potsdam and on the future 
85
coG, Zusammenbruch Deutschlands und Hoffnun en auf einen 
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of the CDG in reports of ten to fifteen minutes. Each one of these 
members represented a specific group of the Council. On the basis of 
this discussion, Tillich wanted to draft a declaration which the CDG 
and its executive committee could deliberate, amend and pass on 22 Sep-
tember. He saw three alternative courses. The Council could continue 
to work as previously and redefine its tasks. It could dissolve and 
make a strong statement about the causes of its failure. Or, it could 
continue "on a larger scale" "tvith new tasks which Tillich did not ex-
plain. For all three possibilities, the attitude of the CDG towards 
86 Potsdam should be "the point of departure". 
Aufhauser and Budzislawski presented a centrist report which 
would have been acceptable to the communist members. It conceded that 
"the German people has now to pay the price1 i for failing to overthrow 
the National Socialist regime and to prevent "the bloodiest of all 
wars". According to the report, "the democratization of Germany must 
be viewed within the framework of the general political development as 
it has been established ... by the various conferences, ... the deci-
sions made there and the execution of these decisions". But it 
admitted that these conditions were "uncommonly severe:' and that ''nobody 
can expect the German people to welcome [ them]". In this way, Aufh.i"user 
and Budzislawski sacrificed territorial integrity to the principle of 
East-West cooperation. The latter remained "the only guarantee for the 
reconstruction of Europe and for a durable world peace". 
86 CDG, Tillich, Mitteilung an Mitglieder, 10 September 1945, 
Nachlass Hertz, reel 20. 
455 
The two CDG emigrants noted, however, that there was friction 
and tension among the Allies that could lead to a division of Europe. 
It would be "objectionable and mistaken" for the two emerging power 
blocs to precariously reconcile themselves at the expense of Germany. 
International harmony should be better motivated than by an Allied 
punishment of Germany. In its internationalist spirit, the report 
welcomed the formation of "antifascist Four Party Coalitions" in all 
parts of Germany because "this wide United Front has proven' to be a 
historical necessity in the most difficult hour of Germany". These 
coalitions resembled the composition of the CDG which should cooperate 
with them in the reconstruction of Germany. After reaffirming the 
precedence of the internationalist principle, Aufhauser and Budzislaw-
ski moderately criticized the post-Potsdam situation. They realized 
"~.;;i.th concern" that a population which had increased by ten million 
refugees was supposed to live on a land reduced by the loss of prime 
agricultural areas and on a limited industrial economy. These disad-
vantages might jeopardize the economic viability of Germany. Also, 
the economic and administrative unity of Germany promised by the Pots-
d d 1 . h d . 1. d 87 am ec arat~on a not yet mater~a ~ze . 
The centrist report did not accomplish its purpose of saving 
the Council at the meetings of 20 to 22 September. After months of 
discussion, there was no majority for a rejection of Potsdam. This 
surprised even Frank. He had thought that fourteen of the twenty-five 
87 f . kl" .. Entwur e~ner Er arung des CDG von Aufhauser und Budzislaw-
ski, Nachlass Hertz, reel 20. 
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members of the Council had "our point of view". 88 This meant, however, 
that a loss of two votes would change the majority into a minority 
r..rhich is exactly what happened. According to Frank, "the moral 
pressure of the communist minority was decisive in this uncertain 
situation11 • 89 Several Social Democratic CDG members were afraid of 
embarrassing 11certain groups in Germany", that is, the Four Party 
Coalitions, especially that of Berlin which the CDG could no longer 
expect to contact if it lost its communist members. With t~e acquies-
cence of the CDG in the post-Potsdam situation, the bourgeois and the 
NB members left the Council, some of the former already in August, 
Frank in October. 
The latter was very bitter in his denunciation of the Potsdam 
decisions and of the CDG majority. He believed that the treatment of 
Germany by the Allies intensified the catastrophe that the National 
Socialists had brought upon Germany. It amounted to an enslavement of 
Germany and a pauperization of its inhabitants. Frank rejected the 
argument of Bonheim, Norden, and Schreiner that the CDG manifesto of 
1944 was outdated because a German revolution had not materialized. 
They had known in 1944 that the chances for such a revolution would 
decrease as the war went on. Finally, "the revolutionary potential 
suffocated in the wild terror of the National Socialist departure" 
without the slightest encouragement by the Allies. The latter did not 
want a German revolution so that "then already, the treatment of 
88 Frank To Niebuhr, 11 September 1945, Frank Papers, box 9, 
folder N. 
89 Frank to Hermens, 19 September 1945, Frank Papers, box 8, 
folder H. 
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Germany as a collectively guilty national unit was imminent'!. 90 Regard-
ing his attitude towards communists, he thought that "on the continent, 
at home, where they are definitely an important minority, it might be 
necessary to cooperate with them in practical questions". But he could 
no longer see the need "to be bound abroad by their controllers and 
91 
retarders", that is, by Moscow. Regarding the Allied behaviour, 
also, Frank centered on the sins of the communists, that is, the 
Russians. In his opinion, even a four party coalition like the CDG 
should have been able and willing to score "the barbaric Russian 
revenge policy of the first weeks and the general strategy of mutila-
tion for which the Russians are more responsible than any one of the 
victorious powers". A CDG protest would have been a sign of courage 
in a situation where even the Western Allies felt impotent. 92 
Frank was already disinterested in the Council before it re-
fused to reject the Potsdam decisions, a development which he had not 
expected. He admitted that Potsdam was "more a secondary problem". 
He had hoped for a new mandate for the CDG from the nascent democratic 
93 
movement in Germany. It did not materialize, partly because of Al-
lied policy and partly because of the ineptitude of the Council. 
90 1 kl" 1 d [ d J d Pau Hagen, Er arung an Mitg ie er es CDG un Freunde, 
18 October 1945, Mappe 194. 
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Because of Allied obstruction, there was "no general representation" of 
a movement "which could take the German antifascists abroad into its 
obligations". Frank rejected the Four Party Coalitions as a substi-
tute. They were, in his view, limited to Berlin and to the Russian 
zone of occupation. Frank would have welcomed an appeal to the CDG by 
German democratic groups to condemn the policy of Potsdam. In that 
case, the CDG could have become a foreign lobby for German liberal 
groups. But the Council remained "an exiled group" which deserved no 
further encouragement. During the war, the mere existence of the CDG 
as a free tribune for German democratic opinion was significant. But 
its potential was not fully realized. It was limited by ;'the nature of 
the people who joined the Council". 94 There was "too much ... personal 
ambition among most of its representatives and too little devotion to 
the common cause". Frank thought that the CDG could have overcome the 
neglect of the American government: "If it would have been a creative 
group, the spark emanating from it would have ignited, nevertheless". 
Its failure of receiving a postwar mandate was na verdict". It was of 
no more use and might change into "a kind of German Mazzini Society11 or 
just "a mailing address in New York". Frank believed that "the period 
of real chances is over". Certain Council members like the Social 
Democrats still hoped "to play some reconstruction role above and be-
yond their individual capacities''. But "they are waiting for a call 
95 
which will not come". 
94 .. Paul Hagen, Erklarung an Mitglieder und Freunde des CDG, 18 
October 1945, EK Mappe 194. 
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The Social Democratic members of the Council were bitter about 
the behaviour of Frank, with some justification. They emphasized their 
past good will to make the CDG work. In the interest of unity, they 
had "tolerated a series of incidents", that is, of "separate actions 
and independent publications by Paul Hagen". They had also resented 
his "subjective orientation of the Association for a Democratic Ger-
many" but had not insisted on an open discussion of the latter. In 
( 
the matter of Potsdam, they forsook party political interests and sub-
mitted a compromise statement that should have been acceptable to a 
well intentioned Left and Right. They felt betrayed by Frank for whom 
the Council was "an instrument for [his] special interests". He split 
the CDG when it failed to serve his purposes. For this, he used the 
issue of Potsdam as an opportunity. He prematurely publicized his 
personal viewpoint on the Allied decisions without regard to the 
Council. Then, he wanted to "impose on the Council his propagandis-
tically overstated view in its entirety". When he failed, he quit. 96 
Without the NB members and the AADG, the Council survived for 
another four months but it did not really function. Tillich agreed on 
Potsdam with the departed members. But he accepted the compromise 
statement by Aufhauser and remained chairman of the CDG in the hope of 
rebuilding it. The last meeting of the executive committee took place 
in October 1945. It decided that the Council should continue but 
should abstain from an outward activity until it could replace its 
96Aufhauser, Glaser, Julius Lips to Tillich, 27 January 1946, 
Sammlung Glaser, vol. II, pp. 237, 238. 
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losses with new members from the same groups, especially the Catholics 
d h b . . 97 an t e ourgeo~s em~grants. But Tillich could not win over any 
members of 11 the Right and of the Catholic wing". In particular, he 
failed in persuading Pastor Forell to rejoin. Then, he arranged for 
a conversation between Niebuhr, Budzislawski, and Lips, in the hope of 
healing the breach with the AADG. When that failed, he proposed to a 
meeting of the executive committee without a quorum the transformation 
of the Council into a relief organization "as the only basis on which 
a German political group in America could be formed". 98 The emigrant 
observer,Otto Piper, agreed with Tillich. For him, it had been pre-
dictable that the CDG would not work since "it was never the task of 
the German emigration to form a government in exile". 99 But nobody 
favored the welfare idea. The Social Democratic members criticized 
Tillich severely for his passivity at a time when "the most important 
decisions in the world and especially in Germany" were at issue. 
Tillich claimed that "any activity of the rump Council would have pre-
vented the rebuilding of a full Council". But the Social Democratic 
members rejected the argument that he could not represent a Council 
that consisted only of the two labor parties. Then they left the 
Council and made him responsible for its final collapse. Tillich had 
not been comfortable with the Social Democratic and communist members 
97Ibid. 
98Tillich to Aufhauser, Glaser, Lips, 6 February 1946, Samrnlung 
Glaser, vol. II, pp. 239, 240. 
99 Hermens to Frank, 15 October 1945, Frank Papers, box 8, 
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in the CDG. He could accept them as a group submerged in a larger move-
ment. This had been the point of his constitutional ideas about the 
Council and his earlier quarrels in the latter field with the Social 
Democratic members. He considered the dissolution of the CDG as "an 
d f 1 f d d ff 1 b . II 100 a vantage or a potentia re oun ation on a i erent, arger as~s . 
But the Council faded away at the time of its best opportunities. 
Frank had been impatient with the CDG because of his personal 
political ambitions. By September 1945, he was determined to return 
to Germany as a liberal. He applied for a passport in London and, as 
a formality, also in Washington "where I have no chance of being sue-
cessful". He found "after a long period of thinking about it", that 
101 
"I must make an attempt". As an American mandate, the CDG had be-
come worthless. For this reason, Frank hoped. that the Council would 
fail faster than it actually did. The latter had looked, at first, 
like "a model of a possible democratic reconstruction". But in Septem-
ber 1945, Frank needed a liberal sponsor group. He told Niebuhr that 
"it is exactly with the vision of a returned German liberal ... that I 
envisage again with more interest than ever a continuation of a group 
like the American Association. We will need a bridge to this country" 
from Germany. Frank proposed to reactivize the AADG "independently of 
what the Council will do". 102 He wanted to free the Association from 
100Ibid. 
101Frank to Hermens, 19 September 1945, Frank Papers, box 8, 
folder H. 
102Frank to Niebuhr, 11 September 1945, Frank Papers, box 9, 
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the handicap of the CDG by a complete dissociation. For this reason, 
he wanted to hasten the demise of the Council. He proposed to Tillich 
a transformation of the latter into a non-political ethnic organization 
that could engage in German postwar relief. He specified that "those 
who want to be more politically active should be invited to enter the 
A . . 11 103 ssoc~at~on . Tillich declined because he was too closely identi-
fied with the idea of the Council to join the organization of one of 
its member groups. After September 1945, Frank intended to limit his 
activity to the AADG. In October, he quit the Council. 
Frank made ambitious plans for the American Association. During 
the spring and sunnner of 1945, the AADG had "nearly come to a stand-
still". It was isolated by the reaction to the revelations about the 
Nazi atrocities. It had "absolutely no money" and was "kept on ice" 
f f . . 104 or uture act~v~ty. In September, Frank saw already "some more 
wind in the sails" of the Association. He expected public opinion to 
be "more articulate than it was during Potsdam". From England would 
come "voices of reason" like a critical editorial on Potsdam in the 
London Economist. Frank also asked Niebuhr to continue as chairman of 
the AADG for another year. He devised a new strategy and a new budget 
for it. The latter would amount to $500 to $600 a month. Frank could 
account for pledges of half of this monthly sum. For a new propaganda 
effort, he proposed to intensify the research section of the Association 
and to issue some new publications so that there would be "one sincere 
103 Hertz to Tillich, 18 October 1945, Nachlass Hertz, reel 20. 
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reporting organization in New York". The main new· publication was the 
monthly Facts about Occupied Germany. According to Frank, the more 
important members of the AADG thought that "for a while it [the AADG] 
will not yet be an important political group because the time has not 
yet come for real mass support". This meant that Frank expected the 
American Association to become "a policy making pressure group" 
105 
eventually. 
But the affairs of the American Association did not improve 
that fast. By the spring of 1946, its activities were still "ridicu-
lously limited" and "we muddle along with a budget of only about a 
thousand dollars monthly". But there was no question of giving up. 
Frank insisted that "we can't do that and particularly [not] now". 106 
The American Association needed about two or .three thousand dollars 
monthly. It negotiated a fundraising agreement with the firm of Harold 
L. Oram which worked "only for liberal causes" and with which the AADG 
had previous relations. The arrangement provided for "a minimum ad-
ditional income of about $20,000". Before the final agreement, Oram 
conducted a preliminary campaign because the Association, "after man-
aging to remain solvent during the last eight months, is at the end -of 
107 its rope". But the Association hoped that the $20,000 "together 
105 
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with our small other income, will permit a better start for the greater 
task ahead". 108 F k 1 1 d t · 1 d l'k v· ran a so appea e o unLon ea ers L e Lctor 
Reuther. He became "a little impatient" with the latter and other 
officials of the United Auto Workers and of the CIO, still hoping that 
"one day_our numerous expectations upon your help will come true". He 
reminded Reuther that the American Association and its predecessor had 
been working for ten years and that "you were never able to give us 
more than moral support and sometimes ... little of that". At the 
return of a UAW official from Germany, Frank expected Reuther to help 
arrange a fund raising affair that would net "a couple of thousand 
109 dollars". 
Despite this optimism, the American Association had hard post-
war times. Frank failed to get permission from the War Department and 
from the American Military Government for a return to Germany,which 
practically ended his political career. Despite this setback, the 
AADG developed enough German contacts to claim something of a new 
German mandate. There were the NB members and friends in Berlin whom 
the American Association and Frank encouraged successfully to oppose 
a merger between the SPD and the KPD in Berlin. It also established 
"quite a network of contacts outside of Berlin". There were the for-
mer London emigrants Schottle and Knoringen who later presided over 
the SPD organizations in Wurtemberg-Baden and in Bavaria. The AADG 
108Frank to Alfred W. Bingham, 9 April 1946, Frank Papers, 
box 8, folder B. 
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ject befQre you leave the country''. In case of a negative answer, the 
AADG would dissolve. 111 Frank agreed that the latter could "not for 
a second time spend years of unnecessary frictions, this time >vith a 
1 , II 112 rea party execut~ve . 
When Schumacher left without answering the telegram of Niebuhr, 
the American Association was in a dilemma which Niebuhr and Frank saw 
in different perspectives. The latter did not consider the nonresponse 
of the SPD executive as final. He hoped to retain Niebuhr by with-
drawing himself from the AADG. He thought that his continued promin-
ence in the Association was the main obstacle to relations with the 
SPD. His withdrawal could overcome "the present prestige touchiness 
among the not really independent new German democratic leaders". They 
would do business with Niebuhr, Bingham, and Goldbloom, that is, with 
a purely American Association. In the postwar situation, Frank was 
dispensable and would retire together with Hertz. 113 He had already 
been devoting much of his time to his psychological counseling practice 
and to psychological and political studies. The latter would give him 
"a better understanding of some of the reasons for the lack of success 
of such good causes as ours". More personally, he felt that he had 
been "weighed and found too light". 114 
111Niebuhr to Kurt Schumacher,28 October 1947, Frank Papers, 
box 9, folder N. 
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The above changes were designed to overcome "Schumacher's 
passive resistance". In another message to the SPD chairman, the 
Association should mention its shift to purely American representation 
and its hope "for better cooperation with the Social Democratic party 
executive". 115 In the meantime, the secretary of the AADG, Goldbloom 
intended to visit Schumacher in Hannover after his attendance of a 
conference of European socialists in Amsterdam in November 1947. He 
expected to get "some kind of an encouragement ... if not a better 
116 
'mandate'". Frank did nothing to jeopardize good relations with 
the new SPD. He even discouraged old NB friends in East Berlin from 
reviving a conspirational NB Group against Russian political intoler-
ance. He refused to sponsor any such group from abroad. Another 
positive measure was the inclusion of the American Jewish laborite 
Charles Zimmermann, who was favorably regarded by Lovestone, in the 
national board of the AADG. Niebuhr also had the idea of including 
some members of the GLD in the Association. Frank originally thought 
that after the departure of several GLD members, there was "no worthy 
personality of the former 'other side' in New York". But a week later, 
he changed his mind because he did not want to withdraw completely 
from the AADG. He resigned the vice chair:nanship but wanted to remain 
on the national committee of the Association. As a counterbalance, he 
agreed that the Association should accept "some of the old Social 
115Frank to Niebuhr, 7 November 1947, Frank Papers, box 9, 
folder N. 
116 Frank to Niebuhr, 13 November 1947, Frank Papers, box 9, 
folder N. 
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Democrats" into its national committee and its board. He hoped that 
this would "make for a new start". Furthermore, "if Schumacher can be 
calmed down and if you [Niebuhr] decide to go on", then "something 
strong must be done" to arrive at a friendly cooperation with the in-
ternational office of the AFL under Lovestone. Perhaps, Dubinsky, as 
117 
one of the vice presidents of the AFL could help in this endeavor. 
When neither the SPD nor the AFL responded, the American Asso-
ciation went on working anyway. Niebuhr upheld his decision to resign. 
But in order to facilitate this s.tep, he conceded that the AADG should 
continue without his leadership. Frank made a last effort to retain 
him. He tried to win James Loeb of the UDA for getting together a 
small delegation of Washington liberals which would ask Niebuhr to 
reconsider his decision. This group should also contact the State 
Department and "get some definitive promise of cooperation". Frank 
thought that the American change of attitude towards Germany presented 
a good opportunity for such an initiative. The new American foreign 
policy which heralded the Narshall Plan offered "a much greater chance 
for a group like the AADG in [the] future". Frank believed that "just 
some kind of an AADG should be founded and not liquidated 11 • 118 now, 
Yet, for exactly this reason, he soon reversed his attitude towards 
Niebuhr. The latter might interfere with the further potential of the 
Association which should not go down with him. Frank became aware of 
"the frustration and relative futility of his [Niebuhr 1 s] great sacri-
117 Ibid. 
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fice of more than ten years chairmanship". He felt that it \vas unfair 
to try to retain him any longer. He also wondered whether the com-
promise of Niebuhr was "enough of a basis" on which to continue the 
Association. Then, he told Loeb that he did "not think that a revival 
of the Association is tied with Reini's continuing services". 
Since a pro-German attitude began to be "more fashionable" for Ameri-
can liberals, it should not be too difficult to replace Niebuhr .. 
Frank objected only to Norman Thomas, whom the latter had recommended 
as a successor. A Thomas chairmanship would "limit the efficiency of 
the group very much". Frank asked Loeb to think of alternatives to 
119 Thomas. Eventually, Alfred Bingham, who had in the meantime served 
with the American Military Government in Germany, became the new chair-
man of the American Association. The-executive committee of the 
120 latter was also reorganized to include Loeb, Thomas, and Shuster. 
In its postwar policy, the AADG had to fight an uphill battle 
also, most of the time. In 1945, the situation seemed hopeless. 
Frank confessed that "the outcome of this war has ... disappointed me" 
despite his attitude of realism and skepticism throughout the war. 
This compelled him to revise his view of "the proportion of good and 
evil" in human nature. In personal terms, he was afraid that "there 
is relatively little to be done in which we still can be of help during 
119Frank to Loeb, [n.m.] 1948, Frank Papers, box 8, folder L. 
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. 121 
our lifetime". This assessment was inspired by his ambition for a 
postwar .career in Germany which soon foundered on the obstruction of 
the War Department and the American Hilitary Government in Germany 
which was in contact with the postwar SPD. 
The AADG had to center on the more practical goal of pro-
German propaganda. Emigrants like Hermens and Piper had thought all 
along that the CDG and the American Association should have limited 
themselves to the latter task. The two organizations should have 
tried "to liberate American public opinion from the impact of wartime 
122 
stereotypes". 
1 • 11 123 menta ~ty . 
The issue was that of "countering the Morgenthau 
For this job, Frank was eminently qualified as "the 
most effective single writer among the emigres from Germany". Hermens 
thought that "our most fruitful work should just begin". 124 He had 
even considered "the advisability of setting up a new group for 
exactly this purpose" if the Association shirked its duty. He held 
the mistaken view that American public opinion was volatile and would 
reverse itself "certainly within a year" 125 
121F k 19 4 ran to Hermens, September 19 5, Frank Papers, box 8, 
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The American Association agreed that "the country is very badly 
misinformed about the real situation". But after it was reactivized 
it experienced "a certain futility in our present efforts ... it is 
126 like trying to drain the ocean with a teaspoon". It published the 
Facts about Occupied Germany, and cul~ivated direct contacts with 
union representatives and government officials. In 1946, Frank urged 
the United Auto Workers to go ahead with the plan of sending a delega-
tion to Germany. This should be done by a combination of UAW locals 
if the national office could not do it officially. Frank also asked 
V. Reuther to take the initiative in establishing an American labor 
committee with the purpose of supporting the democratic labor movement 
in Germany. A number of union and American Military government offi-
cials who returned from Germany reported to the AADG like William 
Kemsley, George Fischer, the son of Louis Fischer, the Jewish labor 
leader Charles Zimmermann, George Silver, and Alfred Bingham. Most of 
them were friends of the American Association. Sometimes they parti-
cipated in meetings with prospective supporters of the AADG. A special 
action committee prepared a meeting with Senators and Congressmen in 
Washington. Also, Victor Reuther kept Frank informed about his in-
volvement in the shaping of a more liberal labor policy towards Germany 
and in the selection of labor attaches for the Military Government. 
He asked Frank for his views on these policies. One of the labor 
126Frank to Bingham, 9 April 1946, Frank Papers, box 8, 
folder B. 
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attaches was Frank's friend, Paul Porter. Before his departure, the 
latter had also conferred with Katz and Brauer of the GLD in Washing-
127 ton. This made the GLD officials think that "this contact ~vas 
extended only to us, not to other groups in the political emigration" 
like "communists, fellow travelers and United Frontists". 128 
In its publications and its correspondence with the government, 
the American Association severely criticized the American postwar 
policy of economic stagnation and limitation of political activity in 
Germany. It wanted the American government to give up its use of 
Germany as a pawn of international power politics and to assume the 
leading role in the struggle for world democracy. The new framework 
of AADG ideology was East-West confrontation rather than cooperation. 
The American Association hoped to win new support from American·liber-
als who had become anticommunist rather than remain anti-German. The 
AADG believed that Germany was then "at the principal frontier and 
point of contact between the communist world and the free world". 129 
Germany became "the battleground where the struggle for a democratic 
world has reached its most acute stage". The American Association told 
President Truman that it considered the West "in imminent danger of 
defeat" on the German battleground. It urged on the President the 
adoption of "a minimum program of economic revival" in Germany. That 
127Thomas D. Schocken to Frank, 28 September 1945, Frank Papers, 
box 9, folder S. 
128Katz to Plettl, 30 March 1945, Nachlass Martin Plettl. 
129AADG, Statement of policy and program for a democratic 
Germany, May 1950, Sammlung Eliasberg. 
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included the importation_ of raw materials on credit and nthe essential 
• 1" • f • • d • II 130 soc1a 1zat1on o maJor 1n ustr1es . It welcomed the economic merger 
of the American and the English zones in an economically more feasible 
bi-zone. 
This 11 positive policyn required also the establishment of a 
unified and democratic Germany and its integration into Western Europe 
and the Western World. 131 But this was an unrealistic goal of liberal 
propaganda. The main concern of the American Association was that the 
American government counter the Russian plan for the conference of 
foreign ministers in London in December 1947. The latter proposed the 
withdrawal of all Allied troops from Germany, national elections and the 
establishment of a central government. The AADG felt that the Russian 
government wanted to use the rejection of its plan as a pretext for 
including Eastern Germany into the Soviet system. Free elections were 
impossible while the SPD was illegal in the Russian zone. The Russian 
proposals concealed ';behind fair words a plan for the ext ens ion of 
totalitarianism to all of Germany''. Yet, their propaganda appeal would 
create the impression that the Western powers were responsible for the 
division of Germany. 
In this way, the American Association put pressure on the Amer-
ican government. It offered Secretary of State Marshall its own plan 
for bringing about a result opposite the Russian intentions. This plan 
130AADG to President Truman, 12 June 1947, Sammlung Eliasberg. 
131
statement of policy of the AADG, April 1947, and Statement 
of policy and program for a democratic Germany, May 1950, Sammlung 
Eliasberg. 
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proposed to end Russian influence in Eastern Germany by a transitional 
arrangement. The latter would abolish the four zones and replace the 
military governments with "one civilian international control body 
for all of Germany". The latter would be under the direction of the 
United Nations. This international control council would call free 
elections and distantly supervise a new German democratic government. 
With such a plan, the United States could demonstrate to the German 
people that "its aim is the protection and extension of freedom 
132 throughout the world". Later, the American Association was afraid 
that the American government might be settled with responsibility for 
the division of Ge~~any because of its insistence on extensive state 
rights in a federal system. A central German government should be the 
. . 133 
mainstay of any Amer~can program. If that were not possible, the 
Western powers should set up a Western Germany which should include 
Berlin. The AADG also demanded "the revision of Germany's tentative 
Eastern boundaries in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter". But its anticommunism did not interfere with its champion-
ship of German progressivism. The Association opposed the revival of 
a German army even for the sake of a better Western defense against 
communism. It considered a new military establishment as a threat to 
the German democratic forces. 134 It also deplored American obstruc-
132AADG to Secretary of State George C. Marshall, 24 November 
1947, Sammlung Eliasberg. 
133 AADG to Dean Acheson, [n.d.], Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, 
Vol. Fb 224, OWl, Deutschlandpropaganda, p. 12. 
134 Statement of policy of the AADG, April 1947, Sammlung 
Eliasberg. 
tion of economic codetermination for the German unions, a goal that 
was finally achieved in West Germany in 1974. 135 
With the European Recovery Plan, the American government 
adopted the outlook of the AADG. The latter credited itself with 
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having contributed to this development. Its program finally received 
the mass support for which the liberals of the American Association 
had hoped. Their organization should then have been in business and 
actually planned to expand. In the spring of 1950, it believed that 
its work of influencing public opinion and the policies of the State 
Department had to continue. It even felt that "the urgency of the job 
to be done calls for expansion". It planned to go beyond research and 
publicity and organize "branch activity throughout the country". With 
its headquarters in New York, .a representative in Washington was 
"desirable". The AADG also planned to establish a representation in 
Germany that ~vould maintain close contacts with German democratic 
leaders and influence American officials in Germany. The American 
Association had never been so dynamic and confident since the end of 
the war. It felt even that "the effectiveness of American promotion 
of German democracy depends to a large degree on the support which 
will be given to the American Association for a Democratic Germany. 
The stakes are high. We cannot afford to fail". 136 
135
voice of America, February 1949, Sarnmlung Eliasberg. 
136s £ 1· d f d · tatement o po ~cy an program or a emocrat~c Germany, 
May 1950, Sammlung Eliasberg. 
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Yet, half a year later, in January 1951, the AADG suspended its 
activity. The official explanation contradicted the feeling of indis-
pensibility of 1950. It stated that the issues of 1951 'tvere "not 
those for which this Association was organized to deal". 137 Actually, 
after the war years of victimization by German emigrant anticommunists, 
it fell victim to the new native anticommunism of the McCarthy era to 
which the ideology of the American Association had contributed. 
The plan of the NB sponsor organization for reorganization and 
reconstruction did not work out. The Council for a Democratic Germany 
did not play its expected role. In the face of the Allied policy 
towards Germany, the American Association revised its attitude to 
postwar international relations. It became anticommunist and advised 
the American government to follow this switch from East-West coopera-
tion to confrontation. But '"hat became the government was fatal to the 
American Association. 
137 AADG to members, 22 January 1951, Sammlung Eliasberg. 
CHAPTER XI 
CONCLUSION 
The German socialist emigration in the United States ended up 
as divided as it had begun, with accordingly minimal political results. 
The Popular Front as a communist concept could not unite this emigra-
tion. It anticipated a second world war and aimed at the defense of 
the Soviet Union in the form of an end to American neutrality at a 
time when the German American and emigrant socialists still had the 
illusion of a domestic solution to the German problem in the form of 
an overthrow of Hitler. Before the belated split of the Socialist 
Party of America, there was at first some Social Democratic cooperation 
in the Popular F-ront which was abetted by the comprehensive nature of 
the secondary German American labor organizations. But after 1936, 
the conservative socialists had their own political group in the Social 
Democratic Federation and their own publication in the Neue Volks-
zeitung. Then they engaged in an endless tug of propaganda war for the 
secondary labor organizations which they could not even win after 
September 1939 when they came into their aggressive own with the diplo-
matic end of the Popular Front. 
The official Social Democratic group of the German Labor Dele-
gation hoped to accomplish great things without any socialist coopera-
tion. For this purpose, it tried to monopolize the socialist and 
unionist American sponsorship to the exclusion of the New Beginning 
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emigrants and their friends. It clung to the illusion of a majority 
opposition in Germany based on liberal, democratic masses which would 
only need some encouragement from abroad in the form of radio propa-
ganda. In this spirit, the GLD continued the Social Democratic tradi-
tion of coalescing with bourgeois groups even though the emigration of 
the latter was insignificant in the United States. In this country, 
some GLD members hoped for a majority labor party with a progressive 
common denominator in which their German American Congress for Demo-
cracy could play a role. In order to follow its conservative political 
line and protect the personal ambitions of its members, the GLD main-
tained a complete independence from the Sopade from which it derived 
its initial authority. During the rescue crisis of 1940 and 1941, it 
was anxious to keep the remaining Sopade executives, as well as the 
majority of the Social Democratic refugees in Southern France, out of 
the United States. It also created problems for the rescue work of 
the American Friends of German Freedom, the American NB sponsor organi-
zation. These divisive politics were a major reason for which the 
American labor sponsorship lost interest in the German socialist emi-
gration. 
The NB emigrants did not believe in a general revolutionary 
spirit in Germany and had no confidence in bourgeois groups. They 
considered underground organization as essential and proposed a social-
ist concentration, that is, a reunification of all Social Democratic 
groups, which could, cu occasion, cooperate with the communists in a 
pragmatic way. For the rejection by the GLD, they tried to compensate 
with the formation of international socialist emigrant coalitions. But 
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without more German emigrant cooperation, they were not successful in 
the pursuit of their goals. 
For the planning of German reconstruction, the emigrant and 
German American socialists did not cooperate either even though the 
Office of War Information tried to promote their unity in the United 
Americans of German Descent. The GLD dropped out of that group because 
it did not want to deal with the second German American Popular Front. 
Its own reorganization failed to establish the emigrant support neces-
sary to impress the American labor sponsorship or government. Accord-
ingly, the GLD plans for reconstruction were unrealistic. In the hour 
of Allied victory, they advised the American government to conduct a 
cold war against Russia to forestall German territorial losses. 
While the GLD refused to accep_t the probability of an Allied 
occupation of Germany, the NB sponsor organization planned for a total 
German defeat. It considered East-West co-existence as necessary for 
a lasting peace. Under this assumption, it initiated the Council for 
a Democratic Germany, a comprehensive German emigrant coalition with 
executive aspirations. The GLD refused to join, but two of its former 
chairmen and several other Social Democratic emigrants did so with the 
result of a serious division of the Social Democratic emigration. From 
the postwar power balance in Europe, the Council hoped to reap a com-
promise solution for Germany and Central Europe in the form of a Social 
Democratic system. But its lack of full emigrant representation and 
its refusal to resolve internal ideological differences at the expense 
of its maximal national program led to its dissolution when the Allied 
decisions of Potsdam revealed Western acquiescence in Russian terri-
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torial acquisitions. Under these conditions, the American Association 
for a Democratic Germany as the main sponsor organization of the Council 
switched to an anti-Russian policy that urged containment of the Soviet 
Union on the American government. In this purpose, it was more speci-
fic and realistic and also more persistent than the GLD which still 
rejected a rapprochement with the NB organization. 
It would have been difficult for the German socialist emigra-
tion in any case to win much consideration by the American government. 
But instead of doing everything possible to further such a purpose, it 
did everything possible to obstruct it. The fact that the American 
government procrastinated in permitting the return of socialist emi-
grants to Germany was partially due to their impractical politics. 
Frank was not allowed to return at all. The significance of the German 
socialist emigration in the United States for postwar German socialism 
is difficult to assess. The GLD anticipated the anti-communism of the 
postwar German Social Democratic Party under the leadership of Kurt 
Schumacher, who was succeeded by the less stern but unimaginative 
Ollenhauer, the former Sopade executive. At the end of the Cold War, 
Willy Brandt brought the more realistic, broadminded and conciliatory 
tradition of the former dissenting Social Democratic emigration to the 
leadership of the Social Democratic Party. 
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